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Summary
This investigation focuses on the Athenian navy, by which I mean the state-owned fleet o f  
triremes. The study covers the years between 480 and 322 BC; while Athens did possess a fleet 
in earlier years, it was in this period that it became an institution of the highest importance.
The work is divided into three parts. Firstly, a systematic review of the operations of the 
Athenian navy, along with case study o f naval activity around Naupactos, which brings up 
general debates regarding the nature o f Athenian imperialism, the scale and nature of naval 
activity, and the experiences o f the crew. Also in this first part, the diversity amongst the crew in 
terms o f both social and professional status will receive attention.
The second section seeks to explore the extent and nature o f the link between the navy and the 
democracy. I shall look at the evidence for the participation of naval people in democratic 
politics at Athens, and the extent to which the policies and decisions o f the Assembly can be 
viewed as favouring the trireme crews. One particularly important example o f the trireme crews 
playing an active political role concerns the events on the island of Samos in 411 BC, when the 
men o f the fleet constituted themselves as a democracy, independent o f the oligarchy that had 
recently taken over in Athens.
The third part o f the study concerns the ideology o f the navy. The first task will be to investigate 
whether the crewman can be fairly described as staunch democrats, and then to tackle the wider 
ideology and characteristics o f the navy. It is preferable to speak o f intersecting ideologies 
within the navy, an institution manned by slaves, foreigners, citizens and mercenaries, 
accompanied by armed men and all led by wealthy liturgist captains.
INTRODUCTION
The Athenian navy is a subject that recommends its own importance as an area for investigation. 
It was one o f the most significant institutions in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries BC, 
this itself one o f the most important and best documented periods o f ancient history. The navy 
represents a fascinating microcosm o f the men of Athens as a whole, with wealthy members of 
the political elite living, sailing and fighting side-by-side with slaves, poor citizens, hoplites and 
metics. Scholarship on the nearly two-century period between the Persian wars and the overthrow 
of democracy by the Macedonians is an extraordinarily crowded field; but the Athenian navy, 
though by no means a neglected topic, has been the subject of fewer dedicated treatments than 
one might have expected. In the preface to his 1965 work Athens and the Sea, Amit was right to 
draw a distinction between the study of subjects such as sea-power and Athenian imperialism on 
the one hand, on which the scholarship is vast, and investigations into what Amit describes as 
“the elements which constituted the basis o f Athenian sea-power” on the other, which have not 
been subjected to the same focus.1
This is not to say that investigations into topics such as the Athenian Empire, Greek warfare, and 
Athenian democracy have not yielded important insights into the workings o f the fleet; indeed it 
would be very difficult to imagine how one could write about such subjects without discussing 
the navy to some extent. But at the risk o f grossly oversimplifying what is a large amount of 
detailed and insightful scholarship, I would agree with van Wees’ 1995 assessment that the 
navy’s relationship to politics and wider Athenian society was often mentioned but rarely 
explored, and Gabrielsen’s more recently still that “such fundamental topics, however, as the 
political, economic and social implications o f naval warfare remain largely unexplored”.2 Work 
focusing on the democracy tends to accept the idea o f a strong connection between the presence 
of thetes in the navy and the radical democracy o f fifth-century Athens; a theory with 
considerable backing from the ancient sources, but which has been recently and convincingly 
challenged by Ceccarelli and van Wees.3 Many discussions on Greek warfare also tend to view 
the navy primarily in the context o f battles at sea, to the extent that the trireme has been thought 
of as a single purpose vessel, or even as a weapon; the versatility o f the ship and the wide range 
of roles performed by the fleet are therefore often underestimated, despite the plentiful contrary 
evidence.
It would not be fair to suggest that the navy itself has not been the focus o f some significant 
scholarly attention. Amit’s Athens and the Sea took perhaps the broadest approach, 
encompassing “the war fleet and merchant navy o f Athens, the sailors, soldiers and traders who
1 Amit, Athens and the Sea, preface.
2 Van Wees, ‘Politics and the battlefield: Ideology in Greek warfare’, p. 155; Gabrielsen, ‘Naval warfare’, p. 72, 
published in 2001. Both scholars have provided valuable exceptions to their own generalizations.
3 Ceccarelli, ‘Sans thalassocratie, pas de democratic?’; van Wees, ‘Politics and the battlefield’, ‘Myth o f the middle 
class army’ and Greek Warfare.
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fought and travelled on board Athenian ships, the Port of Piraeus, its inhabitants, workers, 
merchants and others connected with its activities.”4 This is a lot o f ground to cover in a 
relatively short work, and I mean no disparagement when I suggest that his treatment o f the “war 
fleet”, which is to be my primary focus, can be built upon and expanded. More recent works 
dedicated to the navy have had a far tighter remit; I mention here only a few of the most 
important treatments. Jordan’s The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period: A study o f Athenian 
naval administration and military organization in the fifth and fourth century B.C. is strongest in 
dealing with the specific areas identified in the subtitle; the various boards and officials 
connected with the administration o f the navy ashore. There are many interesting arguments and 
insights throughout the work, but its overall value is undermined by several forcefully argued 
interpretations that are far from convincing. To name two, the evidence for multiple Athenian 
sacred ships, in addition to the Paralos and Salaminia, is less solid than Jordan suggests, and 
dismissed (perhaps a little unfairly) as “pure fantasy” by Wallinga.5 More tenuous still is his 
definition o f the term hyperesia. In typically strident fashion he attacks the “doctrine” that the 
term refers to a team of specialist crewmen, and advocates instead that they were largely state- 
owned slave rowers.6 In fact the so-called “doctrine” fits the evidence far better, and if nothing 
else Jordan’s argument prompted a far more convincing article on the matter by Morrison.7 
While there is still debate as to exactly which men should be considered as members of the 
hyperesia,8 the essential meaning o f the term is beyond doubt.
Morrison’s contribution to scholarship on the navy was certainly not limited to this article. His 
Greek Oared Ships, co-authored with Williams, remains a standard for students on the Athenian 
navy, although once again it is a broader work, covering navies and periods beyond classical 
Athens. As the title suggests, technological developments in the vessels themselves are a primary 
focus of this work, and this has been an important strand o f modem scholarship generally; 
Casson’s Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World deserves particular mention in this context; 
a wide ranging and comprehensively referenced work, particularly on the so-called “polyremes”,9 
the increasingly large and ostentatious vessels that superseded the trireme as the ‘standard’ naval 
vessels. Ship-building technology no longer receives as much attention, mainly because the 
central issue o f ancient oared galleys, the so-called ‘trireme question’, has been solved by work 
carried out under the auspices o f Morrison, Coates and Rankov. Perhaps the most obvious, and 
certainly the most striking, contribution to scholarship on the Athenian navy in recent times has
4 Amit, Athens and the Sea, preface
5 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 19, n. 18. I discuss the evidence for these ships in Part One, section C.2
6 Bartossa ( ‘The social status and ethnic origin o f  the rowers o f Spartan triremes’) pays some credence to Jordan’s 
argument, admitting that in doing so he is he is in something o f  a minority.
7 Morrison, ‘Hyperesia’. Bartossa (‘The social status and ethnic origin o f the rowers o f  Spartan triremes’) pays some 
credence to Jordan’s argument, admitting in doing so that he is he is in a tiny minority o f  scholars who do so.
8 My usage o f  the term includes only the 6 named specialists; the kubernetes (pilot or helmsman), keleustes (literally 
the ‘orderer’, best translated as boatswain or rowing-master), auletes (flute-player), naupegos (the word means 
shipwright, but in the context o f trireme crews refers to a ship’s carpenter), prorates (look-out), and the 
pentekontarchos (the title literally means the ‘commander o f  fifty’, but the role o f  this man was to deal with crew-lists 
and financial records; the translation o f  purser is less literal but more accurate). In particular, I would not include any 
o f the fighting men as hyperesia, nor those men amongst the crew who operated the sails.
9 Casson, Ships and Seamanship, p. 96
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been the project to reconstruct and sail a trireme. The resulting vessel, named Olympias and now 
part o f the Greek navy, not only proved the essential viability o f a seemingly unlikely set o f  
attested design parameters (a fast and manoeuvrable ship with oar benches on three levels, the 
oars for which were essentially all the same length), but has provided a wealth o f comparative 
information about the day-to-day experience o f the men who crewed triremes. The second 
edition o f The Athenian Trireme gives an overview of the vessel’s history, collates the evidence 
for its structural features and gives a great deal o f technical detail about the process of building 
the reconstruction; but for me the most stimulating and inspiring chapters concern the five sea- 
trials o f Olympias in the late eighties and early nineties, which deal not only with the results of  
the experiment, but are also illuminating with regard to practicalities and experiences o f crewing 
these fascinating vessels. It is the perspective o f the rowers themselves that is one of the central 
and admirable features o f Strauss’ recent work on the navy, which has focussed on their 
experiences, their hardships and their deaths.10 His ‘School of democracy’ has been a particular 
influence on this study; and while I have some disagreements with the conclusions he has drawn, 
I have also tried to concentrate on the ways in which crewing the Athenian navy affected the 
rowers and sailors in wider social, political and ideological contexts: in short, how Athens’ naval 
men saw and thought o f themselves and how others in their community perceived them.
This concentration on the crew as a whole will pay less attention to the trierarchs, the wealthy 
Athenians who commanded and part financed the triremes as a public service to their city. This 
is partly in order to focus on the vast majority o f poorer men who were involved in the navy, but 
also because the institution o f the trierarchy has been well treated by Gabrielsen in his Financing 
the Athenian Fleet. This is a valuable work in many ways, not least as it makes extensive use of 
the vast and complex set o f inscriptions relating to the navy from the middle o f the fourth 
century. Amongst the extensive inventories o f ship’s gear contained in these lists is some more 
general information regarding the operation o f the navy; the launching and activities o f some 
fleets are attested only in these documents.
The other principal ancient sources for this study can be briefly summarized. Aside from 
Herodotus’ account of the Persian Wars, the vast majority o f detailed literary information about 
the navy comes from Thucydides’ History. He was a man of the Athenian elite at the time of the 
fifth-century Empire, who served as a naval commander during the Peloponnesian war, and who 
wrote with perception and intelligence about his own times, people he knew and events he 
witnessed personally; it would be difficult indeed to imagine a better placed source. While the 
reverential regard for the straight-forward accuracy o f his narrative has abated somewhat in 
favour o f more nuanced appreciation o f him as a literary artist o f considerable subtlety and 
power, it is fair to say that Thucydides deserves his reputation as a reliable primary source of the 
first rank. The same cannot be said o f his contemporary successor, Xenophon, nor o f the only
10 Strauss, ‘School o f Democracy’; ‘Perspectives on Death’; Salamis; ‘The Dead o f Arginusae’.
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alternative narrative history for period after 410 BC, Diodorus. Although we do have the ability 
to compare and contrast two alternative traditions, at least as far as the terminal events recorded 
in Xenophon’s Hellenica are concerned, neither of these sources inspires a great deal o f 
confidence. Of the remaining literary sources, most important for the fifth century are the 11 
surviving works o f the comic playwright Aristophanes. In the fourth century, the speeches o f the 
orators occasionally refer to naval activities; the most important o f these is Apollodorus’ speech 
Against Polycles, which gives a great deal o f information regarding his (extended) time as 
trierarch from 362 BC. In my presentation o f passages from these sources, I have generally 
based my translations on those most commonly available; most notably, though not exclusively, 
those published in the Loeb library. The main exception is with Aristophanes, where I have 
preferred to use the more recent Sommerstein editions throughout. I have adapted these when 
necessary in order to get a more accurate presentation o f the Greek; most o f these changes have 
been made in relation to semi-technical naval terms. For example, the Loeb translation of 
Against Polycles consistently renders hyperesia as “rowers”, which I have changed to 
“specialists”.
This investigation focuses on the Athenian navy, by which I mean the state-owned fleet o f oared 
galleys, predominant amongst them the triremes. It is a substantial topic by itself, but as Amit’s 
wide-ranging approach made clear, it is one that is closely related to many other areas o f activity 
connected to the sea. The study covers the years between 480 BC and 322 BC; while Athens did 
possess a fleet prior to this, it was the policies o f Themistocles and the repelling of the Persian 
invasion in 480 BC that greatly expanded the fleet and made it into an institution of the highest 
importance.11 The fifth century receives more attention that the fourth, particularly in the 
detailed sections dealing with Naupactos and Samos. This is justified somewhat by the fact that 
the navy was more powerful and significant in the fifth century BC, though a good deal of 
evidence derives from fourth century sources.
The work is divided into three parts. In the first, I shall discuss the Athenian navy and the men 
who composed its crews. A systematic review o f  the operations o f the Athenian navy between 
480 and 322 BC, along with a case study o f naval activity around Naupactos, brings to the fore 
many debates and discussions regarding the nature o f Athenian imperialism, the scale and varied 
character o f naval activities, and the experiences o f the crew. The diversity amongst the crew in 
terms of both social and professional status will also be discussed. There is a tendency in modem 
works to oversimplify this by grouping all of these people together under the amorphous term 
nautikos ochlos, “naval mob”. Indeed this term appears to be more complex and problematic 
than has usually been assumed; it is apparent that “naval mob” is not synonymous with “trireme 
crews” no more than it is with “thete-class Athenian citizens”, and the term itself is used far less
11 On the early history o f the Athenian navy and the campaign o f Salamis, see in particular the works o f Wallinga; 
Ships and Sea-power and Xerxes ’ Greek Adventure.
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in the ancient sources than modem usage would suggest. These terms are sometimes used rather 
interchangeably, particularly in works concerned primarily with the democracy. Scholarship on 
the navy itself is more appreciative o f the mixed nature of the rowers and there has been a good 
deal o f debate as to the relative social composition o f trireme crews. This knowledge is rarely 
applied to the prevailing Aristotelian theory that links military service with political power.
The second section seeks to explore the extent and nature o f the link between the navy and the 
democracy. I shall look at the evidence for the participation of naval people in democratic 
politics at Athens. Practical issues such as long sojourns overseas and the concentration of 
trireme crewmen in the Piraeus would have affected the ability o f these men to dominate 
Athenian politics. I shall also examine the extent to which the policies and decisions o f the 
Assembly can be viewed as favouring the trireme crews, which we might expect if the “naval 
mob” were in control o f Athens. One particular example o f the trireme crews being actively 
political concerns the events on the island o f Samos in 411 BC, where the men of the fleet 
formed themselves into a democracy, independent o f the oligarchy that had recently taken over in 
Athens.
This discussion will lead into the third part o f the study, which concerns the ideology o f the navy. 
The first task will be to investigate whether the crewman can be fairly described as staunch 
democrats, before tackling the wider ideology and characteristics o f the navy. Identifying and 
exploring the mindset o f the predominantly low status crewmen from predominantly elite source 
material is challenging, but despite these difficulties some valuable information can be gleaned 
from careful examination o f the texts. It is preferable to speak o f intersecting ideologies within 
the navy, an institution manned by slaves, foreigners, citizens and mercenaries; by 
‘professionals’, volunteers and occasionally conscripts; accompanied by armed men, many 
equipped with the traditional gear o f the hoplite and all led by wealthy and honourably 
competitive liturgist captains. Attempting to unpick some o f this complexity is my overall aim.
PART ONF,: THF, NAVY AND THE NAVAL MOB
This part o f the study is intended to give an overview of the Athenian fleet and it crewmen 
throughout the classical period. The evidence for the operations o f the Athenian navy will be 
approached from two different angles. The first section will examine individually all of the 
various activities attested for the Athenian navy. As well as elucidating the wide variety of 
different duties undertaken by the fleet and attempting to give a balanced picture o f the relative 
importance o f each one, this section will try and relate the individual activities to the wider goal 
of building and sustaining thalassocracy. As Gabrielsen has argued, “tactically and 
strategically...the main issue was access to and control o f vital bases”,12 and many campaigns, 
particularly in the fifth century, were launched with the intention of establishing or maintaining a 
network o f such stations. Along with this naval network, the ships of the fleet became a visible 
symbol o f Athenian authority and strength, and using triremes to project an image o f power itself 
contributed to the maintenance of thalassocracy.
Many of these issues will be illustrated in the section B, which will give a detailed case study of 
fleet activity around Naupactos. This was one o f the most important Athenian naval bases, and 
the one for which we have a comparatively detailed record of Athenian activity over the course of 
nearly half a century. The case study will highlight not only the operation of Athens’ naval 
network of bases and patrols, but also the range o f missions assigned to individual fleets, and the 
versatility the Athenians required o f their naval commanders and ships. Taken together, the 
review of operations and the case study will give a better understanding of the purposes and 
objectives that lay behind the launching of fleets, and an enhanced appreciation of the 
experiences o f the men who crewed them.
The final section will turn to the men who manned the fleet, dealing first with the difficult and 
evocative term, the “naval mob”, which is much used but largely undiscussed in modem writing. 
By contrast the next topic, the social composition o f trireme crews, has received a good deal of 
scholarly attention, though no consensus has been reached. For neither of these issues is there as 
much evidence as one would like, but some conclusions can be drawn. The evidence is also 
fragmentary for the two most well-known vessels in the Athenian navy, the Salaminia and 
Paralos', I will finish this part by discussing what conclusions can, and cannot, be reached 
regarding these famous ships and their crews.
12 Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 6
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A: Fleet Operations. 480-322 BC: an overview
This section will discuss the wide range of evidence for Athenian fleet movements between the 
successful campaign against the invading Persians in 480 BC and the Lamian campaign of 423-2 
BC, which ended with the final destruction o f Athens as a sea power. I have compiled the 
ancient evidence for these operations in a Microsoft Access Database, which has enabled 
(relatively) easy tabulating and averaging o f the relevant figures. Much of this database was 
itself compiled from a table o f information about fleets, originally conceived to give ‘at a glance’ 
information regarding the operations, movements and scale o f resources involved in the Athenian 
navy during the fifth and fourth centuries BC. This was inspired by Pritchett’s use of such things 
in his Greek State at War, where the sources and brief details on such matters as rates o f pay and 
casualty figures are compiled together in an admirably complete yet succinct manner. It soon 
became clear that the amount of information involved simply belied any attempt to view it ‘at a 
glance’, and a more sophisticated table was needed. Once I had taken the decision to ‘upgrade’ 
the printed table to a series o f related tables in a database, several advantages were gained. 
Primarily, a database allows one to quickly rearrange the same basic set o f information in a 
variety o f ways. It is relatively quick and easy to get one’s hands on (for example) any fleet that 
Alcibiades commanded, all the fleets active in the year 429 BC, all the fleets throughout a given 
period that operated in a particular area, all fleets that carried troops, or any combination of these 
variables; once the raw data is in the database, particular categories o f information can be called 
up without having to go to the trouble of personally sifting the data and compiling a new table 
every time. The database itself is an ongoing project and is not yet in a suitable state for wider 
publication; however, some tables of information which have been drawn from the database and 
which are relevant to the discussion in this section have been gathered together in Appendix 3.
The problems o f a database are equally as obvious and significant as the advantages. The 
operations o f the Athenian navy, like any other complex series o f events and activities, are 
simply not conducive to being placed into definite categories and affixed to specific dates. This 
is especially the case when the dating o f events is often unreliable, unclear, imprecise or disputed. 
It must also be admitted that the database cannot yet claim to have caught every single fleet 
movement recorded in the sources, and so is currently an incomplete record of an incomplete 
record. It need not be stated that this has serious consequences for one wishing to base 
arguments on statistics derived from the database. However the database does currently contain 
all the fleets recorded in the major narrative sources relevant to the period (Herodotus, 
Xenophon, Diodorus and in particular Thucydides), as well as those from the most relevant 
literary sources (the comedies o f Aristophanes and the speeches o f the fourth-century orators in 
particular) and several attested only in inscriptions. I can assert with confidence that the vast 
majority of fleets for which there is some sort o f historical record are present in the database, and
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with even more confidence that few, if any, significant fleets are missing.13 It is my aim to 
complete the record of fleets at a future date, as well as make several changes to the ways some 
of the data is handled. Final completion of the database will add depth to the picture o f Athenian 
naval operations, but is unlikely, at this stage, to alter the overall colour scheme. And so while 
indications, trends and conclusions drawn from this compilation are not to be fully depended 
upon, they are not so unreliable as to be unacceptable to the ancient historian, to whom 
incomplete and unreliable evidence is second nature, and to whom the luxury of definitive proof 
or absolute certainty is rare indeed.
For the 158 years covered, the database contains entries for a total o f 216 fleets. The size of 
these fleets and length o f time at sea varied greatly, but the database allows some very crude and 
approximate averages to be made. The average size o f an Athenian fleet was 32 ships, excluding 
allied vessels.14 The average number of ships the Athenians had in active commission each year 
across the period was 58,15 and the approximate average time that each fleet spent at sea was 8.3 
months.16 This coincides almost exactly with Plutarch’s description of naval activity in the time 
of Pericles; 60 ships on station for 8 months o f the year.17 Doubt has been expressed in modem 
times as to whether the Athenians could have afforded such a scale of operation in the fifth 
century;18 the suggestion from this database is that such a commitment was fully sustainable.19 
Conversly, Wallinga has described a fleet of 60 ships as a “minor operation”, which would seem 
inaccuarate given these figures.20 The evidence for their activities ranges from relatively full 
accounts (see below for a case study of the fleets operating around Naupactos), to cases where 
fleets are not mentioned at all, but the presence o f some ships is required (for example, the 
inscription o f treaties sworn with cities overseas imply that diplomats from Athens sailed there to 
conduct the negotiations).21 The database aims to record the movements of triremes, by far the
13 A slippery word, which in this context should be taken to include fleets that were large, expensive or important in 
terms o f its political or strategic achievements, or any combination o f  these factors.
14 This is based on the 132 fleets for which there is some indication o f their size. Inclusion o f allied ships raises the 
average fleet size to 37 vessels. These averages are likely to be on the high side; literary sources have been known to 
include exaggerated numbers, and huge armadas o f  hundreds o f ships are more likely to be noticed and reported than 
routine patrols o f half a dozen or less.
15 The total strength o f each fleet in each year has been entered in the database. Totalling these figures and dividing 
them by the number o f years gives the approximate average. Even though these totals include allied ships sailing with 
the Athenian navy, it is nevertheless likely to be lower than the true figure; a not insignificant number o f fleets are 
recorded by the sources without any indication o f numbers at all.
16 It must be stressed that this figure is highly approximate, as there is often no precise evidence for how long a fleet 
remained in service beyond inferences from the events they participated in. Even Thucydides’ narrative, from which 
we can assign fleets to summers and winters o f particular years, gives considerable room for error. Fleets operating 
over a summer have been given a value o f three months, unless the large range o f places visited or activities 
undertaken suggests a longer campaign. Many fleets have no indication o f length o f commission, but are stated or 
implied to be permanent stations; for the purposes o f this calculation, these 32 fleets they have been given a nominal 
value o f 12 months duration.
17 Plutarch, Pericles, 11.4. The coincidence, while worth a note, is more apparent than exact. Plutarch’s statement was 
not representing the 60 ships as Athens’ total naval activity in these years, but (probably erroneously) as a single fleet 
amongst others, albeit one that was both substantial and long-lasting. Rawlings (Greeks at War, p. 117) seems to 
accept Plutarch’s single fleet as historical.
18 See Eddy, ‘Peacetime navy’, who argues that 60 ships per year at a drachma a day per crewman would have been 
unsustainable.
19 See Part One Section A.4 for differences in ships per year between the fifth and fourth centuries BC.
20 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 169
21 For example, I have entered fleets into the database on the basis o f IG II2 34/35=RO 20 and IG II2 36, treaties sworn 
in the 380s BC with Chios and Chalkis.
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most common state-owned vessel o f the classical period, and a further level o f difficulty is added 
when the sources do not make clear exactly what type o f ships were being used. For example, it 
is clear from our sources that diplomats and heralds were often carried to and from Athens in 
triremes; but this does not mean that we can take it for granted that all overseas ambassadors 
travelled in such a vessel. Even so, my policy in such cases has been to be rather more inclusive 
than not, and to not always require an explicit mention of triremes to infer their presence. I have 
worked on the assumption of some trireme involvement when we find Athenian armies, colonists 
and ambassadors overseas, even if there is no explicit evidence of their use in the individual 
case.22 While admitting the potential inaccuracies and difficulties of such an approach, I feel that 
it is more useful to have these fleets gathered in the database, to mark the uncertain cases as such, 
and include a full citation o f the sources. Our extant evidence represents only a portion of 
Athenian naval activity anyway, and excluding too ruthlessly may create a larger distortion of the 
true picture than will including uncertain cases.
1: Warfare by Land and Sea
Sea Battles and Land Battles
While this study will look briefly at sea battles, it is this aspect of naval activity that receives the 
lion’s share o f attention in modem writing, to the detriment of the wider roles o f the navy. 
Lazenby seems close to equating naval operations with sea battles; when describing the tendency 
of oared galleys to hug the coast, he evidences it by saying that “it is difficult to think of a single 
sea battle that was fought out o f sight o f land”23 Morrison devoted three successive chapters to 
campaigns centred on set-piece sea battles; Salamis, the Gulf o f Corinth, and the Hellespont.24 
These are followed by a single more general chapter on other naval movements, that opens with 
the following line:
Performance in battle was the main function o f the trieres, but it was not the only
one. She was the means by which Athens exerted her influence throughout the
Eastern Mediterranean.25
While it is not the intention of this work to suggest that sea battles were unimportant, a more 
balanced approach is required. It is clear from the information assembled in the database that, in 
terms of naval activity, it is the trireme fleet as the means of exerting Athens’ influence that 
should receive most attention, and it was this that appears to have been the main function of the 
fleet, if not o f the individual ships.
22 The use o f triremes as troop-carriers, colony vessels and ambassadorial transports will be discussed in more detail 
below, Part One Section A.2 and A.3.
23 Lazenby, ‘Myths and Realities’, p. 446
24 Morrison, Coates and Rankov, Athenian Trireme, Chapter 3: the Salamis campaign (p. 50 ff.), Chapter 4: Sybota and 
the Gulf o f Corinth (p. 62 ff.), Chapter 5: Cynossema, Cyzicus and Arginusae (p. 80 ff.).
25 Morrison, Coates and Rankov, Athenian Trireme, p. 94.
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A total o f 83 sea battles are recorded in the database across the period.26 Only 45 out o f the total 
216 fleets participated in any sort o f fight at sea.27 This is on a similar scale to the number of  
land battles that the fleets indirectly participated in;28 87 land battles are recorded in the database, 
involving 47 different fleets. It seems significant that the Athenian navy participated in (very 
slightly) more land battles than it did sea battles. When one adds the occasions when troops 
were transported but did not fight a pitched battle, and the contribution made (also indirectly) by 
fleets to sieges o f cities and other strongholds, it is clear that the Athenian navy had a more 
significant role in facilitating land actions than it did in attacking other navies and ships. This is 
important, given that modem scholarship occasionally describes the trireme as a one-purpose 
ship, or even as a weapon.29 It would be more accurate, based on these figures, to describe the 
trireme as a troop-carrier rather than a sea-fighter. However, this would come close to falling 
into the trap of overly compartmentalising the navy, by presenting fighting sea battles and 
transporting troops as alternatives. It is misleading to imply that a fleet or individual vessel that 
performed one o f these roles could not perform the other. It is most accurate to reflect instead 
upon the many uses and manifold tasks o f the ships, and the varied roles performed by the crews. 
The trireme fleet was the means of transporting a military force as much as it was a military force 
in and of itself, and while they were sometimes historically important, sea battles were not a day- 
to-day experience for the Athenian navy.
Of course, in the fifth century between Kimon’s defeat o f the Persian fleet at Eurymedon and the 
closing stages o f the Peloponnesian war, there was not a significant naval force in the Aegean to 
challenge the Athenians’ thalassocracy. Nevertheless, several other states, including some 
outside o f the Athenian alliance, did possess numbers o f triremes, and there seems to have been 
very little effort taken on the part o f Athens to do anything about this in terms of seeking decisive 
sea battles; rather, the Athenians sought to control the bases and harbours that galley fleets 
required. Tolmides’ direct attack on the Spartan naval material at Gytheum is significant as it 
was the exception rather than the rule; ships were launched against cities and strongholds more 
than against other ships. Sea battles were not common, and large scale ones were rare indeed.
Sieges and Blockades
More common than set-piece battles by land or sea were attacks on fortresses, strongholds and 
cities. Direct attempts to assault and carry such places by storm have been labelled as ‘sieges’ in
26 This acts somewhat as a check against a recent assertion by Strauss (‘Agony o f Seamen’, p. 3) that there were 
“hundreds” o f engagements in the classical period, and that “a battle involving about 100 ships... was perhaps the most 
common scenario”. Even given the fact that here Strauss is referring to Athenian and non-Athenain battles, he seems 
to be overestimating the number o f sea-battles. While the extant material o f Athenian battles does seem to suggest the 
scale that Strauss indicates, this was probably not typical for fleet confrontations between less powerful naval states.
27 In fact, this figure is likely to be a little low; due to the way the fleets are recorded, if  fleet A combined with fleet B, 
and then the resulting fleet fights at sea, it will only register as a sea battle for fleet B. Even if these are taken into 
account, it would still not be more than 14 o f all fleets who fought at sea.
28 The arguments concerning the possible roles o f seamen in land combat will be discussed below.
29Gabrielsen, ‘Naval warfare’, p. 72, describes the ship as being “exclusively designed for warfare at sea”. Morrison, 
Athenian Trireme, p. 25, calls the trireme “a sophisticated naval weapon developed from the simple longship to 
perform a specific role in warfare at sea.”
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the database. A total o f 138 such attacks are recorded, involving 58 fleets; considerably more 
than both sea battles and land battles. The direct involvement o f the ships in such actions would 
be varied; in some cases, the fleets would have just been carrying soldiers who then made the 
attack. Amphibious attacks from ships on cities and harbours were not unknown in the ancient 
world, and there are some intriguing and vague references to “machines” being used directly 
from ships in the context o f siege attacks. In relation to an attack on Minoa by a fleet under 
Nicias in the summer o f 427 BC, Thucydides reports that:
helon oun apo tes Nisaias proton duo purgd prouchonte mechanais ek thalasses 
kai ton esploun es to metaxu tes nesou eleutherdsas
Firstly, with the aid o f engines from the ships, he [Nicias] captured two towers 
projecting into the sea on the side o f Nisaea and cleared the entrance into the 
channel between the island and the coast.30
These are usually interpreted as some sort of ship-borne siege-towers, as ballistic war machines 
were yet to have featured in Greek warfare.
It was sometimes the case that a blockade followed when a direct siege attack was unsuccessful.31 
‘Blockades’ in the database are those occasions when the fleet, usually in conjunction with a land 
force, circumvented a city usually with the intention o f forcing it into surrender. Not included 
under this heading are those occasions when an Athenian fleet sought to deny access to a 
particular stretch o f water by deploying there in numbers. Activity o f this sort has been 
designated as ‘regional garrisons/patrols’. The line is sometimes a fine one, but most o f the 
blockades listed are more straightforward in that they are directed against particular coastal cities 
or islands. Across the period, 36 fleets participated in one or more blockades. This is fewer than 
the number that fought at sea, but as noted above these fleets almost by definition remained in 
commission for extended periods o f time, and a single entry in the database under the blockade 
heading could represent many months o f naval activity. Indeed, the average commission time for 
fleets involved in blockades was 15.2 months, seven months greater than for the average 
Athenian fleet.32 In total, there were around 50 separate blockades undertaken by Athenian 
fleets. Some places, like Samos, were blockaded on two or more separate occasions.
The balance o f power in ancient siege craft usually rested with the defender. If a city was not 
taken by means o f a stratagem or (as was common) betrayed from within, it was the case that 
even relatively small fortified places could withstand direct attacks by large forces from powerful 
states like Athens. The Athenians enjoyed a reputation for their ability to take strongholds,33 and 
the expense involved in such operations was astronomical. The best known example is the
30 Thucydides, 3.51.3
31 Of the 138 places besieged, 35 were then blockaded.
32 Again it must be pointed out that the figures for any given fleet’s time in commission are somewhat vague, and so 
this comparison is only approximate.
33 Thucydides, 1.102
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blockade of Potidaea. The blockading force remained in continuous service for two and a half 
years, was reinforced until at its height it numbered 70 triremes, and cost the Athenian treasury 
2,000 talents. While Potidaea may have been relatively rare in how long it managed to hold out, 
blockades o f nine months were not uncommon. Not only did blockades demand a great deal of 
money from the city, but also a huge commitment from the crews involved; the regularity of such 
operations required, even presupposed, a large pool of full-time seamen.
Transporting Troops
Only 38 fleets are recorded as transporting specific numbers o f soldiers, but it is clear from the 
number of land operations that took place that many ships must have sailed with unspecified 
troops on board. In addition to pitched battles, many fleet movements involved ravaging enemy 
territory with land forces, and attacking towns and strongholds. There appears to be no 
consistent pattern between fleet size and size o f land force, at least for the figures we have; larger 
fleets often carried more troops, but we do have some small fleets apparently carrying a great 
number o f soldiers. Dividing the number of troops on an expedition by the number of ships 
reveals a great deal o f variation.34 In many cases, the required number of troops per ship 
stretches credulity, given the limited amount o f space on a regular trireme;35 Coates estimated 
that the Olympias reconstruction could have carried, at a pinch, 30 troops in addition to the usual 
fighting men on board.36
There are two likely solutions. Firstly, that there were other, non-trireme, ships present, and 
these were used to carry at least some of the troops. Secondly, many of the listed triremes were 
converted to troop carriers, but still listed simply as “triremes” 37 Neither o f these assumptions 
poses much difficulty, and though the second is probably preferable it is impossible on the 
existing evidence to be certain about these matters in any individual case. A third possibility, for 
which there are some examples in the texts, is that the troops rowed the triremes themselves. 
Thucydides points out one occasion when this happened, but it appears to have attracted his 
notice precisely because it was not the usual practice.38 The fleet launched under Iphikrates in 
389 BC, where eight ships carried 1,200 peltasts, should probably also be interpreted as self­
rowing soldiers, though it is not made explicit in this case.
34 The calculation for troops per ship is usually simple enough. Any cavalry listed is assumed to be carried in ships at a 
rate o f 30 horses and men per vessel (Morrison, Coates and Rankov, Athenian Trireme, p. 227-8). If there are 
unnumbered troops or ships attested, it obviously makes it impossible to obtain an accurate average, and so these have 
not been included in the discussions here, or in the calculation o f the average.
35 One fleet in the table (Fleet Number 207) seems to require 308 troops per ship, after taking the cavalry into account 
(see previous note) though in this instance it is most likely that the figures are wrong.
36 Morrison, Coates, and Rankov, Athenian Trireme, p. 226.
37 The empty ships provided in 415 BC for the Sicilian invasion were divided between 60 “fast” vessels and 40 “troop 
carriers” (Thucydides, 6.43. tacheiai and stratidtides), suggesting some sort o f structural difference; most likely 
expanded deck space or perhaps the (possibly temporary) removal o f one or two levels o f oar-benches in a manner 
similar to horse transports. Morrison, Coates, Rankov, The Athenian Trireme, p.151 ff)
38 Thucydides, 3.18
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Triremes regularly carried some armed troops as part of their crew.39 The numbers of epibatai 
(“marines”, armed as hoplites), and toxotai (archers) varied according to tactical circumstances,40 
but it appears that at least a dozen fighting men would be present aboard any given Athenian 
trireme. 10 epibatai and 4 toxotai are commonly attested figures, but these numbers should not 
be regarded as the ‘standard’. It is clear that these men would have taken part in any land 
fighting that occurred, but it is unclear whether these marines were counted along with a hoplite 
army when such a force was carried with the ships. In other words, when our sources enumerate 
the hoplite contingent of an expedition, do they include the epibatai amongst them? The most 
detailed account of an expedition’s composition would suggest that this was the case. In his run­
down of the forces embarking for Sicily in 415 BC, Thucydides mentions the total number of 
hoplites, and then points out that 800 of this number were thetes serving as epibatai41 Perhaps 
then, in expeditions for which he gives less detail, he would just give the final total, and imagine 
the epibatai already included. If an expedition is listed as enumerating 60 ships, 2,000 hoplites 
and a few horsemen,42 we can safely assume that each trireme held around a dozen armed men, a 
total o f more than 700; but it is not made clear whether these were included with the 2,000 
hoplites listed or in addition to them. Thucydides’ practice with the Sicilian fleet might suggest 
that 2,000 was the sum total. The alternative would be to imagine that they were not included, 
that the marines were considered exclusively as part o f the ship’s crew and quite separate from 
the hoplite army. In this case, there would have been around a dozen extra armed men per ship on 
the expedition, and thus a considerable strengthening of the land forces available.
What is certain is that epibatai (and probably archers too) were present on ships even when a 
hoplite army was not, but were rarely mentioned explicitly. A money-collecting expedition 
suffered a defeat in a land battle in Lycia in 430 BC.43 In 426 BC, the land force that 
Demosthenes lost in Aetolia contained 300 epibatai', no hoplites were mentioned as 
accompanying the fleet when it was sent out, and Thucydides is explicit that these men were 
from the ships 44 It is a similar case for many o f the expeditions launched throughout the 
Pentekontaetia\ most o f the fleets at this time are listed without details o f an accompanying 
hoplite force, and many fought on land. Exactly who was doing the land fighting on these 
occasions is unclear. There are two likely alternatives; that hoplite armies accompanied the fleets 
but were not detailed by our sources (which are incredibly thin and sketchy for the 
Pentekontaetia), or that these land operations were undertaken by the epibatai and toxotai alone. 
Once again, there is often no way of choosing between these hypotheses in any given case.
39 The listing o f  both epibatai and toxotai on IG I3 1036, amongst the rowers, trierarchs and hyperesia, strongly 
suggests that these fighters were attached to particular vessels and considered as part o f the crew.
40 For example when large fleets found themselves in narrow waters (such as the Athenians did in the harbour of 
Syracuse in 413 BC) and there was little room for manoeuvre, generals would put extra fighting men on board and rely 
on head-on ramming, missile fire and boarding actions.
41 Thucydides, 6.60.
42 Thucydides, 4.53, quoted below.
43 Thucydides, 2.68
44 Thucydides, 3.95
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Ship’s Crew Fighting on Land?
There is also a third possibility; that the crews o f the triremes also formed part of the land forces. 
I have suggested above that it was exceptional for soldiers to row; was it any less so for rowers to 
fight on land, perhaps as light-armed soldiers? It is important to note that there are some 
examples o f trireme crews being used in land operations; the question is one o f whether this was 
a regular and usual part of a sailor’s experience. Van Wees has argued that “it appears that 
considerable numbers of rowers were indeed regularly employed as light troops, even if most of 
the time our sources ignore them”.45 He cites two examples in which light troops took part in 
battles, despite not having been previously listed, both from Thucydides’ narrative. The first 
involves a campaign in the Chalcidice in 429 BC:46
Athenaioi dischiliois hoplitais heauton kai hippeusi diakosiois epestrateusan epi 
Chalkideas tous epi Thraikes...kai hoi men hoplitai ton Chalkideon kai epikouroi 
tines met'auton nikontai hupo ton Athenaion kai anachdronsin es ten Spartolon, 
hoi de hippes ton Chalkideon kai psiloi nikosi tous ton Athenaion hippeas kai 
psilous
The Athenians, with a citizen army o f 2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry, campaigned 
against the Chalcidians in Thrace...The Chalcidian hoplites and the auxiliaries 
who were with them were defeated by the Athenians and retreated to Spartalos; 
but the Chalcidian cavalry and light troops defeated the cavalry and light troops on 
the Athenian side.47
The second instance comes in four years later, in the summer of 425 BC:
Athenaioi de en toi autoi therei hexekonta nausi kai dischiliois hoplitais hippeusi 
te oligois kai ton xummachon Milesious kai allous tinas agagontes estrateusan epi 
Kuthera...mia de phroura, heper kai emunato peri Koturtan kai Aphroditian, ton 
men ochlon ton psilon eskedasmenon ephobesen epidromei
In the same summer, the Athenians made an expedition against Cythera with a 
force o f 60 ships, 2,000 hoplites, a small number o f cavalry, and some allied 
contingents from Miletus and other places...There was one garrison which did 
make a stand in the neighbourhood of Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, and when it 
charged it caused panic amongst the scattered crowd of light troops48
From these examples, van Wees suggests that “presumably these light-armed suddenly springing 
into action are the rowers of the warships, taking on a new role, as Thucydides expressly tells us 
they did in the Athenian attack on Sphakteria in 425 BC.”49 It is possible to see the light-armed 
in the first example as rowers, but it is hardly conclusive. The light armed contingent here could 
have been formed solely from the toxotai on board the ships. Though there is no indication in the
45 Van Wees, ‘Politics and the Battlefield’, p. 163.
46 It is worth noting that there is no evidence, other than inference from the fact that the campaign took place on the 
Chalcidice, that the Athenian navy was involved in this campaign at all; no ships are specifically mentioned. It is 
surely correct to infer that this was a naval expedition, and it demonstrates well its (often unstated) key role in 
facilitating land operations.
47 Thucydides, 2.79.1 -3
48 Thucydides, 4.53.1, 4.56.1
49 Van Wees, ‘Politics and the Battlefield’, p. 163.
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text as to the size o f the force, the ease with which the Athenian light armed were defeated and 
driven away is more suggestive o f a small unit rather than one comprising many hundreds of 
sailors. The second example is also far from certain. It does imply a large number of light-armed, 
but again it is far from inevitable that these were rowers fighting in battles on land. It seems 
equally as credible to suggest that there were light armed amongst the allied troops. The specific 
example o f Sphakteria to which van Wees refers damages rather than supports his conclusion. In 
this instance, Thucydides is explicit that rowers were used as light-armed:
hama de heoi gignomenei kai ho alios stratos apebainen, eh men neon 
hebdomekonta kai oligoi pleonon pantes plen thalamion, hos hekastoi 
eskeuasmenoi
At dawn the rest of the army landed. This consisted of the crews o f rather more 
than 70 ships, except for the thalamioi [lowest of the three banks of rowers], each 
having been equipped.50
This example demonstrates that it was possible for rowers to be deployed on land. But the key 
point here seems to be that the rowers were not routinely equipped for performing such roles, and 
on this occasion had to scrape together weapons in order to become Tight-armed’. A further 
example from earlier in this same year, involving Demosthenes’ desperate defence o f his hastily- 
built fort at Pylos:
tas triereis hai periesan autoi apo ton kataleiphtheison anaspasas hupo to 
teichisma prosestaurose, kai tous nautas ex auton hoplisen aspisi [te] phaulais kai 
oisuinais tais pollais: ou gar en hopla en choridi eremoi porisasthai, alia kai tauta 
eh leistrikes Messenion triakontorou kai keletos elabon, hoi etuchon 
paragenomenoi. hoplitai te ton Messenion touton hos tessarakonta egenonto, hois 
echreto meta ton alldn.
He drew up under the fortification and enclosed in a stockade the triremes 
remaining to him of those which had been left him,51 arming the sailors taken out 
of them with poor shields made most o f them o f osier, it being impossible to 
procure arms in such a desert place, and even these having been obtained from a 
thirty-oared Messenian privateer and a boat belonging to some Messenians who 
happened to have come to them.52
Thucydides could not have been clearer; the desperate situation required that the crews be used to 
defend the fort, but it was only through serendipity that they were, even in a minor way, equipped 
to perform such a role. In the face of such explicit testimony from our strongest source, it is 
impossible to sustain an argument that sailors were routinely armed as light troops. A fourth- 
century example of Athenian rowers as light-armed confirms this picture:
50 Thucydides, 4.32.2
51 Demosthenes at this time had three ships; he had been left five to “garrison” Pylos, but had sent two for help. I 
discuss this ‘trip-wire’ fleet further below, Part One section A.3
52 Thucydides, 4.9.1
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Thrasullos de ta te psephisthenta ploia labon kai pentakischilious ton nauton peltastas 
poiesamenos, hos hama kai peltastais esomenois,exepleusen archomenou tou therous eis 
Samon
At the beginning of the summer Thrasyllus sailed from Athens to Samos with the 
ships that had been voted to him. He had equipped 5,000 of his sailors as peltasts 
so they could be used as peltasts also.53
It seems to have been the same for the Peloponnesian navy:
apo ton pleromaton de ton ek ton neon ekeruxe boethein hosoi eleutheroi eien: 
host'eboethoun kai touton polloi, ho ti edunato hekastos hoplon echon
He [Gorgopas] also proclaimed that all free men from his ships should join up 
with him, so that many of those came too, each with whatever weapon he could 
lay his hands on.54
What seems clear from the specific examples is that while it was possible for crewmen of 
Athenian triremes to participate in fighting on land, it was in no way a usual or routine part of 
their duties. On those occasions when they did take on such a role, it required some effort on the 
part of their commanders to see that they had the necessary equipment.55 Thucydides suggests a 
division between land fighters and sailors when he talks about the self-rowing soldiers depicted 
in Homer, implying that the conditions of his own time were different;56 whether or not he is 
right about the practice in Homer’s time,57 this passage certainly attests to Thucydides’ belief that 
rowing and land-fighting were normally separate roles in his day, and there is no good reason to 
doubt this. His evidence suggests that both self-rowing soldiers and sailors fighting ashore were 
exceptional in the classical period.
Even van Wees argues that any fighting done by crewmen was limited to “light-armed raiding at 
best”;58 I would differ with him merely to argue that even this minimal contribution to land 
warfare was the exception rather than the rule, and the examples o f it are noted in the sources for 
their rarity as much their intrinsic interest. Even on those occasions when some arms were 
scraped together, the contribution to land warfare was not usually a significant one. An ad hoc 
round up o f hastily constructed and scavenged weapons thrust into the hands o f rowers would not 
produce a crack cadre of peltasts able to play a significant part at the forefront of land battles. On 
most occasions when crewmen were “armed”, the majority probably had little more than stones 
to throw and Pritchett is doubtless correct to argue that “stone-throwers were never a major
53 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.1
54 Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.11
55 It is worth noting at this stage that the reverse was not true; light troops, or indeed hoplites, would not have faced 
such problems if ordered to man the oar benches, as oars in the Athenian navy were provided with the vessel itself.
56 Thucydides, 1.10
57 Morrison and Williams (Greek Oared Ships, p. 115) argue that some o f  Homer’s fighters were not crewmen, 
allowing them to envision smaller vessels with fewer oars than implied by Thucydides.
58 van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 213. But cf. pp. 62-4 and 222-3, where he seems to put a greater emphasis on the role 
o f sailors fighting on land.
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element in Greek warfare”.59 Overall, the clear demarcation that Thucydides implies existed in 
his period between rowers on the one hand and land-fighters on the other seems to be justified.
Ravaging the Enemy’s Territory
The conclusion that sailors did not usually fight on land need not imply that the crewmen 
remained onboard their vessels for the entire duration of a campaign. While they may not have 
been routinely armed, nor participate in land battles and sieges, it is likely that they did not miss 
out on the pillaging o f enemy territory. The reference in Aristophanes’ play Frogs to sailors who 
“go ashore and nick someone’s clothes”60 seems to be a light-hearted indication of such predatory 
activity. Such activity is referred to in Wasps, although it is not certain in this case that it was a 
sailor doing the pillaging; the old men o f the chorus represent themselves as men who used to 
fight on both land and sea:61
Choros: memnesai deth', hot'epi stratias klepsaspote tous obeliskous hieis sauton 
kata tou teichous tacheos, hote Naxos heald.
Chorus-Leader: Do you remember, then, on campaign once, when you 
[Philocleon] stole those skewers and quickly threw yourself down from, 
the wall, at the time [c. 470 BC] when Naxos was captured.62
There is a reference to similar activities with explicit naval involvement in Aristophanes’ Peace, 
concerning the depredations made by the Athenian navy to the Laconian coast between 431 and 
424 BC:
Hermes: kaita takeinon ge kerde tois georgois en kaka: hai gar enthend' au 
triereis antitimdroumenai ouden aition an andron tas fcradas katesthion.
Hermes: And then the profit they made proved harmful to the [generalized 
Laconian] peasants; for the triremes kept coming from here to retaliate in 
their turn and devouring the fig-sprays belonging to totally innocent 
men.63
The database records 70 instances o f such activity, involving 37 different fleets. Ravaging and 
pillaging o f enemy territory also overlaps with several other categories o f activity. Destruction of 
the hinterland of a city was often an adjunct, and occasionally an alternative, to a more direct 
attack. Plundering and carrying off booty can also be considered as a very crude form of ‘money 
collection’, and it is certainly the case that some commanders funded their fleet through such 
piratical means. Perhaps the most notable, and certainly the largest-scale, examples o f fleets 
attacking an enemy’s territory occurred in the early years o f the Peloponnesian war. In 431 BC,
59 Pritchett, Greek State at War, vol. 5, p. 1.
60 11. 1075.
611 discuss this matter and connected issues in Part Three, section 3.
62 Aristophanes, Wasps, 1. 354-6 cf. a similar occurrence, in relation to the taking of Byzantium in 478 (Thucydides, 
1.131), at Wasps 1. 236-7 cf. Sommerstein’s note on p. 171. The location o f these low-level instances o f ravaging in 
the context o f blockades is again an indication o f the overlap between these categories.
63 Aristophanes, Peace, 11. 625-8
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100 Athenian triremes (and 50 from the allies) under the command o f three generals sailed 
around the Peloponnese, attacking a series o f cities and ravaging territory.64 In the next year, 
another fleet o f 150 ships made a similar voyage 65 These raids were no doubt lucrative for the 
Athenians and damaging, if only in the short term, for the Peloponnesians, but it is probable that 
one of the main motivations for sending out so large a raiding force was in order to give the 
Athenian populace the chance to strike back at the Peloponnesians, in retaliation for the damage 
inflicted (both to territory and to pride) by the yearly incursions o f the Spartan army into Attica.
Athenian Sea Power
In the winter o f 428/7 BC, Thucydides recorded another fleet, o f 100 ships, that sailed along the 
Peloponnesian coast. While it is certain that some looting and pillaging went on when this fleet 
landed, its purpose, according to Thucydides, was very different. The fleet was launched shortly 
after the revolt o f Mytilene on Lesbos, partisans in which had encouraged the Spartans to attack 
Athens by land and sea while she was weak.
aisthomenoi de autous hoi Athenaioi dia katagnosin astheneias sphdn 
paraskeuazomenous, delosai boulomenoi hoti ouk orthos egndkasin all' hoioi te 
eisi me kinountes to epi Lesbdi nautikon kai to apo Peloponnesou epion rhaidids 
amunesthai, eplerosan naus hekaton esbantes autoi te plen hippeon kai 
pentakosiomedimnon kai hoi metoikoi, kai para ton Isthmon anagagontes 
epideixin te epoiounto kai apobaseis tes Peloponnesou hei dokoie autois.
Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations o f the enemy were due to 
his conviction o f their weakness, and wishing to show him that he was mistaken, 
and that they were able, without moving the Lesbian fleet, to repel with ease that 
with which they were menaced from Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by 
embarking themselves, except the hippeis and Pentekosiomedimnoi, and the 
metics; and putting out to the Isthmus, displayed their power, and made descents 
upon Peloponnese wherever they pleased.66
This episode gives a good insight into the Athenian thalassocracy o f the fifth century. Having 
listened to the appeals for aid from the Mytilenians, the Spartans had formed the impression that 
Athens was stretched to breaking point; with a large scale revolt overseas, a fleet heading for 
Naupactos round the Peloponnese and the plague in the city. Athens was indeed stretched to the 
limit; this recruitment o f citizens and metics is usually and rightly interpreted as an example of 
the unusual practice of conscripting men to the oar benches.67 Through this call-up, Athens was 
able to muster an impressive display o f strength. The Spartans responded with despair to the 
appearance o f this fleet, putting off their attempted (and ultimately ill-fated) intervention in 
Lesbos until the Athenians had returned home. It is notable that Athens’ thalassocracy was 
maintained at this time without fighting a battle, nor did the Athenians seek a decisive
64 Thucydides, 2.17; 2.23; 2.25, 2.30-1
65 Thucydides, 2.56; 2.58.
66 Thucydides, 3.16.1
67 See for example, Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 107.
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engagement with the Peloponnesian fleet, which was being hauled over the isthmus.68 Rather, 
they demonstrated their sea power by projecting it upon the enemy’s land, “wherever they 
pleased”; it is this aspect o f thalassocracy, the power of the hegemonic power to more effectively 
deploy and supplement land forces, which deserves a greater emphasis than the relatively 
infrequent sea-fights. This seems to have been obvious to a fifth-century political treatise-writer 
who turned a rather hostile eye onto the subject: the so-called Old Oligarch, most probably 
writing around the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war in 431 BC, managed to 
compose a discussion of Athenian sea power, admittedly on occasions an illogical one, without 
referring once to fighting at sea.69 It is conceived in terms of strategy rather than tactics; sea 
power meant being able to ravage the enemy’s territory with impunity,70 to project power over a 
wider area,71 to benefit from and control overseas trade,72 and to concentrate armies against their 
opponents individually, while preventing them from forming a united front.73 There is praise for 
the technical skill o f Athenian crewmen,74 but neither for their role in defending the city nor for 
their prowess in a specifically combat context.75
However command of the sea (thalassocracy) for Athens was never as full and absolute a thing as 
the Old Oligarch would have us believe; other states could and did ‘defy’ Athenian sea power in 
many ways. In the 440s BC, the Samians were able to briefly wrest control of the sea around their 
island from Athens; although this rebellion was crushed and few other powers could match the 
naval strength o f the Samians, it nevertheless shows that Athens’ control was, in the face of 
hostility, only as strong as the naval force in that area.76 The collapsing of the Athenian empire 
towards the end o f the Peloponnesian war demonstrated this very clearly. There are other 
examples, on a smaller scale, which show the limitations of thalassocracy. In c. 458 BC, the 
Peloponnesians were able to make a landing of troops on Aegina, despite the fact that Athens had 
defeated the Aeginetan fleet and were laying siege to the island. In 427 BC, Mytilene was able to 
import food from the Black Sea in defiance o f an Athenian controls over shipping at the 
Hellespont,77 and Phormio’s fleet at Naupactos in 429 BC failed to prevent, or even spot, a 
Peloponnesian army crossing the Corinthian gulf.78 Despite Athens being a dominant naval 
power, she could not and did not prevent other states from conducting naval operations, even 
within her sphere o f control. These limitations are not so much an indication that Athens was a 
weaker power than has been supposed; nor do they suggest that the generals and trierarchs in 
these cases were incompetent; more that the nature o f the ships and logistical systems available to
68 Thucydides, 3.15
69 [Xenophon], Constitution o f  Athens, 119-2.16
70 [Xenophon], Constitution o f  Athens, 2.4
71 [Xenophon], Constitution o f  Athens, 2.5
72 [Xenophon], Constitution o f  Athens, 2.3 cf. 2.11
73 [Xenophon], Constitution o f  Athens, 2.1-2.
74 [Xenophon], Constitution o f  Athens, 1.19-2.1
75 Starr (Influence o f  Sea Power, p. 5) defines the requirements o f thalassocracy as “naval control o f sea lanes for the 
transport o f useful supplies and also o f armies...Sea power must be able to facilitate and protect a state’s commerce 
and deny that o f  opposing states”
76 Thucydides, 1.115-7
77 LACTOR 1, 121=ML 65=SEG 40.7,11. 35; cf. Thucydides, 3.2.2
78 Thucydides, 1.108; 2.80; this fleet, and others around Naupactos, will be discussed in full below.
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the Athenians allowed control o f the sea to be no firmer. The limitations o f the trireme to operate 
away from markets and harbours in particular made total control of the sea a logistical 
impossibility. Some of the means by which the Athenians sought to overcome these difficulties 
and maintain their thalassocracy will be discussed in the following sections. The Old Oligarch 
made some valuable observations regarding the control of the seas, but the limitations of ancient 
thalassocracy must also be borne in mind.
2: Conquest and Colonization
In the late fourth century, the Athenians despatched a colony to the Adriatic Sea. It is the latest 
colonial mission sent out by Athens in the classical period,79 but it is a colony for which we have 
some our most detailed information. The decree giving details of the colonial mission appears 
amongst the comprehensive lists o f ships and naval equipment held by the Curators of the 
Dockyards.80 It appears to list the specific vessels presumably selected for the mission in some 
detail, before going on to some general points about the expedition. There seems to have been a 
variety o f vessels chosen; triremes, triacontors and quadriremes, of which we have the ship 
details for only the triacontors; a small and somewhat archaic type o f vessel, powered by thirty 
oars. The main text o f the decree describes the desire o f the demos to set up a colony somewhere 
in the Adriatic region, and further on in the text the purposes o f the mission are set down:
hopos d ’ an huparchei [to]i demoi eis ton hapanta [chjronon emporia oikeia kai 
\sit]opompia, kai naustathmo [oik]eiou kataskeuasthen [to]s huparcheiphulake epi 
\Tur\renous kai Miltia[des] ho oikistes kai hoi epoi[koi ech\osin chresthai oikei[oi 
nau]tikoi, kai ton Hel[lenon] kai Barbaron hoi \pleonte]s ten thlattan [kai autoi 
e]ispleosiv ei[s to naustathmjon to Athenaion, [ploia te exon]tes kai ta al[la em 
bebaioi, eido]tes oti
In order that the people may for all future time have their own commerce and 
transport in grain, and that the establishment o f their own naval station may result 
in a guard against the Tyrrhenians, and Miltiades the founder and the settlers may 
be able to use their own fleet, and those Greeks and barbarians who sail the sea 
and themselves sailing into the Athenians’ naval station will have their ships and 
all else secure, knowing that...81
The implication is clear; the ships mentioned in the decree were to form this naval station and 
from there perform these various functions, as well as carry (or possibly escort, in unmentioned 
ships) the settlers to their new home. Obviously there would be some movement of ships 
between the new naval station and Athens (to return trierarchs home after their term of service, to 
relay orders and information and so on), but the idea seems to have been to establish a permanent 
naval presence in the Adriatic region, in order to ensure Athenian interests in the area were 
protected.
79 There is doubt as to whether the colony lasted very long, or was even sent, because there are no other references to 
the colony and a specific site has not been identified.
80 IG II2 1629=Harding 121=RO 100
81 IG II2 1629,11.217-32
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The link between the navy and colonization could not be clearer in this inscription, one o f the 
most detailed examples o f classical colonial activity. The inscription also shows how a naval 
station could be “active” (in that a permanent or long-term fleet was stationed there, and used it 
as a principal base o f operations), or “passive” (the naval station acted as a safe harbour for any 
friendly ships in the region, but without necessarily having a fleet of its own to pursue 
operations); the colony in the Adriatic was envisioned as fulfilling both roles. The question is 
how far this link was foreshadowed in our less detailed examples; were other colonies set up 
specifically as naval stations or at least involve the use o f the navy’s ships? It must be 
acknowledged from the outset that there is little direct evidence for the navy’s role in relation to 
colonies; in the account o f Diodorus regarding the foundation of Thurii in 444/3 BC, ten triremes 
are mentioned, but this colony is somewhat exceptional in both its distance from Athens and its 
joint foundation, and this evidence can not be taken as wholly reliable nor necessarily 
representative.82 While colonial ventures overseas would obviously have involved the use of 
ships, it is unclear whether triremes of the Athenian navy would have been routinely involved. 
Even in those instances when there is some substantial evidence regarding the establishment o f a 
particular colony, such details are not to be found. This is the case for the Brea decree, which 
gives some arrangements and regulations concerning the despatch of a colony to (probably) the 
Thraceward region, but does not tell us how the colonists were to get there in the first place.83
Exploring the relationship between Athenian fleets and Athenian colonies is therefore 
problematic. Such an investigation is largely dependent on determining what purposes colonies 
served, and thus whether or not the Athenian fleet would have been used to fulfil that purpose. 
Colonies must also be examined with an eye on other Athenian naval activity; if it can be argued 
that the establishment of colonies was at least in part to form naval bases, how were these 
different from other ‘permanent’ stations of ships, such as the Guardians of the Hellespont?
Athenian settlements and the tribute lists
In many respects our evidence for colonies is extremely slim. Studies in the Athenian tribute lists 
and other epigraphic texts have allowed us to infer the setting up of Athenian colonies in allies’ 
territories even when we have no hint o f them in the literary record. These inscriptions, 
preserved in various states o f completion from the mid-fifth century until the Peloponnesian war, 
are among the most fundamental, and most difficult, sources for the study of Athens and her 
empire, and augment a period for which the literary sources, as we have seen, are far from 
authoritative. None are entirely intact, but patient cross-referencing has enabled many credible 
restorations to be made.84 Essentially, the inscriptions list the portion of the tribute that the
82 Diodorus, 12.10.4
83 IG I3 46=Fomara, 100=ML 49
84 The fundamental work done on this was completed by McGregor, Wade-Gery and Merrit and published in four 
volumes as The Athenian Tribute Lists.
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Athenians set aside for Athena; one sixtieth o f the total that they received. Athens set the level of 
tribute required from each of her ‘allies’, reviewing the figures in each Panathenaic year.85 The 
first assessment for tribute was made following the assumption o f control by Athens o f the 
Hellenic league; a loose coalition o f states formed to defend Greece from, and subsequently 
strike back at, Persia. This initial assessment was made by the reputedly fair and just Aristides, 
and few passages of Thucydides have been discussed quite to the extent as the one in which he 
reported that the total tribute was set at 460 talents.86 The inscriptional record of tribute 
payments begins later, when the Athenians required payments to be sent to Athens and not to 
Delos. Incomplete though they are, and though their record begins some 20 years after Aristides’ 
initial assessment, the tribute list inscriptions suggest a substantially lower amount o f money was 
coming in as tribute from the allies. The patterns throughout this series o f inscriptions in who 
was paying and how much have led to many interesting interpretations and discussions of 
Athenian histoiy. In the context of the present discussion, the lists show a marked reduction in 
the level o f tribute paid by states where an Athenian settlement was introduced.87 The logic of 
this is that, with much of a state’s land resources taken into Athenian hands, the rest would have 
be unable to afford the level of tribute that they had previously paid. It follows therefore that in 
other places where the level o f tribute drops unexpectedly in our record we can hypothesize an 
Athenian presence being introduced to the area. For example, the island of Lemnos paid 9 talents 
in tribute in the 450s BC, but only 4.5 in 446 BC.88 On its own, the tribute list does not make a 
fully convincing case for colonization taking place, but two Athenian casualty lists record the 
names of men from Lemnos, probably colonists, falling in battle.89 While Lemnos had been 
colonized by Athens before the Persian wars, this inscriptional evidence suggests that a new 
phase of colonization took place sometime between 451 and 446 BC.90 Andros is one of several 
examples where the literary evidence for a cleruchy can be dated by reference to the tribute lists; 
Plutarch records that a cleruchy was sent to the island under Pericles’ auspices, and the halving of 
the tribute between 450 and 449 BC strongly suggests a more precise dating.91
Details of Colonial Expeditions
Even when the colonization is specifically recorded, rarely are there any details o f the process 
itself beyond the number of settlers. For example, vague phrases such as “jc number of colonists 
were sent out later” are not uncommon. For the purposes of dating these expeditions in my 
database, I have assumed that the colonization would follow on quite quickly from the conquest, 
as it appears to have done in the case of Mytilene in 427 BC. In this particular case we also have
85 The Panathenia was held once every four years.
86 Thucydides, 1.96
87 This is the general argument o f the authors of ATL, and it has been subject o f much debate. Their narrative section 
on colonization can be found in the third volume, pp. 283 ff. A cleurchy was a type o f colonial settlement whereby 
Athenian citizens divided up the land o f a state, normally a defeated ally, and rented the land to its local former owners 
to work on. It is this type o f colony which was set up by Athens on Lesbos after the Mytilene revolt; Thucydides, 3.50
88 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, pp. 424-5.
89 IG I2 97 and 98
90 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, pp. 424
91 Meiggs, Athenian Empire, pp. 121 ff.
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some detailed information regarding the division of land between the new settlers and the Gods.92 
Especially in cases where the inhabitants o f a defeated city were left alive, it would seem logical 
that the Athenians would quickly press their advantage by sending settlers as soon as they put 
down the revolt; delay might allow any of their surviving opponents to regroup and offer further 
resistance. While there must always be caution in appealing to logic to explain Athenian military 
practices, it seems a relatively safe assumption that colonization could follow as soon as possible 
after a campaign was won. On the other hand, it appears that the military expedition which itself 
made the conquest was not able or authorized to immediately settle the area in question; we have 
enough pieces o f inscribed decrees to be sure that Athenian colonization missions required a 
specific debate, not to mention a lottery o f candidates to become the new settlers. Such debates 
would have taken a fair amount o f time, as would the fitting out an expedition so voted, even if 
the Athenians tried to move quickly; in the Brea decree, a deadline o f 30 days for the expedition 
to be launched following the assembly vote is mandated.93
As mentioned above, in many cases settlement o f an area is reported as following on from a 
successful campaign or the crushing of a rebellion; conquest, then colonization. There are 10 
clear examples o f such a pattern, spread throughout the fifth century.94 In most cases, however, 
colonization does not to appear to have been planned from the beginning of a campaign, nor was 
it inevitable afterwards. Thucydides says that in the case o f Lesbos in 427 BC, tribute was not 
imposed but the land divided instead, which suggests that either were possibilities for dealing 
with rebellious allies and the aftermath of successful campaigns95 The Samian revolt seems to 
have been followed by punitive damages rather than taking over o f land.
This does not mean to imply that military expeditions were not ever launched with the aim of 
eventual colonization in mind; settling overseas could well be envisaged from the outset, without 
actually being planned in detail. During the planning o f the Sicilian invasion, Nicias likens the 
campaign to a colonization mission,96 and no doubt thoughts o f parcelling out the island were in 
the heads o f those Athenians drawing maps o f Sicily in the sand and fuelled by the ambition and 
rhetoric of Alcibiades.97 If the conquest o f Syracuse had been successful, the Athenians already 
had a city-sized force on Sicily to parcel out the land and booty, but surely would have still
92 Thucydides, 3.50.
93 IG I3 46=Fomara 100=ML 323,1. 27.
94 Eion and Skyros in c. 476 BC; the Chersonese in c. 464 BC and again in 448 BC; Hestiaea on Euboea in 446 BC; 
Sinope, c. 435 BC; Aegina, c. 431 BC; Potidaea in c. 428 BC; Mytilene, c. 427 BC and Melos, c. 415 BC. Diodorus 
(11.88) records briefly three simultaneous colonisations sometime around the mid-fifth century; Pericles’ in the 
Chersonese and Tolmides’ in Euboea and Naxos. There are very few details o f  the campaign or campaigns that 
resulted in these settlements, but it is not unlikely that this is a truncated reporting o f the ‘conquest and colonisation’ 
pattern.
95 Thucydides, 3.50
96 Thucydides, 6.23
97 Plutarch, Life o f  Nicias, 12.1; Thucydides, 6.24
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referred to the Assembly and sent out a further colonization expedition. Colonization would 
always require a separate debate in Assembly and another expedition.98
There were colonization missions which seem to have been planned as such from the start, in 
places where there had been no recent military expedition in the area; the aim of the campaign 
was to establish a permanent Athenian (or Athenian friendly) presence in an area. The most 
obvious example is that of Amphipolis, and it is fair to call the establishment of a settlement at 
the site a persistent aim of fifth-century Athenian foreign policy.99 The colony was eventually 
founded in 436 BC after several previous attempts, where the campaign to conquer and colonize 
was a one stage operation. Thurii was another example of such a settlement, where the colonial 
mission appears to have been sent out without a military expedition preceding it. This 
expedition, according to Diodorus, included ten triremes, and as mentioned above this is one of 
the very few colonial expeditions for which we have explicit testimony that triremes were 
present. In cases where local enemies had not been defeated, the case for providing warships to 
escort the colonists and to help deal with unfriendly inhabitants would be very powerful. In this 
particular case, there were ships being sent to form a colony in eastern waters; the parallels with 
the late fourth-century example which opened this section, and for which we also have explicit 
testimony for the presence o f warships, are very striking. It is by no means unlikely that by 
founding Thurii the Athenians wanted to secure the sea lanes towards Italy, perhaps also with 
Sicily in mind.
Settlement Policy and Types of Settlement
The Athenian practice of sending out settlers to various regions of the Aegean was not a 
consistent policy followed for one common reason or purpose. Like most Athenian policy, the 
sending of colonies was to meet specific and immediate conditions, or to solve particular 
problems; as discussed above, many colonies followed from the crushing o f an allied rebellion. 
There was thus a definite element o f punishment in some o f these missions, as well as ensuring 
the remaining population remained loyal. But colonies were not always set up to garrison 
rebellious areas o f the Empire, or to keep watch on potential trouble in the Aegean; other possible 
motives included to safeguard particular sea-lanes, to monopolize certain natural resources, to 
bring substantial benefits to the poor, or clear Athens o f idlers; there were probably as many 
reasons for colonization as there were colonies, and each colony had a different combination of 
purposes. Therefore the involvement of the navy would probably be equally varied. All that can 
be said with certainty at this stage is that a naval presence would have been useful, or even 
necessary, for many o f these purposes.
98 Tolmides’ settling o f Naupactos seems to be an exception to this rule, and this case will be discussed below, Part 
One section B. 1.
99 And the retaking o f Amphipolis was a recurrent theme of fourth-century foreign policy.
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The status o f colonial missions in relation to each other is also a debated issue. The Athenians 
themselves seem to have made a technical distinction between two types o f settlement, the 
colony and the cleruchy.100 The exact differences between these two types o f settlement are 
difficult to determine, especially as our literary sources are invariably inconsistent with the 
terminology. Brunt argues that the difference between the two was that cleruchies were set up 
alongside existing cities, whereas colonies established settlements on sites where there were no 
current occupiers.101 Scholars such as Graham follow the view that the essential difference rested 
on citizenship; cleruchs retained Athenian citizenship and acted as a self-funding garrison in the 
territory to which they were sent, whereas colonists gave up Athenian citizenship for that o f their 
new home.102 These definitions are not mutually exclusive; cleruchs could have been Athenian 
citizens abroad in the territory o f existing cities, while settlers who gave up their citizenship 
occupied new cities on empty sites. Under this argument, places such as Hestiaea and Aegina 
would be colonies (as they occupied land from which the original inhabitants had been 
removed),103 as would Thurii and Amphipolis, Potidaea, and the first settlements to be sent to 
Imbros and Lemnos before the Persian wars. Cleruchies would include the settlement of Lesbos 
in 427 BC, and places such as Naxos, Andros, Chalchis and Eretria, as well as the later 
occupations o f Lemnos and Imbros in c.449 BC.104
Figueira argues that the cleruchies of the fifth century did not become “functionally self-standing 
communities”.105 Like Brunt, he argues that colonists retained the citizenship rights at Athens, as
100 IG I3 237, 1.9, “apoikiais kai klerochia[is]”'. This suggests a ‘technical’ distinction between these two categories of 
settlement, in the fifth century.
101 Brunt, Greek History and Thought, p. 121. He suggests that Lemnos and Imbros were cleruchies, because they were 
sites on which the Athenians settled alongside and existing city. (p. 121, cf. p. 123). But as he acknowledges later, and 
as Graham emphasizes (Colony and Mother City, p. 175), there seem to have been two phases o f Athenian settlement 
in these places; the first settlement followed the expulsion o f the previous Pelesagian population. The colony on 
Lemnos became independent o f Athenian control fairly swiftly, fighting against her in the Persian wars, but later 
became ‘subject’ to Athens and tribute payers in the Delian league. In the mid-fifth century, a cleruchy was sent out to 
occupy the island. Brunt suggests that the similar later history o f the two islands implies also a cleruchy was sent to 
Imbros at the same time (Greek Political Thought, p. 123)
102 Brunt dismisses the idea that Athenian colonists would have to become non-citizens as unlikely, favouring in the 
absence o f definitive testimony the idea o f these people possessing two citizenships rather than giving up one. (Greek 
History and Thought, p. 131). Graham’s view is that cleruchies were “an extension in the Athenian state overseas” 
{Colony and Mother City, p. 167), and that “the most important characteristic o f a cleruch [as opposed to a settler, was], 
his retention o f citizenship” (p. 169).
103 Graham argues that these were cleruchies, but the way Thucydides describes the people from these settlements (“the 
Hestaians then living in Hestiaea, being settlers”, and “the Aeginetans who then occupied Aegina”, both at 7.57) seems 
to argue in favour o f their interpretation as citizens o f the place they were from, but clearly not the original inhabitants. 
The evidence cited by Graham (pp. 171-3) to argue that these places were populated by Athenian citizens, including a 
fragmentary decree supposedly relating to the Athenian eisphora being levied on Hestiaea, seem inconclusive.
104 Note that Thucydides 7.57, in accounting for the forces that went with the Athenians to Sicily, uses different 
formulas to describe the Imbrians and Lemnians when compared to the Hestaians and Aeginetans which follow in the 
next lines. The formula for the later pair is described in the previous note. For Lemnos and Imbros, they are simply 
described as “Lemnians” and ‘Imbrians”; does this suggest (as Graham argues) that these places had different statuses, 
or was it simply that the colonies in Aegina and Hestiaea were more recent? While the occupiers of these two places 
(Lemnos and Imbros) were o f Athenian origin and (as Thucydides points out) were following Athenian customs, his 
description o f them as Lembrians and Imbrians implies a separate identity. It also implies that, if  Athenian citizen 
cleruchs were still there, then they were not listed by Thucydides in this passage.
105 Figueira, Athens and Aegina, p. 72
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well as becoming citizens o f the newly established colony.106 He also argues that “cleruchies 
could not stand by themselves... [and]...needed the continued presence of an indigenous 
community onto which it might be grafted”,107 but differs from Brunt’s distinction in as much 
that colonies could also be set up alongside an extant local population.
Cleruchies: Athenian “garrisons” overseas?
That cleruchs retained their citizenship is beyond doubt; what seems to be questioned is whether 
or not these men actually went out to their plots o f land, or whether they were absentee 
landholders. Many possible pictures o f these settlements can be drawn; from a tight, self-funding 
garrison that seems to be the natural inference from Thucydides’ description of the division of 
Lesbos,108 to a means of punishment for rebellious states, whereby absentee Athenian landlords 
enjoyed income from estates they probably never saw,109 or the view of Brunt, where the 
Athenians went out as a garrison at first, and were paid from the land they owned, but were 
withdrawn when it was thought safe.110 The question o f whether such cleruchs retained their 
rights to the land overseas upon returning to Athens can be debated around, but not answered by, 
a fragmentary inscription relating to Mytilene which seems to be restoring some land to 
somebody.111 Too little is known o f the details o f cleruchy expeditions to be certain whether they 
were permanent; but the absence of garrisons in opposing the revolts of Athenian allies 412 BC, 
and the listing o f the colonists but not the cleruchy garrisons of Lemnos and Imbros in relation to 
the Sicilian expedition is certainly circumstantial evidence that these garrisons were withdrawn, 
or possibly had never existed.
Figueira argues in his discussion o f  these issues that “garrisons [of soldiers] would have used up 
significant amounts of material and human resources, and they had to be scaled very large to 
counter incursions”, and that “troops without attached squadrons of triremes were relatively 
inefficient in the projection of power.”112 There is much truth in this assessment. But while a 
small establishment of troops may not have been able to hold down an entire city alone, it would 
nevertheless have been o f strategic value. Such a garrison would not only have provided a 
visible reminder of Athenian power, but would also have been able to ensure that the harbour was 
open for Athenian shipping. While isolated garrisons may not have had much strategic impact
106 It should be noted a this point that Figueira (Athens and Aegina, p. 10 ff) argues that “the Thucydidean distinction 
between... [cleruchies and colonies]...appears to coincide with Athenian legal terminology”, and thus he classes as 
colonies some settlements which most scholars consider cleruchies. His table (pp. 217 ff) makes clear his views on the 
status o f each individual settlement. He lists, (Figueira, Athens and Aigina, pp. 66 ff) with full discussion, 10 
arguments in favour o f this interpretation. None are absolutely conclusive, and indeed hold little force if one assumes 
that colonists could return to Athens and regain citizenship in times o f  need, that citizenship wasn’t retained simply 
because it was convenient for a colonist to utilize it, that Athenians could own property abroad without having to
belong to a colony or cleruchy, and that colonist often used the similar political groupings and organizations to the
mother city.
107 Figueira, Athens and Aigina, p. 167
108 Thucydides, 3.50
109 Jones, Athenian Democracy, p. 168-76.
110 Brunt, Greek History and Thought, p. 125 ff.
111 IG I3 66=Tod 63=ATL D22 Referred to by Brunt, Greek History and Thought, p. 126 ff
112 Figueira, Athens and Aegina, p. 174
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on their own, they provided the means for the Athenian navy to do so; a network of bases and 
safe harbours that was essential for a galley navy if it was to efficiently project power. In return, 
the navy could provide supplies and reinforcement if the troops were attacked, making up for the 
relatively small size o f the garrison; cleruchies did not need to be large enough to cope with a 
full-scale incursion, because, so long as they kept the harbour open, the navy could provide the 
force necessary when it was needed.
Considered in this light, it seems not without significance that a large proportion of the 
colonisation activity (7 out of the 24 examples, 5 of them cleruchies) took place in the 4 years 
between 450 BC and 446 BC.113 It was around this time that Athens (probably) made peace with 
Persia, thus bringing to an end the original stated purpose of the alliance.114 The decision of the 
Athenians not only to maintain the alliance, but to continue to levy the tribute is the most 
significant stage in the development o f Athenian imperialism. The spate of cleruchies established 
throughout the Aegean at this time was not unrelated to these developments, and would have 
played an instrumental role in keeping the Athenian Empire together.
This view of Athenian settlement practice in the fifth century (unlike that which supposes that 
cleruchs were largely absentee landlords) needs to take into account the apparent absence of these 
pockets o f Athenian settlers and garrisons in the revolts, most particularly in 412 BC when many 
allies which supposedly had garrisons broke into revolt. It seems not enough simply to conclude 
that these garrisons were overrun and defeated, which might be considered an obvious 
assumption even if it is not spelled out by our sources. It could well be the case that these 
settlements were not as well manned as they had been when established; there is evidence of men 
being siphoned from the garrisons by generals to help with their campaigns,115 and there is no 
indication as to where these men went afterwards; no doubt some returned to their garrison, but if 
some had been taken to Sicily in 415 BC, or recalled to Athens in the wake of the defeat two 
years later, there could be no chance o f return. Cleruchs were Athenian citizens, and many were 
likely to be o f the zeugite class, and were thus liable to be called up for Athens’ campaigns.116 It 
is possible that any men left in any given garrison would have chosen discretion, or possibly 
desertion, over valour. As mentioned above, the garrisons were not nearly numerous or strong
113 Note that this was a period in which there was reported to be ([Aristotle], 36.4) an abundance o f  citizens; if  this was 
so, then some could easily have been spared to become cleruchs overseas.
114 The bibliography for the debate over the Peace o f Kallias is extensive. Meiggs (Athenian Empire, pp. 487 ff) gives 
a summary o f the sources and the historiography, describing how arguments about its authenticity have ebbed and 
flowed. This pattern has continued in more recent scholarship, with the pendulum currently resting in favour o f the 
treaty’s existence. Homblower (Commentary ad loc 1.112.2, pp. 179 ff.) argues for authenticity, suggesting that 
though Thucydides does not mention the treaty during the narrative o f the Fifty Years, such an agreement is assumed to 
exist in later sections o f the work. Badian, Plataea to Potidaea, pp. 1-72 argues that there were two peace treaties with 
Persians in the Pentekontaetia, one after Eurymedon in the 460s BC, and a renewal o f the treaty in 450 BC, though no 
single source says so. Lewis, Cambridge Ancient History, volume 5, p. 121 ff. also believes in a formal peace, and 
argues (p. 121) that “it is the nature and completeness o f his excursus [i.e. Thucydides’ Pentekontaetia] that should be 
questioned rather than the fact that the Persian Wars came to an end”.
115 For example the settlers on Lemnos and Imbros contributed to Athenian campaigns in Lesbos (Thucydides, 3.5, 427 
BC), Pylos (Thucydides, 4.38, 425 BC) and Sicily (Thucydides, 7.57, from 413 BC). Meiggs, Athenian Empire, p. 
425.
116 Van Wees, ‘Myth o f the Middle Class Army’, pp. 60-1
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enough to hold the allies alone and they relied in large part on the fact that any attack on a city 
could result in more forces from Athens coming to their aid. In the immediate aftermath of  
Sicily, this Athenian back-up could not be guaranteed, and while the Athenians may have wished 
emphatically to guard against revolt from the allies,117 they could not back this up with 
overwhelming force. The structures by which Athens sought to maintain a watch in the Aegean 
could not function without direct backing of the navy, or at least the expectation that such support 
could be there soon. In the aftermath o f the destruction of the Sicilian fleet in 413 BC, neither 
the Athenians in the Aegean, nor their allies, had this expectation.118
Fifth-century colonies: new allied cities?
One of the arguments used to support the contention that Athenian settlers of the fifth century 
remained citizens is the apparent inconsistency with regard to tribute payments. Colonies 
founded before the Persian wars (which paid) and those established after (which did not pay) 
differed, it is argued, on the grounds that the former lost their citizenship and the latter did not. 
Cleruchs, as establishments of Athenian citizens, did not pay tribute either, but no doubt had the 
same obligations as other citizens in terms of taxation and military service. The comparative 
status of Athenian colonies and the allied states, and the effect that the establishment of a colony 
could have on tribute payments of local allies, has also received much discussion. In this respect 
the Brea decree is worth examining:
boun de kai p[anhoplian apa\gen es Panathenaia ta megal[a kai es Dionusi\a 
phallon. Ean de tis epistra[teuei epi ten ye\n ten ton apoikon, boethen ta[s poles 
hos ochsu]tata kata tas chsuggraphas
A cow and a panoply shall be brought to the Great Panathenaia, and to the 
Dionysia, a phallos. If anyone makes a campaign against the land of the colony, 
the cities are to help as quickly as possible, according to the arrangements.119
While no tribute payment is mentioned in the decree, it is interesting that the new settlers were 
obliged to send a cow and panoply to the Great Panathenaia, and a phallus to the Dionysia. The 
allied cities of the Empire were also obliged to do this. While this is a singular example, it is also 
our most detailed example o f the setting up of a fifth-century colony.120 We hear of no other 
regular obligations on this document; no tribute or taxation of resources. This colony, along with 
all the others founded after the Persian wars, fails to appear on any of the extant tribute lists. The 
reason for this must surely be that no such settlement was assessed for tribute; the argument from 
silence is quite powerful in this case. So why were colonies such as Brea not obliged to pay
117 Thucydides, 8.1.3
118 However, the fact was that in 412 BC Athens, by some human miracle, managed to put more ships in the water than 
at almost any other time before or since; if  the garrisons did indeed fall, flee or desert, it should be argued that this 
overwhelming show of sea-power was too late rather than too little.
119 IG I3 46,11. 15-9=ML 49,11. 1 l-15=Fomara, 100,11. 1 \-\5=LACTOR 1,232
120 As is noted in the ML 49 commentary, it is also the colony for which we know the least concerning its location and 
subsequent history; apart from the decree itself and a couple o f late marginal notes, the colony is not mentioned in our 
texts, nor has a site been identified.
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tribute? Perhaps instead the colonists were obliged, like some other privileged allies, to furnish 
manned ships when needed, and not regular monetary tribute.
This argument does not have direct support from the ancient sources, so must remain a 
hypothesis. But it is worthwhile to quickly examine the naval potential of the colonies, and the 
extent to which we see the colonists using ships. The first point is that, clearly, any coastal 
colony would have made some use o f ships, not least for transport to Athens for legal hearings 
and the like. Some colonies, like Amphipolis, would certainly have had the resources to build a 
great many ships which could have been used in active service. The authors of ATL list 14 places 
that they believed to be ship-supplying states in 454 BC, some of which were fairly small 
communities. Amongst them we have such places as Andros, Eretria, Hestiaea and Potidaea, 
which were to have Athenian settlers sent out to them later in the fifth century.121 There is no 
reason to suppose, therefore, that the new settlers exploiting the resources for these places would 
have been unable to supply themselves with ships. Clearly the contributions of these places in 
terms of numbers o f ships would not have been great, but for the roles often envisaged for 
colonies, such as patrolling particular sea-lanes or watching local allies, they would not have 
needed to be. If a problem arose which a local fleet could not handle, then they could summon 
help from the Athenian alliance; the Brea decree made specific provision for this. It is possible 
then that some o f these “garrisons” could be more accurately described as ‘trip-wires’, whose job 
was not so much to actively put down a revolt, but to be ready to report trouble to Athens.
The purposes of colonies and cleruchies: a network of naval stations?
The question of naval involvement in colonies and cleruchies obviously hinges on what we 
believe the purpose o f these settlements was; some o f the roles proposed would not have needed 
ships. A stationary hoplite garrison to control a potentially unruly population, or a division of 
land, held by absentee landlords, to punish and extort defeated allies, would not have needed any 
ships to be effective. Despite the argument o f impracticality, this is an acceptable reconstruction 
for cleruchies, but it will not answer for other settlements. Many colonies were put in areas 
either where there were no local inhabitants, or where the locals had been displaced by the 
Athenians. Such settlements were ways in which the Athenians sought to control the resources of 
a region, but there may well have been a wider strategic element to them as well. The synergy of 
ships and regularly spaced land bases, as well as the placing o f colonies on heavily frequented 
trade routes, strongly suggests that there was a link between the location o f colonies and naval 
concerns. Triremes stationed at these bases protected both the harbours and the local shipping 
from attack.122 Figueira suggests that the Athenians scattering their fleet throughout the Aegean 
in a piecemeal fashion would not serve their strategic interests, and that wide-ranging mobile
121 A TL vol. 3, p. 267-8
122 It hardly need be stated that they could also find themselves in a position to prey on the merchants o f other nations.
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flotillas on a large scale would be more appropriate.123 While there is some truth in this, it is the 
case that the Athenians did in fact employ such small and localized patrols of vessels operating 
from specific bases, along with wider-ranging regional patrols. Under this reconstruction, 
colonies would fit well into the pattern of strategic naval defence; small naval establishments in 
specific locations would have facilitated certain tasks such as protecting merchant convoys, 
countering pirates and taxing certain sea lanes, and perhaps most importantly could act as a ‘trip­
wire’ to alert Athens of threats and incursions. If colonies were indeed obliged to provide some 
ships, then these local fleets would not have been at the cost o f thinly spreading Athens’ own 
naval resources; the Athenians would in effect have been ‘subcontracting’ the expenses onto the 
new colonist communities. The allies’ provision o f forces for the Athenian-led fleets seems to 
have been more infrequent than the yearly demanded tribute (but potentially more costly when it 
happened). In addition, the establishing o f colonists and cleruchs in these places would not only 
hold down the local population (if there was one) and protect the natural resources of the region, 
but would help ensure that there was a wide-spread network of friendly ports and bases for the 
larger Athenian fleets to use; these would have been naval stations in what we might term a 
passive sense.124 Trireme fleets could have worked their way between such bases, which would 
have provided shelter, supplies and markets.
This is a compelling picture, but one for which there is little direct testimony. Notwithstanding 
the presence o f some shipping that can be taken for granted in any island or coastal community, 
there is little evidence o f colonists having access to warships on the scale of triremes, or of 
contributing to combined fleets. This is not too surprising, even if  the ships were definitely there; 
it is rare even in Thucydides for the total numbers o f allied ships and their provenance to be 
disclosed, and of course even in his detailed narrative every fleet is not recorded. In 424 BC, the 
generals controlling a small force of ships in the north Aegean, whose mission was to raise 
money, came to hear of some trouble at Antandros. To counter this, they raised some forces from 
the allies in area; the text is unspecific as to whether this was land forces or ships, but there 
would be little way of carrying a great many troops unless some ships were also added.125 
Perhaps colonies set up in the Aegean, such as Skyros, Melos, Aegina, Amphipolis, Scione and 
Potidaea provided such a service to Athens; in these cases at least, the role o f holding down a 
rebellious population can not be cited, as the Athenians expelled or massacred the existing 
inhabitants.126
123 Figueira, Athens and Aigina, p. 174. He considers the Guardians o f the Hellespont as one such “mobile, not static, 
flotilla”, which seems to be an error; like the fleet attached to the toll-house at Byzantium during the Ionian war 410 
BC, this fleet would probably operate from a single base over relatively a short range.
124 And, equally importantly, denying such facilities to enemy navies.
125 Thucydides, 4.75-6
126 These colonies are listed by Brunt, Greek History and Thought, pp. 119-20.
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Melos
One instructive example with regard to how the links between the navy and colonial settlement 
may have operated is that o f Melos.127 In this case, the inhabitants were killed or sold to slavery 
by the Athenians in the winter o f 416/5 BC, and we are told that colonization followed later; as 
usual, we are left to presume that this was soon after. The next time we hear o f Melos is when a 
sea-battle occurred there in 412 BC, in which an Athenian fleet was defeated and fled to Samos. 
This fleet seems to have appeared from nowhere; we do not hear o f its launch, its commanders or 
its objectives. While it is far from unique in this respect, it is perhaps possible to conclude that 
this fleet was in some way connected with the new colony. Perhaps the colony at Melos was a 
naval station, and these ships were stationed there; the launch from Athens was not reported 
because in fact they were stationed at Melos, and manned by the colonists.
However, there is a big problem with this reconstruction, in that even a modest fleet of ten ships 
would have been beyond the man-power capabilities o f the 500 man colony sent to Melos. Even 
if we assume that slaves and mercenaries made up a large proportion of the crews, as they did at 
Athens, it is inevitable to conclude that the manpower o f Melos at this time was not enough to 
man the fleet that appears to be stationed there. Perhaps then, at least at this stage, the colony at 
Melos was a naval station in the passive sense; rather then providing manned ships, it simply 
allowed access to port facilities and markets for Athenian vessels, and (we can safely assume) 
some of the colonists sought employment in the fleet. In this reconstruction, the colony of Melos 
probably had little in the way o f naval power o f its own, but became part of that network of 
friendly ports so important to galley-based navies. No doubt Melos could have provided one or 
two ships if required, and it is not unlikely that there was such a requirement upon them. But it 
seems that for this small colony at least, any triremes that would be stationed here to patrol the 
allies, guard the sea lanes or combat piracy would have been from Athens, and would have been 
funded and commanded from there.
Melos was amongst the smaller o f the colonies for which we have numbers; 1,000 colonists 
seems to be a usual number (although there are several examples of both smaller and larger 
figures)128, and even if this refers to the number o f adult males to the exclusion of slaves, women 
and children, and even under the assumption that most sent out to colonies would be healthy 
individuals in the prime of life, very few ships could be manned by so few men. If we assume 
firstly that the colonists themselves formed only half o f the crews, with slaves and mercenaries 
the rest, and secondly that every colonist joined the fleet, then the colony could theoretically man
127 Graham argues that Melos should be considered a cleruchy and not a colony, because there is inscriptional evidence 
of an Athenian citizen being buried on the island (Colony and Mother City, p. 173-4). The date o f this inscription is not 
certainly connected with the period o f Athenian settlement, and there might be any number of reasons why an Athenian 
was buried abroad; the idea that he was a Melian given Athenian citizenship is tempting, and alone this text does not 
prove that the inhabitants of the colony were Athenian citizens.
128 As Figueira points out though, the larger examples are colonies to which the Athenians contributed only a part o f 
the total number o f settlers. The colonial expeditions sent to Amphipolis in 465 BC (which was destroyed) and 437 
BC (which was successful), and that to Thurii, were all large scale operations to which the Athenians probably 
contributed 1,000 settlers, or 10% of the total. Athens and Aigina, p, 165, n.13
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ten triremes. Two or three ships would seem a more reasonable and sustainable scale for the 
colony’s naval potential. As the Adriatic colony inscription shows, we need not assume that all 
the ships deployed to a colony were triremes; smaller vessels which were less intensive in their 
man-power demands could also have had a place amongst the fleets of these colonies, even if 
they rarely merited one in the source material.
Regional Patrol Fleets
Of course, the Athenians did not need to send out a colony in order to establish a naval base or a 
‘trip-wire’; we have several clear examples o f semi-permanent establishments o f ships in 
particular regions unconnected with a new Athenian settlement in that region. We need not 
imagine that the fleet o f three ships that watched Megara from Salamis in the 420s BC,129 for 
example, were the product of a colonial expedition or permanent settlement in the area, nor that 
the establishment o f the Hellespont Guardians in the mid-fifth century necessarily involved 
sending a new colony to support the fleet. One interesting and explicit example of a patrol fleet 
acting as a ‘tripwire’ occurred in 425 BC. Having hastily constructed a fortification on Pylos, an 
Athenian fleet under Eurymedon and Sophocles continued on towards its destination, leaving 
Demosthenes and five ships “on guard”.130 A little time later, the Peloponnesians gathered a large 
force against Pylos, and Demosthenes sent out two ships to inform the main fleet of the danger.131 
It is clear that time was o f the essence for these messengers. Demosthenes’ force was too small 
and inadequate to have had any chance of mounting a long-term defence or holding down the 
area alone;132 but the hastily built fortifications and poorly-armed men succeeded in repulsing 
several attacks before the main Athenian fleet arrived within a couple of days and inflicted heavy 
defeat upon the Spartans.133
45 fleets were involved in regional garrisons and patrol of one sort or another. This is similar to 
the number of fleets that participated in sea battles. Around 40 different locations are mentioned, 
some quite vague (Attic coast, or the Hellespont), others relating to specific cities or places (the 
little fort on Salamis looking at Megara, or the toll house at Chyrstopolis). There is great 
variation in the size o f fleets and the length o f commission; some fleets were in place to ensure 
short-term control of a particular area, almost like a blockade. But many of these fleets were on 
duty for months or years, and so represent a very large commitment to the navy on the part of 
Athens. I have listed over a third (16) o f these fleets as ‘permanent’, a word which of course is 
more an expression of the intent than reality; for very few fleets or regions is there substantial 
evidence of the breadth of Athenian naval activities. There are some general references to this 
sort of naval activity. Plutarch talks o f 60 ships in regular commission in the middle of the fifth
129 Thucydides, 2.93
130 Thucydides, 4.5.2
131 Thucydides, 4.8.3
132 Thucydides 4.9 describes the short-comings o f the fortifications. Cf. the discussion below regarding the equipment 
of the sailors at this time.
133 Thucydides, 4.13-4
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century, for 8 months o f the year, and Stadter correctly interprets this as “a unique notice to the 
normal activity o f the navy”.134 A similar notice is given for the fourth century, though in this 
instance it is 20 ships that are mentioned.135
After Naupactos, some of the best evidence for the substantial long-term naval presence in a 
region concerns the Hellespont. Following Alcibiades’ success in taking Cyzicus in 410 BC, 
Xenophon reports that a fleet o f 30 ships was left in the area.136 Their mission was three-fold; 
firstly, to levy a 10% charge on merchants going through the Hellespont, secondly to protect the 
recently-established custom house and fort, and thirdly to harass the enemy as and when they 
could.137 It can been argued that this was a re-establishment of a toll-house set up at an earlier 
time; sometime after 430 BC we hear of Athenian officials called Guardians of the Hellespont 
charged with controlling the grain supply in the region;138 no doubt control o f this area was lost 
with the revolt o f Byzantium and the other Hellespontine allies. Whether or not a fleet was used 
on a permanent basis on earlier occasions to ensure payment is not absolutely certain, but seems 
likely; the decree referring to the Athenian officials in the Hellespont envisions them as being 
able to confiscate ships passing through the region. There is no need to think that as many as 30 
ships would have been used in this context; with Byzantium and Chalchadon still enemies in 408 
BC, no doubt the Hellespont remained a dangerous and contested region despite the defeat and 
death of the Spartan admiral Mindarus, and thus a large number of ships were deployed at this 
time. It is not certain for how long a fleet o f such size was intended to stay in this area; in the 
event, o f course, Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian war removed her naval presence from the 
Hellespont until the fourth century BC.
Perhaps even more interesting is the fleet of nine ships reported in the Hellespont region one year 
later, in 409 BC.139 These ships are described by Xenophon as the ships “continually on watch 
there”, and so should probably be distinguished from the fort and fleet recently set up near 
Chrysopolis. In addition, their stated purpose was the protection of Athenian merchant vessels; 
the Hellespont, of course, was on the crucial Black Sea grain route. Exactly what Xenophon 
meant by “continually” is hard to determine; Athens’ interest in the Hellespont area went back to 
the foundation o f Sigeion in the sixth century, before her trireme fleet and empire existed. 
According to Gamsey, it was in the fifth century that Athens began to depend on grain from 
abroad, and perhaps this would have been a good context for establishing a Hellespont fleet; there 
is no evidence that allows greater precision. However, Xenophon’s text, our only evidence for 
these particular ships, offers nothing to support or undermine this, and in using “continually” he
134 Plutarch, Pericles, 11.4; Stadter, Commentary, p. 137
135 [Aristotle], Constitution o f Athens, 24.3 In his note on this section, Rhodes observes that there are very few 
examples for patrol ships using the exact words nees phrourides in the sources. Nevertheless, as the table makes clear, 
there are many examples o f ships operating in particular regions, even if these exact words are not used.
136 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22.
137 cf. Part Two, B.2 on the complex relations between the fleet and the city at this time.
138 IG I3 63=LACTOR 1, 121= ML 65,11. 35 ff.
139 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.36.
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probably meant nothing more than “for as long as I can remember”. While many o f these 
Hellespont fleets purport to be permanent garrisons for the area, the sources usually report no 
more or less than a certain number of ships being there within a very narrow time frame.
Our sources contain enough examples o f fleets operating in specific areas to lead us to conclude 
that they were a regular feature of Athenian foreign policy. It is likely that the true scale o f these 
commitments was larger than the figures suggest. It is unlikely for example that a statistically 
significant number of battles have failed to reach the historical record, but a good number of 
small regional patrol fleets, particularly if  they were regular and routine employments, may easily 
have escaped the notice of our sources.
Logistical Considerations
Patrol ships would no doubt have been crewed and paid for in the same way as any other 
Athenian fleet (i.e. quite sporadically and heavily reliant on the liturgical class to bear the brunt 
when the state could not). The naval presence in any given region then was dependent on the 
ability o f the Athenians to maintain and finance a fleet there.
The case for the colonies may have been different. The naval presence of such a settlement may 
have been small and intermittent in comparison with a permanently established fleet, but it was 
also (from the Athenian point of view) cheaper. No doubt the newly acquired colonial land could 
have been exploited in order to provide pay for hired sailors,140 but we should not assume that a 
small colonial state would necessarily fund its ships in the same way as its imperial mother-city. 
More than likely, manning the ships would have been a duty undertaken by all the colonists, 
rather than a profession after the Athenian fashion.141 But the point is that the Athenian state 
would not have had to fund these ships. The amount o f money needed to maintain even a modest 
fleet all year round was considerable. Clearly the Athenians were willing to put a lot of resources 
into their navy, but the colonies can perhaps be seen as a way of maintaining their naval network 
and giving significant benefits to the poorest citizens,142 while at the same time saving some of 
the costs o f manning the navy. We have seen in the case o f Melos how such a settlement, even if 
it did not boast a permanent fleet o f any significance, could have been used by later Athenian 
fleets as a base. This would not have been the case with some of the patrol and garrison fleets in 
areas such as the Hellespont and overlooking Megara; once these ships left, so did Athens’ direct 
power over the area.
140 Osbome (LACTOR 1, 133, note) points out that the rent paid to the cleruchs o f  Mytilene, 200 drachmae, would 
support a hoplite for most o f a year (although not his servant). This is true, but this same amount o f money would pay 
the wages for a sailor for most o f a year too.
1411 discuss the issue o f professionalism further in Part One, section C. 1 and Part Three, section 2.
142 Or ridding the city o f its lazy rabble-rousers, depending on one’s point o f view.
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The Athenian Naval Network: overseas colonies, naval stations and regional patrols
The Athenian naval network under discussion here, involving colonies, cleruchies and regional 
patrols o f various sorts, was a largely fifth-century phenomenon. However, the only 
uncomplicated and explicit example o f a colony as a naval station comes at the end of the fourth 
century, and there is evidence that regional patrol fleets were a feature of the fourth-century navy 
too.143 It is likely that the Athenian politicians o f the fourth century would have wanted to re­
establish the Athenian naval network of the fifth century, though they would not have expressed 
the desire in such terms. It cannot be said that the Athenians had a consistent, or even a 
conscious, policy of establishing the sort o f naval network that this section is attempting to 
reconstruct. Our sources rather frame Athenian policy aims in more general terms, such as 
“safeguarding the sea” or “keeping a watch over the allies”.144 To meet these general aims the 
Athenians employed a variety o f tools, depending on the political and strategic needs of the 
moment. What was always required for such policies was a strong navy; Athens’ power overseas 
was dependent on her being willing and able to deploy large numbers of ships, ships which in 
turn accounted for a large proportion of the resulting revenues. The navy was simultaneously the 
biggest expenditure and biggest earner o f imperial Athens.
Of the foreign policy tools available to the Athenians, potentially the most long-lived was the 
colony. The establishment of new cities often occurred after the effective destruction of old and 
disloyal ones. These colonies were permanent settlements with close ties to their mother-city; 
they seemed to have become allies of Athens, and perhaps had an obligation to occasionally 
furnish ships, as well as the regular cow and panoply. If indeed such fleets had existed, they 
would have acted as a ‘trip-wire’ to alert the Athenians o f potential (and indeed actual) trouble. 
They could also have provided ships to bolster the numbers o f combined fleets,145 and all this 
with the added bonus of not being a drain on the Athenian treasury.
Like colonies, cleruchies could have acted as safe harbours for any passing friendly fleet, as well 
as providing a base for operations in the local region. There is no evidence for cleruchs operating 
their own ships, triremes or otherwise; cleruchies were aimed more at controlling a local 
population and its resources and harbours, to be withdrawn when the situation was calmed.
Colonies and cleruchies appear to have been self-funding. This was not the case for Athens’ 
regional patrol vessels. These were kept in service for extended periods of time, and thus the 
expenditure was very high. Some of these fleets operated from their own forts or bases; such 
bases were not any type o f colonial settlement, but nevertheless formed some sort o f semi­
permanent emplacement in a region. Ships in these places would have been funded by Athens
143 [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 24.3
144 e.g. Thucydides, 1.143, 2.17, 8.1
145 Note the contributions o f Athenian settlements abroad in the Sicilian expedition (Thucydides, 7.57), though of 
course this does not prove that the settlements involved provided ships, or indeed sailors; only that men from these 
places were part o f the invasion force in some capacity.
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directly, though some like the tollhouse at Chrysopolis provided lucrative opportunities; Athenian 
sea power in the region lasted as long as they supported the fleet there. Fleets patrolling a region 
needed safe harbours, some of which were provided by colonies and cleruchies.
Conclusion
To sum up, colonization formed an essential part of Athenian imperial power in the fifth century 
BC. Their inclusion in the database as operations involving the Athenian navy, despite only a 
few concrete examples, is something of an assumption, but the relationship between established 
colonies and naval movements, as will be demonstrated in the case study of Naupactos, was a 
close one. In nearly all cases we are given very little detail about the missions themselves; 
mostly we hear o f a successful campaign in a particular region, and a sentence to the effect “x 
number o f colonists were sent out later”. The status of these settlements in relation to Athens as 
well as each other is debated; all that is reasonably certain is that there were two types of 
settlement, cleruchies and colonies. In the former, the settlers remained Athenians, but the latter 
lost their citizenship. But neither sort of settlement seems to have been obliged to pay tribute. 
Perhaps it is the case that new colonies were exempt from financial tribute, but were instead 
obliged to furnish ships like some other allies. Small-scale settlements of 1,000 or so citizens 
could not have furnished powerful fleets such as that o f Chios. But an obligation to supply a 
couple o f ships would explain their absence from the tribute lists, give them the somewhat 
privileged status that exemption implies, but still allow a mechanism for non-Athenian citizens to 
be obliged to serve Athens. The presence of very small naval squadrons would have made some 
strategic sense, and if at least some colonies are to be interpreted in the light of securing trade 
routes, guarding the allies and combating piracy, ships would have been absolutely necessary. 
The small squadrons such as these settlements could have provided would have been unable to do 
much against a significant enemy fleet; but they could have provided the Athenians with early 
warning of potential trouble, and been a visual Athenian presence to discourage such trouble in 
the first instance.146 It is perhaps for this reason that so many colonies and cleruchies were 
established shortly after 450 BC, when Athens decided to maintain her dominance over the allies 
even after the Persian threat was neutralized. Under this reconstruction, colonies, and even 
cleruchies, would often have been set up as naustathmoi, like the example of Adriatic colony of  
325/4 BC; but they would not necessarily have been furnished with permanent Athenian fleets, 
like the Guardians of the Hellespont.
146 Compare the diplomatic missions discussed below. Technically speaking, o f course, these were not Athenian 
triremes. But they would be under de facto Athenian control, and anyone seeing such ships would assume them to be 
Athenian, (see the Chians mistaken identification o f Spartan ships as Athenian; Thucydides 3.32.3 cf. 8.28.2 and 
Aristophanes Birds, 1. 108)
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3: Other Naval Activity
Politics and Diplomacy
This section is going to examine the broad range of naval activity that had a diplomatic or 
political dimension. It is the category for which there is the most recorded activity; 191 
instances, involving 95 out of 216 fleets. This is testament to the fact that ‘diplomatic/political 
activity’ is such a big area, and the wide definition covers all sorts of things that a fleet and its 
leaders might do; including the transportation of envoys and ambassadors, conclusion of  
alliances, negotiating terms of surrender and what might anachronistically be termed “gunboat” 
diplomacy.
At the smallest scale, it was often single ships that transported Athenian ambassadors overseas 
for negotiations. This small-scale activity was probably far more widespread than the individual 
examples indicate. Thucydides reports the Corcyraeans barring the Athenians and Spartans from 
their harbour “except on peaceful terms and coming in not more than one ship”,147 suggesting that 
single ship envoys were common and generally acceptable. The Old Oligarch speaks in general 
terms of Athenians sailing abroad on account o f overseas property and public offices, and a 
fourth-century student o f Aristotle suggests that there were 700 such positions.148 We should not 
envisage such political missions involving huge fleets, though the fear of the Corcyraeans about 
the threat posed by multiple vessels seems to have been well founded. In many cases 
negotiations and diplomacy were carried out by Athenian officials (often generals rather than 
ambassadors), with a full trireme fleet forming a somewhat ominous and intimidating backdrop. 
Many cities were taken by words rather than by force, as was the case with Cephallania in 456 
BC and again 431 BC; many no doubt chose to concede in the face o f the threat of Athenian 
force rather than to defy them and fight.149 The position o f these communities is exemplified by 
the case o f Melos in 416 BC. Thucydides reports a unique dialogue between the Melians and the 
Athenians, an exchange which throws into sharp relief his view of what the Athenians meant by 
diplomacy in the fifth century. The following passage is characteristic:
heme is toinun oute autoi met' onomaton kalon, hos e dikaios ton Medon 
katalusantes archomen e adikoumenoi nun epexerchometha, logon mekos apiston 
parexome outh' humas axioumen...ta dunata d' ex hon hekateroi alethos 
phronoumen diaprassesthai, epistamenous pros eidotas hoti dikaia men en tdi 
anthropeidi logoi apo tes ises anankes krinetai, dunata de hoi prouchontes 
prassousi kai hoi astheneis xunchorousin.
Athenians: We will neither use noble phrases to furnish a lengthy and 
unconvincing speech ourselves, about having the right to rule because we put 
down the Persians [at Marathon in 490 BC, at Salamis in 480 BC and at Plataea in
147 Thucydides, 3.71
148 [Xenophon], Constitution o f  Athens, 1.19; [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 24.3
149 To take just two examples, the city o f Selymbria was betrayed to Alcibiades in 408 BC (Xenophon, Hellenica, 
1.3.10), and Timotheus took over the island of Corcyra with diplomacy (Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.4.32). As with many 
similar examples o f “diplomatic sieges”, it is unclear whether any fighting took place.
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479 BC] or attacking now because we were wronged...understanding as well as we 
do that in human considerations justice is what is decided only when equal forces 
are opposed; and in fact the strong do what they have the power to, and the weak 
must acquiesce.150
In the event, the Melians were not swayed by arguments o f this sort, choosing to resist the 
Athenians rather than submit, and were consequently destroyed. This sort of thinking was 
present in Athenian diplomatic activity from a much earlier time. In 479 BC, the wily Athenian 
commander Themistocles, architect o f the great naval victory at Salamis over the Persians the 
year before, laid siege to the island of Andros. The blockade was instigated because 
Themistocles’ extortionate demands for money were not acquiesced to by the Andrians. While 
this blockade was in progress, he sent envoys in ships to nearby islands, threatening them with 
the same treatment if they did not pay up; unsurprisingly, many of them did.151 This is one o f our 
best and most blatant example of what in a later age was called gunboat diplomacy, and no doubt 
this type of one-sided negotiation, based solely on disproportionate power, was at least as 
important as the “direct oral exchange and contact between men and constitutional organs o f the 
various states” on which ancient diplomacy has been argued to have depended.152
Athens did not need to use whole trireme fleets and direct threats o f imminent destruction to 
intimidate the allies; such an effect could be brought about by smaller-scale embassies. The lead 
character in Aristophanes’ play Achamians samples a wine that represents a peace treaty, and 
likens this to bullying:
Dikaiopolis: ozousi chautai presbeon es tas poleis oxutaton hosper diatribes ton 
xummachon.
Dicaiopolis: This one smells too-of embassies to the states o f the alliance-a very 
acid smell, as if the allies were being ground down.153
Such a policy is perhaps personified by the Sycophant in Birds that arrives in a newly-founded 
city o f Cloudcuckooland looking for wings:
Sukophantes: kleter eimi nesiotikos kai sukophantes...eita deomai ptera labon 
kukloi perisobein tas poleis kaloumenos.
Sycophant: I am the Island Summoner and bringer of troublesome
prosecutions...I want to get wings and then sweep all the way round the 
allied states, serving summonses.154
150 Thucydides, 5.89
151 Herodotus, 8.111-2
152 Adcock and Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, p. 152.
153 Aristophanes, Achamians, 11. 193-4
154 Aristophanes, Birds, 11.1422-3 and 25-6. It should be pointed out the Sycophant did not need wings in order to carry 
out his ‘work’, only to perform it more efficiently and safely (11. 27-9).
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Clearly the contexts o f these examples are fantastical, and neither talks directly about triremes. 
But if it they at least reflect some sort o f reality in as much as diplomatic missions were designed 
at least in part to intimidate, this helps to explain why triremes in particular were often chosen to 
carry Athenian diplomats and officials.
The participation of the Athenian navy in diplomatic activities at first glance looks unworthy of  
serious consideration; Athens needed to send diplomats to cities overseas, and the navy had ships 
to take them there. The practical realities of international negotiations demanded the 
employment o f the navy. The case is not so simply explained, however. Diplomats could be 
conveyed across the sea far more cheaply than by using navy vessels if  a functional and 
seaworthy vessel was all that was required; many merchant ships and fishing vessels plied their 
trade in and out of the Piraeus harbour, and thus boats would have been easily available for 
envoys to use. The decision to send them in naval vessels was just that; a conscious decision on 
the part o f the Athenian Assembly, as a decree relating to the despatch of envoys makes clear.155 
It is impossible to say what percentage of diplomatic missions involved triremes, as often such 
details are not given in the sources. However, in nearly all the examples of diplomatic activity 
for which the type of vessel is specified, that ship was a trireme.156
An explanation is required as to why the Athenians paid for triremes, and their large crews, to 
convey diplomats on negotiations which could stretch out for many expensive weeks and even 
months, especially as it was possible for diplomats to use alternative, and cheaper, transportation. 
Even if we concede, as Westermann has assumed, that “the dignity o f sovereign states naturally 
demanded that the presbeis travel in a manner which would command the respect of the states 
visited”,157 there were perhaps features unique to triremes that persuaded the Athenians to 
maintain their dignity with this particular type o f ship.
In looking for justifications for the use of triremes in diplomatic missions, therefore, we must 
look more generally at what advantages the ships offered. Firstly, triremes were extremely fast. 
If a diplomatic mission was especially urgent and a speedy resolution was required, despatching 
the ambassadors aboard triremes made some sense. A fourth-century ship captain boasted how, 
because his ship was the fastest, it was chosen to carry envoys back to Athens.158
One occasion where the speed of a trireme was essential to the success o f the mission occurred in 
427 BC. After quashing the rebellious state of Mytilene, the Athenians debated how to deal with
155 IG I3 1453. In this decree, the Assembly ordered the generals to ensure that the envoys to the allies were despatched 
aboard a trireme. The fact that it is specifically spelt out as part o f the decree (as opposed to there being a ‘standard 
procedure’ for the despatch o f envoys) is interesting. It shows firstly that triremes were not inevitably used in such 
cases and alternatives could perhaps be conceived, and yet on this occasion and on many others, the trireme option was 
chosen.
156 Mosley (Envoys and Diplomacy, pp.75-6) lists some examples o f such ships being assigned specifically for 
diplomatic duties.
157 Westermann, ‘The Ephodia of Greek ambassadors’, p. 204
158 [Demosthenes], 50.12.
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the defeated populace. At first they resolved to slaughter the whole male population and enslave 
the women. The resolution was passed and a trireme duly despatched to relay these orders to the 
Athenian forces at Mytilene. This first trireme despatched had probably come to Athens from the 
general o f the force at Mytilene in the first place, possibly carrying along with it the Mytilenian 
diplomats. The Athenians’ decision to send the second message on such a ship was because there 
existed no faster way of getting the message across.
However, the very next day, perhaps following pleading from the Mytilenian ambassadors 
present in Athens at the time, the Athenians relented, and after another Assembly meeting, they 
decided to kill only the ringleaders o f the rebellion, and to impose less drastic penalties on the 
rest o f the city. Thucydides describes the results vividly:
kai triere euthus alien apestellon kata spouden, hopos me phthasases tes proteras 
heurosi diephtharmenen ten polin: proeiche de hemerai kai nukti
malista. paraskeuasanton de ton Mutilenaion presbeon tei nei oinon kai alphita 
kai megala huposchomendn, ei phthaseian, egeneto spoude tou plou toiaute hoste 
esthion te hama elaunontes oinoi kai elaioi alphita pephuramena, kai hoi men 
hupnon heirounto kata meros, hoi de elaunon. kata tuchen de pneumatos oudenos 
enantiothentos ...d' hustera autes epikatagetai kai diekoluse me diaphtheirai
They immediately sent off another trireme in great haste, lest they find the city 
destroyed because the first had already arrived; it was about a day and a night 
ahead. With the Mytilenian envoys providing wine and barley for the ship and 
making great promises of rewards if they arrived in time, the degree of zeal was so 
high during the voyage that they ate barley kneaded with wine and oil as they 
rowed, and while some rowed others slept in turns, and since by luck there was no 
opposing wind...the ship following landed and prevented the killings.159
Clearly, time was of the essence in this situation, and the second trireme was able to stop the 
massacre of Mytilene being carried out. But if speed was the cardinal virtue o f the trireme, it was 
not only the rapid movement o f important messages that made it so. Triremes were incredible 
machines, awe inspiring and impressive, and the most sophisticated vehicles of their day. The 
visual impact o f a trireme and its speed was remarked upon in the ancient sources.
kai trieres de toi he sesagmene anthropon dia ti alio phoberon esti polemiois e 
philois axiotheaton e hoti tachu plei
And why is a trireme which is crammed with men a frightening spectacle for 
enemies and a pleasant sight to allies? Is it not because it sails quickly?160
Many trireme captains indeed dipped into their own pockets in order to insure not only that their 
ship was well-crewed, but also that it looked the part. Apollodorus, a fourth-century trierarch 
who conveyed many diplomatic missions during his term of service, describes his own efforts in 
this area:
159 Thucydides, 3.49.2-4
160 Xenophon, Economics, 8.8
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daneisamenos argurion protos eplerosamen ten naun, misthdsamenos nautas hds 
hoion t' en aristous, doreas kai prodoseis dous hekastdi auton megalas. eti de 
skeuesin idiois ten naun hapasi kateskeuasa, kai ton demosion elabon ouden, kai 
kosmoi hds hoion t' en kallista kai diaprepestata ton trierarchon.
I was the first [after the call to arms in 362 BC] to man my ship, hiring the best 
sailors possible and giving to each man large bonuses and advance payments.
More than that, I furnished the ship with equipment all my own, taking nothing 
from the public stores, and I made everything as beautiful and magnificent as 
possible, outdoing all the other trierarchs.161
The visual effect o f a trireme, and the ambivalent feelings of hope and fear it could instil in those 
with whom Athens wished to negotiate, could have been a reason for their regular employment to 
convey diplomatic missions.
The sight o f an Athenian trireme would have had several interlocking effects on the viewer, 
alongside the impressiveness described by Xenophon. Most importantly, they were a very direct 
and visible symbol, almost an embodiment, of Athenian power. An Athenian character in a comic 
play could identify himself as coming from “the land o f the fine triremes”,162 so close was the 
association between Athens and these vessels. In 428 BC when the inhabitants of Chios, an 
island allied to Athens, saw a fleet of triremes near their island, they automatically assumed that 
they must have been Athenian:
hordntes gar tas naus hoi anthropoi ouk epheugon, alia prosechoroun mallon hds 
Attikais kai elpida oude ten elachisten eichon me pote Athenaion tes thalasses 
kratounton naus Peloponnesion es Ionian parabalein
For when these [Spartan] ships were sighted the people [of Chios] made no effort 
to flee; instead they came to meet the ships, under the impression that they must be 
Attic, since they never imagined that, with the Athenians in control of the sea, a 
Peloponnesian fleet could come across to Ionia.163
Clearly the inhabitants of Chios believed it would not have been possible for any other state to 
have warships such as triremes in the Eastern Aegean. It was a similar story for the inhabitants 
of Iasos in 411 BC when a Peloponnesian fleet approached:
prosbalontes tei Iasoi aiphnidioi kai ou prosdechomenon all' e Attikas tas naus 
einai hairousin: kai malista en toi ergoi hoi Surakosioi epeinethesan
And making a sudden attack on Iasos, without anyone expecting the ships to be 
other than Attic, they captured it; the Syracusans were especially commended in 
this action.164
[Demosthenes] 50.7. There is evidence (e.g. Thucydides, 6.31) that in the fifth century also captains sought to 
ornament their ships.
162 Aristophanes, Birds, 1. 108
163 Thucydides, 3.32.3
164 Thucydides, 8.28.2
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This is the same assumption made by the Chians in 428 BC, and all the more surprising given 
that the Athenians were far weaker after 413 BC. Indeed the sudden attack by the Peloponnesian 
fleet appears to have capitalised on this perception. The fact that they were wrong in these 
instances is not as important as the fact that they made the assumptions in the first place, and 
such views are indicative of a substantial overestimation o f Athenian sea power.
From our modem perspective, it is easy to see the limitations of sea power in the age of the oared 
galley; it was literally impossible for the Athenians, or any other ancient state for that matter, to 
have such dominance over the sea as to prevent any others from sailing it.165 Gabrielsen has 
argued that such modem ideas o f sea power would have seemed like “wishful thinking” to 
ancient Greeks.166 Yet the Chians seem to have believed the Athenians capable o f this degree of  
dominance. Nor were they alone in this perception; the Old Oligarch explained how the 
Athenians could and did rule the Aegean through sea power:
hai men megalai dia deos archontai, hai de mikrai panu dia chreian: ou gar esti 
polis oudemia hetis ou deitai eisagesthai ti e exagesthai. tauta toinun ouk estai 
autei, ean me hupekoos ei ton archonton tes thalattes.
The large states can be ruled by fear and the smaller ones by sheer necessity. For 
no city can do without importing and exporting, and this will not be possible for it 
unless it submits to the rulers of the sea.167
How had these distorted perceptions come about? Part o f the answer brings us back to Athenian 
diplomatic missions, and the presentation of power. The Chians could believe that only Athens 
could sail warships in the Aegean because they regularly saw Athenian warships in the Aegean. 
Bringing ambassadors to their negotiations in such vessels created the impression that where this 
one ship could sail 100 more could come, and persuading everyone of Athens’ inevitable rule of 
the waves. The Athenians were probably more aware than others of both the power and the 
logistical limitations of their navy, and were no doubt keen to present an image o f greater power 
and control than in fact they possessed.168 Examined from this angle then, the political and 
diplomatic fleet movements played a role in supplementing the naval network as a means of 
maintaining control over the Aegean.
Protecting Merchants and Persecuting Pirates
There are relatively few specific instances (involving seven different fleets) when the protection 
of merchants is referred to specifically as a goal o f an individual fleet. However, this is not to 
suggest that merchant shipping was not o f importance to Athens; indeed, one of the principal
165 The limits o f ancient thalassocracy have been discussed above.
166 Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 5. He quotes here Sir Walter Raleigh’s maxim about control o f the sea 
resulting in control o f trade and wealth, and thus the world; these sentiments seem along similar lines to those of the 
Old Oligarch quoted below.
167 [Xenophon], 2.3. My emphasis.
168 For a lengthier discussion o f this argument, and how it related to the construction o f impressive buildings on the 
Acropolis, see Potts, ‘Power Made Public’.
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goals o f Athenian foreign (and naval) policy was concerned with securing the grain route.169 This 
grain route depended upon private merchantmen rather than state-owned shipping, but was no 
doubt protected by regional patrols and Athenian-friendly harbours throughout the Aegean, even 
if our sources only give a few specific notices of such outposts. Apollodorus’ trierarchy in the 
350s BC provides a good example o f the navy operating directly to help merchants; not only 
protecting them in this case, but even towing them to port.170
Similarly, very few fleets seem to have had missions specifically involving the quelling of piracy. 
This was probably something done at a regional level by Athens’ local patrols, as even a 
relatively small squadron of triremes would have been capable of dealing with isolated bands of 
sea raiders. But while it was probably a comparatively safe time to send goods throughout the 
Aegean and to Piraeus, there seems to have been no concerted and specific effort to rid the seas 
of the menace of pirates. Athenian naval strength may have had the effect o f quietening piracy, 
and there is a sense that the persecution of pirates was simply something that all thalassocracies 
did as a matter of course.171 There are reports o f piratical activity during the Peloponnesian 
war,172 which can be used either to argue that the Athenians had not successfully quelled piracy 
during their years as the hegemonic naval power o f the Aegean, or alternatively that pirates were 
at that point resurgent, and were only able to operate while the Athenians were preoccupied with 
the war with Sparta.173 The evidence is too scanty to make an informed judgement on these 
matters. What does seem clear is that the threat o f piracy, like that from the navies o f other 
states, did not prompt a sustained and systematic campaign from the Athenians, or at least not 
one that has been recorded in our source material.
Money Collection and Religious Rites
As has been discussed in the section above, the extortion of money was often a matter of 
“gunboat diplomacy” by individual fleet commanders, as well as a more general and 
institutionalised policy, in the fifth century especially, through the exaction of tribute.174 There 
has been some debate concerning three fleets described explicitly as “money-collecting vessels” 
by Thucydides;175 were they connected with the collection or reassessment of tribute, or were 
these ships gathering monies over an above the annual levies? Kallet-Marx has argued 
convincingly that these vessels should not be connected with tribute reassessment.176 She 
disconnects them from the tribute entirely, interpreting them as ships sent out to meet short-term
169 Starr, Influence o f  Sea Power, p. 47 In discussing Athenian fourth-century naval reconstruction, Starr asks and 
answers the rhetorical question “why the new navy? Largely because it was useful in protecting the route o f supply 
from south Russia.”
170 [Demosthenes], 50.20
171 In his description o f two ancient thalassocracies, those o f Minos o f Crete (1.103) and o f the Corinthians (1.13), 
Thucydides refers in general terms to their attempts to quell piracy.
172 For example, see Thucydides, 2.32; 2.69.
173 Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World, p. 110
174 Allies in the Second Athenian Confederacy o f the fourth century were obliged to make contributions, but the term 
phoros, “tribute”, was avoided.
175 Thucydides, 2.69; 3.19; 4.50 and 75.
176 Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense and Naval Power, p. 160-4
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financial needs in Athens.177 This is likely, though the possibility remains that such money- 
collecting ships were sent out regularly in order to collect arrears o f tribute, and Thucydides only 
chose to report them when something notable occurred.178
Very few fleets are recorded as being despatched for an overtly religious purpose, but this should 
not mislead us into thinking of the navy as wholly secular. Prayers and sacrifices would have 
been made at the launch of ships and fleets, as they were at the launching in 415 BC o f the 
invasion of Sicily.179 There was also a religious aspect to the aftermath of battles, with the 
concluding o f treaties and the recovery of the dead. Ships were involved regularly in transporting 
theoria, sacred embassies, to sacrifices and festivals. Such missions were not inconsiderable in 
their expense; an Athenian temple account o f the sanctuary at Delos dating from 377-373 BC 
refers to payments made to a trierarch:
eis komiden ton theoron kai ton xoro[n\ Antimachoi Philonos Hermeioi 
trierarchoi TX
For the transport of the sacred embassies and the choruses, to the trierarch 
Antimachus son o f Philon of Hermeios, 1 talent and 1000 drachmas.180
At Athens itself, there was a quadrennial trireme race at Sounion in honour of Poseidon,181 and 
Plutarch refers to the use o f a ship in the ceremonial re-enactment o f Solon’s conquest of 
Salamis:
eoike de toi logoi toutoi kai ta dromena marturein. naus gar tis Attike proseplei 
siopei to proton, eita kraugei kai alalagmoi prospheromenon heis aner enoplos 
exallomenos meta boes ethei pros akron to Skiradion ekges prospheromenois.
Now there seems to be a confirmation o f this story [i.e. his version of Solon’s 
conquest o f Salamis] in certain ceremonies afterwards established. Namely, a 
certain Attic ship would approach the island in silence at first, then its crew would 
make an onset with shouts and cries, and one man in full armour would leap out 
with a shout of triumph and run to the promontory of Sciradium to inform those 
who were attacking by land.182
Very few of these activities can be adequately recorded in the database, as there is very little 
evidence for specific and datable examples o f these activities. Thucydides, our principal literary 
source for naval matters, was famously an author who did not give due prominence to the 
religious aspects o f the events he reported, and it is somewhat inevitable that a database derived
177 Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense and Naval Power, p. 137
178 Such is the cautiously expressed view o f Lewis, Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 5, p. 5. Indeed something other 
than the collection o f money occurs each time that the fleets are mentioned by Thucydides
179 Thucydides, 6.32
180 IG II2 1635=RO 28,1. 35.
181 Herodotus, 6.87, cf. Lysias, 21.5. Our testimony for this festival is too slight to pin down an individual dated 
occasion for this race. Assuming the festival indeed occurred every four years without any interruptions, around 40 
specifically ‘religious fleets’ would need to be added to the database.
182 Plutarch, Life o f  Solon, 9.4
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in large part from his account will suffer the same deficiency. Two triremes often described as 
‘sacred ships’, the Paralos and the Salaminia, will be detailed below.183
4: Conclusions: naval activities in the fifth and fourth centuries BC
The evidence that exists for fleet movements is skewed heavily towards the fifth century BC. 
While the differences in source material accounts partly for this discrepancy, it no doubt also 
reflects the reality that fourth-century Athens participated in less naval activity than in the 
previous century. Of the fleets recorded in the database, 140 operated in the fifth century BC, 
compared to 76 only in the fourth. Perhaps an even more striking comparison is the disparity in 
terms of the average numbers of ships per year across the two centuries; 95 ships per year in the 
fifth century BC, compared to 25 in the fourth century BC.184 This is a strikingly low number of  
reportedly active vessels when one compares it to the ship figures preserved in the naval lists. 
These documents provide a detailed itinerary o f fourth-century BC naval organization; or indeed 
disorganization, as the lists attest to a great deal o f ill-equipped vessels and rapacious trierarchs 
holding on to the city’s supplies of ship’s gear.185 While the naval lists often attest to several 
hundred hulls in Athens’ ship sheds, there was insufficient stocks gear to fully equip all the 
vessels. If the figures derived from the database are a reasonable indication, a smaller proportion 
still of these ships were launched.186 It has long been recognized, of course, that without her 
imperial revenues Athens was unable to subsidise her fleet to the same extent as she had 
previously; but even so, the huge discrepancy in volume of naval activity between the fifth and 
the fourth centuries BC indicated by the database is somewhat surprising. What must always be 
borne in mind, however, is that sustaining an average annual fleet of ‘only’ 25 triremes required 
the recruitment and retention o f nearly 5,000 active and able-bodied crewmen, a scale o f  
manpower beyond any but the largest Greek cities.
As well as putting far fewer ships into the water, the roles of the fleets o f the fourth century BC 
seem to have been somewhat different. Much of the difference in activities is probably a simple 
matter o f sources. The detailed historical account of Thucydides provides at least some of the 
evidence for 120 o f the fleets in the database, well over half of the total. His practice o f tracing 
fleets from year to year and place to place simply provides more information than anything 
written before or after. Even given this, however, there are some interesting differences in the 
nature o f the fleet activities when comparing the fifth century with the fourth. There were 
substantially fewer fleets acting as regional patrols and blockades in the fourth century, implying
183 Section One, Part C.2
184 Included in this calculation are the 32 ships listed as “at sea” each year in the naval lists for 326/5 and 325/4 BC, 
though due to the paucity o f details regarding their roles, these are not yet represented in the database
185 Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, pp. 146-69, “Athens suffered from a serious and chronic shortage o f  
equipment” (p. 147). He attributes this situation to the actions of rapacious trierarchs. As an example, “O f the 283 
ships possessed in 357/6, only about 89 could be fully equipped” (p. 147).
186 Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, pp. 146-57. He attributes this situation to the actions o f rapacious 
trierarchs. As an example, “O f the 283 ships possessed in 357/6, only about 89 could be fully equipped” (p. 147).
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that the resources to sustain such operations, which were often long-term, were difficult to find at 
this time. Without such a strong naval network, Athens’ sea power in the fourth century BC was 
a shadow o f its former self. Athens still had the largest navy amongst the Aegean states, at least 
on paper (or rather stone), but could not project this power effectively without the network of  
bases, allies and regional squadrons o f the fifth century. This position is reflected in other entries 
in this table; the fourth-century fleets facilitated far fewer land battles and sieges than those of the 
fifth, but participated in a greater level o f political and diplomatic activity. This reflects an 
Athens which attempted (or was obliged) to achieve foreign policy aims through negotiation 
rather than direct force.
After diplomacy, the biggest increase was in activity related to merchants. Perhaps the Athenians 
of the fourth century, in a climate where their naval network had been largely dismantled and 
they had fewer resources to put fleets in the water, had to be more proactive in protecting their 
supply lines, rather than relying on bases and their undisputed reputation for naval dominance. 
However, the numbers in the case of merchant-related activities in both the fourth and the fifth 
centuries are far too small to be certain about any such comparison.
This discussion has demonstrated the great range o f activities performed by the Athenian navy in 
the fifth and fourth centuries BC. It shows that a primary role of the navy, especially in the fifth 
century, was in the moving of troops and the facilitation o f land battles and sieges, and the wider 
projection of Athenian power overseas, and that this should make us pause before thinking of the 
navy only in terms of sea battles, or describing the trireme as a sort o f weapon. It has also 
revealed many facets o f the Athenian naval network, the extent and the limits of Athenian sea 
power, and how the use o f naval vessels could cause a distorted perception of Athenian strength. 
What a broad activity-by-activity approach threatens to conceal is the extent to which individual 
Athenian fleets performed multiple roles. In addition, an overview encompassing over 150 years 
and over 200 fleets necessarily takes us away from the day-to-day experiences of the men 
crewing the navy. A case study o f a single series o f fleets is needed to explore these factors.
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B: The Athenian Navv and Naupactos: a case study in diverse
fleet operations
The activities of Athens around Naupactos present sufficient evidence for a detailed case-study of 
the Athenian navy, and the operations and purposes of a crucial naval station. This emplacement 
was established in waters close to one of the most important naval powers in Greece, Corinth. 
But the reported activities of the Naupactos fleets were not solely, or even mostly, concerned 
with the Corinthians and their fleet, and this case study is useful as a demonstration of the wide 
range of tasks and objectives given to individual fleets, and their commanders. It also illuminates 
explicitly both the extent and the limitation of Athenian fifth-century thalassocracy.
Between 450 BC and 410 BC, there is evidence o f ten different fleets operating from or around 
Naupactos,187 often for several years at a time. The evidence for these fleets is tabulated in 
Appendix 4. Almost all o f this comes from Thucydides. Ships operating from the Naupactos 
base were involved in the stasis at Corcyra, the description of which is one of the most celebrated 
sections o f Thucydides’ work.188 While the fleet was not the primary focus of the narrative, its 
movements are nevertheless reported fully at this time. The Naupactos fleet under Phormio took 
centre stage in two o f Thucydides’ fullest descriptions o f naval battles; while these were not the 
biggest and most significant engagements, they provide a picture of the superiority of Athenian 
naval skill overcoming the larger fleets of their Peloponnesian rivals, and this detailed reporting 
of naval tactics should be considered an example of Thucydides’ method of using one set of 
circumstances to stand for whole categories of events. In the closing stages o f the war, the 
Naupactos command fell to Konon, later to be a survivor o f Aigospotamoi and a notable naval 
general.
The study o f the fleets operating at Naupactos also provides a case study of the difficulties in our 
source material. Thucydides is the most reliable and fullest literary source for naval movements, 
but even his account leaves many places where an overly demanding modem scholar might wish 
for more detail. As well as some difficulties in the full reconstruction of fleet movements, 
changes o f commander, appearances o f hitherto unexplained vessels and other such details, the 
chronology of (probably) the earliest Athenian intervention in Naupactos in the mid-fifth century 
BC is tied up with the thorny debate over the chronology o f the Pentekontaetia in general.
1: The Capture and Colonization of Naupactos
The first Athenian intervention at Naupactos is a source o f much debate and controversy, coming 
as it does at the end of the Helot revolt and subsequent war at Ithome, events whose chronology
187 One of these fleets comprised two ships, Salaminia and Paralos, which arrived in Naupactos and joined up with the 
fleet there in 427 BC. It is not therefore listed as an individual fleet in the Naupactos Details table in Appendix 4.
188 Thucydides, 3.70 ff.
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has been the subject of much attention. Two connected interventions at Naupactos need 
discussion; its capture by the Athenians, and the subsequent settling by the Athenians of 
Messenian ex-helots on the site. Most scholars assume that Naupactos was taken by means o f a 
voyage around the Peloponnese, and that the capture was followed soon by the colonization, 
probably as part o f the same campaign. These assumptions are surely correct, but many 
questions regarding the sequence of events remain. The starting point is Thucydides’ statement 
regarding the settlement of Naupactos:
hoi d' en Ithomei dekatoi etei, hos ouketi edunanto antechein, xunebesan pros tons 
Lakedaimonious eph' hoi exiasin ek Peloponnesou hupospondoi...kai autous hoi 
Athenaioi dexamenoi kat' echthos ede to Lakedaimonion es Naupakton katdikisan, 
hen etuchon heirekotes neosti Lokron ton Ozolon echonton
In the tenth year the rebels at Ithome found they could hold out no longer and 
surrendered to the Lacedaimonians on condition that they should leave the 
Peloponnese under truce... and the Athenians received them, in consequence of the 
enmity to the Lacedaimonians already existing, and settled them at Naupactos, a 
place that had been recently occupied by the Ozolian Locrians.189
This translation adopts the interpretation of Badian, and followed by Homblower, that the “Greek 
should mean that the Lokrian seizure of the place was recent [and]...thereby palliates the 
aggressiveness o f the subsequent Athenian seizure.”190 Whatever Thucydides’ motivation for not 
referring here to the Athenian capture of Naupactos,191 this passage gives us a date for the 
Messenians being settled there.192 Exactly what date is implied depends upon how one deals with 
the duration, ten years, reported in this passage, a problem for which there is abundant scholarly 
opinion. If the manuscripts are as accurate as they are unanimous in the transmission of the 
numeral, then it gives a date o f around 455 BC for the end of the Helot revolt and siege of 
Ithome. The inescapable conclusion of this interpretation is that Thucydides narrated these 
events out of chronological sequence, and therefore events in the subsequent chapters preceded 
the colonization.193 Thus many scholars prefer to amend Thucydides’ text to make him say four 
or five years for the duration, and so preserve the sequence. In his commentary, Gomme argues 
that the text is corrupt and dismisses arguments suggesting that Thucydides reported the end of 
the revolt out o f sequence.194 His stance is followed by Pritchett; “If we maintain chronological 
order and place the Messenian settlement at Naupaktos after the affair at Thasos, scholars have 
observed that the numeral...must be wrong.”195 He describes attempts to challenge Thucydides
189 Thucydides, 1.1031-3. The passage continues by narrating the alliance between Megara and Athens, and the latter’s 
building o f Long Walls for the former.
190 Homblower ad loc 1.103, referring to Badian, From Plataea to Potidaea, p. 163-9. Pritchett (Thucydides’ 
Pentekontaetia, p. 73-4) disagrees with this interpretation.
191 Badian (From Plataea to Potidaea  passim, esp. p. 168) casts Thucydides as a constant Athenian apologist, 
meliorating Athenian aggressiveness at every opportunity. In this case, it perhaps did not need stating that, in order to 
settle the Messenian at Naupactos, the Athenians had to be in control of it.
192 The alternative view, that Thucydides (1.103) narrates a recent Athenian capture o f Naupactos after all, which is 
followed by the settlement o f the Messenians, which is followed some years later by Tolmides’ expedition (Pritchett, 
Thucydides ’ Pentekontaetia, p. 71 ff.) is discussed below.
193 Notably the alliance between Megara and Athens, and the building o f the former’s Long Walls.
194 Gomme, H C T \ol. 1, pp. 402 ff
195 Pritchett, Thucydides ’ Pentekontetia Thucydides, p. 24
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in this and other matters as an “occult campaign”.196 The case for emendation would be stronger, 
however, if there was disagreement in the ancient evidence as to the length o f the Helot revolt, 
but it is unanimous in recording a duration of ten years.197 It is of course possible that all o f our 
sources have got the numeral wrong, but more powerful arguments for emendation than the idea 
of Thucydides’ strict adherence to chronological order are needed. Badian is perhaps the most 
strident recent author to argue for the retention of ‘ten’, referring to Gomme and others as 
“fundamentalists” for their adherence to the idea o f Thucydides reporting all events in strict 
sequence.198 Scholars including Homblower199 and Lewis200 have accepted the idea that 
Thucydides occasionally reported events out o f their sequential place, and this indeed seems the 
far stronger position.
Making a choice with regard to these chronologies has consequences for the Athenian navy’s 
activities in Naupactos. The interpretation favoured in this work would give a date o f c.455 BC 
for the settlement of the Messenians at Naupactos; what it does not tell us is when Naupactos was 
captured by the Athenians in the first place. Given the general assumptions that, firstly, the 
capture o f Naupactos would occur only shortly before the settlement, perhaps even in the same 
campaign, and secondly that the capture could only be effected by a naval expedition round the 
Peloponnese, it is tempting to follow Diodorus in attributing the capture to the Athenian general 
Tolmides and his famous periplous of the Laconian coast.201
Tolmides’ Command: 456/5 BC (Fleet 23)
The date of Tolmides’ expedition is fairly secure, as it is given in Diodorus and a Scholiast to 
Aeschines as the archonship o f Kallias, 456/5 BC. However, Diodorus is the only source of the 
several which report the activities of Tolmides to associate him explicitly with the capture and 
colonization o f Naupactos. His treatment is also by far the fullest. After describing at some 
length the preparations for the expedition, his account o f events is as follows:
hos d' autoi kai talla ta pros ten strateian hetoimasto, pentekonta men trieresin 
anechthe kai tetrakischiliois hoplitais, katapleusas de tes Lakonikes eis Methonen, 
touto men to chorion heile, ton de Lakedaimonion boethesanton anezeuxe, kai 
parapleusas eis to Gutheion, epineion ton Lakedaimonion, cheirdsamenos de kai 
tauten ten polin kai ta neoria ton Lakedaimonion empresas, ten choran 
edeiosen. ekeithen de anachtheis epleuse tes Kephallenias eis Zakunthon: tauten 
de cheirdsamenos kai pasas tas en tei Kephalleniai poleis prosagagomenos, eis to 
peran diepleuse kai kateren eis Naupakton. homoios de kai tauten ex ephodou
196 Pritchett, Thucydides ’ Pentekontetia, p. 163. One suspects that it is a reference primarily to Badian’s work.
197 This is pointed out by Gomme (HCT  vol. 1, p. 403), although he still concludes than emendation is required.
198 Badian, Plataea to Potidaea, pp. 78-81 especially.
199 Though not necessarily in this particular instance; in his brief discussion o f the numeral, Homblower (ad loc 1.103) 
does not definitively state his view. He points out that retaining deka means abandoning the idea that Thucydides 
always wrote in strict sequence, and refers to a recent discussion (McNeal’s) that retains the numeral.
200 In a chronological note (Cambridge Ancient History, volume 5 (second edition) p. 500), Lewis argues that “an 
unnecessary belief in the strict order o f Thucydides’ account has frequently led...to the emendation o f the numeral”, 
arguing for the Helot Revolt to be dated from 465/4-456/5 BC.
201 Diodorus, 11.84
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labon, katoikisen eis tauten Messenion torn episemous, hupospondous hupo 
Lakedaimonion aphethentas202
When all the other preparations for his expedition had been made, he [Tolmides] 
set out to sea with fifty triremes and four thousand hoplites203 and putting in at 
Methone in Laconia, he took the place; and when the Lacedaimonians came to 
defend it, he withdrew, and cruising along the coast to Gytheum, which was a 
seaport of the Lacedaimonians, he seized it, burnt the city and also the dockyards 
of the Lacedaimonians, and ravaged its territory. From here he set out to sea and 
sailed to Zacynthus which belonged to Cephallenia; he took the island and won 
over all the cities on Cephallenia, and then sailed across to the opposite mainland 
and put in at Naupactos. This city he likewise seized at the first assault and in it 
he settled the prominent Messenians whom the Lacedaimonians had allowed to go 
free under truce.204
Once again, Diodorus is the only source to report the connection between Tolmides’ expedition 
and the capture and settlement of Naupactos. Accepting this connection thus places heavy 
reliance on a source whose account o f the fifth century is, in general, veiy poor; and whose detail 
regarding even this expedition are not to be wholly relied upon.205 For example, a periplous of 
the Peloponnese from Athens would arrive at Gytheum before reaching Methone, contrary to the 
suggestion in Diodorus’ account.206 However, if Diodorus is prone to inaccuracy on Tolmides’ 
expedition, at least he is in the company of most o f our other material. None of our sources can 
be relied upon for Tolmides’ itinerary, as each o f them reports a different series o f towns and 
activities; though the burning of the Spartan dockyards is common to nearly all. Confusion over 
geography is a common feature of most ancient writers, and does not fatally damage the 
credibility o f Diodorus’ connection of Tolmides with Naupactos. Rejecting Diodorus’ account of 
Tolmides and Naupactos because it is not mentioned in the other sources looks at first to be a 
convincing argument, but becomes far less compelling when one appreciates the nature o f the 
‘rival’ accounts. Even the fact that Thucydides does not specifically tie the expedition of 
Tolmides (which he does report, briefly, at 1.108) with the capture and colonization of Naupactos 
cannot be regarded as decisive;207 even if this can be counted as an omission in Thucydides’ 
account, it is hardly his only, nor the most significant, in the Pentekontaetia,208
202 Diodorus 11.84.6-7
203 The original number o f hoplites voted had been 1,000, but in the passage preceding this, Diodorus explains the 
stratagem whereby he increased the strength o f his army. Lewis (Cambridge Ancient History, p. 117, n. 38) notes this 
is a very large number o f hoplites compared to the number o f ships.
204 Diodorus goes on to explain that this truce was between the Spartans and the Messenians at Ithome, following a 
long war, which suggests the same chronological context as that given by Thucydides.
205 Pritchett (Thucydides’ Pentekontaetia, pp. 163-71) puts this case most forcefully, criticizing scholars who find 
“golden nuggets” in Diodorus’ history without recognizing how poor his work in book 11 is as a whole.
206 Most obviously, Aeschines (2.75) speaks o f Tolmides marching by land through the Peloponnese, a glaring error 
corrected by the scholiast’s comment on the passage.
207 Such a connection would only ruled out by Thucydides if  it is believed that he stuck to strictly chronological 
reporting in the Pentekontaetia; for on such an interpretation, the colonization o f Naupactos by the Messenians would 
have occurred some time (c. 5-6 years) prior to Tolmides’ expedition. The case is not certain, but, as argued above, the 
argument that he occasionally finished o ff one event before reporting the start o f the next seems far the stronger. 
Thucydides’ narrative on this interpretation is thus not incompatible with the connection o f Tolmides with Naupactos; 
he simply did not choose to clearly indicate it.
208 Unz (‘Chronology o f the Pentekontaetia’, p. 75, n. 34) makes this point
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While this scenario might not be regarded as entirely satisfactory, it has nevertheless been 
accepted by modem writers such as Unz, Lewis, Homblower and Badian,209 arriving at a general 
picture o f a periplous involving a series of attacks and raids along the Peloponnesian coast, 
culminating in the capture and colonization of Naupactos in the year 456/5 BC. One reason for 
the accepting of this scenario is that the alternative is less satisfactory still.
The alternative, as advocated by Pritchett, requires a significant expedition round the 
Peloponnese prior to that of Tolmides, one which would have been the first Athenian expedition 
of its kind, one which succeeded in the capture of the crucially important strategic site of 
Naupactos and the settling there of the Messenians, and yet one for which we have no 
information, not even the name of the Athenian general in command. Tolmides, by contrast, 
receives mention by name in no less than six literary accounts in the context of his periplous,210 
despite (on this interpretation) having achieved nothing o f long-term significance to compare 
with Naupactos’ capture. It is o f course impossible to prove that such an expedition did not 
happen; but while our sources on Tolmides are uniformly unsatisfactory in their details, they do 
testify to one key fact: that it was his periplous at this time that was most significant and notable.
I suggest that it was not particularly the capture o f Naupactos that made Tolmides’ expedition 
famous (after all, only one of the six accounts make the connection explicit), but rather that he 
was the first commander to make such a campaign around the Peloponnese. While the scholiast 
on Aeschines claims Tolmides won “brilliant fame” by his exploits, it is again only Diodorus 
who reports that it was because he was the first to attack the Spartan’s coast.
epi de touton Tolmides ho tetagmenos epi tes nautikes dunameos, hamillomenos 
pros ten Muronidou areten te kai doxan, espeuden axiologon ti katergasasthai. dio 
kai kat' ekeinous tous kairous medenos proteron peporthekotos ten Lakdniken, 
parekalese ton demon deidsai ten ton Spartiaton choran
During the year [archonship of Kallias=446/5 BC] Tolmides, who was commander 
of the naval forces and vied with both the valour and fame of Myronides, was 
eager to accomplish a memorable deed. Consequently, since in those times no one 
had ever yet laid waste to Laconia, he urged the Athenian people to ravage the 
territory o f the Spartans.211
The ‘signature event’ of the campaign, the burning of the Spartan port o f Gytheum, was notable 
not because of its long-term military impact on the power of Sparta, but because such a raid on
209 The connection o f Naupactos’ capture with Tolmides is argued for by Badian (Plataea to Potidaea, p. 163-9), and 
his view (if only on this specific matter) is accepted by Homblower (Commentary, ad loc 1.103) and Lewis in 
Cambridge Ancient History, p. 117. Pritchett (Thucydides’ Pentekontaetia, p. 165-7) argues that Diodorus’ accuracy 
on the matter o f Tolmides’ periplous should be considered in the context o f his woeful account o f the middle of the 
fifth century in general, and that assuming an unmentioned periplous to settle the Messenians is preferable to accepting 
Diodorus’ version.
210 Thucydides 1.103, cf. 108; Diodorus, 11.84; Polyaenus, 3.3; Plutarch, Life o f  Pericles, 19.2; Aeschines, 2.75 with 
Scholiast(=Fomara 84). The sources are set out in full by Pritchett, Thucydides' Pentekontetia, pp. 74-6.
211 Diodorus, 11.84.2-3
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Spartan territory had no precedent.212 The event fitted into a pattern of deteriorating relations 
between the two following the snubbing of Kimon’s expedition to aid Sparta during the Helot 
revolt, and the alliances subsequently forged between Athens and Sparta’s enemies, Thessaly and 
Argos.213 The emphasis of the reports is on attacks upon the Peloponnesian coast, but as Lewis 
points out, the two locations mentioned in Thucydides (along with the Spartan dockyards) are in 
the Gulf o f Corinth.214 A date of 456/5 BC would place the expedition of Tolmides during the 
First Peloponnesian War, fought primarily between Athens and Corinth, and Lewis argues that 
“one of the main objectives [of Tolmides’ campaign] was to carry the war” to the Gulf of 
Corinth. It is worth noting that, on Pritchett’s interpretation, the seizure and colonization of 
Naupactos would have to have taken place prior to the alliance between the Megarians and 
Athenians, which was described by Thucydides as “the original and the main cause of the intense 
hatred of Athens by Corinth”.215 Given the aggressive nature o f the Athenian attack on 
Naupactos, and the strategic significance o f the site in relation to Corinthian shipping, it is hard to 
see how Thucydides could have justified describing the Megarian alliance as the “original” cause 
of hatred, if  indeed it had been preceded by the Messenian colonization of Naupactos he had just 
mentioned216 Homblower argues that “the statement that this [i.e. the Megarian alliance] began 
the hatred is emphatically put”; perhaps it was done so in order to indicate that the chronological 
sequence in this part o f the narrative had been interrupted. Thucydides reports the Athenian 
settlement o f Messenians at Naupactos before the account of the Athens/Megara alliance, but 
takes the time to remind his readers that the second event mentioned was the “original” event 
chronologically.217
Advance Plans for the Capture and Colonization of Naupactos?
Badian takes the argument a stage further; not merely that the Athenians sought to move the 
theatre of war to the Gulf o f Corinth, but that Naupactos itself was the Athenians’ target from the 
beginning.218 He finds support for this view in Thucydides’ account o f events in central Greece 
after the battle of Tanagra, just prior to Tolmides’ expedition:
kai machei en Oinophutois tous Boidtous nikesantes tes te choras ekratesan tes 
Boiotias kai Phokidos kai Tanagraion to teichos perieilon kai Lokron ton 
Opountion hekaton andras homerous tous plousiotatous elabon, ta te teiche 
heauton ta makra apetelesan
212 By way o f comparison, Francis Drake’s naval raid on the Spanish port o f Cadiz enjoys fame far out of proportion to 
its military significance, probably again because it was both daring and unprecedented.
213 Thucydides, 1.102
214 Lewis, Cambridge Ancient History, p. 118
215 Thucydides, 1.103.4
216 Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, p. 260-2 stresses the importance of the capture and (in his view) later colonization of  
Naupactos in relation to relations between Athens and Corinth, but his chronology differs from the one accepted in this 
study insofar as “The settlement o f the helots preceded the alliance with Megara”.
217 It seems impossible to believe that the Corinthians would have been indifferent to these sudden events at Naupactos. 
It is equally improbable that Thucydides would, given the role it played in the Peloponnesian war, interpret the taking 
of Naupactos as o f minimal significance. Contra Salmon; see previous note.
218 Badian, Plataea to Potidaea, pp. 168-9
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They [i.e. the Athenians] defeated the Boeotians in battle at Oenophyta and 
conquered the whole o f Boeotia and Phocis. They pulled down the fortifications 
of Tanagra and took as hostages a hundred of the richest people among the
• * 2 1 9Opuntian Locrians.
Badian suggests that the forcing of the Opuntian Locrians alone to give up 100 hostages from 
amongst their richest citizens was a deliberate ploy to soften up Naupactos in anticipation of a 
take-over. With a large portion of the local elite held as hostages in the wake of Athens’ victory 
at Oenophyta, the Athenians could have ordered the Opuntian Locrians to withdraw their settlers 
from Naupactos, thus making it easier for Tolmides to attack the town.220 Under the terms of an 
earlier treaty between the Opuntian Locrians and their settlers in Naupactos, they were to be 
guaranteed residence in their mother-city.221 Whether or not this conjecture is accepted, the 
strategic importance of the Naupactos site in relation to Corinth was probably not lost upon the 
Athenians when they voted in favour o f Tolmides’ expedition, regardless of whether or not they 
wanted Tolmides to win fame. It is also true that the number of hoplites is larger than one might 
expect had only raiding and ravaging of the Peloponnesian coastline been envisioned.
Whether a colony of Messenians was planned at the outset o f the expedition is impossible to say; 
probably not, given that during the planning o f the expedition, the war at Ithome was ongoing, 
and the capture o f Naupactos could not have been guaranteed.222 Naupactos, or some similar site 
to threaten Corinthian shipping, may have been the target from the beginning, but the settlement 
of the Messenians must surely be regarded as skilful opportunism on the part of Tolmides. On 
the chronological reconstruction defended here, the conquest and colonization took place during 
the same campaigning season, which appears to be a unique occurrence. It was argued in the 
previous section that a conquering fleet would not have been able to establish a new colony upon 
a site it had taken, as the Assembly would have needed to arrange a lottery to select the 
Athenians who were to be settlers. Tolmides appears to have circumvented this difficulty by 
using non-Athenian settlers; the Messenian rebels, who were moving through the Peloponnese 
under a Spartan truce. It would be interesting indeed to know how far Tolmides was exceeding 
the bounds of his mission, and what the reaction at home was to his turning over Naupactos to the 
Messenians; our sources do not shed any light upon this, though no source mentions any 
punishment or trouble for Tolmides, and indeed Aeschines’ (admittedly muddled) mention of 
him is in the context o f exemplary Athenian military achievements which ought to be emulated:
219 Thucydides, 1.108.3
220 Badian, Plataea and Potidaea, p. 168-9. In commenting on this argument, Homblower (Commentary, ad loc 
1.108.3) seems to misrepresents it slightly; he paraphrases Badian as saying “that the Athenians were already planning 
the periplous o f Tolmides and the settlement o f the Messenians at Naupactos”; in fact, Badian says that it is uncertain 
whether the Athenians knew at the planning stage whether or not the Messenians would have been available.
221 The Ozulian/Westem/Hypocnemidian Locrians. The treaty; ML 20=Fomara, 47 11. 8-10 required the Opuntian 
Locrians to accept into their city those Locrian settlers in the event that they are driven out from Naupactos.
222 Though it has to be admitted that it would have been in character for Thucydides’ Athenians to make arrangements 
for a colony on a site they did not yet hold, given their overconfidence and expectation o f victory.
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ego de hapantdn men touton ephen dein memnesthai...kai ten Tolmidou zeloun 
strategian keleudn, hos chilious echon epilektous Athenaion, dia meses 
Peloponnesou polemias ouses adeos diexeiei.
I bid you emulate... [describes other past Athenian victories, with many other 
inaccuracies of detail]...and the generalship o f Tolmides, who marched without 
fear with one thousand picked troops through the centre o f the Peloponnese.223
The Messenians were not alone in their new settlement; inscriptional evidence makes clear that 
the resident Naupactians had not all been killed or driven away by the Athenians.224 In the 420s 
BC, together with the Messenians, they made a dedicatory offering to Zeus from the spoils of 
war. It also seems clear that no Athenians stayed as part of the settlement. Given the alliance 
made between Athens and the newly settled Naupactos225 and the strategic value of Naupactos in 
its control o f the Gulf o f Corinth, it seems likely that at least some of the Athenian ships would 
have stayed there and used it as a naval base against the Corinthians. However, there is no direct 
evidence for a patrol fleet established at Naupactos at this time; for such testimony, one has to 
wait until the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.
To sum up; Naupactos was taken and colonised under the auspices of Tolmides in 456/5 BC, in 
the first o f what was to be a pattern of raiding voyages around the Peloponnese. It followed a 
sharp downturn in relations between Corinth and Athens, a deterioration that had begun some 
years before with the alliance between Athens and Megara. Though the site clearly had strategic 
value, it is impossible to prove whether prior planning or shrewd opportunism was primarily 
responsible for the capture. Such an interpretation requires the retention of the manuscript figure 
of ten years for the length o f the helot revolt, and the further conclusion that Thucydides related 
some events out o f sequence.
2: Naupactos in the Archidamian War
Phormio’s Command: winter 430/429-spring 428 BC (Fleets 55 and 56)
The account of the next recorded Athenian naval intervention at Naupactos is far fuller. It 
involved the fleet under Phormio that famously won two naval victories despite being heavily 
outnumbered; their interest and importance notwithstanding, these were just two events in the 
‘life-span’ o f a fleet that was in commission for about 18 months, between the winter o f 430 BC 
and the spring o f 428 BC.
223 Aeschines, 2.75
224 ML 74=Fomara, 135. In addition see the discussion by Lewis (Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 5, p. 118) of an 
unpublished inscription. Both o f these texts indicate the existence of previous inhabitants living alongside the 
Messenian settlers.
225 Following his description o f the settling o f Naupactos, quoted above, Thucydides (1.103) says that the Athenians 
entered in an alliance with the Megarians “also”. The implication is that an alliance was concluded with Naupactos, 
and there is no difficulty in believing that the Messenians and previous inhabitants both would be quite willing to make 
such an agreement (not least as Tolmides had 50 ships and hundreds o f hoplites at hand). See Pritchett, Thucydides ’ 
Pentekontaetia, p. 78-9
60
Such long commissions were not unusual in the Athenian navy; what is unusual is the level of 
detail recorded regarding this particular fleet. But while the base at Naupactos may be taken to 
be somewhat representative o f other such emplacements throughout the Aegean, it was probably 
unusual in both importance and size. The largest navy of the Peloponnesian fleet belonged to 
Corinth, and it was against the ships, particularly merchant vessels, sailing to and from this city 
that the Naupactos squadron operated; according to Thucydides, this was the purpose of 
Phormio’s fleet. This was potentially very dangerous for the Corinthians, who like the Athenians, 
depended on imported com:226
tou d' epigignomenou cheimdnos Athenaioi naus esteilan eikosi men peri 
Peloponneson kai Phormiona strategon, hos hormdmenos ek Naupaktou phulaken 
eiche met' ekplein ekKorinthou kai tou Krisaiou kolpou medena met' esplein
The following winter the Athenians sent twenty ships and Phormio as general 
round the Peloponnese, who from Naupactos guarded against anyone sailing out of 
Corinth into the Gulf of Krisa or anyone sailing in.227
As we have seen, such blockades were in practice difficult to enforce except in the most narrow 
of waters; triremes, while being more weatherly than is often assumed, could not stand out to sea 
constantly and in all weathers. The effective limits o f blockades with oared galleys, even under 
skilful and responsible commanders, are made clear in the summer of 429 BC, when the 
Peloponnesians were able to amass land forces, often transported by sea, at Leukas “without 
being noticed by Phormio, in command of the twenty ships around Naupactos.”228 It is of course 
impossible to determine exactly how negligent Phormio was in this instance; is Thucydides 
implying censure simply by recording this fact? Even if Thucydides did mean to suggest 
Phormio should have done better, we at least should recognize the logistical problems faced by 
ancient navies in blockading waterways. There is only a little evidence to suggest how such 
patrols were conducted. For example, the Athenian fleet at Pylos had two ships row all day 
round the island of Sphakteria in opposite direction, and would presumably rotate the vessels as 
the men tired. At night, the entire fleet o f seventy ships lay at anchor around the island.229 
Clearly, Phormio could not achieve such a perfect blockade with a far smaller force and a far 
larger area to patrol. He certainly had enough ships to perform a similar daily routine, even in 
several places at once; but his fleet had a much larger area to patrol than was the case at 
Sphakteria. In addition Phormio’s fleet had a powerful and active enemy fleet in the vicinity, and 
splitting his forces to make an effective ‘screen’ might leave them in danger of being attacked 
one by one, destroying the fleet piecemeal.
There is in fact direct evidence that Phormio was reluctant to split up his fleet too much or spread 
his forces too thinly; following the build-up o f Peloponnesian forces at Leukas and their attack on
226 Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, p. 129-31
227 Thucydides, 2.69.1
228 Thucydides, 2.80
229 Thucydides, 4.23
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Acamania, Phormio received deputations from the Acamanians to come to their aid. He refused, 
on the grounds that Naupactos could not be left undefended with an enemy fleet in the vicinity.230 
Such caution may well have been sensible, but in this, he contrasts to some extent with one o f his 
successors at Naupactos, who was willing to leave but a token fleet behind at Naupactos in order 
to interfere in Corcyra.231 While he might have detached one or two ships from his force for 
particular missions, he clearly did not wish, for example, to leave half his ships behind and take 
half to aid the Acamanians. Later events in this same year demonstrated that Phormio was not 
simply timid; rather he should be considered overtly aware of his primary objective, and the 
danger to Naupactos that a large Peloponnesian fleet, with many troops at hand, represented. 
This episode is a good illustration of the role played by Athenian generals in the field; Phormio 
was not able to refer to the Assembly for an immediate decision on whether or not to help the 
Acamanians, and it was clearly not direct orders that prevented him from doing so.232 While he 
would certainly have the Assembly’s reaction to his actions in mind (most acutely if he thought it 
likely Naupactos could be taken), Phormio clearly had the option of aiding the Acamanians, but 
refused for strategic reasons. While Phormio stuck to the patrol duties on this occasion, later in 
429 BC his fleet were involved in more diverse actions.
The two battles fought in 429 BC between Phormio’s fleet and far larger Peloponnesian forces 
have already received much detailed comment and description, not least from Thucydides 
himself.233 Sea battles were the exception rather than the rule for most Athenian fleets, and this 
was probably even more the case for patrol fleets. The Naupactos fleet was different, in that it 
was deployed expressly against the Peloponnesians’ strongest naval power, and in sufficient 
numbers to show that this was no mere ‘trip-wire’ to bring reinforcements. The crews of ships 
sent to Naupactos would have been more expectant o f facing conflict at some point in their 
deployment than would, for example, those sent to patrol around Euboea. Out o f the eight fleets 
active at this most difficult of naval stations, four faced battle at sea.234
Following the first battle of 429 BC, Phormio sent news of his victory to Athens, and requested 
aid.235 While Thucydides does not explicitly say so (no doubt because he thought it obvious), this 
piece of news was borne by a trireme; if for no other reason than this was the only type of vessel 
Phormio is recorded as having in his fleet,236 and an overland messenger would be passing
230 Thucydides, 4.81
231 See discussion below.
232 On the subject o f the amount o f latitude and independence Athenian generals could exhibit, and the price they paid 
for this when things went badly, see Hamel, Athenian Generals, esp. pp. 158 ff.
233 In modem writing, see the detailed account, with maps, provided by Morrison, Coates and Rankov, Athenian 
Trireme, p. 69 ff.
234 This is indeed a higher proportion than the average, which is nearer a quarter. (Of the 216 fleets recorded, only 45 
participated in a sea battle.)
235 Fleet 56. Thucydides, 2.85
236 The possibility that Phormio (and other naval commanders) had access to smaller vessels that were unrecorded, and 
that these vessels could have been used for running despatches, cannot be ruled out. There is, however, enough 
evidence o f triremes being used to report information and request aid (for example, Konon, when commander o f the 
Naupactos fleet in 413 BC; Thucydides 7.31) to suggest that the practice was common.
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through universally hostile territory. Relaying of information to Athens, and requesting 
reinforcements, was a regular feature o f Athenian naval operations.
The response to Phormio’s request was also somewhat typical of naval operations in this period; 
reinforcements were sent, but not directly. The fleet of 20 despatched to aid Phormio was 
instructed first to sail to Crete to undertake a strong-arm diplomatic mission.237 This intervention 
was instigated by Athens’ proxenos,238 a Cretan named Nicias, who suggested that the Athenians 
would win over the city of Cydonia. In fact, the fleet only ends up ravaging Cydonian land, and 
as Thucydides records, “wasting a considerable amount of time” due to contrary weather 
conditions before progressing to Naupactos. Missions like this, with a dual purpose, were not 
uncommon.239 In a similar vein, changing circumstances might have meant that a fleet intended 
for one purpose would find its role changed, or augmented, at the last minute.240 All this 
demonstrates the way in which fleets could be despatched for one purpose could end up fulfilling 
quite another role; it attests to the flexibility o f the fleets and in particular the commanders.241
In this particular instance, the Athenian commander o f the (eventual) reinforcement fleet, Fleet 
56, was not named, nor described as a strategos?42 Thucydides calls him ho komizon, a unique 
and “curious nomenclature”.243 When this fleet arrived in Naupactos, it seems that all 40 ships 
fall under Phormio’s command.244 There is some value in following Jordan’s suggestion that this 
man was not one o f the ten elected strategoi, but one o f the variously named archai who are 
found in command if ships from time to time.245
By the time the fleet from Crete arrived in Naupactos, Phormio had already won his second 
brilliant victory.246 Perhaps emboldened by his victory and with his fleet doubled, Phormio made 
an expedition from Naupactos in the winter o f 429/8 BC to strengthen the Athenian hold on 
Acamania.247 Various places, including Stratus and Coronta, are mentioned as being cleared of 
(from the Athenian point of view) “undesirable elements”; an attack on the city of Oenidae was
237 Thucydides, 2.85
238 A proxenos was a citizen o f a city who was responsible for looking after the interests o f another city. Nicias of 
Gortyn was Athens’ proxenos in Gortyn, and thus responsible for seeing to Athenian interests there. Proxenoi were 
therefore something between an ambassador and a double agent; somewhat more o f the later in this case, as Nicias was 
encouraging the Athenians to implement a coup in a neighbouring city on Crete.
239 Cf. Thucydides 4.2 f f ,  for example; this fleet was sent to reinforce Athenian forces on Sicily, making a stop at 
Corcyra on their way, and then was diverted again to Pylos.
240 For example, Thucydides, 1.57 ff; a fleet for Macedonia was diverted to Potidaea. See also Thucydides, 3.4-6
241 It also asks questions o f Rosivach’s interpretation o f fleet manning (discussed in more detail below, Part One, 
section C .l). Given the uncertainty and plurality o f objectives that a single fleet might have, it could be difficult for 
crewmen to know how long a particular fleet was going to be at sea for. While there was certainly some divide 
between what Rosivach calls the annual ‘summer fleets’ that raided the Peloponnesian coast during the Archidamian 
war on the one hand and long-term commissions on the other, the distinction may not have been as clear cut to 
contemporary oarsmen seeking a rowing berth as it is for us looking back.
242 Thucydides, 2.92
243 Jordan, Athenian Navy, P. 128, n. 39.
244 Subsequent actions o f this fleet (e.g. Thucydides, 2.102) are attributed to Phormio alone.
245 1 discuss the evidence for these commanders below in Part Two, Section A.5, cf. Appendix 1.
246 Thucydides, 2.90 ff. Thucydides (2.92) seems unable to help remarking that Phormio’s fleet should have had 
reinforcements for the battle, but did not.
247 Thucydides, 2.102
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contemplated, but dismissed as impossible in winter. As far as the fleet was concerned, this was 
essentially a troop-carrying exercise; taking the 800 troops (400 Messenian and 400 Athenian) to 
an unspecified point, and picked them up again after they had been around the cities. Gomme, 
not unreasonably, suggests that the 400 Athenian “hoplites from the ships” were epibatai, 
marines, ten from each ship.248 This does not necessarily mean that all 39 ships were present on 
this mission, however. Despite his victories over the Peloponnesian fleet, Phormio may have 
been as reluctant as he was previously to leave Naupactos unguarded. It is possible that, having 
been reinforced, he would have felt able to split his forces, perhaps leaving half of the ships 
behind, and loading up all the marines and the 400 Messenian hoplites on the other half. It is 
impossible to be certain of course; Thucydides records the number of troops used in this 
essentially land-based campaign, but not the number of ships that took them there. An indicative 
passage, in that the role of the navy is not here spelt out.
Thucydides, in the closing paragraph of his second book, records that Phormio’s fleet 
(presumably all 39 remaining ships)249 returned from Naupactos to Athens. The recording of this 
event, which he dates to the spring of 428 BC, is chronologically interesting, as he relates it 
before he closes his account of the year with his usual formula; “so ended the winter and the third 
year o f this war recorded by Thucydides.” This would seem to be a clear case, minor though it is, 
of Thucydides finishing off the account of one series o f events out of strict chronological order.250 
The description of Phormio’s voyage itself is also not without interest:
hama eri katepleusan es tas Athenas, tous te eleutherous ton aichmaloton ek ton 
naumachion agontes, hoi aner ant' andros eluthesan, kai tas naus has heilon
In the spring they [the Athenian fleet under Phormio] sailed back to Athens and 
brought with them the ships that they had captured and all the free men who had 
been taken prisoner in their naval actions. These were exchanged, man for man.251
This is a brief hint at what must have been a considerable logistical problem for ancient navies; 
the capture and holding of prisoners. In all, the Athenians captured 18 enemy ships in their two 
victories, and as well as this several nauagia, “wrecks”, were recovered.252 Exactly what types of
248 Gomme, HCT, ad loc 102.1; This was a usual, though not the ‘standard’, number o f hoplites for a trireme to carry as 
part o f its crew. As Gomme points out, losses in battle would have meant that the marine compliments were not at full 
strength, and so if  400 is exactly accurate, it implies that there were more than ten hoplites per ship initially. Most 
likely, however, Thucydides is using a rough rule o f “ 10 per ship” to work out approximately accurate figures; if  some 
ships had slightly different compliments o f marines, or if there were some casualties, the rounded figure would still be 
400.
249 One Athenian vessel was lost in the second battle, and not re-taken; the Peloponnesians made a dedicatory offering 
o f it. Thucydides, 2.92.5
250 Perhaps surprisingly, Gomme (a defender o f the argument that Thucydides recorded events in strict order 
throughout his work) argues this, saying {HCT, ad loc 2.103) “Thucydides closes the episode, the year’s events, with 
Phormio’s return home; which actually overlapped with the beginning o f the following year. He anticipates a little” 
and that to suggest from this passage that somehow Thucydides counted the spring as part o f the ‘previous winter as 
“pedantic”.
251 Thucydides, 2.103
252 Triremes did not sink when holed, merely became waterlogged and impossible to row (Morrison, Coates and 
Rankov, Athenian Trireme, pp. 127-8). They could be salvaged after the battle, and either repaired, or stripped for 
useful timbers and ship’s gear.
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ships were taken is unclear. Whether the captured ships were towed to Athens, or the Athenian 
trireme crews spread themselves out so as to provide at least a skeleton crew for all the vessels is 
also unclear; either way would have slowed the fleet considerably. It is impossible to ascertain 
the scale of the problem, as there is no evidence o f the numbers o f prisoners involved. But even 
assuming only 25 prisoners per ship taken, the Athenians would have had close to 500 bodies to 
guard and extra mouths to feed. Even if only a proportion of the total men taken were citizens 
and imprisoned and held for later exchange, there is perhaps a suggestion in the text that the 
logistical burden was hard to bear; Thucydides says that “most o f the crews”253 of the 12 ships 
taken after the first battle are imprisoned, but after the second “some of the crews were killed, 
others imprisoned”.254 Given that ransoming prisoners could be politically beneficial and 
financially lucrative,255 this action perhaps implies that there were limits to the number of 
prisoners the Athenians at Naupactos felt they could handle.
It is notable that it was the free men who were reported to be imprisoned in this way, and then 
exchanged. What became of the slaves rowing the Peloponnesian ships is not reported, but 
suggestions can be made. They were possibly purchased wholesale and shipped off at once by 
merchants looking to profit from selling them on later at auctions. There is evidence of 
merchants following the Sicilian invasion fleet in order to profit in this way from the spoils of 
war and this was probably common practice for other fleets too.256 Fleet commanders, who 
appear to have had significant say over the division o f the spoils of battle, would thus be provided 
with ready cash and also relieved of a logistical problem. There is no evidence of merchant ships 
accompanying this particular fleet however, and such quick trade may not always have been 
possible, or even desirable. Athenian generals would no doubt have seen the advantage in certain 
circumstances of keeping indentured ship’s crew to hand. Incorporating captured slaves into 
their fleets would enable any ships taken from the opponents’ navy, along with any “wrecks” able 
to be repaired, to be manned and used all the quicker. Thucydides presents the competition for 
naval manpower as essential to strategic thinking prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian 
war.257 The narratives o f both Thucydides and Xenophon o f the course o f the conflict following 
the Athenian defeat at Syracuse in 413 BC show this competitive struggle to out-pay the other’s 
sailors. While it is free mercenaries that these writers seem to have most in mind, slave rowers 
should not be forgotten. As well as cases o f desertion, the capture of slaves in a naval encounter 
would have been a very obvious way for one side to boost its naval manpower at the expense of 
the other. Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence in this or any other case o f such a thing
253 Thucydides, 2.84.4
254 Thucydides, 2.92.2
255 See Thucydides, 3.70, where 800 talents were paid to ransom some Corcyraean prisoners. The figure is 
suspiciously high, but Gomme’s discussion {HCT, ad loc 3.70) o f this and other examples should leave us in no doubt 
as to the financial potential for ransoming captives.
256 Thucydides, 6.44
257 Thucydides, 1.121 cf. 1.143. Pericles’ pre-war speech is discussed in more detail in Part Two, section A.2
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happening, not least because, despite their crucial importance to the manning of ancient navies,
258the sources give but scant notices o f slaves as trireme crew.
With Phormio’s fleet returning to Athens, it would seem that the seas around Naupactos were left 
unguarded;259 perhaps the area was thought sufficiently secure after a winter without reports of 
any Peloponnesian fleets making another entrance into the Gulf of Corinth. Perhaps the 
Acamanian cities could be relied upon, for the time being, to keep an eye on the sea. 
Alternatively, as Gomme suggested, there were logistical concerns; “it was not easy to keep up 
supplies to so distant a place” 260 However, it is by no means clear that the Athenians did in fact 
send supplies to fleets and garrisons in far flung places; the usual and almost invariable practice 
was to supply troops and sailors with money to buy their own necessities. If the expense to the 
Athenian coffers o f the Naupactos squadron was an issue, then it is surprising that another fleet 
of similar scale was sent out later in 428 BC.261 It is perhaps better to consider the logistical 
difficulties in supplying Naupactos only in terms o f the regular influx o f wages for the crews; if 
there were problems with regard to this, a not uncommon occurrence,262 then perhaps the impetus 
to return came not from Athens, but from the men o f the fleet. Having been away for 18 months, 
with little prospect o f plunder, the trireme crews themselves may well have felt that it was time to 
return to Athens.
Asopios’ Command: summer 428 BC (Fleet 66)
The importance o f Naupactos as a naval base during the Peloponnesian war was underlined when 
the Athenians despatched a further fleet, this time of 30 ships, to take up station there in the 
summer of 428 BC. The launching of this fleet was thus a matter of a few months after Phormio’s 
return; but in that small delay it appears that the general was unavailable to return to the Gulf of 
Corinth. In an interesting passage, Thucydides reports a request made o f the Athenian assembly 
at this time:
keleusanton Akarnandn ton Phormionos tina sphisi pempsai e huion e xungene 
archonta
For the Acamanians had asked them to send out a son or relation of Phormio as 
commander.263
Assuming that this is an accurate report (and there is no compelling reason for us to think it is not 
so), it is most interesting not that only that a foreign power sought to influence the selection
258 Hunt, Slaves, Warfare and Ideology, pp. 83-101
259 Naupactos itself was still protected by its Messenian hoplites; without a fleet, however, they would have had no 
chance o f disrupting Corinthian shipping, which was Phormio’s original goal.
260 Gomme, HCT, vol. 2, p. 251
261 This one is, admittedly, smaller than the 39 ships that Phormio ended up with, numbering 30; still a considerable 
expense, however, especially considering the higher level o f naval activity (and thus expense) elsewhere in 428 BC 
compared to the previous year.
262 Knights, 1364-1378, cf. 1063-5
263 Thucydides, 3.7.1 Homblower (Commentary, ad loc 3.7.1) gives a good summary o f the debate concerning 
Phormio’s unavailability.
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Athenian generals, or at least the assignment o f generals to particular commands, but that the 
Athenians seem to have responded to such an appeal; the commander sent out to Naupactos was 
Asopios, the son of Phormio.
This fleet remained in place for at least 12 months, from the early summer of 428 BC, until the 
summer of 427 BC. It appears from Thucydides’ reporting of the fleet’s movements that this was 
another case o f a fleet with a dual objective. In the summer of 428 BC, the fleet sailed around the 
Peloponnese and “various places on the coast were laid waste”264 before Asopios divided his fleet 
in two; 18 of the 30 ships were sent back to Athens, and only 12 continued on to Naupactos. This 
seems to have been the plan from the start; to make short-term raids with a substantial number of 
ships, but to pare back the fleet for the longer-term task o f patrolling the region of Naupactos.
Asopios was an active commander in 428 BC, making an attempt on Oenidae and various other 
places. However, he was killed along with many of his troops in a land battle near Nerikus. The 
fleet, however, did not seem to have suffered much from the loss of these troops and their 
commander; at any rate, there were still 12 Athenian ships on station at Naupactos a year later in 
the summer o f 427 BC.265
Salaminia, Paralos and Nicostratus’ Command: 427 BC (Fleets 65 and 66)
The sequence o f events and naval movements in this year are of particular interest, as they 
involved the Athenian sacred ships Salaminia and Paralos. It is clear that these singular vessels 
were not part o f Asopios’ original fleet, nor were they in Naupactos at the start o f 427 BC. 
Indeed, Thucydides reports them as spotting a Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas while they were 
cruising off Clarus, near Notium, on the other side of the Aegean Sea.266 He does not report what 
the Salaminia and Paralos were doing in Ionian waters, nor whether they achieved their original 
aims; only that they immediately headed to Mytilene on Lesbos to relate the information to 
Paches, the Athenian general there.267 Paches was not slow to react:
ho de hupo spoudes epoieito ten dioxin: kai mechri men Patmou tes nesou 
epedioxen, hos d' ouketi en katalepsei ephaineto epanechorei
[Paches] therefore, immediately set out in pursuit and went after them [the 
Peloponnesian fleet] as far as the island of Patamos [100 miles south o f Mytilene].
From here he turned back again, since it appeared that they had got away out of 
reach.268
Like the Salaminia and Paralos, Alcidas and his fleet were found on the far side of the Aegean 
later that same summer. It is likely that the sacred ships joined Paches in the pursuit to Patamos,
264 Thucydides, 3.7
265 Thucydides, 3.69
266 Thucydides, 3.33
267 Thucydides, 3.33
268 Thucydides, 3.33
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at which point Alcidas had a substantial lead. When Paches returned to Mytilene, however, it 
need not be assumed that Salaminia and Paralos went with him. Indeed their later presence in 
Naupactos suggests that they most likely parted company with Paches at this point, and sailed 
west. Thucydides tells us nothing o f their movements between reaching Patamos and turning up 
in Naupactos, but it seems most likely that they would not have gone straight from the one place 
to the other; they may have needed to finish the mission that had taken them into Ionian waters in 
the first place, and, perhaps more importantly, they may have reported back to Athens regarding 
the recent presence o f an (admittedly timid) Peloponnesian fleet in the eastern Aegean.
Alcidas’ route to the Gulf of Corinth was also not direct. Thucydides reports that the fleet:
pros tei Kretei cheimastheisai kai ap' autes sporades pros ten Peloponneson 
katenechthesan, katalambanousin en tei Kullenei treis kai deka triereis Leukadion 
kai Amprakioton kai Brasidan...eboulonto gar hoi Lakedaimonioi, hos tes Lesbou 
hemartekesan, pleon to nautikon poiesantes es ten Kerkuran pleusai stasiazousan, 
dodeka men nausi monais paronton Athenaion peri Naupakton, prin de pleon ti 
epiboethesai ek ton Athenon nautikon
Ran into rough weather off Crete, scattered and made their way to the 
Peloponnese. Arriving at Cyllene [nr. Elis, on the west coast of the Peloponnese], 
they found thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot trireme and also Brasidas...After 
their failure at Lesbos the Spartans wished to reinforce their fleet and sail to 
Corcyra, where a revolution had broken out. The Athenians at Naupactos had a 
force o f only twelve ships, and so the Spartan plan was to arrive at Corcyra before 
reinforcements could be sent out from Athens.269
It seems then, that despite the time-wasting delays around Crete, Alcidas managed to reach 
western waters prior to Salaminia and Paralos, or indeed any extra ships from Athens. The first 
Athenian ship to come to the region after Alcidas’ arrival is mentioned in the next chapter of 
Thucydides: a trireme carrying diplomats was sent to negotiate with the Corcyraeans. This ship 
stayed in Corcyra for some little time, and acted as a refuge for the democratic faction, who fled 
following the murder of their leader Peithes, before it returned to Athens.270
According to Gomme’s chronology, the return of this trireme, carrying Corcyraean exiles, 
sparked the sending of the Paralos and Salaminia to the Gulf o f Corinth. It has been suggested 
that they were sent with some kind of special diplomatic mission,271 but while this is possible, it 
seems difficult to reconcile with the evidence; not least the fact that they are not reported as 
taking any part in the diplomacy at Corcyra, and that their destination from Athens appears to 
have been Naupactos. The Athenian squadron was by then under a new commander, following 
the death o f Asopios; he is introduced by Thucydides at this point, though presumably he had 
been in command for several months.
269 Thucydides, 3.69
270 Thucydides, 3.70
271 Homblower, Commentary, ad loc 3.77.1
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tei de epigignomenei hemerai Nikostratos ho Dieitrephous Athenaion strategos 
paragignetai boethon ek Naupaktou dodeka nausi kai Messenion pentakosiois 
hoplitais: xumbasin te eprasse kai peithei hoste xunchoresai allelois deka men 
andras tous aitiotatous krinai, hoi ouketi emeinan, tous d' allous oikein spondas 
pros allelous poiesamenous kai pros Athenaious, hoste tous autous echthrous kai 
philous nomizein
Nicostratus, the son of Dietrephes, came up from Naupactos with 12 ships and 500 
Messenian hoplites. His aim was to arrange a settlement and he persuaded the two 
factions [on Corcyra] to agree among themselves to bring to trail ten men who are 
chiefly responsible, who presently fled, while the rest were to live in peace, the 
whole state was to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Athens.272
The fact that Nicostratus here has “12 ships from Naupactos”, as opposed to “the 12 ships from 
Naupactos”273 suggests that he had more than 12 ships at his disposal at this point; it is tempting 
to conclude that Salaminia and Paralos had reinforced him, and brought fresh orders from 
Athens, and possibly news that a large Athenian fleet was being prepared.274 Nicostratus was 
then able to leave two ships behind to provide at least a ‘trip-wire’ in the event of Naupactos 
being attacked, and proceeded to Corcyra with 12 triremes. This picture is largely conjecture, but 
no more so than the assumption that Salaminia and Paralos had some sort of diplomatic role to 
play. Given that the Corcyraean oligarchs had resolved to regard any more than one ship 
approaching them as an enemy,275 it seems that the Athenians had decided to send an armada 
rather than an envoy; clearly the diplomacy envisaged was decidedly “gunboat” in nature. 
Certainly the presence o f Salaminia and Paralos in the fleet might have added some substance 
and weight to Nicostratus’ force and would have made it look more impressive, but it was the 
general himself who did the negotiating; there is no evidence o f a diplomatic role played by the 
crews of the sacred vessels, save from being part o f the fleet that backed up Nicostratus’ words.
It is perhaps not without significance that the presence o f Salaminia and Paralos is not remarked 
upon by Thucydides until after the negotiations were completed. While Nicostratus was 
attempting to keep the two sides from slaughtering one another, the Peloponnesian fleet under 
Alcidas and Brasidas arrived on the scene. It is only in the context o f the ensuing battle that 
Thucydides mentions the ships by name. The Peloponnesians split their fleet, and sent most o f 
their ships against the Athenians’ 12 vessels, “of which two were Salaminia and Paralos”.276
Rather than being sent to complete some sort o f diplomatic mission to the Corcyraeans, it appears 
then that Salaminia and Paralos were simply messengers; relaying instructions to Nicostratus to 
intervene in Corcyra. The decision to send these particular vessels in this instance probably had
272 Thucydides, 3.75.1
273 A point made by Gomme, HCT  ad loc 3.77.1, cf. 3.75.1
274 The alternative would be that the Salaminia and Paralos were already part o f the 12 strong, unreinforced, fleet at 
Naupactos perceived by Alcidas and Brasidas at 3.69. While this is possible, (and would have interesting consequences 
in terms o f our perceptions o f these two ships) I have argued here that Alcidas arrived in western waters prior to the 
Salaminia and Paralos, suggesting in turn that the sacred ships did not form part o f the Naupactos patrol at this time.
275 Thucydides, 3.71
276 Thucydides, 3.77
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little to do with their special status, but rather because these two vessels were ready and available 
to sail, having recently returned from the east Aegean.277 Nicostratus’ decision to leave no more 
than two ships at Naupactos, despite the fact that the Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas and 
Brasidas was in the region, probably indicates that further reinforcements were anticipated; and 
indeed arrived later, in the form of Fleet 73, 60 ships under Eurymedon278
The Peloponnesian battle tactics at Corcyra indicate the importance of organization, good order 
and situational awareness in naval battles, as well as evidencing the superior naval reputation 
enjoyed by the Athenians. The Corcyraeans had themselves launched 60 ships in the face of 
Brasidas and Alcidas’ Peloponnesian fleet, but they disregarded the Athenian advice to sail out as 
one unit, with disastrous results:
hos de autois pros tois polemiois esan sporades hai nees, duo men euthus 
eutomolesan, en heterais de allelois hoi empleontes emachonto, en de oudeis 
kosmos ton poioumenon. idontes de hoi Peloponnesioi ten tarachen eikosi men 
nausi pros tous Kerkuraious etaxanto, tais de loipais pros tas dodeka naus ton 
Athenaidn, hon esan hai duo Salaminia kai Paralos kai hoi men Kerkuraioi kakos 
te kai kat ’ oligasprospiptontes etalaiporoun to kath' hautous
As the Corcyraeans ships approached the enemy in this disorganized way, two of 
them immediately deserted, in other ships the crews were fighting among 
themselves, and no sort o f order was kept in anything. The Peloponnesians 
observed the confusion in which they were, set aside twenty of their ships to meet 
the Corcyraeans, and the rest against the 12 Athenian ships, including the two 
Salaminia and Paralos. The Corcyraeans, in their part of the battle, were soon in 
difficulties, since they were making their attacks inefficiently and in small 
detachments.279
The contrast could not be clearer; 20 Peloponnesian ships were more than a match for three times 
their number of disorganized Corcyraean vessels; while on the other hand 12 Athenian vessels, 
all with crews known to one another280 and using good tactics, required the attention of 33 
Peloponnesian ships. Nor were the Peloponnesians on this occasion guilty of overestimating the 
abilities of the Athenians; indeed the Athenians got rather the better of their opponents, in the end 
drawing the entire Peloponnesian fleet into chasing them. As Thucydides notes, this gave “the 
Corcyraeans ships the fullest opportunity to escape”.281
A little time later, the Athenian general Eurymedon arrived with Fleet 73, prompting the 
Peloponnesian fleet to withdraw; and it was these 60 ships alone that rode at anchor in the
277 It is possible that the crews for these ships were always “on call”; I discuss these vessels in Part One, C.2
278 Thucydides (3.80) says that Eurymedon’s fleet was sent out after the Athenians learnt o f the stasis on Corcyra and 
that the Peloponnesian fleet was about to leave Cyllene. This perhaps suggests that the fleet was planned after the 
diplomatic mission to Corcyra had returned with the exiles, and the process hastened upon further intelligence about 
the intentions o f the Peloponnesians.
279 Thucydides, 3.77.2-3.78
280 Salaminia and Paralos probably had permanent, on-call crews, men who were used to working together (see 
discussion below, Part One, section C.2). The other 10 vessels had been on station at Naupactos together for plenty 
long enough for their crews to have become efficient.
281 Thucydides, 3.78
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Corcyraeans harbour while the stasis reached its bloody climax.282 Nicostratus’ fleet was not 
mentioned in this context again, and it is to be presumed that they returned to their patrols around 
Naupactos. There is also no direct evidence for the movements o f Salaminia and Paralos; the 
former appears next in Thucydides’ narrative o f the Sicilian invasion of 413 BC, when she tried 
to bring Alcibiades back to Athens for trial; and the latter is not referred to until the political
• 283upheavals o f 411 BC, which will be discussed in full in a subsequent section.
Demosthenes in Naupactos, summer 426 BC (Fleets 78)
It is uncertain whether Fleet 66 remained in Naupactos throughout 427 and into 426 BC;
Nicostratus was not mentioned in this context again,284 nor was any naval activity explicitly
undertaken by the Naupactos fleet at this time. However, Naupactos featured as a base for 
Demosthenes during his ill-fated campaign in Aetolia in the summer of 426 BC. According to 
Thucydides, Demosthenes launched this attack in the hope of preventing a potential threat to 
Naupactos, and it was the Messenians who encouraged him by saying that the Aetolians “could 
be quite easily subdued”.285 There is no suggestion here of the presence of another Athenian 
commander at Naupactos, nor does it appear that ships from a Naupactos squadron joined 
Demosthenes’ attack. The attack in Aetolia ended with a heavy defeat for the Athenians:
tous de nekrous hupospondous anelomenoi para ton Aitdlon kai anachoresantes es 
Naupakton husteron es tas Athenas tais nausin ekomisthesan. Demosthenes de peri 
Naupakton kai ta choria tauta hupeleiphthe, tois pepragmenois phoboumenos tous 
Athenaious.
After recovering their dead from the Aetolians under an armistice, the army
returned to Naupactos, embarked on their ships and went back to Athens.
Demosthenes stayed behind either at Naupactos or in the area, since he was afraid 
to face the Athenians after what had happened.286
Soon after the withdrawal o f this force, Naupactos came under direct attack. Thucydides suggests 
that the Aetolians had wished to attack Naupactos earlier that summer, before Demosthenes’ 
attack on them.287 If this can be accepted, it suggests a rough timeframe for the withdrawal of at 
least the majority of Fleet 66, as the Aetolians may have seen the lack of such a force as a golden 
opportunity to strike. The fact that the Messenians at Naupactos were said to be “calling in the 
Athenians” once again suggests that there was no patrol fleet present at this time, and it seems 
unlikely that the simultaneous absence o f Athenian forces and formulating the idea o f an attack 
on Naupactos were entirely co-incidental.
282 Thucydides, 3.80 (Eurymedon’s arrival); 3.81 (his pointed inaction during the killings on Corcyra)
283 Part Two, section B
284 He later served as general, along with Nicias, in Macedonia (Thucydides, 4.126, 423 BC), and again with Laches in 
the Peloponnese in 419 BC (Thucydides, 5.61)
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The appeal o f the Aetolians for an attack on Naupactos was responded to by the Peloponnesians, 
though it was not until the beginning of autumn that the army was gathered; a mixture of 
Peloponnesians and Ambraciots.288 This force succeeded in laying waste the land around 
Naupactos and capturing the unwalled part o f the city.289 It appears that no Athenian forces had 
arrived in Naupactos by this time, for there were not enough troops there to defend the walls; 
indeed, the situation was only saved by the arrival o f Demosthenes, who transported 1,000 
hoplites from Acamania to relieve the besieged city and man the defences.290
Demosthenes is said to have transported the hoplites onboard “his ships”; it is somewhat unclear 
where he got these vessels, as his 30 ships, Fleet 78, had been sent home. Gomme suggests that 
they might not yet have left the region even if they had sailed from Naupactos, and would thus 
have been available for Demosthenes291 An alternative is that these ships were from an 
(unattested) Acamanian navy, and amend the text so that it does not say that these ships were 
Demosthenes’.292 A third proposal might be that these ships were Athenian, either a few vessels 
left over from Fleet 78, or some small squadron from Fleet 66 that had been in Naupactos all 
along. Prior to his venture into Aetolia, Demosthenes had (according to Thucydides) planned on 
a second attempt from Naupactos if his first was unsuccessful.293 Perhaps he had taken this small 
naval force from Naupactos to try and make amends for his previous failure, and it was for this 
reason that the base was vulnerable when the Peloponnesians attacked. It is to be presumed that 
he had not by this stage been relieved of his command, and nor had his time as strategos come to 
an end; ships taken from an Athenian naval base could be fairly, if  loosely, described as “his”. If 
he had taken some o f the Messenians as crew and epibatai, this might explain why the defences 
at Naupactos were so thinly manned. None of these proposals are especially convincing, and the 
ships of Demosthenes which brought the troops to relieve Naupactos in the summer of 426 BC 
must remain something o f a mystery.
Demosthenes in Naupactos Again, With Aristotle and Hierophon: winter 426/5- 
summer 424 BC (Fleets 225 and 85)
It might be thought somewhat remiss o f the Athenians to have left Naupactos unguarded for a 
period of (at least) several months between the summer and autumn 426 BC and to thus come 
within an ace of losing this most crucial of bases. This is especially the case given the high 
priority with which maintaining a squadron at Naupactos had been treated in the previous few 
years. A fleet was sent out to Naupactos eventually. In the winter 426/5 BC, Thucydides reports 
20 ships, Fleet 225, operating around the Peloponnese; it is possible that these vessels were sent 
in response to the Messenians’ appeals for aid, and like other reinforcement fleets, had been 
given other tasks to undertake en route. Although there is no evidence to say how long it had
288 Thucydides, 3.100
289 Thucydides, 3.102
290 Thucydides, 3.102
291 Gomme, HCT, ad loc 3.102.4
292 Gomme, HCT, ad loc 3.102.4 refers to the arguments of Steup and Classen, which are along these lines.
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been in commission at the time when Thucydides first mentions it, it could be speculated that it 
had spent some time cruising the Peloponnesian coast, as had the fleet under Asopios before it. In 
the winter of 426/5 BC, these 20 ships, under the generals Aristotle and Hierophon, were 
appealed to by the Acamanians to come to the aid o f Amphilochian Argos, which was under 
attack from Eurylochus’ army.294 Fleet 225 played a supporting role in the ensuing conflicts and 
negotiations; following a crushing defeat in the field, the enemy commander was forced to appeal 
for terms;295 “if he stayed there, he did not see how he could stand a siege, cut off as he was by 
land and by the Athenian fleet at sea.”296 The fleet played a further supporting role in the 
destruction of the reinforcing army at Idomene; having been ambushed by the Amphilocian army, 
which was being led by Demosthenes, the Ambraciots were routed:
kai es pasan idean choresantes tes phuges etraponto tines kai es ten thalassan ou 
polu apechousan, kai hos eidon tas Attikas naus parapleousas hama tou ergou tei 
xuntuchiai, proseneusan, hegesamenoi en toi autika phoboi kreisson einai sphisin 
hupo ton en tais nausin, ei dei, diaphtharenai e hupo ton barbardn kai echthiston 
Amphilochon.
In a frantic effort to escape, some of them actually turned to the sea, which was 
not far off. There they saw the Athenian ships sailing up the coast just at the same 
time as the action on land, and such was their panic at the moment that they swam 
towards them, thinking it better for them to die, if die they must, at the hands of 
those on board the ships than by those o f the barbarous and detested 
Amphilochans.297
These are dramatic and telling examples of the advantages o f having local superiority at sea, and 
of the synergy between land and sea forces; without directly participating in any fighting (save, 
presumably, to despatch the poor wretches who swam out to their triremes), the Athenian ships 
had a profound impact upon their opponents, not least by severely limiting the available strategic 
options. The Athenian control o f the sea also seems to have cut off hope; the Ambraciots become 
pathetically hopeless upon seeing the Athenian fleet sail up in support o f the army, and the 
Spartan commander could see no way out of his situation given the fact that the Athenians held 
the strategic advantage o f sea power. As we have seen even in the context o f the Naupactos 
station, Athenian sea power was not so omnipotent that it could not be challenged or 
circumvented; blockades could be run, patrols evaded, trireme crews caught napping. It thus 
might be argued that this was another instance of Athens’ opponents over-estimating Athens’ 
power; however, in this particular and localized situation, the image of invincible thalassocracy 
was fairly close to the reality; the Ambraciot army probably had nothing in the way of sea power 
apart from a few troop-transport ships, and it is likely that they were cut off even from them.
It was shortly after these events when Thucydides reports on another logistical naval matter that 
rarely features in our source material.
294 Thucydides, 3.105.
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Meta de tauta triton meros neimantes ton skulon tois Athenaiois ta alia kata tas 
poleis dieilonto. kai ta men ton Athenaion pleonta heald, ta de nun anakeimena en 
tois Attikois hierois Demosthenei exeirethesan triakosiai panopliai, kai agon autas 
katepleusen: kai egeneto hama autoi meta ten ek tes Aitolias xumphoran apo 
tautes tes praxeos adeestera he kathodos. apelthon de kai hoi en tais eikosi nausin 
Athenaioi es Naupakton.
Afterwards they [i.e. Athens’ allies the Acamanians, who comprised the majority 
of the army] divided up the spoils, giving a third to the Athenians and divide the 
rest amongst their cities. The Athenian share was captured on the voyage home.
What is now to be seen in the Attic temples is the 300 panoplies which were 
specially set aside for Demosthenes and which he brought back with him by sea. 
Incidentally, after the disaster in Aetolia, it was now, with this achievement to his 
credit [Demosthenes had led the victorious army], a much safer thing for him to 
return home. The Athenians in the twenty ships also left for Naupactos.298
Several points call for comment here. The first is that Thucydides would probably not have 
drawn attention to the fact that the spoils of war were shipped to Athens were it not for the fact 
that much of the booty did not make it home. As Homblower points out in his commentary, such 
a loss was not unique, and it serves as a reminder o f the dangers of sea travel, even for Athenian 
vessels.299 There are many queries prompted by this brief notice, not least the question of who 
was responsible. Pirates or Peloponnesian ships would seem the most likely alternatives, with the 
former most likely; Thucydides would probably have reported the incident more fully had the 
Spartans been responsible for the capture, but there is o f course no way to tell for certain. The 
Athenians’ share o f the panoplies, even discounting those set aside for Demosthenes, would have 
amounted to a not inconsiderable amount of metal and would have been a tempting target.300 
Another question would be how these panoplies were transported; it is clear they were, like 
Demosthenes’ share, conveyed by sea, but in which ships? The twenty Athenian vessels were all 
said to have gone to Naupactos. Perhaps they captured some vessels from the defeated 
Ambraciots, and used these new acquisitions to send home the booty. Alternatively, Thucydides 
was inexact in his recording of fleet movements, and at least one ship from Fleet 225 returned to 
Athens at this point, only to be captured en route. This is perhaps unlikely; as Thucydides chose 
to specify the number of ships going to Naupactos, it would take more than this circumstantial 
case to doubt him. A third possibility is that trireme fleets were accompanied by other vessels, 
unmentioned in the narrative much as the non-hoplite component of infantry forces was often 
ignored.301 The Sicilian invasion of 413 BC provides a good example o f a trireme fleet being
298 Thucydides, 3.114.1-2
299 Homblower, Commentary, ad loc 3.114
300 In the two battles reported in Thucydides, there were losses numbering around 1,200 men. After taking 
Demosthenes’ 300, there would have been a maximum o f 900 or so left; o f these, the Athenians took a third. It is 
interesting that the Athenians were to have received as large a reward as the commander Demosthenes, given that there 
is no evidence o f them committing troops to the battle. It would seem that the generosity was due either to the 
appreciation o f the indirect contribution o f the navy (as discussed above), or perhaps due to the proximity of that same 
force while the spoils were being divided; either interpretation emphasises the intimidating nature o f a fleet o f triremes.
301 Note that the Spartan commander Brasidas (Thucydides, 4.120) had access to triremes and at least one Tight boat’, 
keles; note also that such light vessels and triacontors are reported by Thucydides (4.9) as being possessed by the 
Messenians; perhaps such craft were commandeered for transport purposes. In this passage o f Thucydides, the ships 
are possessed by pirates. If pirates were responsible for capturing these spoils, it seems very unlikely that they were
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accompanied by privately owned merchant vessels, whose owners were looking to turn a profit 
from the spoils o f war, and it is possible that such vessels tagged along with smaller fleets such as 
this one as well.302 If an Athenian trireme had been involved in the loss of these panoplies, we 
might expect Thucydides to have mentioned it; the capture of a private merchantman would 
perhaps be considered less significant. Demosthenes is reported to have sailed back successfully 
with his 300 panoplies, and indeed the next mention o f him in Thucydides finds him back at 
Athens, and virtually given command o f a fleet despite not being a general.303 Once again, there 
are no details of the vessel used to transport Demosthenes and his treasures home.
The Fleet 225 remained on station at Naupactos throughout the winter of 426/5 BC, and the 
entire summer o f 425 BC as well; at this time the Naupactos squadron contributed a small 
number of ships (exactly how many is unclear) towards the fleet of Eurymedon and Sophocles.304 
These ships were summoned to aid the small beleaguered force of Demosthenes on Pylos, and 
were alerted to his plight by ships acting as a ‘trip-wire’.305
That same summer Fleet 225 was in action once more. The campaign again combined an 
Athenian force with an Acamanian army, and was the last event reported by Thucydides before 
the end of his seventh summer. The report of this campaign is brief:
kai hoi en tei Naupaktoi Athenaioi kai Akarnanes hama teleutontos tou therous 
strateusamenoi Anaktorion Korinthion polin, he keitai epi toi stomati tou 
Amprakikou kolpou, elabon prodosiai: kai ekpempsantes Korinthious autoi 
Akarnanes oiketoras apo panton eschon to chorion, kai to theros eteleuta.
At the end of the summer (425 BC) the Athenians in Naupactos supported by the 
Acamanians made an expedition against Anactorium, the Corinthian city that lies 
at the entrance o f the Ambracian Gulf. They took the city by treachery, and the 
Acamanians then sent out settlers themselves from all parts o f their country and 
occupied the place. So the summer ended.306
As has been discussed previously, the taking of cities by treachery rather than force was far from 
uncommon in the ancient world. Like the base o f Naupactos itself, this expedition succeeded in 
weakening the Peloponnesians’ strongest naval state, Corinth; triremes could not carry much in 
the way of supplies for their crews, nor was it usual or desirable for crews to sleep onboard, and 
so by denying an enemy fleet friendly ports, the Athenians considerably restricted its range and
transported in a trireme; even given that a pirates’ crew would all have had weapons and a trireme would have been 
crew mostly unarmed, a thirty-oared vessel would have little chance o f overpowering a trireme, even if it could have 
caught one. Thucydides 4.9 describes a small pirate ‘fleet’ o f 2 vessels, but it would probably have taken several more 
to stand a reasonable chance o f trapping and overpowering a trireme.
302 Thucydides, 6.44
303 Thucydides, 4.2. He perhaps had won election to the strategia and was simply waiting for his term o f  office to 
begin (Fomara, Generals, p. 57). Even so, it is somewhat surprising that Demosthenes is given so much lee-way.
304 Thucydides, 4.13. This fleet was originally intended for Sicily, but ended up taking a detour to Pylos, where after a 
close blockade the Athenians captured some Spartan soldiers.
305 Thucydides, 4.5 and 4.8.
306 Thucydides, 4.49
75
capabilities. Salmon points out that Anactorium was one o f the last important Corinthian bases in 
the region.307
Once again it is unclear how long Fleet 225 remained on station at Naupactos; it is not referred to 
again after the end of the summer of 425 BC. In 424 BC, Demosthenes planned to take 40 ships, 
Fleet 85, to Naupactos, raise an Acamanian army and so attack the city of Siphae, which was to 
be given up to him by a faction within.308 No current squadron of ships on station at Naupactos is 
referred to, although of course the silence does not prove that there was no such fleet there. At 
the least it shows Naupactos acting as a naval station in the passive sense; a base and safe 
anchorage for a passing Athenian force. Demosthenes’ plan came to nothing, as the Boeotians 
had gotten wind o f it and reinforced Siphae.309
3: The Naupactos fleet between 414/3 BC and 411 BC
Konon and Diphilus at Naupactos: winter 414/3 BC-summer 413 BC (Fleet 104)
After the end o f summer 425 BC, Naupactos is next mentioned by Thucydides in the context of 
the winter 414/3 BC.
pempousi de kai peri ten Peloponneson hoi Athenaioi eikosi nans, hopos 
phulassoien medena apo Korinthou kai tes Peloponneson es ten Sikelian 
peraiousthai
The Athenians also sent twenty ships around the Peloponnese to guard against 
anyone crossing from Corinth and the Peloponnese to Sicily.310
In the same passage, Thucydides reports the intention of the Corinthians and Peloponnesians to 
send troops in merchant vessels to Sicily, and then describes their naval arrangements to facilitate 
this:
naus te hoi Korinthioi pente kai eikosin epleroun, hopos naumachias te 
apopeirasosi pros ten en tei Naupaktoi phulaken, kai tas holkadas autdn hesson 
hoi en tei Naupaktoi Athenaioi koluoien apairein, pros ten spheteran antitoxin ton 
trieron ten phulaken poioumenoi.
The Corinthians were also manning twenty-five ships so that they might attempt a 
sea-battle against the ships on guard at Naupactos, and the Athenians would be 
less able to prevent their merchant ships from sailing because they would have to 
give attention to the triremes confronting them.311
The natural reading of this passage is to suppose that the fleet sent round the Peloponnese was to 
reinforce the ships already on guard at Naupactos, whom the Corinthians were trying to protect
307 Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, p. 318
308 Thucydides, 4.76
309 Thucydides, 4.89
310 Thucydides, 7.17.2
311 Thucydides, 7.17.4
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their troop-transports against. However, the account o f the subsequent events around Naupactos 
favours the interpretation that the “20 ships around the Peloponnese” and the “ships on guard at 
Naupactos” are in fact the very same ships, Fleet 104.312 The next passage that refers to the fleet 
seems to assume that only 20 ships were around Naupactos in the spring o f 413 BC:
hai de pente kai eikosi nees ton Korinthion hai tou cheimonos plerdtheisai 
anthormoun tais en tei Naupaktoi eikosin Attikais, hedsper autois houtoi hoi 
hoplitai tais holkasin apo tes Peloponnesou aperan: houper heneka kai to proton 
eplerothesan, hopos me hoi Athenaioi pros tas holkadas mallon e pros tas triereis 
ton noun echosin.
The 25 Corinthian ships manned during the winter stayed facing the 20 Athenian 
ships at Naupactos up to the moment they got their hoplites in the merchant 
vessels clear of the Peloponnese; this was exactly why they were manned in the 
first place, so that the Athenians would have to give their attention to the triremes 
and leave the merchant vessels alone.313
Given the previous experience of conflicts in the Gulf o f Corinth, and the near parity of forces 
involved, it seems surprising that no attempt was made to engage in battle, or at least attack the 
merchant vessels. Unlike the previous occasions in the Gulf, however, the Athenians’ opponents 
had not only parity but superiority in triremes, as well as a larger number o f vessels total. In 
addition, a hoplite force supported by a large naval force could have been capable of taking 
Naupactos itself, should the Athenian fleet have risked an engagement. Dover sees the 
explanation rather in terms of the deteriorating crew quality o f the Athenians and the 
corresponding rise in ability o f the Peloponnesians.314 There may be some truth in this, and it 
would not have encouraged the Athenians to fight a Peloponnesian fleet with superiority in 
trireme numbers, as well as its tactical separateness from the sluggish troop-transports.315 While 
all these factors might explain the Athenians’ caution on this occasion, it was caution 
nevertheless, especially given the fact that their mission, according to Thucydides, was expressly 
to prevent these ships delivering reinforcements to Sicily. It is also surprising given that the 
commander of the Naupactos squadron appears to have been Konon, who was to later enjoy a 
reputation for being a bold and enterprising naval commander.
312 It is possible to argue that there was a very small (three ship) fleet on station at Naupactos prior to the arrival o f the 
fleet of 20 here reported. This argument is sustainable due to the natural reading o f this passage, and to the sudden 
appearance o f three not before mentioned vessels in the fleet at 7.34. What makes the argument tenuous is not only the 
reference to “the twenty ships” discussed below, but also the unlikelihood o f the Corinthians putting 25 triremes in the 
water to confront a mere 3 Athenian ships; even giving the drubbings taken by Peloponnesian ships in this region, and 
the twice-repeated desire to ensure no losses amongst the troop-carrying merchant vessels, this seems like overkill, 
especially considering how, in the event, the 25 ships managed to prevent 20 Athenian vessels from coming out in 
battle. Of course, it could be that the Corinthians (not unreasonably) anticipated Athenian reinforcements when 
preparing their trireme fleet, and so we should not dismiss altogether the possibility that the Athenians had a small 
naval presence in Naupactos prior to 414/3 BC.
313 Thucydides, 7.19.5
314 HCT adloc 7.31.4
315 Contrast the situation in the summer o f 429 BC, when Phormio’s Peloponnesian opponents seemed to have grouped 
the merchant vessels and triremes together in one fleet, with the result that the slow and unhandy vessels hampered the 
faster ones.
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Konon is not mentioned by name in connection with the Naupactos fleet at this point; it is only 
his presence later in the summer of 413 BC from which it can be inferred that he was in 
command the preceding winter and spring.316 Following the successful protection of their 
merchant fleet, the Corinthians pursued a more aggressive policy against the Athenian Naupactos 
squadron. Konon requested aid from Demosthenes, who was at Zacynthus with a reinforcement 
fleet for Sicily.
aphikneitai de kai Konon par' autous, hos erche Naupaktou, angelldn hoti hai 
pente kai eikosi nees ton Korinthion hai sphisin anthormousai oute kataluousi ton 
polemon naumachein te mellousin: pempein oun ekeleuen autous naus, hos ouch 
hikanas ousas duoin deousas eikosi tas heauton pros tas ekeinon pente kai eikosi 
naumachein. toi men oun Kononi deka naus ho Demosthenes kai ho Eurumedon 
tas arista sphisi pleousas aph' hon autoi eichon xumpempousi pros tas en tei 
Naupaktoi
Konon, the commander at Naupactos, came to them [Demosthenes and his co­
general, Eurymedon] with news that the 25 Corinthian ships stationed opposite to 
him, far from going home without a fight, were meditating an engagement; and he 
therefore begged them to send him some ships, as his own 18 were not a match for 
the enemy's 25. Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent 10 of their best sailors with 
Konon to reinforce the squadron at Naupactos.317
It is worth noting here the discussion in Wallinga as to what made ships arista pleousai, “best 
sailors”.318 It is clearly right to suggest that this refers to speed through the water under oars, 
rather than a literal comment on the ship’s qualities in harnessing the wind. As part of his 
argument in favour o f systematic undermanning in the classical Athenian navy, he argues that 
such “best sailors” were vessels with full (or, relative to the other ships in the fleet, fuller) crews. 
While full crews led to fast ships, Wallinga’s arguments are not convincing, and the description 
arista pleousai is more likely to apply to the relative quality o f a ship’s rowing crew rather than 
its sheer numbers.319 Fourth-century litigants often claim that their vessel was the fastest in the 
fleet due to their hiring o f the best crews; the quality and not the quantity o f the men is what is 
stressed.320 Polyaenus records a stratagem of Philip o f Macedon which suggests that the fastest 
ships were those with the best structure, and the best rowers to match. In order to evade an 
Athenian fleet under Chares lying in wait at Neopolis, Philip provided them with some bait to 
chase:
316 If Konon was an elected strategos, his period o f command would have covered both the events reported by 
Thucydides at both 7.17 and 7.34
317 Thucydides, 7.31.4-5
318 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-Power, p. 180-2
319 See Appendix 2 for a fuller discussion o f Wallinga’s arguments regarding undermanning, which I believe are 
unsustainable.
320 Wallinga argues that when an anonymous trierarch and client of the speech-writer Lysias spoke out in court 
(Lysias, 21.2), “he constantly harps on about his outlays, never on the discrimination in choosing his men” (Wallinga, 
Ships and Sea-Power, p. 180). This is either a gross error or wilful disingenuousness on Wallinga’s part, for it is this 
very trierarch, a little later in this very speech (Lysias, 21.10) who claims to have hired the best helmsman in Greece, 
with “a full oarcrew and other specialists” to match. He might have compared Apollodorus, ([Demosthenes], 50.7), 
who also boasts o f the money he spent and the quality o f the crew he thus obtained. In both cases, as with the 
trierarchs vying for the best rowers for the invasion o f Sicily, the assumption was that larger expense led to better 
crews, and thus faster ships. Wallinga is thus too quick to dismiss the connection between better rowers and faster 
ships within a single state’s navy, and to conclude that differences in speed were due to differences in the numbers on 
board.
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Philippos epilexamenos ton neon tessaras tas arista pleousas eplerosen ereton axui 
kai technei kai rhouei ariton, kai parayyelma edoke, proanaxthenai tou stolou 
pantos kai paraplein ten Nean polin oupolu tes ges apechontas
After selecting the four fastest ships [tas arista pleousas], Philip manned them with 
his best rowers in terms of age, skill and strength, and gave orders to put out to sea 
before the rest o f the fleet and to sail past Neopolis, keeping close to the shore.
On this occasion, the Athenians took the bait; they unsuccessfully chased Philip’s four best ships, 
allowing him to slip away with the rest of his fleet. There is also some suggestion in the 
Athenian evidence that the build quality of some vessels gave them an edge of speed over other 
ships; the naval lists refer to two ships as taxunautousai, “fast ships” suggesting that something in 
their build made them speedier than a regular trireme.322 While this unique entry is not sufficient 
evidence to suggest that some triremes were vastly superior in their essential design and structure 
from any others, it is not unlikely that some improvements in build and performance were made 
during Athens’ period of thalassocracy.323 In addition, triremes that had been damaged in battles 
or storms, had not had their timbers regularly dried out, had had their gear appropriated by 
unprincipled trierarchs, or were simply old, would not perform as well as dry, newly-built, well- 
equipped vessels that had yet to sustain scars; these factors seem to have been built in to the 
classifications mentioned in the fourth-century fleet inventories.324 Along with the strength and 
efficiency o f the crews, these factors would have done most to distinguish the “best sailors” from 
the rest.
It is slightly surprising that the ten “best sailors” from Demosthenes’ and Eurymedon’s fleet here 
reinforced a Naupactos squadron numbering 18, and not 20 as might have been expected from the 
preceding narrative. A discrepancy of two vessels is perhaps not too difficult to explain, as it is 
unlikely that the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus was the only target for this request for 
reinforcements. It seems likely that one o f these ships took such a request to Athens itself, and 
the response was to send a few more ships and a new commander. It is certainly the case that the 
Naupactos fleet’s numbers are larger than expected when it is next mentioned:
321 Polyaenus, Stratagems, 4.2.22
322 IG II2 1623, 11. 276-285. Wallinga unconvincingly dismisses this entry; the ships are said to be sent out to “guard 
against pirates”, and Wallinga argues that such work would require fully manned ships. Because they were fully 
manned, they were described as “fast”. As he himself notes, however, ships could be described as “the best sailors” 
before they had been manned at all (Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.19), suggesting some degree o f physical difference 
between a fast ship and a standard one.
323 The sources do record some developments in the build o f triremes over the period; for example, Plutarch (Kimon, 
12) states that Kimon altered the design o f the ships to make them “flatter”, and to bridge the decks to enable them to 
carry more troops. Thucydides discusses the developments made to the Corinthian triremes during the Peloponnesian 
war to make them more effective at head-on ramming (Thucydides, 7.34)
324 Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 129 ff. He argues that the Athenians “classified all hulls by rating 
them in accordance with their age arid performance abilities.” (p. 129) The evidence covers the period from the 370s 
and 360s BC (when ships were classed as either “old or “new”) to the 330s BC (by which time four classifications 
were used; “first”, “second”, “third” and “select”). The changeover between these two methods o f classification was 
357/6 BC
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hoi d' Athenaioi ek tes Naupaktou triakonta nausi kai trisin erche de auton 
Diphilos epepleusan autois...kai ton men Korinthion treis nees diaphtheirontai, 
ton d' Athenaidn katedu men oudemia haplds, hepta de tines aploi egenonto 
egenonto antiproiroi emballomenai kai anarrageisai tas parexeiresias hupo ton 
Korinthion neon ep' auto toutopachuteras tas epotidas echouson. naumachesantes 
de antipala men kai hos autous hekaterous axioun nikan, homos de ton nauagion 
kratesanton ton Athenaidn dia te ten tou anemou aposin auton es to pelagos kai 
dia ten ton Korinthion ouketi epanagogen, diekrithesan ap' allelon, kai dioxis 
oudemia egeneto, oud' andres oudeteron healdsan
The Athenians sailed out of Naupactos to meet them [the Corinthian fleet of 25] 
with 33 ships commanded by Diphilus...Three of the Corinthian ships were 
destroyed, and none of the Athenians were sunk outright, but about 7 were put out 
of commission which were struck prow to prow and had their foreships stove in by 
the Corinthian vessels, whose cheeks had been strengthened for this very 
purpose.325 After a battle indecisive enough that both sides claimed victory the 
sides separated, but the Athenians still got control of the wrecks because of a wind 
driving them further out to sea, the Corinthians not putting out again to meet them.
There was no pursuit or prisoners taken on either side.326
The fact that the wrecks were taken from the battle, despite the apparently heavy damage 
sustained, testifies to the fact that triremes “had a positive buoyancy, and did not sink when 
flooded.”327 The extra vessels here imply that Diphilus had relieved Konon of his command,328 
and brought a few extra vessels with him;329 four at least, on the assumptions that the two 
previously “missing” vessels both returned, and one vessel was used to carry Konon home.
Hippocles and Konon at Naupactos: 411 BC (Fleet 104)
There is an interval of a couple o f years before ships in Naupactos are referred to again. After the 
final destruction of the two invasion fleets sent to Sicily, Thucydides reports that the Athenians 
looked to redirect their resources, and to form a committee o f older citizens to formulate policies 
accordingly. The measures came into effect during the winter o f 413/2 BC:
pareskeuazonto de kai Athenaioi, hdsper dienoethesan, en toi autoi cheimoni 
toutoi ten te naupegian, xula xumporisamenoi, kai Sounion teichisantes, hopos 
autois asphaleia tais sitagogois nausin eie tou periplou, kai to te en tei Lakonikei 
teichisma eklipontes ho enoikodomesan parapleontes es Sikelian, kai talla, ei pou  
ti edokei achreion analiskesthai, xustellomenoi es euteleian, malista de ta ton 
xummachon diaskopountes hopos me sphon apostesontai
During this same winter the Athenians were busy with their preparations as they 
had determined, they contributed timber and pushed on their ship-building, and
325 This can be interpreted as a technological change designed to counterbalance the superiority o f Athenian naval skill, 
though Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, p. 334, argues that on this occasion the Corinthians are likely to have been at least as 
accomplished as the Athenians.
326 Thucydides, 7.34.3-6.
327 Morrison, Coates and Rankov, Athenian Trireme, p. 121
328 Nothing need be read into this other than the suggestion that Diphilus was elected for 413/2 BC, and Konon’s term 
of command had by that point expired. If there was any further political intrigue behind the appointment, it is not 
mentioned in the sources.
329 The alternative is that some vessels were present in Naupactos prior to the arrival o f Konon’s 20 ships in the winter 
of 414/3 BC, and only now appear in the narrative. The appearance o f 33 ships here, rather than the 30 or 28 we might 
expect, makes it possible, though not terribly likely, that three ships had been on station at Naupactos throughout the 
period; see note 312.
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fortified Sounion to enable their com-ships to round it in safety, and evacuated the 
fort in Laconia which they had built on their way to Sicily; while they also cut 
back in the interest of economy if there seemed to be any useless spending 
anywhere, and above all by watching over the allies and keeping them from 
revolting.330
Would the Naupactos fleet have been considered an area of “useless spending”? The station was 
not near any of Athens’ major tribute-paying allies, nor on the principal grain route from the 
Black Sea. Under Konon, the fleet had the role (though it did not perform it successfully) of 
preventing the Corinthians reinforcing the Syracusans, a role made obsolete by the winter 413/2 
BC following Athens’ devastating defeat. It seems open to question, given the Athenians’ 
priorities with the allies and the grain route, whether a naval force in the Corinthian Gulf was 
sustainable.
This is not to say that a fleet at Naupactos had no strategic significance at this time; while there 
was no need to prevent Corinthian troops trying to reach Sicily, there was a fear in Athens of a 
fleet from Sicily sailing against the Piraeus.331 Such a fleet did indeed appear that summer, and 
Athens had ships in place to try and stop them:
anekomizonto de hupo ton auton chronon touton kai hai apo tes Sikelias 
Peloponnesion hekkaideka nees hai meta Gulippou xundiapolemesasai: kai peri 
ten Leukada apolephtheisai kai kopeisai hupo ton Attikon hepta kai eikosi neon, 
hon erchen Hippokles Menippou phulaken echon ton apo tes Sikelias neon, hai 
loipai plen mias diaphugousai tous Athenaious katepleusan es ten Korinthon
At about this time [Summer 412 BC] 16 Peloponnesian ships, which had served 
with Gylippus in Sicily throughout the war, were on their way home; and as they 
were off Leucadia they were intercepted and struck by the 27 Athenian ships 
under command o f Hippocles son of Menippus, who was on guard for ships from 
Sicily; one was destroyed and the rest escaped the Athenians and sailed to 
Corinth.332
It seems most likely that this is Fleet 104, operating from a new station under another new 
commander, and with the inverse o f their previous mission; preventing ships from Sicily reaching 
Greece.333 It seems that the ships rendered inoperable by the Corinthians the previous summer 
had not for the most part been either repaired or re-crewed; only one of the seven loses appears to 
have been made good, despite the Athenians capturing the wrecks. While a generous observer 
might regard this battle as a victory on points for the Athenians, there is something of a rebuke in 
Thucydides’ description. With a significant advantage in numbers and crews that could not be 
described as novices (this fleet had probably been in continuous service for at least 18 months), 
the Athenians failed to stop the enemy. It might be suggested that the fleet’s poor performance in 
this encounter somewhat justified Konon’s caution with the same fleet in 413 BC, when he
330 Thucydides, 8.4.
331 Thucydides, 8.1
332 Thucydides, 8.13
333 Such is the view o f Andrewes, HCT ad loc 8.4. He notes that the economy drive does not involve the sacrifice o f  
stations at either Pylos or Naupactos
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refused battle with a slightly larger Corinthian fleet, and instead called for reinforcements. There 
is no reliable way to assess the validity o f this suggestion. The evidence is simply not full enough 
to analyze the reasons for this poor performance, or to discover the relative blame of the 
commanders, the hyperesia or the crews as a whole. What is certain is that this fleet did not 
match the heroism and skill o f its predecessors, and thus to some extent the series of squadrons at 
Naupactos chart the decline of the navy’s abilities and Athenian sea power more generally. 
Tolmides’ daring raid and capture of Naupactos gifted the Athenians a strategically crucial base, 
from which they were able to bottle up the most important o f the Peloponnesian naval powers. 
Phormio’s brilliant victories in the early years o f the Peloponnesian war were followed by 
Nicostratus successfully holding off (though not defeating) of a vastly bigger Peloponnesian 
force. A decade and more later, with the Athenians on the brink of defeat in Sicily, Konon felt 
that his Naupactos squadron needed numerical superiority to fight the Peloponnesians; the 
ensuing battle, in which the Athenians actually had more triremes, was wryly described by 
Thucydides as the sort of encounter where both sides can claim victory. The final sea battle 
fought by a fleet (probably) from Naupactos could also be so described; the Athenians destroyed 
one vessel and prevented the enemy fleet from attacking the Piraeus; however, almost the entire 
enemy fleet escaped to a friendly port, and it had had no intention of doing anything more than 
return to the Peloponnese in the first place.
Such a summary, however, focuses solely on sea battles, to the detriment of the wider roles of the 
fleet. As has been shown previously, over the fifth and fourth centuries more Athenian fleets 
facilitated combat on land than fought in battles at sea. It is therefore appropriate that the final 
recorded act o f the Athenian navy operating (probably) from Naupactos is one of transporting 
troops; in this case, to that most persistent of trouble-spots, Corcyra.
hoi d' oun Korkuraioi theorountes tous dunatotatous ton politon ontas pros toi ten 
polin encheirizein Lakedaimoniois, metepempsano par' Athenaidn dunamin ten 
paraphulaxousan ten polin. Konon d' ho strategos ton Athenaidn pleusas eis 
Korkuran, hexakosious men ton ek Naupaktou Messenion katelipen en tei polei, 
autos de meta ton neon parepleuse, kai kathormisthe pros toi tes Heras temenei. 
hoi de hexakosioi meta ton demotikon hormesantes epi tous ta Lakedaimonion 
phronountas exaiphnes agoras plethouses hous men sunelambanon, hous d' 
ephoneuon, pleious de ton chilion ephugadeusan: epoiesanto de tous men doulous 
eleutherous, tous de xenous politas, eulaboumenoi to te plethos kai ten dunamin 
ton phugadon.
Accordingly the Corcyraeans, seeing that their most influential citizens were 
planning to hand the city over to the Lacedaimonians, sent to the Athenians for an 
army to protect their city. And Konon, the general of the Athenians, sailed to 
Corcyra and left in the city six hundred men from the Messenians in Naupactos, 
while he himself sailed on with his ships and cast anchor off the sacred precinct of 
Hera. And the six hundred, setting out unexpectedly with the partisans o f the 
people's party at the time of full market against the supporters o f the 
Lacedaimonians, arrested some of them, slew others, and drove more than a 
thousand from the state; they also set the slaves free and gave citizenship to the
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foreigners living among them as a precaution against the great number and 
influence o f the exiles.33
Diodorus, our only source for this voyage o f Konon, places it in the year 410/9 BC. However, as 
the two events he records on either side o f this are both to be dated to 411 BC, this seems to be 
the most likely context.335 The comparatively passive role of an Athenian naval squadron while 
there was killing on the streets o f Corcyra puts one in mind of the 427 BC, and the inaction of 
Eurymedon’s Fleet 73.
4: Conclusions
This case study has highlighted the various roles of the Athenian fleet, some general issues 
connected with study of the Athenian navy as an institution, and some of the problems, debates 
and gaps in the source material. The Naupactos fleets are covered by our most detailed source, 
the author o f which was at one time a naval commander, but perhaps inevitably there are details 
of the Athenian navy’s operation which remain shrouded in mystery. The inconsistencies in fleet 
numbers which hint at, but do not demonstrate, ships flitting from Athens to generals in the water 
with orders information and pay; the logistics o f sending war booty home, and of dealing with (or 
possibly re-employing) captives; the use of triremes as ‘trip-wires’; the categorization of 
triremes; the status o f the Salaminia and the Paralos\ all o f these wider issues to do with the navy 
have been raised in this case study of one naval station.
The fleet operations around Naupactos have shown the diversity demanded of the navy and in 
particular its commanders, who were often given multiple missions in disparate theatres of war. 
They appear to have had a good deal of latitude within the framework of the Assembly’s 
instructions, but failure (or even incomplete success) could bear a heavy price; Phormio was 
deprived of his citizenship despite his brace of victories, and Demosthenes (foreshadowing 
Nicias’ thoughts in Sicily) feared to return to Athens on the back of a heavy defeat.336
The Naupactos fleets offer a case study of the lengths and limits of Athenian sea power and 
ancient thalassocracy generally. A fortified naval station close to the principal Peloponnesian 
naval power, and with a relatively large337 but intermittent fleet presence, Naupactos was thus 
variously a passive or active naval station, depending on the tactical and strategic circumstances, 
and was the scene for many conflicts. Athens’ ability and willingness to pay for long-term fleets, 
and the sea battles won by these fleets, kept the navy of Corinth out o f the Archidamian war 
almost entirely. Such fleets would have been out of reach, or at the very least unsustainable, for 
the vast majority of city-states in the fifth and fourth centuries; Athens by contrast nearly always
334 Diodorus, 13.48.5-7
335 Andrewes/Dover, HCT, ad loc 8.13; the events at Corcyra are placed between “Theramenes’ voyage to Paros...of 
autumn 411 [Diodorus, 47.8] and his collaboration with Archelaos at Pydna...of winter 411/10 [Diodorus, 49.1]”, 
which suggests a date late in 411 BC.
336 Hamel, Athenian Generals, esp. p. 118
337 Relative, that is, to other fleets that operated regional patrols and naval stations.
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had other, often larger, operations going on at the same time as supporting the Naupactos fleets. 
The triremes sent to this station were usually away from home for many months at a time, often 
for a year or more;338 Fleet 104 appears to have remained for over three years.339 It has been 
noted above that the Naupactos fleets fought in disproportionately large numbers o f battles 
compared to the average Athenian squadron.340 However, considered in relation to the length of 
time the fleets were in commission, and their missions, sea battles were even here a highly 
exceptional experience. Aggressive though the occupation of Naupactos was, the Athenian fleets 
stationed there do not appear to have deliberately sought to provoke a battle with the Corinthians, 
nor to have pursued a policy aimed at the destruction of their enemy’s fleet.341 Restriction rather 
than destruction, probably of merchant vessels at least as much as triremes, seems to have been 
the aim. The long-lasting Athenian presence in the waters close to her biggest Greek naval rival 
is a testament to the extent of her sea power, and deserves attention along with the victories in sea 
battles that resulted when Athenian control was challenged. But even the striking victories of 
Phormio did not ensure total domination of the region’s waters, as the Peloponnesians were able 
to move their armies around in ships on the Corinthian Gulf. Both the extents and the limitations 
of sea power and naval blockades with trireme fleets are thus clear.
Thalassocracy in the ancient world was essentially limited to those areas that the hegemonic 
power could deploy forces in sufficient numbers at that moment. As has been discussed 
previously, the Athenians could not possibly provide enough ships and troops to keep down all of 
their allies at once. Instead they employed regional patrols and diplomatic missions to remind 
their subjects o f Athens’ domination (or, from an alternative point o f view, protection) and 
intimidate (or reassure) them into obedience (alliance) and prompt tribute payment. In the event 
of an allied uprising or the presence o f an enemy force, such a fleet could act as ‘trip-wire’, 
raising the alarm and enabling a larger force to be deployed. That such a strategy was a general 
and conscious policy on the part o f the Athenians is difficult to demonstrate absolutely, but this 
case study has provided a couple o f explicit examples o f this sort of activity. The Salaminia and 
Paralos in 427 BC, when they reported the movements o f a Peloponnesian fleet to the Athenian 
commander in the region, acted as a ‘trip-wire’, although it is far from certain that this was their
338 The fleets o f Phormio and his immediate successors to the Naupactos command (Asopios, Nicostratus) each 
remained on station for around 18 months, Aristotle and Hierophon’s fleet for 9 months. It is impossible to determine 
exactly how long Tolmides’ presence in Naupactos lasted, but given his eventful voyage, his fleet can not have spent 
anything less than 9 months in commission.
339 Between the winter of 414/3 BC, and the summer o f 410 BC. It goes almost without saying that the patchiness of 
the historical record, as well as the demonstrated willingness o f the Athenians to leave Naupactos without a fleet at 
earlier stages o f the Peloponnesian war throw doubt on the continuous presence of ships in the Gulf of Corinth; the 
most assertive the evidence allows us to be is say that it is fully compatible with an Athenian fleet, under various 
commanders, being on station for 42 months, and no recorded fleet movement would suggest that all the vessels went 
home to be replaced at a later time (as had occurred in the spring/summer o f 428 BC).
340 Between the eight ‘proper’ fleets that operated in and around Naupactos, fully half participated in a sea battle; the 
Athenian average across the classical period is nearer a quarter. In total, six battles are fought by these 8 fleets (75%), 
again higher than the proportion amongst the recorded Athenian fleets; 84 battles fought by 216 fleets (39%).
341 We can usefully contrast the Samos fleet from 411 BC, alternately seeking and refusing battle with the 
Peloponnesian fleet depending on who held the advantage; this fleet will be discussed in full later on.
84
original purpose. A ‘trip-wire’ fleet was certainly left at Pylos under Demosthenes in 425 BC; 
when triggered, ships from Naupactos were amongst the fleet that responded.342
Athens was able to ensure that the faction favourable to her won out in the civil strife on Corcyra, 
and this was achieved in no small part through better employment o f strategic sea power; in 427 
BC, it was the Athenian fleet that arrived first to Corcyra, and was then reinforced in sufficient 
strength to hold off a challenge from the Peloponnesian fleet. This Peloponnesian fleet had been 
in the region in large numbers for some time, but had not acted decisively. Athens’ use of small, 
widely dispersed fleets and naval stations had given her strategic superiority. It was in such 
contexts that the speed of triremes, and the skill of the rowers who provided that speed, was most 
important. Faster ships with superior crews meant the swifter reception of information, more 
impressive and intimidating forces, the faster arrival of reinforcements, and the seizing of the 
strategic initiative.
As will be argued fully in the following section, such a model requires, indeed presupposes, a 
large pool o f men willing and able to row triremes all year round, year after year. It was noted 
above in relation to the ships sent to Naupactos that scale of fleets and the lengthy commissions 
required financial and logistical resources beyond nearly all classical city-states; these ships also 
represented full-time work for thousands of rowers and other crewmen, who were prepared to 
spend months and years away at sea.
When the Peloponnesian fleet in 427 BC finally did make a move, the ensuing battle off Corcyra 
demonstrated the importance o f sound tactical formations and organization in sea battles. Along 
with superb situational awareness and not a little daring, it was this ability to operate as a 
cordinated fleet, rather than a loose collection o f ships, which also brought about Phormio’s first 
victory in 429 BC.343 In the second battle around Naupactos that year, the Athenians were able to 
snatch victory from the jaws o f defeat by exploiting the fact that the Peloponnesians had broken 
formation in order to pursue them.344 While the role o f the rowers was important in the 
performance o f a trireme in battle, manoeuvres and actions o f this sort depended far more on the 
tactical abilities the trireme’s hyperesia, especially the kubernetes, and the fleet’s commander.
We have seen that the latter fleets to occupy Naupactos did not emulate Phormio’s victories in 
battle, and that the squadrons sent to Naupactos to some extent chart the decline of the Athenian 
navy over the course o f the Peloponnesian war. Caution should be employed in the use of this 
argument; Athens’ naval ‘decline’ was not a linear process, nor was her prowess in battles or 
control of the seas absolute even at the height o f her power. The ships under the generals o f the 
Samos fleet proved capable of winning significant tactical and strategic victories after 411 BC.
342 Thucydides, 4.5 and 4.8, cf. 4.13.
343 1 discuss the importance o f professional skill to the outcome o f the ‘ideal’ sea battle in Part Three, section 3.
344 Thucydides, 2.91
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Nor was sea power equated with victory in battles; thalassocracy depended not so much on never 
being defeated (as the total destruction o f Athens’ massive force in Egypt during the 450s BC 
demonstrates), but in maintaining and securing enough resources to weather such defeats.
C: Naval Personnel
1. Who Were The “Naval Mob”?
Having examined the types o f fleet actions and roles played by them in the fifth and fourth 
centuries BC, it is time now to turn to the men who crewed them. Given the central nature of the 
institution of the navy, our sources are remarkably reticent on the details of crew; potential 
reasons and explanations for this will be discussed in due course, after a review of the testimony 
we do have.
This subject has been discussed in the past. The focus o f the debate amongst writers on the navy 
has primarily been the balance between the four distinct social groups who make up the bulk of 
the navy crews; Athenian citizens of the thetic class, metics, foreigners (xenoi) and slaves. While 
this debate is clearly important, it misses out on a second and equally crucial approach to 
examining trireme crews; by their professional status. By this I mean simply an assessment of  
how many trireme crewmen did nothing else but crew triremes, as against those who may have 
pulled an oar only once or twice in their lives. It is only by examining both the social and the 
professional aspects o f trireme crews that we will get a complete picture of the “naval mob”.
Nauiikos Ochlos
It is with this highly charged and widely used term that I will begin. Widely used, that is, in 
modem writing; the phrase we commonly render “naval mob”, nautikos ochlos, occurs only three 
times in the contemporary source material, twice in Aristotle’s Politics, and once in Thucydides’ 
history.345 It is hardly the ubiquitous and well attested group that it appears to be from modem 
scholarship; for example, Hunt argues that “Only once does Thucydides refer to the “naval mob”, 
a favourite bugbear o f fourth-century elitist writers”;346 while he is right to suggest that such 
writers frequently discuss sailors, he gives the perhaps misleading impression that the phrase 
“naval mob” was widely used and understood. It is somewhat surprising to find it so often used 
without explanation or discussion, as though the meaning were self-evident and obvious. Amit 
gives quite a broad and inclusive meaning to the phrase, deeming it to cover “sailors in the navy 
and merchant vessels, craftsmen working in shipbuilding and repairs, port workers”.347 More 
recently, van Wees has defined the phrase in a similarly broad manner, though in describing the 
“naval mob” he relates it particularly to the trireme fleet: “the tens of thousands of people-mostly 
poor men, foreigners and slaves-required to build, maintain and man the fleet.”348 Earlier in the 
work, however, he uses the term in a more narrow sense, “the ‘naval mob’ of rowers and
345 Aristotle, Politics, 1304a; 1327a; Thucydides, 8.72.
346 Hunt, Slave, Warfare and Ideology, pp. 125-6.
347 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 62; cf. p. 58, when he asserts that the nautikos ochlos “was mainly composed o f  
sailors”.
348 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 200
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sailors”.349 Even given the fact that this is a somewhat inexact phrase, such a large variation in 
meaning should give us pause, and lead us back to its use in the sources.
The three ancient uses o f the phrase nautikos ochlos are obviously too few to represent any sort 
of generally-held ancient conception of the “naval mob”, and certainly the phrase is an evocative 
and emotive one, and therefore perhaps does not admit o f overly tight definitions. However, the 
contexts in which the phrase is used do at least hint at a more exclusively definition, and give a 
clue as to exactly what sorts of people were envisioned as belonging to “naval mob”.
The Thucydides passage refers to the period of the oligarchic coup of 411 BC, which will be 
discussed in detail later.350 After the take-over by the oligarchs, some delegates are sent out to 
the fleet at Samos to explain the new arrangements. Thucydides reports:
didaxontas hos ouk epi blabei tes poleos kai ton politon he oligarchia kateste, all' 
epi soteriai ton xumpanton pragmaton, pentakischilioi te hoti eien kai ou 
tetrakosioi monon hoi prassontes... alia t' episteilantes ta preponta eipein 
apepempsan autous euthus meta ten heauton katastasin, deisantes me, hoper 
egeneto, nautikos ochlos out' autos menein en toi oligarchikoi kosmoi ethelei
They [the ten delegates chosen] were to explain that the oligarchy had not been 
established to do any harm to the city or the citizens, but in order to preserve the 
state as a whole, and that it was not 400 but 5,000 who shared the 
government....They were also told the right line to take on other points, and were 
sent out directly after the new government was installed, since they feared (and 
their fears were justified by the event) that the men serving in the navy [nautikos 
ochlos] would not be willing to keep in their own place under the oligarchic 
system.351
This passage is o f crucial importance in discussing ideological and political matters concerned 
with the navy, which are topics for later sections of this work.352 For the present discussion, it 
serves to tell us that the nautikos ochlos, at least in the eyes o f the oligarchic leaders at Athens, 
comprised citizens; the nature o f the appeals and fears expressed only make sense if the nautikos 
ochlos had citizen rights which could be thought under threat by the new regime. The two 
passages of Aristotle confirm the idea o f the nautikos ochlos referring only to those amongst 
trireme crews who were citizens.
The two incidences in Politics appear simple at first sight, but are in fact problematic. In the 
first, Aristotle is expounding the now commonly held theory of the intrinsic link between military 
strength and political power within the constitution, giving examples from Greek history. He
says:
349 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 78
350 Part Two, section B
351 Thucydides, 8.72.1-2
352 Part Three, section 1.
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hoion he en Areioi pagoi boule eudokimesasa en tois Medikois edoxe suntondteran 
poiesai ten politeian, kai palin ho nautikos ochlos genomenos aitios tes peri 
Salamina nikes kai dia tautes tes hegemonias dia ten kata thalattan dunamin ten 
demokratian ischuroteran epoiesen
The Council of the Areopagus at Athens, for example, gained in reputation during 
the Persian War; and seemed for a time to be tightening the constitution. Then 
naval mob [nautikos ochlos], were responsible for the victory at Salamis, and 
secured for Athens an empire which depended on naval power; and the effect o f  
this was to strengthen once more the cause of democracy.353
Here then the nautikos ochlos is those who manned the triremes at Salamis and in the subsequent 
campaigns in the Aegean; or to be more precise, the Athenian citizens amongst those who crewed 
the ships; the metics, xenoi and slaves are implicitly excluded from the definition by the political 
context.354 The second passage, more disparaging of the “naval mob”, appears to support this 
definition. Here Aristotle is discussing the virtues and dangers o f sea-power in connection with 
the hypothetical city:
ei men gar hegemonikon kai politikon zesetai bion, anankaion kai tauten ten 
dunamin huparchein pros tas praxeis summetron. ten de poluanthrdpian ten 
gignomenen peri ton nautikon ochlon ouk anankaion huparchein tais polesin: 
outhen gar autous meros einai dei tes poleds. to men gar epibatikon eleutheron kai 
ton pezeuonton estin, ho kurion esti kai kratei tes nautilias: plethous de 
huparchontos perioikon kai ton ten chdran georgounton, aphthonian anankaion 
einai kai nauton.
If it [the city] prefers to pursue a life o f leadership, and of active relations with 
other cities, naval power must be commensurate with the activities involved. The 
large population which results from a crowd of naval oarsmen [nautikos ochlos] is 
a consequence which need not follow: there is no need for such people to be part 
of the citizen body. The marines belong to the class of full freemen: they count as 
part of the infantry, and are in control and command on shipboard. But if there are 
masses o f dwellers-around [perioikoi] and farm-workers ready to hand, it should 
always be possible to draw an abundant supply o f sailors from this source.355
The first part o f this passage seems to confirm our picture o f the nautikos ochlos\ they are 
citizens who ensure state power by serving in the navy. However, there is some contradiction in 
the second part o f the passage. Aristotle claims that there is no need for a large nautikos ochlos 
in the ideally-run city, because other groups could be drafted in to pull the oars. There is also the 
implication that if the serfs and farm-workers rowed the ships, they would somehow be distinct 
from the nautikos ochlos who did the same thing. Pat o f the difference, I would suggest, is that 
nautikos ochlos specified those men who crewed the navy as their profession. To suggest that an 
identifiable group of Athenian citizens rowed triremes as, so to speak, a full-time job is not an 
uncontroversial assertion, but it does have explicit support from a further passage in the Politics; 
although it does not mention the phrase nautikos ochlos, it gives us a very good definition of an
353 Aristotle, Politics, 1304a20
354 Arguments regarding the balance o f social groups within the trireme crews are given below.
355 Aristotle, Politics, 1327b4-15
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identifiable group of professional ‘naval people’. Earlier in the work, in listing various groups 
amongst the demos (“common people”) o f a state, he says:
eide gar pleid tou te demou kai ton legomenon gnorimon estin, hoion demon men 
eide hen men hoi georgoi, heteron de to peri tas technas, alio de to agoraion to 
peri onen kai prasin diatribon, alio de to peri ten thalattan, kai toutou to men 
polemikon to de chrematistikon to de porthmeutikon to d' halieutikon pollachou 
gar hekasta touton poluochla, hoion halieis men en Taranti kai Buzantidi, trierikon 
de Athenesin, emporikon de en Aiginei kai Chioi, porthmeutikon d' en Tenedoi
So far as the populace is concerned, one sort is engaged in farming; a second is 
engaged in the arts and crafts; a third is the marketing sort, which is engaged in 
buying and selling; a fourth is the maritime sort, which in term is partly for naval 
war [polomikon] and partly mercantile, partly employed on ferries, and partly 
engaged in fisheries. We may note that there are many places where one of these 
subdivisions forms a considerable body; as fishermen do at Tarentum and 
Byzantium, the trireme crews [trierikon] at Athens, the merchant seamen in 
Aegina and Cos, and the ferrymen at Tenedos.356
While the phrase nautikos ochlos does not occur in this passage, it nonetheless indicates a group 
amongst the Athenian citizens which crews triremes in a professional capacity, as implied in the 
second Aristotle passage quoted above. This concept o f the “naval mob” fits in with the first 
Aristotle passage, although admittedly not as well; the people in the ships at Salamis, for 
instance, could hardly be described as career sailors, even if (as seems not unlikely) many of 
them stayed on in the trireme fleet and became professional in the years to follow, while securing 
the Empire for Athens. The Thucydides passage also features citizens who had been at sea and 
on campaign for an extended period. We have arrived at, therefore, a large but selectively 
defined group; the nautikos ochlos was a sub-division o f the citizen body identifiable for making 
their living at sea, and predominantly aboard triremes.
When referring specifically to people, the term ochlos usually takes a more derogatory rather 
than descriptive tone; ‘rabble’ and ‘mob’ are appropriate translations.357 The work of the Old 
Oligarch uses the word in this context, contrasting the poor ochlos with the rich and good men 
who benefit the city. For example, in the context of warfare, ochlos is used to refer to a mass o f  
people without organization or formation and is often opposed to the well-ordered and ranked 
hoplite phalanx. It is a highly charged term, and therefore it should not be surprising that 
Aristotle, in the third passage above, eschews it for something more neutral in his description of 
naval folk. As mentioned above, its association with the word nautikos, which in other forms can 
mean ‘fleet’ or ‘navy’, is not a common one, and the derogatory nature of the combination is 
clear in the three passages quoted above. Nautikos ochlos is a simply a more negative way to 
refer the professional group of seamen described neutrally in the third Aristotle passage. 
Gabrielsen appears to appreciate this, when he argues that “the Athenian demos was renowned
356 Aristotle, Politics, 1291 b l8-25
357 Hunt (Slaves, Warfare and Ideology, p. 126, n. 32), in discussing 8.72 quoted above, argues that Thucydides often 
used the term neutrally, and quotes examples. While the general argument may be valid, the context here, the 
perceptions and fears o f the Athenian oligarchs, probably calls for a disparaging tone.
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for its nautical abilities... so that Aristotle could refer to part o f it as the “trieres folk” (trieriokori) 
or “naval mob” (nautikos ochlos)”.358 The part of the Athenian demos to which these passages 
refer is, I suggest, that part which earned its sole or primary living on board triremes.
In modem writing, the term is frequently used in a wider context, although of course it still 
includes that group of lower class Athenian citizens united by their service in the navy, and in 
two of these passages, seemingly characterized by their democratic instincts.359 While such 
evidence provides some justification for linking the navy crews and democratic politics, the 
extent and nature of this link is going to be the subject of Part Two. Perhaps unsurprisingly given 
the nature and political contexts of the passages involved, the sources clearly have only citizens 
in mind when they talk of the nautikos ochlos. While this superficially provides some 
justification for modem writers equating trireme crews with the thete class, we need not be bound 
by the same constraints and prejudices as Aristotle and Thucydides. While the elimination of 
other social groups from their key role in the navy in our sources is a phenomena worthy of 
comment, it is certainly not worthy of emulation. Any political analysis is obviously going to 
concentrate on citizens, but we must not forget that, if we are faithful to the (albeit limited) 
ancient usage o f the phrase, nautikos ochlos no more corresponds to ‘trireme crews’ that it does 
to ‘thetic class’; many thetes were not trireme crewmen and many in trireme crews were non­
citizen. In the next section I will investigate what portion of our trireme crews were full-time 
citizens, and thus how many of the thetes belonged to the nautikos ochlos.
Social Status Groups in Trireme Crews
There is good evidence to suggest that those who manned the fleet were not exclusively Athenian 
citizens, and even that citizens did not form a majority o f crewmen. In an inscription dating from 
around the turn of the fourth century BC, which appears to be some sort of trireme crew list, the 
bulk of crewmen are listed under three headings;360 nautai astoi ( ’sailors of the city’, referring to 
citizens),361 xenoi (foreigners; principally from the Aegean islands though many were presumably 
metics resident in Athens)362 and therapontes (slaves).363 This inscription confirms the general 
picture from the sum of the surviving evidence, mostly for the fifth century, which suggests a 
strong contribution from these social groups, but it does not indicate that any one of these groups 
contributed significantly more than any other. Nevertheless there has been much scholarly debate 
on the relative importance to the fleet o f these groups.364 The speech of Pericles to the Athenian
358 Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, pp. 108-9
359 I discuss this issue below, Part Three, Section 1.
360 This unique inscription, IG I3 1032, contains nothing to indicate the reason for its existence, being nothing more 
than a list of names and crew positions. The dating o f the inscription to 410-390 BC relies primarily on epigraphic 
arguments, and although prosopographical investigation render this period very likely, there is no way to be more 
precise. The ‘marines’ on the stone are listed as epibatai and toxotai, and the specialist crewmen in terms o f their 
duties onboard (for example, kubernetes, protates etc).
361 IG I3 1032,11. 3, 50, 172 and 305
362 IG I3 1032,1.71.
363 IG I3 1032,1. 227.
364 Amit (Athens and the Sea, p. 31) gives and overview of the debate, before concluding that citizens played the 
dominant role; Whithead provides a very brief review o f the positions adopted; Ideology o f the Athenian Metic, p.84.
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ekklesia in 431 BC makes clear that citizens and mercenaries contributed significantly to trireme 
crews in this period, and the Old Oligarch suggests that metics were also crucial to the operation 
of the fleet.365 The close links between the merchant shipping crews and trireme crews, which 
existed in both the fourth and the fifth centuries, may suggest that non-citizens, even slaves, 
regularly worked aboard triremes as well as merchantmen.366 It is the issue of slaves amongst the 
oarsmen that has been most contentious.367 In the fourth century BC, Isocrates suggested that in 
Athens’ imperial hey-day, slaves and foreigners crewed the triremes, whereas in his time it was 
citizens who took the oars.368 While there is clearly much exaggeration in his suggestion, the Old 
Oligarch reports that finding slaves in the fifth century fleet was not unusual; he says that 
Athenian citizens and their slaves learnt seamanship through being at sea regularly, and that 
masters were keen to put their slaves to work on the oars so they could profit from their wages.369 
Slaves were also present in the triremes sent to Sicily; in the letter Nicias sent back to Athens, he 
reported on the fate of his crews, saying that “the slaves, since we [and the Syracusans] are now 
on terms o f equality, desert.”370 In the face o f this testimony, the suggestion that slaves were only 
present in the Athenian fleet for the battle o f Arginusae in 406 BC seems untenable;371 what was 
unusual on this occasion was that those slaves who did take part were promised freedom and 
citizenship.372 It seems clear, therefore, that slaves rowed Athenian triremes side by side with 
citizens, foreigners and metics on a regular basis in the fifth centuiy BC.373
There is far less evidence for the composition o f trireme crews in the fourth century BC. As 
noted above, Isocrates certainly thought that citizen conscripts were compelled to row triremes in 
his day more so than in the past. Conscription was the exception rather than the rule in both the 
fourth and the fifth century, but we do hear of citizen conscripts taking oars more regularly. 
Apollodorus, during his trierarchy in the late 360s BC, turned away the citizens called up to serve 
on his ship as they were o f inferior quality, and he preferred to hire crewmen privately;374 the 
episode suggests that conscription was not an especially effective means of manning the ships. 
Apollodorus’ speech also demonstrates that there were alternatives to conscripted sailors well 
into the fourth century, and throughout his term of service he seems to have been able to 
replenish crewmen lost through injury and desertion with ease.375 Clearly then there was a 
substantial pool of skilled mercenary oarsmen in the fourth century BC, and unlike the fifth, there
365 Thucydides, 1.143; [Xenophon], 1.12.
366 Slaves were often found aboard commercial vessels, sometimes constituting the entire crew. (Casson, Ancient Trade 
and Society, p. 25). The Old Oligarch ([Xenophon], 1.20) attests to the links between the commercial fleet and trireme 
crews.
367 Sargent, ‘The use o f slaves’ and Casson, ‘Galley slaves’ deny any slave prsence in Athenian triremes; contra Hunt, 
Slaves, Warfare and Ideology, pp. 90 ff.
368 Isocrates, 8.48.
369 [Xenophon], 1.11, cf. 1.19.
370 Thucydides, 7.13.2; Graham, ‘Crews o f Athenian triremes’, p. 259.
371 Sargent, ‘The use o f slaves’, p. 278.
372 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.24 cf. Aristophanes, Frogs, 1. 693.
373 As was the case in the contemporary navies o f other states; for example those o f Corcyra (Thucydides, 1.55.1), and 
Chios (Thucydides, 8.15)
374 [Demosthenes], 50.7
375 [Demosthenes], 50.12
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were plentiful employment alternatives to the Athenian navy.376 The fact that the Paralos was 
remarkable for having an all-citizen crew in the 330s BC, and that we see a slave serving as a 
trireme’s auletes, suggests that crews of mixed social backgrounds were the norm.377 The exact 
relative proportion of citizens to non-citizens in the crews is o f course impossible to determine, 
and no doubt varied widely from fleet to fleet and year to year. IG I3 1036 and the sum of our 
other evidence suggests that each group made a numerically significant contribution throughout 
the period, so rather than placing emphasis on testimonies that suggest that one group was more 
numerous than the others, it is perhaps better to suppose a relatively even contribution from the 
four principal social groups involved. On this interpretation, citizens did not have a dominant 
presence, and were outnumbered by non-citizens. Even if this conclusion is not accepted, the 
evidence does not allow us to argue for an overwhelming number of citizens amongst trireme 
crews, and the large numbers of non-citizens within the navy must surely be of great significance 
when considering the political influence of the trireme crews at Athens.
Professional Sailors378
It is equally clear that a substantial number (and the evidence permits us no more precision) of  
trireme crewmen made their sole or primary living as trireme crewmen. Even given the great 
fluctuations in the numbers o f ships in commission throughout the fifth century especially, which 
in term required equal fluctuations in the numbers of crewmen at sea, there is plentiful evidence 
to suggest a large number of full-time seamen amongst the trireme crews. As we have seen 
already in the discussion o f Athenian fleet patterns on the fifth century, Athens was regularly able 
to keep substantial numbers of ships in commission all year round, which surely implies a large 
proportion of those on board did not have other occupations.379 The citizens amongst these men, 
who spent most o f their lives at sea and were identifiable as seaman as opposed to anything else, 
are those whom I have identified as the “naval mob”. It is to an audience of Athenian citizens 
that Pericles makes the point that skill in seamanship “allows one no spare time for anything 
else”.380 Just how many o f the full-time crewmen were citizens as opposed to slaves, metics or 
xenoi is not apparent from our sources. Thucydides’ description suggests that in the early years 
of the Delian League, the Athenian citizens themselves played a leading role in the campaigns,381 
and Plutarch’s fleet of 60 ships in permanent commission is described (probably with some 
inaccuracy) as being manned by citizens.382 Rosivach has argued that, for the early years of the 
Peloponnesian war, mercenaries provided most of the ‘full-time’ crewmen, while citizens 
(mainly farmers and farm-workers in their slow season) provided the manpower for the big 
summer fleets. While there may be some truth in this, it would involve us in imagining a sea-
376 [Demosthenes], 50.16
377 Arrian, Anabasis, 3.6, cf. Thucydides, 8.73; Demosthenes, 18.129.
378 1 discuss this issue more fully in Part Three, section 2.
379 Plutarch (Life o f  Pericles, 11.4) suggests that 60 triremes were in operation for eight months o f every year, and 
various roles which triremes performed indicates that substantial numbers o f ships would be in service even in times o f  
(relative) peace.
380 Thucydides, 1.142.
381 Thucydides, 1.99
382 Plutarch, Pericles, 11.4
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change in manning patterns since the reportedly citizen-based days o f the Pentekontaetia. In 
addition, Pericles’ speech to the Athenians on the eve o f the war suggests that there was a strong 
professional citizen presence in the navy at that time.383 So while we can say that a lot of 
Athenian citizens sailed in triremes in a professional capacity in the fifth century, any more 
precision in this area will be conjecture and guesswork. I have argued in favour approximately 
even division in numerical contribution between the four principal social groups that formed 
trireme crews. Given this, and assuming that Plutarch’s suggestion of 60 ships in regular long­
term commission during the fifth century is a reasonable estimate for the constant manpower 
demands o f the fleet,384 these two suggestions together would imply a “naval mob” o f around 
3,000-4,000 thete professional crewmen in Athens.385 Although it should go without saying that 
very little confidence can be had in this specific figure, it is probably along the right lines.
I suggested above that the term “naval mob” is somewhat unsatisfactorily used in modem 
writing, and I have attempted to find a definition that accords better with the limited ancient 
testimony. However, even having clearly set out this definition, continuing to use the most 
accurate translation “naval mob” inevitably carries some of the pejorative sense with which it 
was used in its original context. A strong argument can be made for abandoning the phrase 
altogether, an argument that would be conclusive if only there was alternative and equally 
concise way to express the definition I have defended here, “those Athenian citizens who were 
identifiable as crewing triremes as their sole or primary occupation”. So while I shall continue to 
use the phrase “naval mob” in this work, I shall highlight it with quotation marks to show that by 
its use I mean the professional Athenian crewmen, for whom the negative connotations o f the 
phrase should not (necessarily) be applied.
2. Salaminia and Paralos: the “naval mob” personified?
When describing the Paralos crew, Thucydides says “each man was a free-bom Athenian citizen, 
and all of whom had always been thoroughly opposed to the idea of an oligarchy, even when 
there was no question of such a thing existing.”386 The Paralos crew were Athenian citizens, and 
clearly identifiable as trireme crewmen; at first glance they appear to be an identifiable 
personification of the “naval mob”. However, while the Paralos crew share these essential 
characteristics o f the “naval mob”, they also are, in several ways, exceptional. The extent to 
which Paralos and her crew were different from the rest of the Athenian navy will be the subject
383 Thucydides, 1.140-4. I discuss this speech in more detail in Part 2, section A.2
384 This figure may be a reasonable estimation o f the numbers o f fifth-century vessels in long-term service. The 
figures discussed in the previous section have suggested that the average number o f ships per year and the average 
length o f commission for fleets corresponds well with Plutarch’s statement. The average number o f ships per year in 
the fifth century was 95, though this figure encompasses long and short term fleets
385 Each ship would have a crew o f up to 200. Assuming that between a quarter and a third o f the crew comprised 
Athenian citizens, that would give between 50 and 67 Athenians per ship. Across 60 ships, this would equal between 
3000 and 4020 Athenian citizens.
386 Thucydides, 8.73.5
94
of this section, and this will make it clear whether a useful analogy can be drawn between the 
Paralos crew and the “naval mob” as a whole.
Modern views
The special status of the Paralos is often noted in modem writing; for example, Morrison 
describes her as “one of the two crack state triereis”387 which “went on errands for the state”.388 
The other one o f these “state” vessels, the Salaminia, is often mentioned in the same breath as the 
Paralos in modem writing.389 Casson, for example, writes “The Athenians had a famous pair, the 
Paralos and the Salaminia, the swiftest units in the fleet, which they constantly used to carry 
messages or transport important personages”.390 At the point of their first appearance in 
Thucydides, Homblower describes them as “The Athenian sacred triremes...two fast ships used 
for special missions”,391 while the footnote given by Warner at this point in the Penguin edition 
reads “these two ships were the elite of the Athenian navy, in service throughout the year for 
special missions.”392 They are invariably described as having some combination of the following 
attributes; for being especially fast and/or elite, for being “state” vessels, for being sent on 
particular types o f mission (“such as the despatch of news...or the transport o f ambassadors”)393, 
for being “sacred” vessels, and for the unique nature o f the crew. None of these statements are 
absolutely false; but some are more appropriate than others, and some are misleading. For 
example, Kagan’s statement that the Paralos was “Athens’ messenger ship”394 implies both that 
the job of sending information was the unique preserve o f the Paralos, and also that Paralos’ 
sole role was to deliver messages. Both are misleading implications that are not borne out by the 
evidence.
Primary Evidence for the Paralos and the Salaminia
The evidence for the Salaminia and the Paralos is, as ever, patchy and incomplete, but it does 
allow a more precise description of how these ships were different from the ‘standard’ Athenian 
trireme, and thus why they were the best known ships in the Athenian navy. Thucydides is the 
first author to mention the ships, and he refers to several of their missions during the 
Peloponnesian war, and Xenophon’s narrative similarly mentions the vessels at relevant points in 
his history. The ships were well known enough in late fifth-century Athens to be referred to by 
name in several of Aristophanes’ plays, most notably in Birds. In the fourth century, a section of  
Demosthenes’ prosecution of Meidias refers to the latter’s allegedly dishonourable service as 
treasurer of the Paralos', a brief and one sided account, but which gives valuable evidence about
387 Morrison, Coates and Rankov, Athenian Trireme, p. 136
388 Morrison, Coates and Rankov, Athenian Trireme, p. 155, n.28
389 As will be discussed in more detail below, the two are mentioned together in the ancient sources tooj 
Thucydides, once in Xenophon’s Hellenica, and once in Aristophanes’ Birds.
390 Casson, Ancient Mariners, p. 92
391 Homblower, Commentary on Thucydides, ad loc 3.33
392 p. 210.
393 Sommerstein, note on Aristophanes, Birds, 1. 147
394 Kagan, Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 170. 0
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this vessel. Remarks in the Scholia, and later sources such as Plutarch, Pliny and Arrian, add to 
the somewhat fragmented picture o f these ships.
One persistent problem in investigating these ships is the question o f how different they were 
from one another. They are on several occasions mentioned as a pair in our sources. Thucydides 
describes then sailing out of Athens together in 427 BC,395 and later in that year, fighting as part 
of the same Athenian fleet.396 Xenophon mentions them together amongst ships gathered up by 
the general Iphikrates in composing his naval force.397 These occasions are records o f the ships’ 
movements and actions, rather than qualities. A character in Aristophanes’ Birds mentions them 
in the same breath, pretending to mistake an envoy from the Gods for one or other o f these 
vessels.398 While this is quite sufficient testimony to suggest that these ships often operated 
together, it is perhaps not sufficient to justify the supposition that characteristics described as 
belonging to one vessel or its crew (for example, the fact that all the Paralos crew were Athenian 
citizens) was necessarily shared by the other.399 There is enough evidence to be more exact in 
terms o f the ‘unique’ characteristics attributed to these vessels in modem works. It happens that 
most o f the information regarding these features pertains to the Paralos, which appears to have 
been the more significant of the two vessels.400
Special Missions
The oft-repeated statement that the Paralos and Salaminia were used, or even reserved, for 
special (often diplomatic) missions is not bome out by the literary evidence of their actions. 
While Plutarch records an anecdote o f Critolaus that Pericles “reserved himself... like the galley 
Salaminia, for great occasions”,401 evidence from more reliable sources suggests that this as not 
invariably the case. Thucydides’ first report o f the two ships, in 427 BC, has them bringing news 
of an approaching Peloponnesian fleet to the Athenian general Paches, stationed at Mytilene.402 
However, the ships were not launched in order to bring this news; they “happened to be sailing 
from Athens” when they spotted the enemy fleet and altered course 403 The fact that Salaminia 
and Paralos are sailing together at this time tells against there being assigned a diplomatic 
mission, as such delegations were usually carried by a single vessel.404 The point at which the 
Salaminia and Paralos joined the Naupactos fleet is not clear. They are named at 3.77 as
395 Thucydides, 3.33
396 Thucydides, 3.77
397 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.14
398 Aristophanes, Birds, 1. 1203
399 As for example, Jordan does {Athenian Navy, p. 174) when he suggests that the group known as the Paraloi could 
be considered a genos, as the Salaminioi were one.
400 If only in terms o f longevity; [Aristotle] records (61.5) that there was a treasurer elected for the Paralos, and one 
also for the Ammonia. The usual interpretation is that this latter vessel replaced the Salaminia sometime in the 4th 
century BC. Even if  the Salaminia still part o f the fleet in the late fourth century BC, its absence from [AristotleJ’s 
account would suggest that it did not have comparable status to Paralos.
401 Plutarch, Pericles, 1
402 Thucydides, 3.33
403 Thucydides, 3.33
404 The Corcyraeans’ closing of their harbour to all but single Athenian or Spartan vessels (Thucydides, 3.71.1) 
suggests that this was the usual size for a diplomatic mission.
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amongst the 12 ships that fought in the battle, but it is unclear whether they should be included in 
the other references to the fleet o f 12 ships several chapters earlier.405 For the purposes o f the 
present discussion it matters only a little; the undisputed presence o f the Salaminia and the 
Paralos in the line o f battle should be enough to highlight the fact that they were not reserved for 
special missions and taking messages.
The Paralos crew were selected by the stratiotai on Samos and the Samians to relay news to 
Athens 411BC 406 While the ship was certainly being used as a messenger vessel in this instance, 
it should not be taken as evidence that the Paralos exclusively filled this role. It is likely that the 
ship had been stationed at Samos for quite some time, and taken a full (but unrecorded) part in 
the various naval operations between 412 BC and the stasis, and again afterwards when she 
returned to Samos in 411 BC. Similarly, Paralos is reported by Xenophon as being one o f the 
few ships that escaped from the fiasco at Aigospotamoi in 404 BC,407 and was the vessel which 
bore the news to Athens; certainly this is evidence of the Paralos as a messenger, but her earlier 
contribution as part of this fleet was not remarked upon.
It may be argued that the Paralos would not normally have been present in a war-fleet such as the 
one that fought at Aigospotamoi; the desperate circumstances of the fleet’s launch, with 
citizenship being offered to anyone who pulled an oar, would surely explain the presence o f a 
normally reserved vessel in the battle line.408 Along with the example o f the battle off Corcyra 
mentioned above, a later reference in Xenophon’s narrative shows that this was not the case. In 
373 BC, Iphikrates persuaded the Athenians to add the fleet cruising around Attica, along with 
the Salaminia and Paralos, to his own force due to sail round the Peloponnese.409 The ships 
presumably played a full role in Iphikrates’ successful campaign though were not mentioned by 
name again.
Demosthenes’ prosecution of his political enemy Meidias sometime around 350 BC reveals a 
great deal about the Paralos.410 Demosthenes attacked Meidias’ record as a public figure and 
performer of liturgies, pouring scorn on, amongst other things, his record as treasurer o f the 
Paralos. The vessel’s status as “sacred” is highlighted,411 and some of the duties (and, in this 
case, abuses) of the treasurer are briefly described. Under Meidias’ leadership, Demosthenes 
alleges that the Paralos was involved in plundering and extorting the people o f Cyzicus (from 
which activities Meidias profited substantially), and was also involved in the campaign against 
Euboea; in particular, the Paralos appears on this occasion to have been involved in the
405 1 discuss the sequence o f events above, Part One, section B.2
406 Thucydides, 8.74. For fuller discussion, See Part Two, Section B.2
407 Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.1.28-9
408 This offer was made before the battle o f Arginusae in 406 BC (Aristophanes, Frogs, 1. 694 with Scholia). Following 
that hollow victory, it appears that most o f the fleet remained at sea until the disastrous ‘battle’ o f Aigospotamoi a year 
later.
409 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.14. It seems to be coincidence that this campaign also involves fighting around Corcyra.
410 Demosthenes, 21.171-4
411 Demosthenes, 21.174. See discussion below
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transporting of troops from Athens to Euboea, for which operation the treasurer was to have 
dispersed a fund of 12 talents.412 According to Demosthenes these instructions were not carried 
out with diligence appropriate to the office, but there is nothing that suggests the tasks were 
themselves unusual. Once again, therefore, the Paralos appears to have performed a variety o f  
tasks and missions according to the needs of the political and military situation.
The best example o f a ‘special’ diplomatic mission undertaken by the Paralos comes late in the 
fourth century, and is reported in a late source. According to Arrian, the Paralos was sent by the 
Athenians to negotiate with Alexander the Great at Tyre in 322 BC:
Entautha aphikneitai p a r ’auton ex Atheneon he Paralos presbeis agousa 
Diopanton kai Achillea. Xunepresbeuon de autoiskai hoi Paraloi xumpantes. Kai 
houtoi ton te allon etuxon hon heneka estalesan
[When Alexander was in Tyre] the sacred vessel called the Paralos came to him 
from Athens, bringing Diophantus and Achilleus as envoys to him; and indeed all 
the Paraloi were members of the deputation. Approaching Alexander, these men 
achieved all the objects of their mission413
This notice is exceptional. The history of these ships suggests that there was little unique in the 
types of jobs they did; at various times, they carried troops, fought in sea battles, reinforced 
blockading fleets, as well as acting as messengers and carrying diplomats; in other words, they 
performed the wide range of roles usual to triremes of this period. It seems that the “sacred” 
status of the vessels and the weight of cultic association added to their importance and renown, 
and led to their being chosen for some special diplomatic missions, such as the Paralos’ mission 
to Alexander, but the sending of important political delegations were not unique to these two 
ships, nor was their role confined to such things.
State ships and sacred vessels
The description of the Salaminia and Paralos as state ships seems to be somewhat misleading. 
While some extremely rich private individuals owned personal triremes,414 nearly all the ships o f 
the Athenian navy were state ships; it is not a feature which distinguishes the Paralos and the 
Salaminia from ‘regular’ triremes. Some justification for this title may be found in the presence 
of an elected Athenian official aboard.415 These treasurers seem to have had role in the 
distribution of public money for naval campaigns, though it was also usual for these funds to be 
handled by the strategoi.416 It appears that these monies were for the campaign and not the ship 
itself, and furthermore that Treasurer of the Paralos did not command the vessel; an inscription
412 Demosthenes, 21.173-4.
413 Arrian, Anabasis, 3.6.1-2
414 Alcibiades5 forebear, Klienias, supplied his personally owned trireme at the battle o f Salamis, but he is one of the 
last recorded individuals known to privately own such a vessel. Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, pp. 1-2.
415 [Aristotle], Constitution o f Athens, 61.5
416 Demosthenes, 21.174 Apollodorus ([Demosthenes] 50.10) refers to receiving (or rather in his case, not receiving) 
money from the generals.
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set up in the mid-fourth century by the Paraloi and dedicated to their trierarch Anthippos shows 
this:
[hoi] Paraloi a\po ton—on] hoi Paraloi apo t[on—on]. Anthippos etrie[rarchei]
The Paraloi.. .The Paraloi from.. .Anthippos, trierarch.417
It seems difficult to argue that the trierarch (an appointed liturgical duty relating to a single ship) 
and the Treasurer (a popularly-elected office with seemingly wide financial responsibilities) were 
one and the same post, though this has been supposed.418 There is however no single source that 
refers to the trierarch and tamias as separate individuals, and so the question is beyond absolute 
proof. While every vessel in the fleet would have had at least one trierarch, the presence of an 
elected Athenian official aboard the Paralos probably made this ship (and by extension the 
Salaminia too) seem more of the state than regular triremes.
Some confusion can also be accounted for by the fact that Demosthenes contrasted the Paralos 
with triremes he describes as idiotikon, ‘private’.419 It seems that the term is somewhat loosely 
used by Demosthenes, as a slightly earlier section of this speech suggests the provenance o f these 
ships; they were ‘voluntarily donated’ to the navy by wealthy, patriotic and ‘philotimic’420 
Athenians, who then often commanded them through the liturgy of the trierarchy421 While these 
vessels were clearly part o f the Athenian navy, their origin could easily be made slightly 
ambiguous by a cunning speaker like Demosthenes. But he does not describe the Paralos by 
contrast as ‘state-owned’ or ‘public’, but as hieran, ‘sacred’.
It is far more meaningful, and with far better grounding in the ancient evidence, that the ships are 
described as ‘sacred’. Not only was Paralos explicitly described as such, but a passage in 
Aristophanes’ Birds, staged in 414 BC confirms that this was probably true of the Salaminia as 
well:
Iris: para ton theon egoge ton Olumpidn.
Peisetairos: onoma de so. ti esti; Paralos e Salaminia;
Iris: Iris tacheia.
Peisetairos: ploion e kune;
Iris: I am from the gods, the Olympian gods.
Peisetaerus: And what’s your name? Paralos or Salaminial
Iris: Iris the fast.
Peisetaerus: Do you mean a fast boat, or a fast bitch?422
417IG II2 2966. This fact however did not stop Demosthenes (21.174) attempting to lay the blame for the perceived 
failures o f the ship’s maintenance at the door o f her tamias Meidias.
418 Gabrielsen, Financing the Fleet, p. 73 cf. p. 243, n. 12, argues this; “the commanders o f the sacred ships, Paralos 
and Salaminia, bore the distinct title o f treasurers, tamiai, and were elected officers”, a view which does not sit 
particularly comfortably with his later statement (p. 88) that the Paraloi “carried a permanent obligation to furnish the 
commander o f the sacred ship”.
419 Demosthenes, 21.174
420 Philotimia translates literally as “love o f honour”, and refers to the spirit o f competition amongst the elite in terms 
of conspicuous and generous performance o f liturgies in exchange for recognition, respect and favours from the 
community.
421 Demosthenes, 21.160
422 Aristophanes, Birds, 1.1203-4
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The pairing of Paralos and Salaminia in this passage, and Peisetaerus’ pretending to assume that 
someone from the Gods must have been one ship or the other, suggests that both vessels were 
sacred, and famous for being so. The question of how many other sacred vessels Athens 
possessed is an interesting one, but not relevant to the debate here.423 However many there were, 
it seems from the extent of the evidence on Paralos and Salaminia that these two vessels 
occupied a privileged place in Athenian consciousness. But how did sacred vessels differ from 
regular Athenian triremes?
The evidence suggests two principle features unique to these two ‘sacred’ triremes. Firstly and 
most obviously, these sacred vessels “served certain ceremonial and religious purposes”.424 
While these ships performed all the roles usual to triremes, they appear to have had extra duties 
relating to their ‘sacred’ status. Such tasks could have included the conveying of sacred 
embassies, theoria, that were “regularly sent to a sacrifice, and to the festivals” aboard theoric 
ships.425 The mission of the Salaminia in 414 BC, to go to Sicily and arrest Alcibiades, should 
perhaps be regarded in this religious context.426 Alcibiades was accused of serious religious 
wrongdoing, the breaking of the Herms statues in Athens, and profaning the Eleusinian 
Mysteries; it may have been the case that sacred vessels were required to bring such defendants 
to trial. As Lambert notes, it is possible that Alcibiades himself was a member of the Salaminioi 
and this possibility makes the sending of the Salaminia to arrest him, and his subsequent escape,
427even more interesting.
These two ‘sacred’ triremes also appear to differ from the norm in terms of the selection of their 
crew. Thucydides’ account o f the political turmoil of 411 BC makes clear that the Paraloi were a 
distinct and identifiable group even when not crewing the Paralos, and highlights that “those 
who sailed on the Paralos being Athenians and free men one and all” 428 It is possible to be more 
precise; Garland suggests that the worshippers of the hero Paralos, the son of Poseidon and the 
inventor of the warship,429 “are to be identified with the crew of the sacred trireme Paralos”,430 
and this association with the cult would perhaps explain why the whole crew were Athenian 
citizens. Kearns also identifies the Paraloi as both the trireme crewmen and those sacrificing to 
the hero, arguing that “the hero Paralos, for whose worship they came together, functioned as a 
focus of loyalty and an expression of corporate identity” 431
423 There was at least one other vessel that performed a sacred role; the triacontor (30-oared ship) that conveyed the 
sacred embassies to Delos every 4 and 6 years. [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 54.7 cf. 56.3. Jordan {Athenian 
Navy, pp. 153-81) argues that there were several more sacred vessels, but his arguments do not always persuade. If 
there were other sacred triremes, they would no doubt have performed similar tasks to those discussed here, but they 
may not have had, like Paralos and Salaminia, all-citizen crews.
424 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 153
425 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 156, referring to the Suda. Cf. Part One, section A.3.
426 Thucydides, 6.53 and 6.61, cf. Aristophanes, Birds, 147
427 Lambert, ‘The Attic Genos Salaminioi’, p. 103, n. 68, cf. p.97, n. 28
428 Thucydides, 8.73.5
429 Pliny, Natural History, 7.56.207
430 Garland, Piraeus, p. 131
431 Kearns, Heroes o f  Attica, p. 42-3, cf. p. 193
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The crew of the Salaminia were perhaps associated with a specific genos group called the 
Salaminioi432 Lambert suggests that the “genos of the Salaminioi might have regarded 
themselves as descendants of the original 6th century settlers on Salamis”, men with interests on 
the island and in Attica itself.433 He also accepts the thrust o f Jordan’s suggestion that the men of 
the genos crewed the Salaminia, and if this is so he argues that “the three groups of Athenian 
“Salaminioi” attested in the classical period... [the genos, Athenians living on the island and the 
trireme crew]...would be nicely interconnected”.434 It might also suggest that the “Attic vessel” 
that Plutarch describes as taking part in ceremonial re-enactments of the Athenian conquest of 
Salamis could have been the Salaminia herself.435 Taylor is dismissive of the connection 
between the ship and the genos, suggesting that there is no evidence for anyone of the Salaminioi 
serving on the Salaminia, and that their presence as trierarchs on other ships suggests that they 
would not have been able to bear the financial burden of the upkeep of the Salaminia to o 436 
Given how little we know about the Salaminioi and its membership, neither o f these objections is 
strong enough to disprove a connection, but the case must remain uncertain. If the Salaminia's 
crew were provided from the Salaminioi, whether or not we identify the vessel with Solon’s 
“Attic ship”, it would suggest that she was similar to the Paralos not only in respect o f their 
‘sacred’ status, but also in their all-citizen crews.
The fastest ships with elite crews
It is often stated that the Salaminia and the Paralos were the fastest ships in the fleet. 
Notwithstanding the fact that all triremes were noted for their speed, the case for these vessels 
being faster than the rest o f the Athenian navy rests on very thin grounds. In his prosecution of 
Meidias, Demosthenes makes mention of the ‘fact’ that, when his opponent was treasurer o f the 
Paralos, the sacred vessel was overtaken by a “private” warship, and that this showed culpable 
negligence on Meidias’ part.437 The inference is, presumably, that under normal circumstances 
and a responsible treasurer, the Paralos should have been able to outstrip any ship in the fleet. As 
noted above, it seems likely that the blame for this alleged disgraceful conduct should rightly fall 
on whoever was the trierarch o f the Paralos at that time, and not on the tamias. Demosthenes is 
not presenting an ordered and balanced account of the comparative speeds o f Athenian ships; he 
is simply flinging accusations o f misconduct at Meidias and hoping that some will stick. There is 
no need to believe unreservedly, based on this passage, that the sacred ships were the fastest in 
the fleet.
There is very little evidence on which to judge the relative speeds o f the two sacred vessels and 
the rest of the Athenian navy. It is unlikely that the Paralos and Salaminia, or any other ship,
432 Jordan, Athenian Navy, pp. 165-72
433 Lambert, ‘The Attic genos Salaminioi’, p. 99.
434 Lambert, ‘The Attic genos Salaminioi’, pp. 102-3
435 Lambert, ‘The Attic genos Salaminioi’, p. 100. If this connection is accepted, it is a good example o f the kind of 
additional duties that ‘sacred’ triremes would have undertaken. I quote this passage in Part 1, A.3
436 Taylor, Salamis and the Salaminioi, p. 114, n. 23
437 Demosthenes, 21.174
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would have had a greatly superior structure to any other trireme in the fleet, and certainly not to 
newer built vessels; if these were the fastest ships, it would have been because they had the best 
and strongest rowers; in other words, an elite crew. It is a not infrequent boast of litigants that, 
during their trierarchy, they commanded the fastest ship in the fleet.438 When a reason is given 
for their speed, it is that the trierarch was willing to spend money to secure the best crew. It 
would of course serve the interests of the litigants to attribute their ship’s performance to their 
outlay, but it is also likely to have been the truth; better pay would usually secure better crew, and 
thus a faster ship.
It has been argued above that, in terms of social status, the crew of the Salaminia and Paralos 
could indeed be described as comparatively elite.439 But were they elite in the professional sense 
as well? There are some references in Aristophanes to the Salaminioi in the context of rowing, 
which might suggest that they were famous and skilful in this art. These passages, however, are 
primarily excuses for Aristophanes to make jokes based on the fact that the verb to row was a 
euphemism for having sex. In the Ecclesiazusae, for example, one of the female plotters explains 
her lateness to the meeting by saying “my husband is from Salamis, you see, and all night long he 
was rowing me between the sheets.”440 It is the association of the sailors with both ways o f 
‘rowing’, rather than the sober evaluation of the relative strength of crewmen and velocity o f  
Athenian warships, that is Aristophanes’ concern here.
The eponymous heroine o f Lysistrata also had to deal with poor attendance at her female political 
gathering. In assessing the poor turnout, Lysistrata comments that “There isn’t a single woman 
here from the Paralia, nor from Salamis”441 It is clearly the two ships of similar name that 
Aristophanes was alluding to here; the nautical flavour of the jokes in this section are similar to 
the Ecclesiazusae passage quoted above. Sommerstein seems to consider this also a reference to 
great speed of Salaminia and Paralos’, “if these were Athens’ quickest moving ships, the districts 
bearing their names should produce Athens’ quickest moving women”.442 While we should not 
exclude this fairly absurd possibility, it is perhaps a better supposition to assume that the women 
from these places would be, like their menfolk, politically active and interested in participating; 
their prompt arrival was expected not because of their speed, but because of their dedication to a 
political cause. Thucydides provides solid evidence for the political disposition of the Paralos 
and the decisive action that resulted from it; perhaps this passage suggests that the crew of the 
Salaminia were similarly forceful.
438 [Demosthenes] 50.12; Lysias, 21.6-7.
439 Comparative, that is, to the mix o f metics, slaves and citizens that formed the crew of every other Athenian trireme.
440 Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae, 38
441 Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 58
442 Sommerstein’s note on Lysistrata, 1. 58, p. 157. cf. “the reference is to wives o f the Paraloi, i.e. the crew o f the ship 
Paralos, who, it is implied, might be expected to arrive promptly.”
102
There is just as little evidence concerning the pay, recruitment and conditions of the crew of the 
Paralos and Salaminia. It is suggested in a late lexographical source that the crews o f the 
Paralos were paid throughout the year, at the rate of four obols per day.443 This is a lower wage 
than could be gained in the open market, where a drachma a day was expected 444 It is likely that 
the ship did not have to be actually on duty for the crew to be paid, but that the Paraloi were 
always ‘on call’ for manning their ship. This was not the case in the Athenian navy as a whole, 
where wages appear to have been given per day worked, and is more comparable with the daily 
stipend given to officials and magistrates such as members of the boule, or Council 445 Given 
this (admittedly slim) evidence for the terms, conditions and wages of the crews of one o f the 
‘sacred’ ships, it is perhaps unlikely that they would often be the very fastest triremes in Athens’ 
navy. The Paralos and the Salaminia probably selected their crews on the basis o f their 
belonging to certain organizations; the cult of Paralos and the genos Salaminioi respectively. 
While these groups would no doubt have been keen to maintain their respective ships to the 
highest possible standard, they would have been competing with vessels crewed by rowers drawn 
from all over the Greek world. The basic pay for these rowers was a little higher than that far the 
sacred triremes, and securing a rowing berth (not to mention bonus pay) depended on an 
individual’s skill and reputation. A keen and wealthy trierarch could offer big bonuses to secure 
a fully professional crew,446 one which would probably be capable of regularly out-rowing the 
sacred ships. The fact that Demosthenes, in the context of a rhetorical attack on an enemy, 
regarded it as disgraceful that the Paralos was overtaken by a private warship does not 
necessarily mean that such a thing was ordinarily impossible.
Conclusions
While Salaminia and Paralos performed similar roles to the other vessels in the Athenian navy, 
and their full time, Athenian citizen crews can in some ways be regarded as an extreme 
personification of the “naval mob”, there were too several fundamental differences between the 
sacred ships and the rest, and this makes such an identification dangerous. The Athenian citizen- 
only environment of the Paralos and Salaminia may have engendered different beliefs and 
ideologies to those found in the majority of the Athenian navy and its more cosmopolitan crew 
make-ups. In other ways too the Paralos and its crew were different from the rest o f the 
Athenian navy, in terms of the identity and association with the cult hero for which their ship was 
named (in the case of the Paralos), or as part of the genos of the Salaminioi (in the case of the 
Salaminia). It was from these land-based associations that the crews were drawn, and which 
forged their collective identity. Jordan argues that the Paralos crew’s action in 411 BC indicated 
that they “were held together in an organisation with ties stronger than those which spring from 
common political sympathies or from loyalty to shipmates.”447 The conditions under which the
443 Harpokration, Lexicon, s.v. Paralos. Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 176
444 1 discuss the pay rates for Athenian sailors in Part Three, section 2
445 [Aristotle], Constitution o f the Athens, 62.2
446 A client o f Lysias (21.10) claimed to have hired the best helmsman in Greece, and hyperesia and oarcrew to match.
447 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 173.
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Paralos crew worked seem to have been somewhat different than those for the navy as a whole. 
Not only was the crew all citizen, but they appear to have been paid throughout the year, whether 
actively in commission or not. It was only under exceptional circumstances that they sailed in 
any vessel but their own, or with any other rowers. This is significantly different than is the case 
for the “naval mob”, who seem to have been paid a higher wage, but only while actually on 
active service, and who often moved between ships as the market dictated, with little 
identification with an individual vessel after a given campaign. Given these factors, it would be 
unwise to suggest that the “naval mob” was personified by crews of the Paralos and Salaminia, 
despite the obvious and significant similarities.448
3: Conclusions
This discussion has shown the diversity of the crews o f triremes, not only in terms of their social 
status, but also in what might be called their professional status. The ancient evidence highlights 
a group amongst the citizen population of Athens who rowed triremes as their profession, in that 
it was their principal means of supporting themselves and their families. I am using the term 
“naval mob” in this work to refer to these people specifically; a usage which is consistent with, 
though not mandated by, the ancient evidence. They represent only a small minority o f those 
many thousands, citizens and non-citizens who, at some point in the fifth and fourth centuries 
BC, rowed on board a trireme. The crews of the Salaminia and Paralos present something of an 
anomaly; not only because they were crewed solely by citizens; it appears that specific 
organizations were responsible for supplying the crews. These men, while not amongst the 
fantastically rich, would be a financial cut above the usual naval volunteers; whether they were a 
match for them in terms of speed and endurance is a debatable issue. In the following Part, I will 
assess the evidence regarding the connection between democratic politics and the “naval mob” 
and indeed the navy as a whole.
448 1 discuss the ideological ramifications o f this conclusion in Part Three, section 1.
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PART TWO: DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND THE
ATHENIAN NAVY
proton men oun touto ero, hoti dikaids autothi [kai] hoi penetes kai ho demos pleon 
echein ton gennaion kai ton plousion dia tode, hoti ho demos estin ho elaunon tas 
naus kai ho ten dunamin perititheis tei polei, kai hoi kubernetai kai hoi keleustai 
kai hoi pentekontarchoi kai hoi proiratai kai hoi naupegoi, —houtoi eisin hoi ten 
dunamin peritithentes tei polei polu mallon e hoi hoplitai kai hoi gennaioi kai hoi 
chrestoi. epeide oun tauta houtos echei, dokei dikaion einai pasi ton archon 
meteinai en te toi klerdi kai en tei cheirotoniai, kai legein exeinai toi boulomendi 
ton politdn.
First of all, I maintain that it is appropriate that in [fifth-century BC] Athens the 
poor and the common people should seem to have more power than the noble and 
the rich, because it is this class that provides the rowers for the fleet and on which 
the power of the city is based; for the steersmen, boatswains, pursers, look-out men, 
shipwrights- these are the men on whom the power o f the city is based, far more 
than the hoplites, the noble and the respectable. Since this is so, it seems 
appropriate that they should all share in the offices of state by the process o f lot and 
election, and that anyone of the citizens who wishes should have the right to speak 
before the citizens.449
This passage, taken from a political treatise, probably written in the early years of the 
Peloponnesian War,450 is the most explicit statement of a view that has been commonly held in 
both ancient and modem commentaries on classical Athenian democracy; that the thetes, 
Athenian citizens of the lowest property class, controlled democratic politics, and that this 
superiority was caused both practically and ideologically by their contribution to Athens’ trireme 
fleet, seen as the basis o f the city’s security and power. Aristotle argues that, in general, those 
who serve the city militarily deserved the right to political power, and this view has 
fundamentally informed the debate on ancient Greek political life ever since. Amit argues that 
“Modem scholars have generally accepted the opinion o f the ancients and frequently refer to the 
link between extreme democracy and sea power,”451 and this is as true now as it was when he 
wrote it in 1965. Of course, there is far more to Athenian democratic politics than this simple 
theory can express, and the subject has seen much discussion. Amit himself saw the link as a 
problematic oversimplification, stating correctly that “sea power alone does not explain 
democracy” 452 Athenian democracy has been defined, refined and re-defined by historians and 
political philosophers on such a scale that listing all their contributions here would be neither 
practical nor useful. Nevertheless, many would still hold up classical Athens as a prime example
449 [Xenophon], Constitution o f Athens, 1.2.
50 There is some debate over the date o f this work. All points o f view are based solely on inferences from the contents 
of the text itself (what events the author does or doesn’t write about), and therefore are not definitively provable. 
While Homblower ( ‘A fourth-century date for the Old Oligarch?', pp. 263-84) has recently argued that it may have 
been written in the fourth century BC, most other scholars prefer to date it to the fifth, usually a time just prior to, or 
during the first years of, the Peloponnesian War.
451 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 59
52 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 60. Though he thought that the link was a strong one in the specific case of Athens.
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of Aristotle’s political theory in practice, and few would find fundamental fault with Hansen’s 
view:
Athens was a radical democracy ruled by the ekklesia in which the majority was 
constituted by thetes who lived within the city walls and were called up to row the 
ships whenever a squadron was launched.453
Strauss expresses a similar view, but his formulation places more emphasis on the political power 
claimed and wielded by the sailors themselves, rather than the general class from which the 
sailors came:
The navy was the backbone of Athens’ military power...it allowed the poor men 
who rowed its warships to leverage political power454
However, van Wees is correct to remark that “The political implications of the rise of the fleet are 
often noted (though rarely explored in depth)”.455 While we have several general statements in 
the ancient sources regarding the influence of naval folk over the democratic system, there is 
little to suggest how this might have operated.
Thalassocracy and Democracy
There has been much recent debate on exactly when the Athenian democracy became a 
democracy. In their contributions to one stimulating volume on the democracy, Raaflaub, Ober 
and Wallace each advocated a different decisive period; for Wallace (and indeed in the 
imagination of the Athenians themselves), the reforms o f Solon in the early sixth century were 
key.456 For Ober, the reforms of Kliesthenes, and more importantly the actions o f the demos 
itself in restoring them in the face of Spartan occupation in 508/7 BC, defined the beginnings o f  
democracy.457 For Raaflaub,458 recently followed by van Wees, the policies of Ephialtes and 
Pericles from 462 BC, and particularly the introduction of pay for political service in the 450s BC 
was the stage at which “recognized the right of the ‘working’ classes to play a role in politics 
beyond attending assemblies and law courts”.459 It is striking how little any of these arguments 
fit chronologically with the advent of Athenian thalassocracy, and the development of the navy 
into the basis of Athenian power. The decisions of Themistocles to develop Piraeus, the trireme 
navy itself, and the subsequent victory of this fleet over the Persians in 480 BC are considerably 
later than either Ober’s or Wallace’s decisive moments, and more than 20 years earlier than that 
of Raaflaub. In the latter case it can be said that the revenues from the Empire, which were 
ensured by the fleet, were a key factor in providing the material conditions necessary for radical 
democracy; but to say that the navy (indirectly) provided the cash for radical democracy is not
453 Hansen, The Athenian Assembly, p. 11.
454 Strauss, ‘The Dead o f Arginusae’, p. 3-4
455 Van Wees, ‘Politics and the battlefield: Ideology in Greek warfare’, p. 155.
456 Wallace, ‘Solonian Democracy;’, pp. 11-28
457 Ober, ‘Revolution Matters’, pp. 67-83. cf. Ober, The Athenian Revolution, esp. pp. 32-52.
458 Raaflaub, ‘Power in the Hands o f the People’, pp. 31-62
459 Van Wees, ‘Myth o f the Middle Class Army’, p. 62.
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the same as saying that service in the navy by poorer citizens itself caused radical democracy to 
happen.
Nautical Thetes?
Cartledge has argued that “politically, it mattered very much where the specific gravity of 
Athens’ principal military fighting force was centred”, because “in wartime...practically every 
available free adult male, citizen and non-citizen, bore arms - or at any rate fought in some 
capacity”.460 Athens had, in Andrzejewski’s terminology, a high “Military Participation Ratio”, 
or M.P.R, and this fact, he argues, has political consequences. Cartledge’s gloss on bearing arms, 
(“or at any rate fought in some capacity”) is significant, as the trireme crews emphatically did not 
bear arms;461 and as Andrzejewski argues, the significance of the M.P.R is greatly effected by 
whether “the warriors equip and maintain themselves, or whether they are equipped, provisioned 
and paid by the state...High M.P.R will exert a stronger levelling influence if the armed forces 
fall into the first category” 462 Here we see quite a difference between hoplites and sailors; 
hoplite soldiers supplied their own weapons, and the richer hoplites contributed to wars though 
taxation too. Sailors appear to have been paid from an earlier date, and often at a higher rate, 
than hoplites 463 The relative significance of self-arming hoplites and professional volunteer 
trireme crews in terms of M.P.R. is thus less clear and more nuanced than Cartledge or 
Andrzejewski allow. In his discussion of Athens, Andrzejewski leans heavily on Aristotle to 
come to the conclusion that:
in Athens it was only when the fleet became the basis of its might that that those 
too poor to afford the equipment of a hoplite, but whose services as oarsmen now 
became essential, gained equal rights. After the Persian wars, the Athenian state 
became a sailors’ republic.464
This is an admirable summation of the traditional view, but for all its attractive simplicity it is a 
view that does not really hold up; as Ceccarelli has argued, the two central facts o f fifth-century 
Athens, thalassocracy and radical democracy, are not causally linked.465 Whatever date we 
choose to place the decisive stage in the development of Athenian democracy, none really fits 
with the establishment of Athens’ thalassocracy. The association of the democracy and the 
thalassocracy is an ideological construct,466 one that, as van Wees puts it, attempted to 
retrospectively justify the democracy by an appeal to the naval role of the poorer citizens.467 The 
navy was a cosmopolitan institution, and the thetes were only a part, and probably a clear 
minority, of the total crew of triremes. More importantly in terms of this discussion, the thetes 
were not defined solely by their role in the navy, and to equate them with trireme crews is
460 Cartledge, ‘Machismo o f the Athenian Empire’, p. 61.
461 I discuss armed trireme crews as a ‘practical’ matter above (Part One, section A .l) and as an ‘ideological’ matter 
below (Part 3, section 3)
462 Andrzejewski, Military Organization, p.34-5
463 1 discuss this issue in Part Three, section 2.
464 Andrzejewski, Military Organization, p.45
465 Ceccarelli, ‘sans thalassocratie, pas de democratic?’, p. 444
466 Ceccarelli, ‘sans thalassocratie, pas de democratic?’, p. 470
467 van Wees, Greek Warfare, p 83
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misleading; not least because many thetes were hoplites. As van Wees has argued, the 
contribution of the thete class to the hoplite army was significant, perhaps over half of the field 
army on occasions.468 In terms of Cartledge’s “specific gravity” o f fighters, the number of thetes 
who served as hoplites was probably greater than the number of professional citizen sailors. At a 
low point of the Athenian population, 411 BC, there were probably 9,000 hoplites in the city of 
Athens. Van Wees has convincingly argued that around 4,000 of these may have been of the 
thete class.469 I estimated, very approximately, that the maximum size o f the “naval mob” in the 
fifth-century hey-day of the navy as being 3-4,000; in other words, at its lowest point, the likely 
number of thetic hoplites in the fifth century exceeded the highest likely peak size o f the “naval 
mob”. Even given the fact that there would have been many non-professional thetes manning the 
oar benches, we should not be thinking in terms of “nautical thetes” having “de facto  military- 
political prepotence”470
It has long been noted that while the navy folk of Athens were said to have held power, there are 
many counter-examples which should caution us from accepting Aristotle’s general theory; 
Corinth, for example, never went democratic despite its powerful navy, and democratic Argos 
was never a significant naval power. It is perhaps surprising that in the face of such examples the 
theory is still held to be true for Athens, but we still should test it against the Athenian evidence; 
indeed Amit argued that the theory came about in the first place because “our authorities had the 
example of Athens before their eyes, and their generalisations were based on the situation 
there.”471 But how well founded were such generalisations, even in the specific case of 
Athens?472 Jordan argues that “it was during the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian 
Wars that the nautikos ochlos achieved the position of political power which the Old Oligarch 
and the political theorists of the fourth century attacked.”473 But aside from the broad statements 
in Aristotle and the Old Oligarch, where and when do we see specific examples Athens’ “naval 
mob” dominating, or even just engaging actively, in politics? The most obvious example is the 
actions of the trireme crews in resisting a succession of oligarchies took control of Athens in 411 
BC; but was this the quintessential example of the democratic feeling and political power o f the 
navy crews, or can we see other motivations and factors in operation here? A study of the events 
at Samos in 411 BC will form the second part of this section, following a review of the evidence 
for the contribution made by the “naval mob” to democratic politics in Athens. The relationship 
between the fleet’s role and the power of the Athenian state on the one hand, and the political 
influence of those who crewed the fleet on the other, can then be properly re-assessed, and in 
particular it will indicate whether or not the “naval mob” was as politically strong as some o f our 
largely fourth-century source material sometimes suggests.
468 Van Wees, ‘Myth o f the middle class army’.
469 ‘Myth of the Middle Class Army’, pp. 57-90
470 Cartledge, ‘The Machismo o f the Athenian Empire’, p. 63
471 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 60
472 Even Amit (Athens and the Sea, p. 60) conceded that “even in this particular case, the theory is not unquestionable”
473 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 220.
108
A: Political Institutions and the “Naval Mob”
1: The Navy and the Democracy
This section of the study will explore the link between Athenian citizens who crewed Athens’ 
navy and the political institutions at Athens. It will discuss various means by which the citizens 
of Athens’ navy might have been able to secure political power, and to see what evidence we 
have of them actually doing so; through which democratic institutions could they have made their 
influence felt? Or were they no stronger in political terms any other professional class in 
classical Athens?
The Old Oligarch’s view, that the poorer citizens gained power and influence through the 
contribution of some members of that class to the navy, is subtly but substantially different from 
saying that it was the men who themselves pulled the oars who controlled the democracy: this 
latter point o f view was held by Plutarch, who states that, as a result o f Themistocles’ policies 
with regard to the Piraeus, “control of policy now passed into the hands of sailors [nautai] and 
boatswains [keleustes] and steersmen [kubernetes\'’A1A The Old Oligarch is not infrequently cited, 
however, to substantiate the idea that democratic politics was influenced, even dominated, by the 
trireme crewmen themselves. A recent and telling example o f this is the following statement by 
Maurer:
In general, the politically dominant ‘nautical crowd’ [i.e. nautikos ochlos] of 
citizen-sailors described, or presupposed, in most fifth- and fourth-century texts 
seems a thing so constant and so solid that to sift again all the proofs collected by 
M. Amit, who did his work carefully, seems otiose.475
The first source cited for this view, and described a “locus classicus”, is the Old Oligarch passage 
quoted above. The sections o f Amit’s work cited in Maurer’s note indeed provide a good 
discussion of the main point he is looking to make here; that Athenian citizens had a place of 
“prime importance by their numbers”476 in terms of manning triremes. I would disagree with this 
particular conclusion,477 and with using the Old Oligarch to support the idea of a democracy 
dominated by the “naval mob”. But there is a bigger issue here; the central idea of trireme 
crews themselves controlling the democracy is extremely problematic. The main problem is 
trying to find specific examples and manifestations o f this in the fourth- and fifth-century 
evidence. Indeed, Amit’s section478 on the matter o f the political impact o f the “naval mob” 
argues that “if we look for evidence showing direct influence of the nautikos ochlos on the
474 Plutarch, Themistocles, 19.4
475 Maurer, ‘Sailors considered Athenian’, p. 273.
476 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 48.
477 1 would class myself as one o f the “stubborn critics” who Maurer suggests (‘Sailors ‘considered’ Athenian’, p. 273, 
n.4) could dispute this interpretation, and have argued above that citizens, though their contribution to trireme crews 
was significant, were probably in the minority compared with the non-citizen groups.
478 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 57-71
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conduct o f affairs in particular cases, the result is disappointing.”479 It is the purpose of this 
section to look again for such evidence. Firstly, it will examine the institution of the Assembly in 
the light o f recent work done in the relation to its composition and dynamics. The political 
apparatus o f the Piraeus will also be explored; were the extra offices and occasional ekklesia 
meetings in this deme indicative o f the political influence of the “naval mob”, or was this extra 
administrative machinery simply reflective o f the status of the Piraeus as a principal population 
and commercial centre o f Attica? Next, the evidence for signs that the navy and its personnel 
influenced policy and legislation in Athens in a more abstract and distant sense will be assessed; 
did the Assembly vote in ways that favoured trireme crews, even if these people were not 
themselves a significant portion o f the Assembly’s make-up? It will also examine the Assembly 
in the context o f electing Athens’ military and naval leaders, the strategoi, and briefly look at the 
myriad of other Athenian boards o f officials for traces o f the influence o f the “naval mob”. 
Ultimately it will be shown that Amit’s somewhat negative statement, at least in what might be 
cautiously termed ‘normal circumstances’, is valid.
Amit and the Sea
It is worth setting out a little more fully Amit’s views on the relationship between naval people 
and the democracy at Athens; given his misgivings about the Aristotelian theory in general, and 
the lack of evidence for the “naval mob’” s influence in specific cases, his conclusions are a little 
surprising. He begins with the general theoretical arguments regarding the navy and democracy:
The impression given by the political and philosophical writings concerning 
Athenian democracy at its zenith, is that the mob dominated the Polis, and that mob 
was mainly composed o f sailors (<nautikos ochlos)480
After reviewing a very few specific instances where the sailors had a political impact, which will 
be discussed later, he concludes that:
The political regime [i.e. at Athens] was based on an alliance between a class of 
sailor-citizens who were the core o f a permanent sea power, and the majority o f the 
urban population who had direct or indirect sea interests 481
In other words, while he conceded that there is very little evidence o f their direct involvement in 
political activity, Amit believed in a politically significant and active “naval mob”; dominating the 
Assembly in an alliance with the urban population, perhaps, but dominating nevertheless. This is 
a difficult conclusion to accept. As will be discussed in more detail below, there are serious 
problems in conceiving the Assembly in terms o f people voting primarily along the lines of class 
interest and alliance. In addition, the almost total lack of specific instances of naval people 
participating in politics is a grave difficulty. For example, Amit argues that the debate on the
479 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 63
480 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 58
481 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 70
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Sicilian expedition was “an occasion for the clash between the partisans of the expedition, the 
nautikos ochlos, and the peace-loving country folk who had no interest in a war of conquest”, 
which would be a great example o f the political power of sailors were it not for the problem that 
there is no evidence at all for such a reconstruction! As Amit himself recognizes, Thucydides 
frames this debate as a generational clash between the young and the old.482 To conclude that we 
may “presume” a significant presence o f sailors on this occasion, given our evidence, is absurd483 
The extent to which the “naval mob” dominated, or even significantly contributed, to the politics 
of the Assembly must be regarded as highly questionable.
The Athenian Citizens of the Navy
It has been argued that the fleet provided a forum for the forging of political consciousness and 
self-confidence amongst the poorer citizens as a group, and it was this that enabled them to 
participate successfully in politics; Strauss’ ‘School o f Democracy’ is the most detailed and lucid 
discussion of this phenomena. While his argument is not without problems, it is essentially 
correct to stress the links and group identity which may have been formed in the context of 
working on board a trireme. It follows that those who worked in triremes on a full-time basis 
would have been most likely to form into this sort o f identifiable group; and we have seen in the 
previous section that the phrase “naval mob” indeed does seem to indicate exactly what we might 
expect to find; an identifiable group essentially defined as trireme crewmen who possessed 
citizen rights to allow then access to the political system.
My definition of the “naval mob” as professional Athenian citizen trireme crewmen obviously 
excludes the vast majority o f those who crewed the navy o f Athens. In particular, it leaves out 
those citizens who crewed the navy on a temporary basis, either through conscription, or the 
occasional volunteer.484 What is problematic for this study is the great degree o f overlap between 
these groups. The clearest division in this is that between the conscript and the volunteer, 
although even here a man drafted one year could offer his services in another. In terms of 
analysing the political clout o f naval people, therefore, we can legitimately ignore the knight or 
hoplite, called up to oar benches in an emergency. As van Wees argues, such people would have 
been unlikely to volunteer for the navy outside of these national emergencies, as they were under 
regular obligations to serve in the land army.485 Similarly, the thetes who volunteered 
occasionally for naval service, for whatever motive (pay, plunder, revenge or simply wanting to 
do their bit to help Athens) would not have been likely to form a particularly naval group 
identity; it is likely that a farm labourer who took an oar during the occupation of his land at the 
time of a Spartan invasion would think still think o f himself as a farmer rather than a member of
482 Thucydides, 6.12, 13, 18. Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 64
483 I argue later (Part Three, section 2) that many o f the people who voted for, and sailed on, the Sicilian expedition 
formed part o f a group o f occasional contributors to the navy; men who would have had other professions and ways of 
life, but who sometimes joined a trireme crew for the sake o f profit, plunder, adventure or emergency.
484 The sliding scale o f professionalism with regard to contributions to the navy will be discussed in detail in Part 3, 
section 2.
485 Van Wees, ‘Myth o f the Middle Class Army, p. 60
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the “naval mob”. The extent o f the adoption of a nautical identity by the demos as a whole will 
be looked at later; in this way, a farmer, cobbler, labourer or any other poor Athenian could think 
of themselves as a member of the “naval mob”.486
The division between sporadic volunteers and ‘full-time’ professionals is even less clear; we can 
suggest a division between those who depended on rowing in the fleet for their living, and those 
who did not, but the idea of a ‘steady job’ seems alien to the Athenian economy. An Athenian 
who did only one job or had a single source o f income over his entire working life was probably 
exceedingly rare. This was true o f most professions in ancient Athens; the labour market (to use 
a somewhat anachronistic term) was far more loose and unfixed than is the case today. 
Labourers could hire themselves out in the quarries and building sites, at the docks and in the 
fields; farmers and landowners could engage in trade as a sideline, and sellers in the agora could 
own their own plot of land to grow crops. Aristotle’s definition of naval people demonstrates this 
fluidity; the group of naval professions consisted o f several sub-divisions, and while one of these 
may be a large group in a particular place (as the trireme crews were at Athens) it seems that men 
moved fairly freely and frequently between, say, fishing and ferrying. But even within this 
varied picture, with a sliding scale o f participation in the navy based on individual factors and 
circumstances, we can advocate a ‘core’ group of volunteers who, while they were free to take 
work in other professions when the need arose, would have nevertheless always sought 
employment on triremes. We have seen in the previous section that the navy’s operation 
provided a constantly high, though fluctuating, demand for long-term manpower. There is no 
difficulty in arguing that this group of professional trireme crewmen existed; the key question in 
this section is whether there is evidence for them participating in politics? Given the strong link 
between trireme crews and democracy which is often assumed but rarely detailed in modem and 
ancient works, it seems a valid and necessary to examine the evidential foundations of such a 
view. Despite the difficulties with the evidence and categories o f analysis, we can legitimately 
ask where, when and how the supposedly dominant “naval mob” made its presence felt.
2: The Athenian Ekklesia and the Political Participation of 
Trireme Crews
The Assembly is the obvious place to begin the search. As both the most easily accessed and 
‘sovereign’ body of the Athenian political system, we would expect to find any domination by an 
interest group or faction to occur through control o f the Assembly. Although in the fourth- 
century the decrees of the Assembly lost some of their power and breadth of application, it was 
still this body that, ultimately, voted for laws and proposals, scrutinized magistrates and decided 
on the elective offices such as the strategia. Aside from general information in writers such as 
Aristotle, we have several other sources relevant for this discussion of the Assembly, most
486 cf. Part Three, section 4.
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importantly the speeches o f the orators before the demos. In addition, the plays of Aristophanes, 
in particular those such as Knights which most blatantly caricature politicians and debates 
contemporary to the drama, provide some insight to the political attitudes and activities of non­
elite Athenians.487
Assembly Attendance
Analysing the presence or otherwise o f a group within Athenian politics, be it farmers, eisphora 
payers, liturgists or naval crews, is very problematic. As well as the inevitable overlap between 
these groups, the ancient record does not allow us to precisely gauge with any degree of accuracy 
who contributed to the various political institutions at Athens. Ober argues that “no evidence 
suggests that the Assembly was grossly unrepresentative of the social composition of the 
Athenian citizen body as a whole”,488 though he stresses that the demographic make-up of any 
given meeting would vary according to the circumstances. There is very little detailed evidence 
to suggest how regularly people participated, and whether it was in fact possible for any single 
group to sufficiently fill the Assembly so as to dominate its agenda. The important role of the 
boule, “Council”, in setting the Assembly’s discussion agenda would also have a limiting effect 
on the issues that could be raised and decided from the floor. Xenophon’s Socrates’ list o f those 
attending an Assembly meeting presents us with exactly what we might expect, a mixed bag:
poteron gar tous gnapheas auton e tous skuteas e tous tektonas e tous chalkeas e 
tons georgous e tous emporous e tous en tei agordi metaballomenous kai 
phrontizontas ho ti elattonos priamenoi pleionos apodontai aischunei; ek gar 
touton hapanton he ekklesia sunistatai.
The fullers or the cobblers or the builders or the smiths or the farmers or the 
merchants, or the traffickers in the market-place who think of nothing but buying 
cheap and selling dear489
Plato’s Socrates’ list o f those who spoke in the Assembly is also broad:
sumbouleuei autois anistamenos p e r i touton hom oids men tekton, homoios 
de chalkeus skutotomos, emporos, naukleros, p lousios penes, gennaios 
agennes, kai toutois oudeis touto epiplettei
Anyone may get up and give advice [on matters o f general policy], be he a 
carpenter or smith, cobbler, merchant, shipping agent, rich or poor, high or low, 
and no-one objects to him.490
Aside from the variety, the absence o f rowers, fishermen, ferrymen and the like is the most 
notable feature of these lists; the “naval mob” does not seem to have been a force worth
487 While o f course it would be dangerous to regard Aristophanes as ‘the voice o f the people’, his standpoint and 
audience are both significantly less o f the Athenian elite than most o f our other sources. The mandate o f comedy was 
to comment and satirize contemporary politics, politicians and ideology.
488 Ober, Mass and Elite, p. 137
489 Xenophon, Memorabilia, 3.7.6.
490 Plato, Protagoras, 319d
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reckoning in a typical Assembly meeting. In the Assemblies parodied by Aristophanes, the 
normative Athenian attendee, indeed the normative Athenian, appears to have been a farmer.491 
This is not to say a rich farmer, although the characters tend to own at least one slave; but these 
servile characters may have been placed purely for comedic purposes rather than demographic 
accuracy. While we would not want to put too much weight on these testimonies, it is perhaps 
surprising that a group of such reported influence as the “naval mob” was not represented492
Distance and Time
The Assembly meetings were usually held in the Pnyx, and there has been much discussion 
regarding the willingness of men living outside the asty, “city”, to travel the distance and attend. 
Obviously those living within the city itself would have had an advantage; both in terms of their 
location, and the amount o f time they would have had to spend away from their professions, an 
Athenian living within the city could attend more regularly than his counterpart on the farm. 
Citizens who lived in demes such as Marathon and especially those living in cleruchies overseas 
would have found regular attendance in Assemblies far more burdensome than ‘local* Athenians. 
Demes such as Piraeus, o f especial interest in a discussion concerning the “naval mob”, were not 
so far from the city as to make the journey too tiresome for the politically interested Athenian; it 
would perhaps be more a disinclination to participate in political office, rather than the 5 mile 
walk, that would put off a resident from Piraeus attending the Pnyx.
Wealth also played a role in this, and probably a bigger one than simple distance; clearly the 
closer a man was to dependence on regular work and the wages derived from it, the less likely he 
was to have taken leave from his work to attend the Assembly. It would have been a similar case 
for the farmer operating close to subsistence; politics may have seemed a luxury he could ill 
afford for much of the year,493 though the seasonal nature o f many tasks on farm would have 
allowed some time for participation in political, social and religious activities within the city. In 
the fourth centuiy, following the reestablishment o f the democracy in 403 BC, the situation was 
improved for the poorer man, in that a certain number o f attendees to the ekklesia were entitled to 
a stipend; this started off at one obol, but was soon increased.494 But it appears this was given on 
a ‘first come, first served’ basis, and offered no compensation for days lost while travelling to the 
Assembly; even in the fourth century, therefore, it is likely that the richer slave-owning farmer, 
even if not a member o f the ‘leisured’ class, could have taken time off for politics more 
frequently than the poorer one. Which is not to say that the rural poor did not regularly 
participate; as noted above, Aristophanes has many non-elite farmers attend the Assembly. Ober
491 Not only were many o f Aristophanes’ protagonists country folk (Dicaiopolis from Acharnians, Strepsiades in 
Clouds, and Trygaios in Peace), but his personification o f Demos in Knights is described (11.40-3) as a man from the 
country.
492 The military careers of the old men in the choruses o f Aristophanes’ Wasps are suggestive o f part-time 
campaigners, not members o f the “naval mob”; it is a fine line to draw, however. His farmers and jurors operated in 
their youth as both hoplites and rowers. I discuss this issue further in Part Three, section 2.
493 Aristotle, Politics, 1318b 10
494 [Aristotle], 41.3, cf. Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae, 11. 185-9
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is probably correct to argue that “there is no reason to suppose that the members of any 
identifiable social sub-group would systematically avoid the [Assembly] meetings”; the flip-side 
of this is that, given the diverse Assembly that would result, no such social sub-group could have 
dominated proceedings. When we relate these ideas to the “naval mob” and assess their likely 
level o f attendance at the Assembly, we should perhaps be unsurprised that they do not figure in 
Socrates’ brief list. These professionals would often find themselves away from Athens for 
months on end, and attending the Assembly regularly enough to produce a significant impact 
would have been practically impossible. While trireme crewmen would have not systematically 
avoided the Assembly, long sojourns in foreign stations like Naupactos were not conducive to 
conscientious and frequent political participation. The earnings o f the “naval mob” is debated, 
but even on the most generous interpretation of the evidence (a drachma a day as the standard 
rate throughout most of the period, which could have been supplemented by bonuses), work 
needed to have been secured for much o f the year in order to support a family.495 As discussed in 
the previous section, a trireme crewman would often have found work within the ‘naval sector’ 
when not rowing warships; and once again, a voyage in a merchant’s vessel would not have 
facilitated regular Assembly attendance. Even if a man’s work was centred in Athens, he might 
not feel he had sufficient means and leisure time to journey from the Piraeus attend the 
Assembly496
Addressing Groups within the Assembly
Sinclair’s study into the composition o f the Assembly suggests that the audience may have 
contained a disproportionate number o f wealthy citizens 497 This conclusion is mainly drawn 
from inferences in the speeches made before the Assembly; we find in the speeches appeals to 
particular sections o f the audience, along several lines; age, for instance, but also wealth 498 He is 
right to reject Jones’ view that the wealthy elite would have been able to form, if not a majority, 
then a numerically significant minority;499 and while Ober is certainly correct to state that “many 
more working than leisure-class citizens would be in attendance” in the Assembly, it is probable 
that the wealthy comprised a higher proportion of the average Assembly meeting than they did of
495 1 discuss the evidence for sailors’ pay in Part Three, section 2. Markle has argued (‘Jury pay and assembly pay’, p. 
112) “a family o f four could have been fed on about two-and-a-half obols per day”, and thus payments made at the rate 
of three obols per day to public servents were sufficient to maintian a household. His estimations seem too low, but 
even if they are true for a relatively inactive juryman buying only barley and that at reasonable prices, and with all 
other sorts of food available at prices “so cheap that they are hardly worth reckoning” (p. 111-2), they can certainly not 
be applied to naval crews. Not only were rowers exceptionally active, but they cannot be assumed to have always had 
such easy access to reasonably priced food. Their basic requirments alone would have accounted for much o f the 3 
obols; at an absolute minimum, Demosthenes (4.28) suggested to the Athenian assembly that naval crewmen would 
require 2 obols per day just for their own rations. Maintianing a household on 2.5 obols a day (=c. 152 drachmas per 
year) seems to be a significant underestimation, and I prefer to accept Cook’s analysis ( ‘Timocrates’ 50 talents’, pp. 
85-7) that estimates annual living expenses for a family o f four to run to a minimum of 280 drachmas. This figure was 
first proposed by Glotz and accpeted by Rosivach, (‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p.52, with discussion o f previous 
scholars’ figures detailed in p. 64 nn. 59 and 60; none o f these altematrive estimations are anyting like as low as 
Markle’s). It is worth noting the figure o f Tod (Cambridge Ancient History, volume 5 (first edition), pp. 20-2), who 
posits 180 drachma per year (c. 3 obols per day) for a man and wife only, without dependent children or slaves.
496 1 discuss the Piraeus below, Part 2, section A.4
497 Sinclair, Democracy and Participation, pp. 119 ff. By contrast, he argues that the jury courts were staffed by 
relatively older and poorer people (p. 124 ff.).
498 Sinclair, Democracy and Participation, pp. 123-4
499 Jones, Athenian Democracy, pp. 35-6
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the Athenian population as a whole. While eisphora payers and other rich men of the ‘leisured’ 
class are often singled out, as are farmers, speakers seldom directly addressed the lower classes, 
and there are no examples o f them directly speaking to the “naval mob”. Though Athens was 
still spoken of as a prominent sea power with important naval assets,500 the nearest we have is 
Demosthenes hypothesising about the men in the Assembly going themselves to crew the vessels. 
These references to manning fleets suggest attempts, usually unsuccessful, to persuade the citizen 
audience o f the necessity o f becoming rowers, rather than any sort o f comments being addressed 
to a “naval mob”. Crewing triremes was here perceived as an irksome but necessary burden to be 
placed upon the citizens, and many o f these references talk about, or at least hint towards, the 
imposition o f conscription;501 certainly Demosthenes would have had little luck in hiring oarsmen 
on the open market with offers of 2 obols ration-money only.502
Demosthenes gives one example where a general succeeded in making the case that his audience 
should become rowers; he refers to the inspiring example o f Timotheus, who encouraged the men 
to man the ships, and inspired by his words, they trooped down to Piraeus in order to “cover the 
sea in triremes”.503 It is likely that Demosthenes somewhat exaggerated the spontaneity of this 
event, and the direct relationship between the Assembly listeners and the trireme crews. Even if 
we accept the essentials o f the story, it need not imply that Timotheus’ audience contained many 
from the “naval mob”, and indeed it is more likely that the opposite conclusion can be drawn; 
many of these were non-naval citizens inspired into service by powerful oratory. In other words, 
Timotheus succeeded in inspiring the Athenian citizens to go on campaign in person. In general, 
extant speeches to the Assembly seem to have been addressed, as far as we can tell, with 
landowners, tax payers and hoplites in mind. In relation to the fourth century BC, we are forced 
to accept Amit’s negative conclusion; “we do not have the means to trace the influence of the 
nautikos och los on any particular event in the period.”504 In the context of Demosthenes’ 
speeches encouraging the Athenians to repel Philip in particular, we might have expected him to 
suggest that, along with the rich man paying his taxes and the strong man serving in the line, the 
sailor and oarsman should attend diligently his assigned station; he does not do this.505 The 
pseudo-Demosthenic speech On Organization contains a passage about organizing the Athenians 
that seems to deliberately avoid mention o f the navy:
kai diexelthon hos an suntachtheiete, hoi th' hoplitai kai hoi hippeis kai hosoi
touton ektos este
500 See especially Demosthenes, 7.8, 7.14-6, 17.25
501 Demosthenes’ First Philippic (4.16 ff) is a good example o f a sustained argument in favour o f citizens serving as 
oarsmen themselves, esp. 4.33 with its reference to binding people to the expedition, cf. 17.20 (a successful launch of 
a seemingly conscripted fleet), 4.43 and 3.4 (a conscripted fleet was proposed, but in the event an “unmanned” one was 
launched).
502 As he suggests in 4.28; such a fleet was not voted.
503 Demosthenes, 8.74-5
504 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 70.
505 e.g. Demosthenes, 1.28, 4.7, 8.23.
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[I] have described the method of organizing you, whether you serve in the infantry 
or the cavalry or in other ways.506
Several passages from other speeches that urged the Assembly to serve in person and take action 
that lives up to their fine words can be construed as encouraging participation on board 
triremes;507 if  naval service was meant, it is striking that orators chose not to make it explicit.
A lot o f our evidence comes from the fourth century, where the navy as an institution was not as 
strong as in the fifth; we might expect to find more references to the “naval mob” in the 
Assembly had more speeches from the fifth century survived. Plutarch tells an anecdote 
concerning Alcibiades’ first speech before the Assembly, at the conclusion of which a quail 
escaped from under his cloak; the bird was eventually caught by “Antiochus the pilot”, certainly 
a member of the “naval mob”.508 Aside from this story, there are two particular occasions from 
more contemporary fifth-century evidence which may indicate that there was at least some “naval 
mob” presence in the fifth-century Assembly. The first is Pericles’ speech, as presented by 
Thucydides, given before the Assembly prior to the outbreak o f the Peloponnesian war, in which 
he discussed sea power and naval resources at length and addressed comments specifically to 
sailors. The second example concerns the debates following the battle of Arginusae in 406 BC, 
in which Xenophon seems to give evidence o f members o f the “naval mob” themselves speaking 
before the ekklesia.
The “Naval Mob” in the Assembly: Pericles’ speech in 431 BC
The first speech made by Pericles in Thucydides’ history contains much valuable information in 
relation to the Athenian navy.509 It is in this speech that Pericles discusses Athenian seamanship 
and sea power, and how Athenian superiority in this and other areas should shape their strategy 
and ensure success in the coming war. In doing this, he offers counter-arguments to likely 
Peloponnesian strategies, options for which were set out in a previous Thucydidean speech made 
by the Corinthians to the Peloponnesian League.510 It is probable that there were speculations 
amongst the Athenians regarding the likely strategies o f the Peloponnesians, and that predictions 
were made about the possible course of the hostilities. There could have been talk of Athenian 
sea power at this juncture, and it is likely too that Pericles will have had things to say on all of 
these matters. What is not as likely is that all o f these things were put into a single speech by 
Pericles, and delivered as an almost telepathic counterpoint to a near-contemporary speech made 
by the Corinthians; this presentation is the artifice o f Thucydides, who probably found it useful 
for himself and his readers to make a single review from the many debates and discussions he 
was privy to, emphasizing what he (and probably Pericles) saw as the principal pre-war issues. 
Therefore this pair of speeches is genuine and useful evidence for the kinds o f strategic and
506 [Demosthenes], 13.9
507 Demosthenes, 4.7; 8.23; 1.28
508 Plutarch, Alcibiades, 7.
509 Thucydides, 1.140-44
510 Thucydides, 1.120-4
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political thinking going on at the time of the outbreak of the war. What we cannot be certain of 
with this speech, as is the case with just about all speeches recorded by ancient historians, is the 
extent to which the words reported were ever actually said.511
This is an important point in relation to the present discussion, as this speech is one of the only 
examples in the sources when a speaker in the Assembly not only discusses naval people and 
issues to a unique extent, but specifically addresses trireme crewmen in the audience. Pericles in 
fact goes a step further; identifying the Assembly goers, and thus the Athenians generally, as 
sailors and rowers, professional experts in seamanship. Is Thucydides here reflecting some sort 
of reality, or are these things which he thought ought to have been said, should a speaker wish to 
discuss naval experience and sea power?512
In this speech, Pericles talks often o f the navy and sea power, using phrases in the first person 
which suggested ownership o f a useful commodity. For example, he argues that the 
Peloponnesians might invade Attic territory, “but can never prevent our sailing into their country 
and raising fortifications there, and making reprisals with our powerful fleet”,513 and that “we 
have acquired more experience o f land fighting through our naval operations than they have of 
sea fighting from their operations on land.”514 He goes on to make the point that the 
Peloponnesians would not be able to learn the skills o f seamanship quickly, and emphasizes this 
by switching to the second person and saying:
oude gar humeis meletontes auto euthus apo ton Medikon exeirgasthe po
You yourselves have been studying it ever since the Persian wars, and have still not
entirely mastered the subject.515
This does show a degree o f appreciation for the skills and experience o f Athenian sailors, and the 
difficulty in acquiring such skill. There is perhaps a hint o f the schoolmaster about this not-quite 
glowing tribute, as if the Athenian sailors were skilled but unruly boys, in danger of falling prey 
to arrogant complacency and not reaching their full potential. Even so, this is a positive 
comment, and the mention o f sailors and rowing skill in such a direct manner is a complete 
contrast with the more cagey and subtle references to naval service in fourth-century speeches. If
511 In his commentary introducing this speech, Homblower (Commentary, vol. 1, p. 226) “The speech notoriously 
answers and echoes, at many points, the Corinthians’ speech at [1.] 120 ff. None o f the particular correspondences is 
by itself fatal to the authenticity o f either...but the general effect is disconcerting.” However, in introducing the 
corresponding speech (made by the Corinthians to the rest o f the Peloponnesian League, Thucydides, 1.120-4), he 
seems to take a more forgiving line, stating that “The ‘correspondences’ are not really troubling”. The more cautious 
approach seems better.
512 Thucydides’ famous methodological statement regarding speeches (1.22), in which he expresses the somewhat 
contradictory aims o f faithfully reporting what was said, but also, when he and his informants could not remember the 
exact words, putting down what he felt was called for, has rightly been the starting point for discussions about the 
validity o f using the information contained in the speeches. If this speech was real, it is certain to be one that 
Thucydides himself heard, and could have recorded with a reasonable degree o f accuracy. But the clear signs of 
correspondences with other speeches, combined with the foreshadowing o f  future events, and the Thucydidean writing 
style, all should give rise to caution.
513 Thucydides, 1.142.4
514 Thucydides, 1.142.5
515 Thucydides, 1.142.7
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these words are accurate, they imply at least that Pericles was addressing comments to a 
substantial number of sailors in the audience, or, perhaps more likely, he was identifying the 
whole Assembly, and by extension the Athenian citizens as a whole, as professional rowers; 
members o f the “naval mob”, according to my definition. As such it is a singular notice (he 
might just have easily have said “our sailors have yet mastered it”) even in the context of the 
speech; other references to the navy and sea power, like the ones quoted above, are usually 
couched in the first person, and are spoken o f as a possession or resource owned collectively by 
the Athenians. A reference in a later passage to skilled professional seamen is expressed in such 
terms; “we have amongst our citizens more and better kubernetes, and other hyperesia, than all 
the rest of Greece”,516 which is rather different from saying “you are better helmsman and more 
skilful specialists than any others in Greece”. In a similar vein, he talks o f “ourselves” only as 
potential trireme crew, able to take the place, along with the trusty metics, of any foreigners 
should they decide to defect to the other side; this is much more of a sort with the appeals made 
by Demosthenes to the Assemblies o f the fourth century.517 Despite at an earlier juncture 
identifying his audience as expert, full-time trireme crewmen, Pericles was well aware of the 
varying degrees o f naval contributions made by citizens to the Athenian navy. While this 
example o f trireme crews being referred to by a speaker before the Assembly is certainly worthy 
of discussion, it must also be recognized that in the same speech he identifies the audience as 
people who own property outside the city walls; Pericles argues that the Athenians should 
consider themselves islanders and abandon their land and houses, and furthermore “if I thought 
could persuade you, I would bid you to go and lay waste your own property.”518 If these words 
were said (a not inconsiderable ‘i f ) , they might be more indicative o f rhetorical flourish than 
demographic accuracy; presumably Pericles did not think that everyone in the audience owned 
land outside the walls, just as he did not imagine that all his audience were themselves naval 
professionals, and such comments do not give us much in the way o f accurate information as to 
who attended Assembly meetings. It is clear that a speaker could address remarks to, or identify 
his audience with, whichever group of people best suited his argument at that moment, and these 
need not reflect accurately the demographic spread o f people in the Assembly. With the 
exception of this passage, it is nevertheless striking that Athenian orators never seem to have 
thought it necessary or advantageous to address trireme crews, still less identify their audience 
with the “naval mob”. This must surely tell against any reconstruction which views them as 
having great political power.
The “Naval Mob” and the Trial of the Generals
An instance for which there is more solid evidence o f the political contribution of the “naval 
mob” relates to the series of Council and Assembly meetings held in the wake of the battle of 
Arginusae. In the course of these meetings, the eight victorious generals (two of whom had not
516 Thucydides, 1.143.1
517 Thucydides, 1.143.1
518 Thucydides, 1.143.5
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returned to Athens) were put on trial for neglecting their duty towards both the shipwrecked 
survivors o f the battle, and the bodies of the dead. This infamous trial, in which the eight 
generals were sentenced to death on a single vote, has rightly been given much scholarly 
attention, highlighting the tragic consequences of the huge power of the demos in Athens, despite 
legal safeguards, arguments in favour o f moderation, a far from water-tight case against the 
accused, and the stalling o f the vote by Socrates. In the context of this study, the episode is an 
important one in terms of the engagement o f sailors in politics at Athens, as it is the single 
occasion for which there is direct testimony for members o f the “naval mob” speaking before the 
Assembly. This testimony comes from Xenophon’s account, the fuller and more detailed of the 
two principal sources for the trial.519 The second is the brief narrative o f Diodorus,520 which 
provides some credible incidental details that Xenophon’s account does not. It is also the more 
internally coherent o f the two accounts.521 Aside from discrepancies over the names of the 
generals who returned to face the trial,522 the main difference lies in their depiction of 
Theramenes’ role. In Xenophon’s version, he zealously accused the generals and manipulated 
the Assembly by bribing people to turn up as mourners for the drowned.523 In Diodorus, 
Theramenes only turned against the generals when they tried to pin the blame on him for the 
failure to recover the dead and dying, and even then there is no hint that he did anything other 
than speak against them in the Assembly.524 This is however presented as being the crucial factor 
in the conviction, as Theramenes was a powerful speaker with a large personal following.525 On 
this matter, Diodorus’ account is probably to be preferred, but only because, if Theramenes had 
done anything more culpable than fight back using legitimate means against people who had 
accused him, it would surely have found its way into Lysias’ damning account of him.526
So, what role did the “naval mob” play in this affair? It should be noted that it would be unfair to 
describe the majority o f crews in the Arginusae/Aigospotamoi fleet as members o f the “naval 
mob”. By the time the Arginusae fleet was launched, the city would have been largely emptied 
of regular rowers. No doubt there would have been some experienced sailors around, who acted 
as the hyperesia of the 110 ships; but the fact that slaves were offered their freedom to row, and 
even members o f the hippeis, “Knights”, class were conscripted, demonstrates the acute shortage
519 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.1-35
520 Diodorus, 13.101-3
521 Andrewes, ‘The Arginusae Trial’, p. 118
522 In this matter, Xenophon’s account is far preferable. He lists 6 names, where Diodorus has only 5, including one 
Calliades; a clear error. Diodorus’ list does not list Erasinides or Diomedon, who are notable omissions; in 
Xenophon’s version, these two generals advocated opposing courses o f action in the post-battle conference, in which 
Erasinides advocated abandoning the shipwrecked to their fate. As a result o f this, he is the first general to be 
prosecuted when the generals returned to Athens. In Diodorus’ narrative (though not in Xenophon’s) Diomedon 
makes a speech at Athens prior to his execution, which obviously requires him to have been one of the generals who 
returned despite not being listed.
523 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.4 (most vigorous in his attacks on the generals), 1.7.8 (bribery).
524 Diodorus, 13.101.4
525 Diodorus, 13.101.7
526 Andrewes, ‘The Arginusae Trial’, pp. 120-l.Theramnes was subjected to virulent attacks in two speeches o f Lysias 
(12 and 13), but neither mentions anything about culpable behaviour in relation to the Arginusae trial. The inference 
that he therefore did nothing improper at this time is probably true, but it must be recognized that this argument is only 
as strong as any argument from silence can be.
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of naval personnel in Athens. At the time, Konon already had a substantial fleet at sea, and it was 
in these ships that the bulk o f Athens’ “naval mob” was concentrated.527 Xenophon specifically 
attests to the skills o f the remaining crew after Konon consolidated his 100-strong but thinly 
manned fleet into 70 ships.528 Despite the crews’ skill, he lost another 30 in battle to a far larger 
Peloponnesian force,529 and had the remainder o f his fleet trapped in Mytilene. Another fleet of 
12 ships under Diomedon was also at sea, but was ambushed and 10 of the triremes were 
captured.530 While the offer o f citizenship for slaves no doubt encouraged many to join, and any 
remaining metics presumably played their part, the Arginusae fleet was disproportionately 
manned by Athenian citizens, including many o f the wealthy. The outrage about the men left to 
drown and the bodies left unburied cannot be attributed to the fact that the men were sailors; 
more likely, the reverse was the case; the outrage was more intense precisely because it was non­
sailor conscripts who suffered this appalling fate. Most likely though is that the social or 
professional status of the men was not the primary concern, but the fact that citizens had died in 
circumstances where more could possibly have been done to save them, and bodies were not 
recovered when more effort should have been made to do so.
The discussions o f Kagan, Andrewes, Strauss and Amit all assume a large presence of sailors in 
Athens at the time o f the trial. Kagan argues that there would have been “thousands of Athenians 
who knew the basic facts” regarding the unsuccessful rescue mission given to the trierarchs, 
taxiarchs and nauarchs. Given that the news of this failed mission had yet to be disclosed before 
the Assembly or Council, Kagan must here be envisioning a large number of citizen sailors from 
the Arginusae fleet itself, the only numerous group who would at that point have known about 
the rescue mission, and might have been sufficiently disappointed with the conduct of their 
superiors to denounce then.531 Unlike the other two authors, he does not refer to them 
specifically in terms of their voting behaviour in the Assembly. Andrewes is most explicit, 
arguing that the generals “hoped that the many sailors from their ships would help then at their 
trial, but in the event...they listened rather to the accusers”.532 Strauss sees the Arginusae affair 
as Athens “nadir”, and that in the trial o f the generals “Athens had become an ochlocracy [“rule 
by the mob”]; the Athenian navy was its enabler.”533 He suggests that Xenophon’s account of the 
political debates invites a familiar contrast: “The traditional Greek elite male ideal was the 
orderly, virtuous hoplite. What Xenophon descried in the Athens o f 406 B.C. was, instead, the 
disorderly, vicious, rower.”534 Amit too assumes that there were sailors present, and sees the 
need to account for the conviction o f the generals despite the fact that their own men were voting; 
he suggests that they would have been in an awkward position, and would have perhaps
527 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.17
528 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.15
529 The crews escaped to land, but given the Peloponnesian blockade, it is unlikely that any o f them could have made it 
back to Athens in time to take part in the Arginusae fleet.
530 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.22-3
531 Kagan, The Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 364
532 Andrewes, ‘The Arginusae Trial’, p. 117
533 Strauss, ‘The Dead o f Arginusae’, p. 17
534 Strauss, ‘The Dead o f Arginusae’, p. 12
121
convicted the generals so as to avoid the possibility of the blame falling on them.535 These 
arguments are not without some merit, but there is no real need for them, as the number of 
Arginusae sailors in Athens was probably far smaller than they all assume. Amit is correct to 
argue that “the Assembly changed into a mob ochlos...but it was not the nautikos ochlos”;536 but 
the reason is not anything to do with the sailors’ ambiguous views; it is simply because not many 
of them where there.
At first glance, there is some evidence to support the idea o f a large presence of Arginusae sailors 
at Athens; a direct statement from Diodorus:
meta ton pleiston neon katepleusan eis tas Athenas, elpizontes tous en tais nausi
pollous ontas boethous hexein en tei krisei.
[Most o f the accused generals]537 sailed home with most o f their ships, hoping they
would have their sailors, who were numerous, to help them in the trial.538
No doubt the generals entertained such hopes o f support from their crews, but there are 
reasonable grounds to doubt that the Pnyx was packed with men fresh off the oar-benches. The 
most fundamental reason is that, in both the narratives o f Xenophon and Diodorus, the Arginusae 
fleet was still on station at Samos when the authors turn their attention back to the Ionian war;539 
the large figures given for the number o f ships (173 and 180 respectively)540 mean that neither 
account seems compatible with the idea that a substantial number of ships had at any point 
returned to Athens. This would have been an extremely foolish thing to do in any case; given the 
inevitable desertion of a fleet returning to its home port,541 and the profound difficulties that were 
experienced in manning these ships in the first place, Konon and the other generals would have 
had to have taken leave o f their senses to allow the six generals to each take “most of their ships” 
back with them.542 In any event, as the generals were deposed, they presumably did not have the 
authority to command any ships. When the charismatic and wealthy Alcibiades was deposed in 
the previous year, he was able to sail off with only a single trireme,543 and it would seem unlikely 
that the eight generals deposed at this time would have been able to have done better. We can 
perhaps assume that each of the six generals who returned to Athens sailed back in one ship. As 
well as these six ships, a few more were certainly in Athens. Prior to being removed from office, 
the generals had sent two separate dispatches to Athens. Firstly, they sent word of their victory,
535 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 69
536 Amit Athens and the Sea, p. 69
537 For the problems with Diodorus’ list o f generals, see note 522 above.
538 Diodorus, 13.101.5
539 Diodorus, 13.104; a new commander is sent out to the fleet at Samos to share command with Konon. Xenophon, 
Hellenica, 2.1.12, cf. 2.1.16; the Athenians are still based at Samos, conducting raids on the King’s territory.
540 Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.1.20; Diodorus, 13.104
541 Apollodorus, a fourth-century trierarch describes this as well-known problem; [Demosthenes], 50.11
542 It is suggested in Xenophon’s account, during the speech made to defend the generals (1.7.30) as well as in his 
account of the battle itself, (1.6.28) that the generals each had their own group o f ships under their command. 
Assuming that each o f  the 6 generals had 12 ships and each took “most” o f  theirs back with him, Konon’s force would 
have been weakened by at least 42 vessels!
543 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.17
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and the unfortunate aftermath, to the city. As it is reported at this point that the trierarchs 
Thrasybulus and Theramenes had “gone off ahead to Athens”,544 it seems likely that it was they 
who had conveyed this first message. It would certainly have made sense for the generals to 
entrust their initial version o f the aftermath, which blamed only the storm for their failure to 
rescue the survivors and recover the dead, to those men who had perhaps most to lose from 
revelation of the full facts.545 Later, the generals sent a second dispatch; having learned that 
discontent was growing in the city and perhaps fearing betrayal by their earlier messengers, the 
generals’ second dispatch placed the blame for the failed rescue with the captains they had 
assigned to the task. Assuming that the generals followed their previous, though unusual, 
practice of sending two messenger ships to the one destination, there would have been a 
maximum of 10 ships from the Arginusae fleet in Athens at the time of the generals’ trial. 
Assuming that fully half o f all the ships’ crew were citizens, and that every single one of these 
citizens was able to get into the Assembly, there would have been a theoretical maximum of 
1,000 Arginusae sailors in the Pnyx; a substantial minority certainly, but hardly enough to carry 
the day, particularly since they would not have been shouting and voting en masse. The crews of 
Thrasybulus and Theramenes at least would surely have been pushing for conviction, but many 
of those from the generals’ ships may have been calling for clemency. We cannot assume that 
there were a significant number o f citizen sailors from the Arginusae fleet, and certainly not 
“thousands” of them, in Athens at the time of the trial. The significance of the naval contribution 
to the trial of the generals has nothing to do with the scale o f their votes or voices in the ekklesia.
Expert Witnesses
Xenophon’s account of the various Assembly proceedings includes two interventions by naval 
people, both of which had a substantial effect o f the debate. These naval contributions appear to 
have been quite short, and subsidiary the main rhetorical action; rather than making full speeches 
on their own account, it is as if they were being summoned as expert eye-witnesses to supplement 
the principal orators. This is most clear in the first case. The generals, when speaking before the 
Assembly, sought to defend themselves by blaming the severity o f the storm:
touton de marturas pareichonto tous kubernetas kai allous ton sumpleonton pollous
They produced as witness to these statements the steersmen [kubernetai] and many 
others of the ship’s company.546
This contrasts with the situation in relation to Apollodorus’ law suit against Polycles in 359 BC. 
In his speech before the jury courts, he called upon people who were on the expedition to bear 
witness to his great exertions on behalf o f the city. Instead o f bringing individuals forward to 
speak, he assumed that many of the people on the jury were on the expedition, and he urged them
544 Diodorus, 13.101.2
545 i.e. the fact that a portion o f the fleet, including the ships o f Theramenes and Thrasybulus, was assigned to pick up 
the bodies and survivors, but never managed to carry the mission out.
546 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.6
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to remind their neighbours o f his many and expensive good deeds.547 It is likely that 
Apollodorus’ prosecution was initiated after Polycles, and the fleet to which both had served as 
trierarchs, had returned to Athens, and so while this passage can be written off as a rhetorical 
device, it was at least possible for there to have been men from the campaign in Athens and on 
the jury. Such first-hand knowledge amongst the audience was not assumed by the parties in the 
Arginusae trial, and lends a little weight to the idea that very few from the campaign itself were 
present; the audience would not have needed telling about the prevailing weather conditions after 
the battle if enough men who were there had returned to Athens and spread the story. This 
inference should not be pressed too far, however, as it would have always been advantageous in 
the context of a trial to call expert witnesses on specific points, however much the audience 
already knew. The unique appeal by Apollodorus to his audience’s first hand knowledge of the 
campaign would be evidence suggesting the political participation of the “naval mob” in the jury 
courts, but for the fact that the expedition to which Apollodorus refers was, like the Arginusae 
campaign, largely manned through conscription.548
It is certainly fair to regard these witnesses in the trial o f the generals as members of the “naval 
mob”, called upon to give testimony in their area o f professional expertise; at least the kubernetai 
must be regarded, even in the context o f a conscripted fleet, as expert seamen. Xenophon reports 
that their statements were convincing, but that the meeting ran out o f time before a vote could be 
held. It seems most likely that, had there been sufficient light to have held a vote that evening, 
the generals would have escaped execution.
The second allegedly naval intervention had precisely the opposite effect. During the debate in 
the next Assembly meeting, a man got up to speak before the people:
parelthe de tis eis ten ekklesian phaskon epi teuchous alphiton sothenai: epistellein 
d' autoi tons apollumenous, ean sothei, apangeilai toi demoi hoti hoi strategoi ouk 
aneilonto tons aristous huper tes patridos genomenous.
And there came before the Assembly a man who said that he had been saved by 
floating upon a grain tub, and that those who were perishing charged him to report 
to the people, if he were saved, that the generals did not pick up the men who were 
most brave on behalf o f their country.549
The man’s fortuitous arrival, and the perfect way in which his testimony suited the accusers’ 
case, is enough to raise serious misgivings about his authenticity. While such an escape and such 
a message are not beyond the bounds o f possibility, his arrival in good time to make the trial 
seems awfully convenient, if  not contrived.550 If he was indeed a stooge deployed by the
547 [Demosthenes], 50.3
548 [Demosthenes], 50.6-7. Apollodorus dismissed the conscripts as they did not meet his apparently exacting 
standards, but there is no reason to assume that any other trierarch acted in this way.
549 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.11
550 Xenophon makes no comment on this sailor’s testimony, but he does accuse Theramenes (Hellenica, 1.8.8) of 
bribing the main prosecution speaker, and o f hiring fake mourners to pack the Assembly and encourage votes against
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accusers, their plan worked very well; despite a noble speech by Euryptolomus in the generals’ 
defence,551 some voices o f protest regarding the procedures, and a show of hands so close it 
required recounting, eight were sentenced to death on a single vote, and the six who were present 
were executed.
Xenophon reported that the Apaturia festival intervened between the two Assembly meetings 
regarding the generals,552 and it has been argued that the mood of the people turned decidedly, 
and fatally, against the generals at this point. Amit and Kagan both make much of the startling 
and dismaying effect caused by the fact that many were mourning the loss of brothers, sons and 
fathers, and that families with missing members were highly visible in the context of this 
festival.553 This is o f course true, but it must be borne in mind that the vast majority of the gaps 
in the families were simply due to the fact that the bulk o f the Arginusae fleet was still at sea. 
Most of the missing menfolk were not pitifully drowned and abandoned to the elements, but 
stationed at their base in Samos, and possibly raiding and pillaging the territory of the King.554 
What perhaps would not have been obvious was which men were missing for which reason. 
Given the relatively small number o f ships that had come back to Athens, there were probably 
many families who did not know whether their menfolk were alive and well, dead or wounded in 
battle, or drowned, and would have been desperate for first-hand news. When commenting on 
the strengths o f Thrasybulus and Theramenes in relation to the case, and the generals’ tactical 
error in antagonizing them, Diodorus claims that their most important asset was that they had 
been “participating in the events around the battle”.555 It seems likely then that there were very 
few people in Athens at this time that had been eye-witnesses to the events, and information 
regarding the fate o f individuals was very patchy; uncertainty is likely to have been at least as 
prevalent as grief. Families o f members o f the “naval mob” were no doubt accustomed to this 
kind of uncertainty, though they can hardly have relished it. The families of the many conscripts, 
however, would not have been as familiar with their loved ones being away for extended periods 
of time and missing important civic festivals, particularly those that happened outside the usual 
summer campaigning season. The mourners may have been both numerous and conspicuous, but 
there surely would have been many more people who were uncertain as to whether they should 
be mourning or not. This uncertainty in itself could have had an effect on the mood of the city, 
and have contributed to the resentment and recrimination that eventually condemned the 
generals.
the generals. These accusations are probably false, but it is hard not to have this in mind when reading about the 
miraculously escaped sailor a few sentences later and this only adds to the impression that he or his message was fake.
551 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.16-33
552 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.8
553 Amit (Athens and the Sea, p. 68) sees the festival as bringing in a lot o f  people resident outside the city, and became 
a “reunion o f mourners”; he argues that it was these people who tipped the balance in the composition o f the second 
Assembly. Kagan {Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 368-70) argues that at the festival “the gaps caused by the recent 
deaths at Arginusae became painfully apparent”, and the “second Assembly obviously began in the emotional 
atmosphere created by the Apaturia”, an atmosphere characterized by “grief and anger”
554 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.38, cf.2.1.16.
555 Diodorus, 13.101.3
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The contribution of the naval crews as voters in the Assembly during this trial was probably 
minor. Instead, the few members o f the “naval mob” who were present in the city acted in the 
role of expert witnesses, testifying, to an Assembly which was unfamiliar with the circumstances 
after Arginusae, that the generals’ version of events was correct. Xenophon reports that some 
combination of their testimony and the generals’ eloquence had begun to persuade the 
Athenians.556 A man purporting to be a sailor made a speech before the second Assembly 
meeting, apparently on his own initiative but fulfilling the request of his dying comrades; 
regardless o f the genuineness o f his origins or sentiments, he too was effective in making his 
case. The episode shows that sailors, at least as speakers rather than a voting block, could have a 
profound impact on the deliberations o f the Assembly, and their words were listened to at least 
with regard to events they had witnessed and their field o f expertise; it must be emphasized, 
however, that this is the only concrete example we have o f them acting in such a capacity in the 
Assembly.
Assembly, Class and Interest Groups
As we have seen above, we run into several problems in trying to identify the influence of 
smaller within the Assembly. To assess the political clout o f any given group, be it farmers, 
trireme crews or eisphora payers, is a difficult, perhaps impossible, task. We must ask ourselves 
how would such a thing work; what would we expect to see if, say, the peasant farmers of Attica 
controlled the democracy? How would this be different from if the urban poor were the ones in 
command? Is it, in the first instance, relevant to talk o f separate and conflicting class interests 
amongst the demos', should we rather look at the leading political figures, and see who supported 
them? But this leads to further problems; successful leaders like Pericles could call on wide 
support over a long period; while he was a successful general and his plan for the Peloponnesian 
war relied heavily on the navy, can we assume that he therefore had the backing of the “naval 
mob”? And if he did, was this the crucial factor that kept him at the top? Of course, even the 
Athenians are unlikely to have known which groups supported which measures; our sources do 
not allow us to assess with accuracy the composition o f the various political institutions of 
Athens and evaluate which was strongest. Even when we can identify particular groups, it is hard 
to link them with particular measures; for example, ex-crewmen of triremes o f all social statuses 
probably played a role in the restoration of democracy by “the men o f the Piraeus” in 403 BC,557 
but was it due to the votes of the “naval mob” shortly after that Assembly pay was introduced? 
We have seen that the “naval mob” was a fluid and roughly-defined group; doubtless they shared 
some common interests, but this does not equate to a united political force. There is no 
guarantee, and indeed no real likelihood, o f a consistent political agenda amongst the naval 
people in Athens.
556 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.6
557 e.g. Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.4.24
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In addition to the difficulties o f investigating and separating class interests, we have many 
problems in trying to assess how and when such interests could impact on the democracy. Even 
if we allow the possibility o f a class interest dominating the political agenda, can we differentiate 
a period in which such control was maintained at the expense of other groups, or particular 
measures that resulted from that control?
Periods of political control and influence are described only in the broadest terms of class (the 
rich vs. the poor), and are centred on particular individuals. In these broadest terms, we do have 
some indications o f class interests taking control o f the Assembly; indeed, even domination for 
one day could have a profound effect. According to Plutarch, the reforms of Ephialtes that 
stripped the Areopagus of most o f its power and transferred it to the Assembly could only be 
passed when Kimon, the champion o f the aristocracy, was away from the city.558 The suggestion 
is that, with a big opposition leader gone, Ephialtes’ supporters were able to dominate the 
Assembly and pass their laws. In 411 BC, an Assembly was held in which an attempt was made 
to exclude the poorer citizens; by holding the Assembly outside o f the city walls, at a time when 
the Spartans occupied Decelea, those who could not afford arms and armour were discouraged 
from attending. At this meeting, the citizenship criteria were made more stringent, 
disenfranchising many o f the poor and setting up an oligarchic system.559 What these stories 
suggest is that the Assembly could not usually be dominated even by the largest ‘class’ groups of 
rich and poor; devices had to be employed or circumstances exploited to ensure that one group 
could overcome the other. Even if the literal truth o f these stories can be cast in some doubt, they 
nevertheless indicate that a normative Assembly had a balance in terms o f broad ‘class interests’. 
This lack of stasis between the rich and poor and the stability o f Athens’ direct democracy was 
one of its most remarkable features; Ober’s detailed study into the relationship between the mass 
and elite concluded that “rhetorical communication...was a primary means by which the strategic 
ends of social stability and political order were achieved.”560 While there was some class tension, 
much of the political competition in our sources is presented as being between individual 
members of the elite; conflict was based more on faction than on class.
Leaders and Factions
The analysis by Strauss of politics during and following the Peloponnesian war should lead us to 
be cautious about ascribing class groups to particular policies or individual politicians. While he 
does not deny the existence o f class interests and tensions in this period,561 he argues that 
personal factions are a more appropriate analytical tool in examining the Assembly; groups built 
around a specific leader, who no doubt would have appealed in general term to class interests, but 
where the link between the person of the leader and his faction was more important than the
558 Plutarch, Kimon, 15.
559 Thucydides, 8.67
560 Ober, Mass and Elite, p. 338
561 Strauss, After the Peloponnesian War, pp. 26-7, cf. p. 63
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leader’s link to a particular programme or principle.562 In this analysis, a trireme crewman might 
approach the Assembly and vote not as a member of the “naval mob”, but as a follower of 
Kimon, or Pericles, or whichever leader he happened to favour. Plutarch presents the reforms of 
Ephialtes and Pericles as being passed by the poor while Kimon (and the wealthier hoplites) were 
away, but many poor members o f the “naval mob” might have been just as willing to support 
Kimon as they were to back the reformers. While traditionally seen as a friend of the wealthy and 
a ‘conservative’ leader, Kimon was much more o f a ‘naval man’ than Pericles when the latter 
began his political career; he was also as much of an ‘imperialist’. While his views on the 
political system at home were less ‘radical’ than those o f his opponent, we should not on this 
basis shrink from ascribing to Kimon strong support from amongst the groups that would benefit 
most from the reforms, including the poor men o f the “naval mob”.563
The dynamic o f leaders and their friends, clients and followers in Athens is a crucial one. The 
sources, as we have seen, focus on individual politicians and their careers and rivalries. These 
career politicians often had a substantial group o f followers; and while Strauss argues that these 
factions would tend to be fairly small groups based on personal links (as opposed to mass- 
membership corporate groups based on shared principles like modem political parties), the role 
of such supporters in the Assembly would have been crucial; not only in voting the right way and 
persuading others to do so, but for heckling and intimidating opponents. In the context of the 
Arginusae trial, described above, Diodorus is probably correct to suggest that the generals made a 
grave mistake in antagonizing Theramenes and Thrasybulus, as both men had substantial factions 
on whom they could call for political support. The battle between orators and their respective 
factions is the crucial political struggle in the extant evidence for the democracy.564 The extent to 
which more ‘ordinary’ people took advantage o f their democratic right to share in the speaking is 
unclear; but even if they did, they have left little for us to examine in the source material.
While no doubt many politicians did have personal links with Athens’ citizen trireme crewmen, 
the extent and importance o f this is not known. Service as a nauarch565 or a trierarch would have 
given aspiring members o f the political elite an opportunity to establish links with trireme 
crews.566 Once again, this emphasizes the personal nature o f Athenian politics cutting across the 
class interests o f the “naval mob”; trierarchs, nauarchs and generals could have recruited 
members of the “naval mob” to their cause by personal persuasion, bribery and mutual interest, 
but their political rivals could have been doing the same thing on other ships within the same
562 Strauss, After the Peloponnesian War, pp. 17-28
563 Strauss, ‘Athenian naval tactics’, p. 320-3, argues that Kimon’s choice to take many hoplites on his Eurymedon 
campaign was a deliberate political act to counter the prevailing Athenian method o f fighting at sea “that maximized 
the state’s dependence on the poorest men who filled the rowing benches” (p. 317). It is an interesting argument, but 
one that takes for granted that the ‘ideal’ Athenian sea battle was representative o f naval campaigns in reality (see Part 
One, section A .l and Part Three, section 3). It seems more likely that that the decision to take a strong force of  
hoplites was dictated more by the strategic and tactical requirements o f the campaign rather than an attempt to boost 
influence of Kimon’s political constituency (van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 274, n. 19).
564 Strauss, After the Peloponnesian War, pp. 27-8
565 1 discuss these ship commanders in Part Two, section A.5 and Appendix 1.
566 Links between members o f the elite and poorer citizens in the navy will be discussed in Part Three, section 4.
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expedition. Therefore, if we are expectant that the “naval mob” could and did control politics, or 
at the very least were an important group amongst the demos which the orators would try to 
mobilize to their cause, we might not see them acting as a unified group; but we might see 
politicians who had extensive links or ‘careers’ in the navy being more successful than those who 
did not; unfortunately, looking for such details is to put pressure on our extant evidence that it 
cannot possibly bear. A successful general in naval actions may have been able to influence 
politics by virtue o f that success and its appeal to Athenians generally rather than because he 
coveted and won the support o f those on his campaign. A rich trierarch who became a politician 
may well have paid and treated his men well and thus have won their support, but whether this 
would be enough on its own to ensure success in Assembly is doubtful; other extravagance on 
liturgies and political ‘networking’ would probably have been crucial too. The most successful 
politicians, such as Themistocles, Kimon, Pericles, Kleon, Aristides (and their opponents) can all 
find contexts for these sorts o f political activity, and beyond the general statements of Aristotle 
and the Old Oligarch, we have nothing to suggest that gaining support for one’s faction from 
members of the “naval mob” in particular would be crucial. Nor do we often see trireme crews 
as a specific group addressed an appealed to in the Assembly, suggesting that their presence in 
the Pnyx may not have been o f great importance. Finally, we have not been able to discern a 
context for the “naval mob” to act as a group, even under the questionable assumptions that 
logistically and politically they could and would have acted as one; it should be pointed out, 
however, that any analysis o f an individual class group, aside from the broad umbrella terms 
‘rich’ and ‘poor’, is likely to be frustrated in this sense; the political system appears to have 
operated more on a factional, rather than a class, line. Any single interest group that we might 
identify, while some would have been more important than others, would not have been able to 
dominate the Assembly to any significant extent.
3. The Output of the Assembly
Decrees and Laws
In the previous paragraphs, we have seen that there is no evidence o f one particular class interest 
literally packing the Assembly and controlling the democracy through its votes and leaders. We 
have also seen that the personal nature o f politics and political factions intersected class interests, 
dividing groups such as the “naval mob” and thus diluting any collective interest that they might 
have had. Successful politicians like Pericles had wide appeal amongst class groups and no 
doubt lots of supporters in their faction, but even they, for all their influence, could not have 
totally controlled the Assembly. The Assembly contained enough disparate elements that even 
the largest and broadest class groups of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ which the faction leaders and politicians 
ascribed to could not dominate proceedings.
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However, if the group was a powerful one outside the direct political contexts that we have been 
looking at, the legislation o f the Assembly may still have reflected this group’s concerns. The 
‘out-put’ o f democracy and decisions in the Assembly should surely reflect a class bias if there 
was one dominant interest (farmers, the wealthy, tax-payers) in the Assembly. The “naval mob” 
may not have physically packed the Pnyx, nor might leaders have dominated based on the votes 
of trireme crews, but nevertheless is there evidence to suggest they were of sufficient importance, 
presence and clout to ensure that their interests were looked after in the Assembly? 
Alternatively, is there any evidence to suggest that the voice o f the navy was not a strong one in 
democratic politics, and legislation was passed which damaged their interests?
Our examination therefore turns on whether the sources can provide evidence for this sort of 
indirect influence, or even dominance, o f the Assembly. A large number of Athenian decrees and 
laws survive and can be examined in this light. Quite a lot o f the decrees we have are concerned 
with the minutiae o f finance and political administration, and we would struggle to find whether 
such measures had any particular effect on the “naval mob” at all. Many others involve treaties 
with foreign powers, which have the same difficulty. The proposers o f decrees, when they can be 
identified, are useful to see who were making the speeches and getting laws passed, but 
discovering whether they or their proposals were supported by the “naval mob” is impossible.
In the first instance, it should be acknowledged that the decision to build and maintain the navy, 
along with the vast and costly shore installations associated with it, were ones that obviously 
benefited those Athenians (and non-Athenians) who were to crew the vessels. But while the navy 
and its pay can be seen in the context of populist measures to win the support of the masses,567 
the navy brought power, and wealth, to most o f the citizens, and the city as whole. While Plato 
might have happily given up sea power, Athenians o f all classes benefited from the Empire and 
had a vested interest in maintaining it; such maintenance required a powerful navy, and ensuring 
employment for the poor in triremes may not have been a significant factor in the decisions to 
pursue sea power, but a by-product. We do not have any obvious measures to placate or favour 
the trireme crews, something that for example decreed that all the naval crews should receive 
more pay or grants of land. By way o f contrast, there is some evidence o f measures passed by 
the Assembly which suggests that merchants had their interests looked after. Garland argues that 
“procedure regarding maritime lawsuits (dikai emporikai) was revised in c. 350 for the benefit of 
traders”,568 and a petition from non-Athenian merchants to be given the right to buy land for a 
temple was granted in 333 BC.569 Aristophanes alludes to a privileged legal status enjoyed by 
merchants in two plays.570 Merchants, unlike trireme crewmen, appear in the list of typical
567 Plutarch (Life o f  Pericles, 11-12) sees the navy in this light.
568 Garland, Piraeus, p. 62 cf. 192; see also p. 108.
569 IG II2 337=RO 91=Harding 111
570 Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae, 1022-7 (a man attempts to avoid the law by claiming to be an emporos, merchant); cf. 
Wealth, 903-4
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Assembly-goers given by Xenophon’s Socrates,571 and so perhaps these measures were to some 
extent the result o f direct political influence; but many merchants were non-citizen, and to 
Xenophon in his advice about increasing Athenian revenues, the merchants as a group were 
thought of as non-citizens who should be better catered for at Athens; some of his proposed 
reforms were put into effect.572 In other words, merchants were an important group who had a 
considerable and perceptible indirect influence upon Athenian decision-making. The same 
cannot be said o f trireme crews, although there were some legislative measures which had a 
particular bearing on naval folk; for example, the measures proposed by Demosthenes in 354 BC 
to reform the hierarchy. With one exception, there are no honorary decrees rewarding someone 
for naval actions.573 We have seen above that the dynamics o f the Assembly, and the likelihood 
of a disproportionately rich ekklesia, would mean that the surviving decrees are unlikely to 
exhibit any obvious fingerprints of the “naval mob”.
Pericles’ “Citizenship Law”
Legislation proposed by Pericles in 451/0 BC is perhaps one o f the most overtly ‘social’ laws 
which can support this sort o f discussion. Referred to as ‘The Citizenship Law’ in modem 
works,574 this decree dates from the height o f Athenian power, a time perhaps when Athenian 
citizenship was seen as an increasingly valuable commodity. The primary sources agree on the 
main thrust o f the reform; limiting citizenship to the offspring o f parents, both of whom had 
certain status. Patterson’s statement that the law does no more or less than “establishes a 
minimum condition...for citizenship”575 is clearly true; the debate has centred on defining exactly 
what that minimum condition was.
All of the primary sources are collected quoted and discussed by Patterson in the opening chapter 
of her work on the citizenship law.576 Most are one-line remarks in lexicons and late writers; the 
two fullest sources are the papyrus o f [Aristotle] on the Constitution o f  Athens, written in the 
330s BC, and Plutarch’s second century AD biography o f Pericles. The different details and 
contexts recorded in these sources are suggestive o f separate literary traditions. Plutarch records 
the terms of the law as part o f a moral anecdote, when the proposer Pericles finds himself a 
victim of it; without legitimate sons and late in life, Pericles beseeched the demos to relax the 
provisions which he himself put in place, and allow the younger Pericles, his son by Aspasia, a 
foreign-bom woman, to become an Athenian citizen:
571 Xenophon, Memorabilia, 3.7.6
572 Xenophon, Revenues, 3.3
573 This inscription awards a trireme crewman named Asklepiodorus for his courage in fighting the enemy sometime in 
the second half o f the fourth century BC. This document, which flatters to deceive, is discussed in detail in Part Three, 
section 4. It again contrasts with the situation for merchants, who feature quite prominently in late fourth-century 
honorific decrees.
574 Plutarch (Pericles, 37) referred to it as “the law concerning bastards”.
575 Patterson, Citizenship Law, p. 95.
576 Patterson, Citizenship Law, pp. 1-3
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akmazon ho Perikles en tei politeiai pro panu pollon chronon, kai paidas echon, 
hosper eiretai, gnesious, nomon egrapse monous Athenaious einai tous ek duein 
Athenaion gegonotas
When Pericles was at the height o f his power, and, as I have mentioned, had 
legitimate children bom to him, he proposed a law that only those who could claim 
Athenian parentage on both sides should be counted as Athenian citizens.577
The account of the law in [Aristotle] has a different context. He begins the second section of his 
work, pertaining to the present political system at Athens, by giving a list of requirements for 
citizenship, the first o f which is that both parents o f a citizen must be astoi,578 Earlier in the work 
(in the section tracing the history and development o f Athens’ political system), he records that 
this particular provision was initially made under the auspices o f Pericles in 451/0 BC.
epi Antidotou dia to plethos ton politon Perikleous eipontos egnosan me metechein 
tes poleos, hos an me ex amphoin astoin ei gegonos.
Under Antidotus, because o f the large number o f citizens and on the proposal of 
Pericles, they decided that none was to share in the city who was not bom of two
• 579astoi.
The account of [Aristotle] is therefore to be preferred in terms o f accuracy o f detail to the far later 
and more anecdotal account o f Plutarch. The inclusion o f an archon date and a proposer (which 
would have appeared at the top of the stone when the law was inscribed) admit the possibility 
that the author recorded the terms of the legislation exactly as it was enacted. This possibility is 
strengthened (though of course far from confirmed) by the fact that the law was in active use at 
the time he was writing. Most modem interpretations o f the law holds that there is no substantive 
difference between the basic terms o f the law as recorded in these sources; the “two Athenians” 
of Plutarch a simpler way of writing the two key phrase in [Aristotle], astoi, and metechien tes 
poleos (“to share in the city”).580 In the political context, these two phrases are essentially 
synonymous, and the law requires new citizens to have two “citizen” parents; thus the testimony 
of our two principal sources is in agreement. The difference in terminology is explained by the 
fact that, despite loose wording in Plutarch and many modem works, women could not be 
“Athenians” or “citizens” in the political context that this law is primarily concerned with. The 
term astoi encompassed male citizens, and non-foreign women (i.e. the daughters of citizen 
fathers, and mothers who themselves had citizen fathers). Plutarch, perhaps not understanding 
the subtleties of the terminology, went for the simpler and essentially correct interpretation using 
technically the wrong language.
577 Plutarch, Pericles, 37.3
578 [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 40
579 [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 26.3
580 See Cohen, Athenian Nation, pp. 49-78, for a forcefully argued yet ultimately unsubstantiated and speculative 
interpretation o f this legislation, which seeks to include certain metics within the category o f astoi.
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Effects of the Citizenship Law
While of course its impact would be felt amongst the whole city, the men of the “naval mob” 
might have been amongst those most especially affected by the decree. Citizenship was to be 
restricted to those whom had astoi parents. One of the effects of this would have been to 
disenfranchise the children o f an Athenian and foreigner (whether they were married or not), and 
thus potentially make such a union less inviting. Patterson is correct to argue that “the idea that 
foreign marriage was generally a habit o f the Few is widespread, but perhaps unjustified 
considering how little we know about the practices o f the Many”,581 but the passing of this law 
suggests that marriages between xenoi and astoi were far from uncommon, and that prior to 451 
BC the male children of such unions could become citizens.582 Notwithstanding the greater 
amount of potential contact with non-Athenians that the fifth century afforded all o f the Athenian 
population, the “naval mob” was perhaps the most numerous group with whom relationships with 
foreign women could regularly arise. We are into the realms of speculation here, of course, but it 
seems likely that the “naval mob” would have greater contact with foreign people while working 
throughout the Aegean,583 and also back at Athens if  (as seems likely) foreign visiters, metics and 
members of the “naval mob” all lived in the Piraeus in disproportionate numbers. Roy has 
recently challenged this particular assertion with regard to the metics. He bases his case on 
Whitehead’s discussion584 of the 366 metics whose deme registration is known, which shows that 
19% of known metics lived in Piraeus, and 61% lived in the city. Therefore, Roy argues “if the 
free population of the asty was less than about three times as great as that o f the Piraeus, there 
was a greater concentration o f metics in the asty than in the Piraeus.”585 The case is flawed, as 
Roy is not comparing like with like; the asty here is composed o f six demes, against the single 
deme of Piraeus. The bouletic quotas586 of the respective demes can give us some idea of the 
respective population; these can only be rough estimations, but the argument that the demes 
could have contained many citizens from other places in Attica would apply equally to the city 
and the Piraeus, and so does not invalidate such a comparison. The six demes of Roy’s asty have
CO'7 coo
a total bouletic quota o f 36 or 37, against 9 for Piraeus; this suggests that the population of 
the city was four times as great as that o f the Piraeus. This would imply in turn that the Piraeus 
did indeed have a greater concentration of metics per head o f citizen population than did the asty
581 Patterson, Citizenship Law, p. 99
582 Patterson argues that “such a law [re: Pericles’ citizenship law] is only passed when it is needed or thought to be 
needed.” Pericles ’ Citizenship Law, p. 132.
583 Shipley, History o f  Samos, p. 124, n. 56, argues that Alcibiades may have fathered a child while the fleet was 
stationed at Samos. The evidence he bases this on is not the strongest (the claim o f  a Samian tyrant and writer Douris 
to have descended from Alcibiades, FGrHist 76 T 3 and F70). But the supposition that Alcibiades fathered a child at 
this time is likely enough, and he is not likely to have been the only one from the fleet in such a position.
584 Whitehead, Demes o f  Attica, p. 83-4.
585 Roy, ‘Threat from the Piraeus’, p. 196.
586 This is the number o f men that each deme was entitled to have sitting on the 500-seat Council. The seats were 
divided as evenly possible between the tribes and trittys, and bore at least some relationship to the relative populations 
of the demes.
587 Melite; 7, Kollytos; 3, Alopeke; 10, Kydathenaion; 12 or 11, Skambonidai; 3, Keiriadai; 2.
588 These figures come from Whitehead, Demes o f  Attica, pp. 369-74. Roy’s own figure for the bouletic quota of 
Piraeus is 8, one lower than Whitehead’s, making the difference that little bit more vast.
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as a whole,589 and, as the principal point o f entry by sea, it would certainly have had a greater 
concentration and number o f non-metic xenoi as well.
It seems that the Piraeus was an area with a very high density o f non-Athenians, both settlers and 
visitors, and thus the potential for members o f the “naval mob” taking foreign wives was 
increased. A law which, while stopping short of an outright ban,590 nevertheless had the effect of 
discouraging unions with foreigners can surely be interpreted as not having in mind the interests 
of those groups which regularly contracted such marriages. One such group was the rich elite, 
for whom we have most evidence, and who perhaps frequently contracted dynastic marriage with 
powerful families overseas.591 The Citizenship Law has been interpreted in such a way, an anti- 
aristocratic measure,592 perhaps even one directed against a particular politician, Kimon.593 Such 
arguments are not convincing, not least because they ignore the reason given in the ancient 
evidence for the law; the fact that there were “too many citizens”. Disenfranchising the children 
o f the Athenian elite would have imperceptibly small effects on any demographic level. The 
“naval mob”, however, was a far more numerous group, probably in the low thousands at this 
time, and certainly large enough to have an impact on the number of citizens. Another large 
group o f citizens who would have been more likely to take foreign wives were the men sent out 
to the various cleruchies, but all o f  the records o f  these settlements seem to have antedated the 
law.594 Indeed, sending out cleruchies and especially colonies would have been a more direct, 
obvious and traditional method o f solving the problem o f too many citizens in Athens, and it is 
probably not coincidence that a good deal o f these expeditions were despatched in the years 
around 450 BC.
It is well worth asking how this law was intended to solve the problem o f their being too many 
citizens. In itself, it seems not to reduce the number of citizens in 451/0 BC, but only to maintain 
about the present number in the future.595 As Patterson has pointed out, if the law presumes that 
an increasing proportion o f Athenian men were marrying foreign women (and vice versa), the
589 It is worth noting that the deme Melite appears to have had a higher concentration o f metics than the Piraeus, given 
that a greater number o f  attested metics were registered there (75 as against the Piraeus’ 69; far and away the highest 
two totals for Athens), and had a lower bouletic quota; 7 as opposed to 9.
590 There is no evidence to suggest that there was a clause attached to this law that made marriage between a xenos and 
an astos illegal, though there was such legislation in force by the middle o f  the fourth century; [Demosthenes] 59.16.
591 Conner (‘Civic Identity’, p. 36) states that “We know that marriages with foreigners were not uncommon amongst 
members o f the Athenian elite”; similarly Boegehold ( ‘Citizenship Law’, p. 58) states that “leading citizens had for 
generations been contracting marriages with prominent non-Athenian families”; there is probably a good deal of truth 
in these statements, but Patterson (Citizenship Law, p. 99) is right to sound a more cautious tone, pointing out the 
general paucity o f evidence, asking the question “can we assume... [from a very few examples]... that it was necessarily 
a widespread habit among the better sort at large...What marriages between foreigners and Athenians o f Pericles’ 
generation do we really know of?”
592 It also is predicated, as Patterson notes (Citizenship Law, p. 99), on the assumption that “extra-Athenian marriage 
was a unique characteristic o f the Athenian aristocracy”
593 Boegehold ( ‘Citizenship Law’, pp. 58-9) gives a useful and brief discussion o f  these and many other interpretations 
o f the Citizenship Law, with full references.
594 I discuss colonies and cleruchies above in Part One, section A.2
595 We may not fully agree with Boegehold ( ‘Citizenship law’, p. 59) that laws are not often passed because “a far­
sighted statesman looks into the future and sees a source o f trouble ahead”; Pericles after all was credited widely with a 
high degree o f  foresight. But it is certainly fair to look at this law as a solution devised for an immediate and current 
problem in 451/0 BC.
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population o f new citizens would only have been slowed down if this new law did not 
significantly deter such unions, or if we assume “that if deprived o f foreign wives Athenian men 
would choose not to marry at all”.596 Similarly, it does not seem that the law was to be 
retrospective, in that it did not disenfranchise those who were not bom of two astoi but who had 
already been enrolled as citizens before 451/0 BC. Conner is right to say that there is no 
indication in the texts o f the law that it could not be applied retrospectively,597 but equally there is 
noting to suggest that it could; our evidence o f the exact terms o f the law is too scanty to be sure 
on this point. That some sort o f large scale disenfranchisement is said to have happened several 
years later, and was prompted by a specific event (a gift o f grain) rather than as an immediate 
result and consequence o f this law, perhaps suggests that it was not retrospective in its effect.598 
At the very least, the passing o f the law in 451/0 BC did not seem to provoke a wave of legal 
challenges and disenfranchisements o f existing citizens. It is worth noting that when the law was 
re-enacted, we have more detail o f the exact provisions, and this one was emphatically not 
retrospective in its nature;599 whether this was a break from the 451/0 BC or continuing its 
principals is unclear.
It is perhaps best to look at this measure in relation to current astos/non-astos unions in 451 BC. 
A perceived and effective reduction in the citizen body would have been achieved if the 
(probably many) children bom o f such couples who had been registered with their demes after 
birth, but had not by 451/0 BC reached their full adulthood, were by this law to be excluded from 
becoming full citizens.600 Such young males would doubtless have been expected (and 
expecting) to become citizens during their childhood, and so while it is not technically a 
reduction o f the number o f citizens in 451 BC, it could easily have seemed like one, and been 
described as such with only a moderate degree o f licence. Given that Athenian naval campaigns 
and a full-time fleets involving citizen rowers had begun as early as 478 BC, and that the fact o f a 
permanent, wage-paying fleet probably accelerated the rate o f  migration to Athens which had 
begun with the refurbishment o f the Piraeus under Themistocles, many naval families could have 
been in the position o f having their children disenfranchised by this law. A man of 20 man 
coming to Athens to seek employment in the fleet in 478 BC, settling as a metic and marrying a 
local ‘Athenian’ girl when he turned thirty, having his first son in the next year, might well find 
that his boy would have been unable to join his deme as a citizen as planned after Pericles’ law 
was passed. It would have been a similar story for Athenian sailors bringing foreign wives back 
to the city; any sons bom after 469/8 BC would not have become citizens.601 There is
596 Patterson, Citizenship Law, p. 102
597 Conner, ‘Civic identity’, p. 43, n.25.
598 Plutarch, Pericles, 37. As Patterson argues (Citizenship Law, p. 122-3, n. 63), the passage does not need to imply a 
scrutiny off every single person in Attica, but only those who actually applied for a share o f the grain handout.
599 Scholiast to Aeschines, 1.39; Patterson, Citizenship Law, p. 145.
600 Patterson, Citizenship Law, p. 105, suggests that there was probably a “’boom’ (post-crisis) generation bom in the 
470’s”, contributing to the impression that there were too many citizens coming o f  age in the 450s.
601 At least in theory; while Patterson (Citizenship Law, pp. 146-7) is correct to that “it cannot be shown to have been 
revoked or modified” between 451/0 and 403 BC, the ultimate decisions regarding citizenship would have been in the 
hands o f the demesmen, and there were surely many who slipped through the net despite being technically unqualified
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unfortunately no direct evidence for such people and circumstances; but such changes and 
increases in the overall population could have fed an apparent perception that there were too 
many Athenians to share the large but finite benefits of Empire and the far less large and 
infinitely more finite land resources o f Attica itself.602 It would be going too far to suggest that 
the law was passed specifically and consciously against the interests o f the “naval mob”; even if 
that was the effect was damaging to them, there was not necessarily any intention to do so. But it 
does seem to be a law which was perhaps significantly disadvantageous to the “naval mob”, and 
trireme crewmen more generally, and which was passed seemingly with little obstacle or 
opposition. It is not what we would expect under the hypothesis that the “naval mob” had a 
strong voice in the Assembly, or had its interests looked after there.
Naval policy and Aristophanes’ Knights
O f all the plays o f  Aristophanes, perhaps the Knights has most to tell us regarding the interaction 
o f the navy, its members, and its interests with the Athenian political system as a whole. While 
references to the navy, rowers and famous sea-battles are not replete in Aristophanes, they are far 
from absent; most plays have one or two notices or jokes about naval matters in them. The 
Knights gives us information on the promotion o f sailors within trireme crews and the terms 
under which they earned their money, but also gives us some insight as to the presence of the 
navy and its crew on the political stage.603
The central action in the play surrounds the satirical battle between the slave Paphlagon and the 
Sausage Seller (backed up by the titular chorus o f Knights) for the favour of the old man Demos. 
Of course Demos, characterized as self-serving, greedy and short-sighted, represents the 
Athenian people as a whole. Paphlagon represents the politician Kleon, who was one of the most 
influential orators at the time the play was written and produced, not only due to his fiery and 
aggressive rhetorical tactics, but also his military success against the Spartans at Pylos.604 
Aristophanes was always a foe o f Kleon and his brand o f ‘demagogic’ politics, and this work is 
the playwright’s most direct attack on him. His method of bringing Kleon low shows a high 
degree o f cynicism in politicians and politics as a whole; as Sommerstein puts it, “the only way
to be citizens. As Conner (‘Athenian Civic Identity’, p. 40) has emphasized, “the decree itself was not the end o f the 
story. It required interpretation and implementation.”
602 Boegehold ( ‘Citizenship Law’ p. 60) argues convincingly that worries over the thin spreading o f Attica’s land was a 
principal factor in legislation designed to narrow access to citizenship, and thus the right to own and inherit land. He 
further suggests that the law was little more than Pericles’ putting into decree a principle that had stemmed from 
decisions and arbitrations regarding land disputes in Athenian courts; that children o f  two astoi had a superior claim to 
those o f mixed parentage. It is an attractive and persuasive speculation, but a speculation still.
603 The passages on pay quoted below are used by Morrison and Williams (Greek Oared Ships, pp. 258 ff), along with 
Thucydides 8.45, to suggest the policy o f withholding half o f a sailor’s pay until his return to port; see discussion in 
Part Three, section 2.
604 Aristophanes’ view (voiced through the character o f Demosthenes, a slave o f  Demos, 11. 55) was that this success 
was primarily due to the far more gifted military leader Demosthenes, and Kleon cynically capitalized on the other 
man’s success. There is some support for this view from Thucydides 4.29-32, where it seems that Demosthenes took 
most o f the tactical decisions.
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for Cleon to be overthrown is by a man who outdoes him in those very qualities that make Cleon 
such a menace.”605
It is not surprising that a play produced in the centre o f the Archidamian war should show 
concern for the military affairs o f Athens and the expenses occasioned in its prosecution. Indeed, 
the character o f Demos twice refers specifically to the importance o f pay for sailors. In the first 
instance, the Sausage Seller is interpreting Oracles for the old man:
Allantopoles; houtos gar hemon tas puelous apherpasen. all' houtosi gar estiperi 
tou nautikou ho chresmos, hoi se dei prosechein ton noun panu.
Demos; prosechd: su d' anagignoske, tois nautaisi mou hopos ho misthos proton 
apodothesetai.
Sausage-Seller: Well, anyway, this oracle is about the fleet, and you should pay 
close attention to it.
Demos: I’m doing so; you read it, and first and foremost say how my sailors are 
going to be given their pay.606
In the final act, when the Sausage-Seller has been victorious and Demos rejuvenated, the fleet, 
and particularly the payment o f the sailors, is the first priority;
Allantopoles; ta d' alia, pher' ido, pos politeusei phrason.
Demos; proton men hoposoi naus elaunousin makras, katagomenois ton misthon 
apodoso 'ntele
Sausage-Seller: What policy will you follow? Tell me.
Demos: First o f all, to all who row longships I will give their full pay when they 
come into port.607
There are several things that can be drawn from these lines. Firstly and most obviously, they 
give voice to the view that paying the sailors o f the navy should be a high priority. Secondly, the 
implication (and possibly indeed the reason for the inclusion o f the lines in the first place) is that 
the political system was failing the navy crews in this important regard. The connection between 
pay and the navy is made elsewhere in the play (as it is commonly in Thucydides’ history); in an 
invocation o f Poseidon, triremes are noted by the chorus for three qualities; their speed, their 
rams and their pay.608
While we do not have a member o f the “naval mob” expressing a view on this or indeed any 
other issue, the Chorus Leader tells the audience o f a fictional conversation between two of  
Athens’ warships.609 An older trireme expresses concern for the ambitious plans o f Hyperbolous
605 Introduction to his edition o f Knights, p. 2.
606 Aristophanes, Knights, 11.1063-65. He also refers to payment for triremes in line 1078; the Sausage-seller interprets 
an oracle’s mention o f fox-cubs as referring to triremes, and Demos immediately asks who is to pay for them.
607 Aristophanes, Knights, 11. 1364-1378
608 11. 554. The word uses in this context is misthophoroi, money-bearing, and it is debated whether the expense o f the 
ship is being referred to, or the use o f triremes as revenue collection vessels (cf. 1. 1070)
609 Knights, 1300 ff.
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to send 100 ships to Carthage, and her sentiments are echoed by her younger companion, who 
would rather go rotten in the shipsheds than sail under the command o f such a man, advocating 
an aggressive policy simply to win political capital. There are echoes o f Pericles’ policy being 
advocated here, stressing the dangers and folly o f over-reaching. Is this just the view of 
Aristophanes, or is he using a rather nice device to express the views o f the “naval mob”? It is 
difficult to be certain, and in such circumstances caution must be exercised. While sailors, and 
potential sailors, would certainly not want to be led by a fool on a fool’s errand, most of our other 
evidence (including other plays of Aristophanes) suggests that they were generally quite willing 
to go on extended campaigns, as this would result in long-term pay and the chance for booty. An 
expedition likely to be successful in Carthage would have been likely to receive enthusiastic 
support from the “naval mob”, as would the large-scale attack on Egypt in the 450s BC, and the 
one to Sicily in 415 BC. Of course in the circumstances Aristophanes describes in Knights, with 
the provision o f pay being something of an issue, a long sojourn to Carthage may not have 
seemed as attractive a prospect. The effects o f a long conflict were beginning to tell on Athens, 
and despite recent successes in Pylos and their characteristic confidence,610 Athenian optimism 
that Carthage could be subdued might not have been high.
We should resist the temptation to ascribe such thinking to the “naval mob” on the basis o f this 
passage o f Aristophanes, just as we should not unthinkingly ascribe the views o f his female 
characters to real Athenian women. At the very least, the play does suggest that the navy crews 
were not being treated in a noticeably good or preferential manner. Given the assumption of the 
political strength o f these men, and the by no means desperate financial situation facing Athens at 
this time, it is somewhat surprising to find their pay lacking and their case on this matter being 
advocated by Aristophanes. The treatment o f naval issues in Knights could be viewed as an 
attempt to get genuine concerns regarding the navy, and particularly sailors’ pay, onto the 
political agenda. This in turn implies that such matters were not already being given their proper 
attention in Athens in the 420s BC, and perhaps that Kleon and his ilk were neglecting them. On 
the assumption that the naval crews were a powerful force in democratic politics, this would be a 
surprising conclusion. In fact the play as a whole is veiy good grounds to reject this assumption 
and to see the link between the navy crews and democratic politics as something o f an artificial 
construct. Perhaps the veiy fact that Aristophanes was here voicing the rowers’ concerns can be 
thought of as evidence that they could not or did not put them forward themselves.
Harming the “Great Yo-Ho”
If it was indeed the case that navy crews were treated with some degree o f neglect or negligence, 
that is not to say that there was any deliberate persecution or political sidelining o f the “naval 
mob”; while such sidelining certainly happened on a cultural level,611 Aristotle’s dream of a navy
610 A trait ascribed to them in Thucydides (see for example 1.70-1, where they are compared (not unproblematically) 
with the more cautious and less mercurial Spartans).
6111 discuss these issues in Part Three, section 4.
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manned by disenfranchised serf/rowers never materialized, and Plato’s vision o f a city shorn of 
its connections to the sea lasted only as long as the brief and ill-fated regime o f the 30 Tyrants, 
imposed upon Athens in 404 BC and overthrown within a year. A passage from Aristophanes’ 
Wasps suggests that accusations o f harm done to naval people by their leaders could be taken 
very seriously. The context is the comic trial o f the watchdog Labes (a caricature o f the Athenian 
general Laches), who was prosecuted by the Hound of Cydathenaeum (whom no-one in the 
audience could fail to perceive as Kleon, a member of that deme); the play’s protagonist, the 
rascally old Philocleon, is given the task o f judging the case, in order to cure him o f his addiction 
to the real Athenian jury courts. The hound opens his case thus:
Kuon: tes men graphes ekousath' hen egrapsamen andres dikastai toutoni. 
deinotata gar ergon dedrake kame kai to rhuppapai. apodras gar es ten 
gonian turon polun katesikelize kaneplet' en toi skotoi
Hound: You have heard, members o f the jury, the indictment I have entered 
against the defendant here. He has committed the most disgraceful crimes 
against me and the great yo-ho [to ruppapai]. He ran off into the comer 
and ensicilized a great amount o f cheese and stuffed himself with it in the 
dark.612
This is satire o f the highest order; the reference is to accusations o f embezzlement made against 
Laches in relation to his command of an expedition to Sicily, and parodies a trial that could have 
resulted from these rumours.613 Aristophanes has the missing money represented as the cheese 
that Labes “ensicilized”, and the prosecutor Kleon-Hound incensed not so much by the theft, but 
from the fact that he personally did not profit from it.614 The mention o f to ruppapai is a clear 
reference to the crews o f triremes, possibly the “naval mob”; this was their distinctive and 
rhythmic call made while at the oars. However, Sommerstein perhaps goes too far in suggesting 
that the phrase was “used to denote the poorer Athenians who manned the navy (and, in large 
measure, the juries) and were Cleon’s strongest supporters.”615 This seems to place too great a 
weight on the passage; while poorer Athenians did contribute both to the juries and to the fleet, 
equating the two like this is problematic. On the evidence o f this play as much as anything else, 
the average juror appears to have been amongst the older citizens, his days o f campaigning in any 
capacity behind him. There is no other evidence to suggest that Kleon had any sort o f systematic 
support from the “naval mob”, and this passage need not suggest it. What can be said is that a 
successful prosecutor616 could inflame the passions o f a jury by suggesting that the navy (and 
possibly its crew) had been undermined by the actions o f the accused. This could certainly 
suggest a concern for the welfare o f naval people, at least to the extent that crimes against them 
should be punished; it is worth noting that the crime perpetrated against the “great yo-ho” was
612 Aristophanes, Wasps, 908-11
613 See Sommerstein’s brief summary o f Laches’ career and the allegations against him in the notes o f his edition o f  
Wasps pp. 171-2, ad loc 1. 240
614 Aristophanes, Wasps, 915-6
615 Sommerstein, pp. 211 ad loc 1. 909
616 For the Hound wins over the one-man jury in this case; he is denied his verdict when Bdelycleon tricks his father 
Philocleon into voting to acquit rather than convict.
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depriving them o f resources, which was a key issue for Aristophanes throughout Knights. It 
could also reflect a concern that was to resurface; that the embezzlement o f unscrupulous leaders 
was undermining the navy itself, and therefore the safety o f the city, and that such activity 
angered juries. It does not suggest that the “naval mob” were themselves actors in such political 
actions, still less that they were an integral part o f the prosecutor’s following.
A Demosthenic speech hints that the Athenians were still susceptible to such arguments in the 
forth century BC, and argues that such overreactions were not conducive to making rational 
decisions:
prin an hapant' eipd aneoixan depou proen tines ton opisthodomon. oukoun hoi 
pariontes hapantes ton demon katalelusthai, torn nomous ouket' einai, toiaut' 
elegon...palin kopas tis hupheileto: mastigom, strebloun pantes hoi legontes, ton 
demon kataluesthai.
You know that a day or two ago the Opistodomus was broken into. So the speakers 
in the Assembly, one and all, cried that the people are overthrown, that the laws 
were null and void, and so on.. .a few oars were stolen. “Scourge the thieves torture 
them,” cried the speaker; “the people are overthrown.”617
This is an interesting example o f the link between the navy (in a very broad sense) and the safety 
o f Athens, though one that the speaker emphatically rejects; he claims that the democracy was 
threatened by the demos itself and the failures o f its political leaders.618 There is no question here 
o f crimes against the “naval mob” being the cause of the outrage and danger, as the oars were 
state-owned equipment; the speaker’s example involved the theft o f valuables from the Parthenon 
treasury, and so his train o f thought is concerned with state resources and not particularly about 
the navy or its people.
Demosthenes’ Speech On the Symmories
The proper organization of these material resources was one o f the main subjects of 
Demosthenes’ first speech before the Assembly. In the context o f a speech urging the Athenians 
to follow a cautious policy with regard to the Persian King in 354 BC, he proposed a complex 
and substantial reorganization o f the symmories, groups o f wealthy liturgists who shared the 
large financial burdens o f the trierarchy between the members. Although the reforms were not 
enacted, the speech is an interesting text to consider in relation to this discussion. Even given 
the fact that the need for the reform stemmed from the huge financial burdens that were being 
placed upon the liturgical class as a whole, and in particular upon the-very-wealthy-but-not-quite- 
extremely-rich, the speech takes no notice o f the effects o f that the reform would have had on the 
crewmen, who themselves stood to be affected by the changes. It might be argued that the 
changes to the trierarchy proposed by Demosthenes, a complex set o f measures designed to
617 [Demosthenes], 13.14
618 [Demosthenes], 13.14
140
spread the costs o f the liturgy as fairly as possible amongst the wealthy,619 would make naval 
finances more efficient for the liturgists, and therefore would have been welcomed by the “naval 
mob”; poverty stricken and ruined liturgists were not likely to make effective or generous 
trierarchs. This is quite so, but it is remarkable that Demosthenes did not make the point in these 
terms to his audience. The beneficiaries o f these measures were to have been the citizens and the 
city as a whole, which would have been on a better war footing whatever future enemies arose.620 
But as a strategy for winning sufficient support in the Assembly to pass the reforms, 
Demosthenes might have been well advised to appeal to the self-interest o f the “naval mob”; if  it 
is assumed that they were a significant political presence. Jones points out that this speech 
provides the one exception to the rule that speakers addressed the Assembly members as if they 
were themselves tax-payers; here Demosthenes speaks o f “us” as those paying the taxes, and 
“you” (i.e. the Assembly) as voting for it. Jones uses this instance to argue that it was only in 
circumstances like the one o f this speech (a moment o f crisis) that the poor would outnumber the 
rich;621 if this inference is correct and more o f the poor citizens were present than was usual, 
could some of those have been members o f the “naval mob”, and thus make it even more striking 
that Demosthenes makes no mention of how the reforms will effect them? However, this is a 
tenuous chain o f reasoning, and the initial inference is not valid. While this is a notable 
exception to the general pattern of how the Assembly was addressed, the very next sentence 
resumes normal service:
alia tho boulesthe dodekaten hemas eisoisein, pentakosia talanta; all' out' an 
anaschoisthe out', ei katatheite, axia tou polemou ta chremata.
Suppose you want us to pay one twelfth in tax, 500 talents? But you would not 
submit to such a tax, nor if you paid up, would the money be sufficient for the 
war.622
If this speech can be regarded as an attempt by an Athenian politician to look after the interests of 
the city’s sailors, it would seem that (like with the potential damage caused to them by the 
Citizenship Law in 451/0 BC) it was probably not thought of, and was certainly not presented, in 
such terms. The speech does not totally neglect the rowers themselves, however; Demosthenes 
does discuss new procedures for manning the ships:
plerosin d', he kai saphes estai kai rhaidia, meta tauta lego, phemi tom  strategom  
dein dianeimai topous deka ton nedridn, skepsamenous hopos hos engutat' allelon 
kata triakont' osi neosoikoi, epeidan de toutopoiesosi, duo summorias kai triakonta 
triereis touton hekastoi prosneimai ton topon, eit' epiklerosai tas phulas: ton de 
taxiarchon hekaston, hon an he phule topon lachei, dielein tricha kai tas naus 
hosautos, eit' epiklerosai tas trittus, hopos an ton men holon nedridn hen hekastei 
meros ei ton phulon, tou de merous hekastou to triton meros he trittm echei, eidete 
d', an ti deei, proton men ten phulen, hopou tetaktai, meta tauta de ten trittun, eita
619 Demosthenes, 14.20-22.
620 Demosthenes, 14.11
621 Jones, Athenian Democracy, p. 36
622 Demosthenes, 14.27
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trierarchoi tines kai triereis poia, kai triakonta men he phule, deka d' he trittus 
hekaste triereis echei.
I now proceed to describe a clear and easy way of manning the ships. I suggest that 
the generals should divide the dockyards into ten areas, so arranging it that there 
may be dock-room in each for thirty ships, as close together as possible, and that 
when they have done this, they should apportion two boards and thirty galleys to 
each area, and then assign the tribes by lot to the areas. And each taxiarch must 
divide into three parts whatever area his tribe has taken over, and the ships in the 
same way, and then he must allot the thirds o f his tribe in such a way that o f the 
whole space o f the dockyards each tribe may have one area and each third of a tribe 
a third o f an area; so that you can know at once, if necessary, where each tribe and 
each third o f a tribe is stationed, who are the trierarchs and what ships they have, 
and that so each tribe may have thirty ships and each third o f a tribe ten.623
It is worth comparing Demosthenes’ idea o f a nice, systematic and ordered sorting o f thousands 
and thousands o f men with the more dynamic and realistic portrait o f the launching of a fleet 
given in Acharnians around 70 years earlier:
Dikaiopolos: pher' ei Lakedaimonidn tis ekplensas skaphei apedoto phenas 
kunidion Seriphion, kathesth' an en domoisin; e pollou ge dei: kai karta 
mentan eutheds katheilkete triakosias naus, en d' an he polis p lea thorubou 
stratioton, peri trierarchou boes, misthou didomenou, palladidn 
chrusoumenon, stoas stenachouses, sition metroumenon, askon, tropoteron, 
kadous onoumenon, skorodon, elaon, krommuon en diktuois, stephandn, 
trichidon, auletridon, hupopion:
Dicaiopolis: Supposing one o f the Spartans had sailed forth in his bark and 
denounced and sold a puppy dog to the Seriphians, “would you within your 
halls sat? Far from it!” Why, on the very instant you’d have been
launching 300 ships, and the city would have been full of the hubbub of
soldiers, noisy crowds surrounding ships’ captains, pay being handed out,
Pallas emblems gilded, the colonnade groaning, rations being handed out, 
leathers and oarloops and people buying jars, garlic and olives and onions 
in nets, crowns and anchovies and flute-girls and black eyes.624
It is notable that the difficulties in getting men to turn up in the first place are not part of
Demosthenes’ speech, just how to arrange them most efficiently when they arrive.625 Such
centralization and organization by tribe is more suggestive o f citizens levied for naval service 
rather than the hiring o f a more varied mix o f men on the open market as described by 
Aristophanes; we should perhaps interpret this section of the speech as provisions to have been 
put in place in the event o f a citizen call-up. This impression is strengthened by involvement of  
the taxiarchs in Demosthenes’ organization plans. Taxiarchs were normally commanders of land 
forces, and are attested as being involved only in one fleet; that which fought at Arginusae, and 
which was manned by conscription. In any event, these provisions were not enacted.
623 Demosthenes, 14.22-3
624 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 11. 542-51
625 This might suggest a degree o f  naivety and inexperience on Demosthenes’ part (this is his first known speech before 
the Assembly, and his measures were not endorsed); certainly Apollodorus ([Demosthenes], 50.7) had considerable 
problems with listed sailors turning up in the first place, rather than whether they were standing in the right place on 
the quay.
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The conclusion o f this discussion is somewhat negative; we cannot detect the presence o f the 
“naval mob” in any individual political decision o f the fourth century, nor acting in any sort o f  
collective manner on the political stage. It is also not possible to detect any particular concern for 
the “naval mob” in the decisions o f the Assembly; while attacks on the “great yo-ho” might have 
been met with calls for retribution, such evidence as we have is more suggestive o f an 
indifference towards them, to the extent that Aristophanes thought it necessary to give voice to 
some naval concerns in Knights. This discussion does not absolutely prove that the “naval mob” 
were not a significant presence or influence on decision making in the Athenian Assembly; our 
evidence is insufficiently detailed to be able to conclusively demonstrate a negative conclusion in 
these matters. But it certainly renders as problematic any vision o f the Athenian political system 
as one in which the “naval mob” had considerable political power, still less dominance.
4. Politics in the Piraeus
Assemblies in the Piraeus
The deme of Piraeus was one o f the biggest, and possibly the most important, of all of the 
individual demes. As well as having a large population of citizens, the Piraeus was home to 
larger than average numbers o f metics, and no doubt many seasonal foreign visitors. The 
maritime activity o f the Piraeus, both in terms of the merchant fleet and the trireme fleet, 
accounted for the fact that in the fourth century BC, compared with most demes, the harbour 
town boasted a great many magistracies and institutions, duplicating many of those of the 
Athenian state as a whole. Of particular interest at this stage is the indication in Demosthenes 
that the Assembly itself was sometimes held in the Piraeus. In his speech On the Embassy, he 
talks about two different Assembly meetings that were held in the Piraeus rather than the Pnyx.626 
The first passage from this speech suggests that there was an Assembly convened for the purpose 
of discussing ‘things in relation to the dockyards’,627 though certainly it was the case that items 
other than the dockyards made it on to the agenda, and it was these (and the timing of the 
Assembly) that are the reasons for Demosthenes referring to it. Clearly the fact o f the Assembly 
taking place in the Piraeus was intended to jog the memories of his audience and remind them of 
the sequence o f events; it was an unusual and notable occurrence. This o f course does not mean 
it was unique; even if Piraeus meetings were a regular if infrequent happening, it would have 
been worth Demosthenes making a casual reference to the location. This passage is the only one 
amongst the references to Assemblies in the Piraeus that comes close to suggesting that there 
were meetings there for the express purpose o f discussing nautical matters. A second passage in 
this same speech refers to an occasion in Piraeus where the people refused to appoint Aeschines
626 Demosthenes, 19.60 (cf. 125), held in 347/6 BC; 19.209, held in 343 BC; discussed by Garland, Piraeus, pp. 81-2,
cf. p. 197
627 Demosthenes, 19.60
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as an ambassador; this is surely an ekklesia, although the text does not explicitly say that.628 
There is other evidence for meetings in the Piraeus in the literary sources; the reference in Lysias’ 
Against Agoratus records events that occurred “when the Assembly in the theatre o f Munichia 
occurred.”629 We do not know what business caused this Assembly to be convened in Piraeus. 
The central events o f the case, concerning the ‘assassin’ and stooge Agoratus, involved him 
seeking sanctuary at an altar in Piraeus, and the serious nature o f the allegations may have 
brought the Assembly to Munichia. Far more likely, though, is that the actions o f Agoratus 
followed the Assembly schedule; if he was indeed keen to denounce people before the Assembly, 
he took steps to ensure that his refuge-place was near to the Assembly’s meeting point. It is a 
possibility, then, that the plot o f Agoratus and his choice of refuge took into account the fact that 
an Assembly meeting was scheduled in Piraeus. Alternatively, and perhaps most likely, it could 
have been a simple coincidence that these locations coincided; Agoatus fled to the nearest 
sanctuary when men came to arrest him, which just happened to be in the same area as the next 
Assembly meeting.
Again, while the pointing out o f the location of this Assembly may suggest it was unusual, it does 
not imply it was not a regular feature o f Athenian politics. In the examples discussed above, it 
seems that whatever this Assembly was convened for, it could to carry out regular business, pass 
decrees and elect officials as usual. Indeed some of the decrees resulting from this Assembly 
were reportedly read out during the course o f Lysias’ speech; of course the full texts of these 
decrees are not given, but the speaker alludes to the substance.630 There is no allusion at all to 
any business that might be described as ‘naval’ being dealt with in this Assembly; if such items 
were on the agenda, they did not totally dominate it to the exclusion o f other issues.
These represent the literary sources for the Piraeus Assembly in the classical period. Staveley 
suggests that “from the time o f Demosthenes, it became increasingly common to hold Assemblies 
in the theatre, or if their principle business was to discuss naval matters, in the port o f Piraeus”.631 
He cites in support some o f the passages above, and, without specifying, “the plentiful evidence 
of inscriptions.” Garland is more forthcoming regarding the epigraphic texts, and it is clear from 
the ones he cites that the Assembly met not infrequently in the Piraeus from the third century BC 
and onwards.632 He also adds the meeting in the Piraeus in 411 BC to organize resistance to the 
400 as an example o f an ekklesia in the Piraeus.633 It is certainly true that the Piraeus acted as a 
centre o f dissidents at this time, as it was to do in 403 BC, when those who fought against the 
Thirty became known as “the men of the Piraeus” in fourth-century sources; but these can hardly
628 Demosthenes, 19.209
629 Lysias, 13.32
630 Lysias, 13.34-6; the decree o f the Assembly required those denounced by Agoratus to be tried before a court o f 
2,000; in fact the Thirty took over before the trial took place, and they were tried, condemned and executed on the 
judgement o f  the boule.
631 Staveley, Elections, pp. 79-80
632 Garland, Piraeus, p. 82
633 Thucydides, 8.93
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be described as regular Assembly meetings, and they do not shed light onto the use o f the Piraeus 
in ‘normal’ circumstances during the fifth and fourth centuries BC.
The Agenda of Piraeus Assemblies
That the Athenian Assembly occasionally met in the Piraeus during the fifth and fourth centuries 
is beyond doubt; but the evidence for whether or not there were regular scheduled meetings in the 
Piraeus at this time is inconclusive. Even so, it is worth speculating as to the possible rationale 
for such meetings. One peculiarity o f the Piraeus deme was that its demarch was elected by the 
whole o f the Athenian people, and not just the demesmen of Piraeus (it is unsure whether the 
candidate for the post could be from any deme; the one named man we have testimony for was of 
the Piraeus deme). This bit of business would probably have been conducted at a meeting of the 
Assembly in Piraeus, although this election was only required once per year and would 
presumably have not taken the entire debating time for the day. One o f the passages above 
implies that the rationale behind Piraeus meetings was the discussion o f peri twn en tois neoriois 
“dockyard business”, and on the face of it, it seems a perfectly sensible measure to locate a 
meeting concerned with naval matters in the harbour district, and to do so regularly if such issues 
often arose. The Assembly dealt with, or at least scrutinized, much if the minutiae o f running the 
state, and the navy was a particularly large, important and complex institution; in the fourth 
century the navy produced a large amount of epigraphic records and inventories, many of which 
were found in the Piraeus.634 This large-scale bureaucracy probably existed in the fifth century 
too.635 Such scrutiny at the level o f the Assembly need not have happened frequently, even if it 
did so regularly; one might draw a parallel with the infrequent but regular Assembly meeting 
held in the theatre o f Dionysius, to discuss matters arising as a result of the festival.636
However, we might pause to consider what naval matters actually meant in terms o f an Assembly 
agenda. Many of the surviving speeches we have, not to mention the epigraphy, are concerned 
with the launching o f naval campaigns. Would these foreign policy decisions, some of the most 
important deliberations undertaken by the Assembly, have been taken at the Piraeus? Jordan 
suggests this might have been the case when he refers to a meeting in the Piraeus to review a 
current naval expedition.637 If this is so, then many of Demosthenes’ speeches calling for fleets 
to be launched would have been delivered at the Piraeus and not the Pnyx. However, the 
evidence that Jordan cites for this review, a decree relating to the arrangements for the Sicilian 
expedition, suggests only that some sort o f review in Assembly should take place, and the words 
on the stone do not suggest that the venue for this reassessment should be the Piraeus.638 We
634 IG II2 1604-32. For a brief discussion o f these texts, see Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, pp. 13-5; this 
work makes extensive and sensible use if  these complicated documents throughout.
635 Gabrielsen (Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 13) notes only three such documents from the fifth century (IG I3 498- 
500), but argues correctly that “Although quantitatively these are insignificant, their very existence bears testimony to a 
well-established naval administration in this period.”
636 Demosthenes, 21.8-9; IG II2 223 B 5-6; Hansen, Athenian Democracy, p. 129
637 IG I2 98=ML 78=IG I3 93; Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 22.
638 Garland, Piraeus, p. 197
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should be cautious about making such a restoration; the identification of the Assembly and the 
Pnyx639 must indicate that the key policy decisions, like launching fleets, were taken there. These 
sorts o f things were not considered primarily ‘naval’. But what about the organization of the 
trierarchy, and decrees concerned with conscripting sailors?640 Were these ‘naval’ debates, or 
would such issues, dealing with liturgical and military obligations, have taken place with the 
other state business on the Pnyx? Demosthenes’ detailed proposals on such matters in his first 
Assembly oration On the Symmories could be considered as ‘naval’ matters, but they come in a 
speech that also dealt with the pressing foreign policy issues o f the day. It is simple at first sight 
to say that ‘naval matters’ were discussed in a Piraeus Assembly, but it is unclear exactly what 
would be deemed as such, and, as On the Symmories makes clear, individual debates or even 
single speeches were not confined to a single category o f issues. The phrase used in 
Demosthenes, “dockyard business”, should probably be interpreted in a fairly narrow way, and 
the Assembly’s role was to scrutinize the administrative work on the navy that was done by 
boards o f magistrates and the boule. Perhaps one possible reason for moving the Assembly to the 
Piraeus was that those attending a Piraeus Assembly would be in a better position to speak about 
and judge the matters at hand.641 It need hardly be stated that the members of the “naval mob” 
would have lived in disproportionate numbers within the deme o f Piraeus (which is not to say 
that they were demesmen o f  Piraeus), and therefore it is not unlikely that, in a Piraeus Assembly, 
the “naval mob” and sea-faring folk more generally would have been a more noticeable presence 
than in the Pnyx. In the Arginusae trial discussed above, we saw that the “naval mob” could be 
relied upon to provide credible testimony on their areas o f expertise. Perhaps part o f the rationale 
for holding Assemblies in the Piraeus was to ensure a greater presence o f such people.
If it is correct to suggest that the Assemblies in the Piraeus were held there in order to ensure a 
greater number o f naval ‘experts’ in the Assembly, it has several important implications for the 
debate at hand. Firstly, it perhaps indicates that such people were not in regular attendance in the 
Pnyx, but that when their expertise was needed, it was sought. There is some debate regarding 
the separation of the asty and the Piraeus, and the extent to which its separate institutions, rules 
and amenities were constituted to keep the mixed population of Piraeus and its corrupting 
influence away from the rest o f Attica.642 It is perhaps possible to interpret the Piraeus Assembly 
in this light; a way o f keeping the “naval mob” at a distance, away from central affairs, but still 
able to utilize their abilities and knowledge. The Piraeus also held many festivals, 643contained
639 For example, Aristophanes’ Demos (Knights, 1. 43) has the demotic name ‘Pnyx’
640 For example, the decree o f Aristophon referred to by Apollodorus at the start o f Against Polycles ([Demosthenes], 
50.6) and the sending o f men and carpenters to Macedonia, IG I3 117=Fomara 161.
641 Plato, Protagoras, 319b-d; his Socrates suggests that, in matters o f  technical skill the Assembly would not tolerate 
the advise o f non-experts; ship-building is mentioned explicitly as an example. Note also the view expressed by 
Gorgias in conversation with Socrates (Plato, Gorgias, 459c) that a glib speaker could be more persuasive on technical 
matters than the expert, provided that the audience was ignorant o f  those matters.
642 Roy (‘Threat from the Piraeus’) argues that there was much tension between the city and the Piraeus, arguing 
against the view o f Amit (Athens and the Sea, p. 89) that in practical and ideological terms the two were “practically a 
single and continuous inhabited area”.
643 Garland, Piraeus, p. 101-38. He argues (p. 103) that the “religious year o f the Piraeus was very full”
146
temples and sanctuaries, brothels and wine-shops,644 so that a sailor’s political, social, religious 
and indeed base needs were catered for there. On an economic level, a man returning to Piraeus 
and looking for more work would have been loath to spend too much time away from the Piraeus. 
None o f these things, nor the moderate physical distance between Pnyx and port, would stop a 
politically dedicated rower journeying to Athens to take part in the Assembly when he was 
ashore. Despite all the wonders on offer in the Piraeus, there would have been many reasons for 
members o f the “naval mob” to travel to the city. Even if most o f a sailor’s friends and shipmates 
lived in Piraeus, a journey to the asty to attend a festival or sacrifice or visit family would also 
facilitate taking part in the Assembly, if  one happened to be scheduled at that time. Our evidence 
allows us very little certainty on any o f these issues; the regularity o f Piraeus meetings and their 
rationale, the precise nature of the naval matters discussed there; the relative proportion of the 
“naval mob” attending meetings in the Pnyx and the Piraeus; the extent to which the institutions, 
attractions and Assemblies of the Piraeus, particularly in the fourth century, resulted in the people 
o f the asty and the port living separate lives; all o f these issues are matters o f conjecture and 
speculation rather that concrete evidence.
5. Elections, Commanders and Officials 
The Election of Generals
Unlike most political positions and boards o f magistrates, the board of the strategia was directly 
elected in the Athenian Assembly. It is not unlikely that members o f the “naval mob” would 
have been even more interested than most Athenian citizens in the selection of strategoi, 
“generals”. Not only would they share their countrymen’s concern for appointing effective 
military leaders, but these men would be largely responsible for their wages and welfare in any 
campaigns o f that year. Money voted for military expeditions was generally in the hands of the 
strategos, and while sailors could (and did) petition their captains for wages and rations, it was 
the strategoi who were (or should have been) responsible for handing out the bulk o f the pay of 
those on the expedition. At an even more basic level, it may be argued that the men of the “naval 
mob” could be required to fight under the orders o f the strategoi, and so they would be interested 
in picking leaders who were proven and competent naval commanders and not likely to expose 
them to unnecessary danger. What we might expect to see if  the “naval mob” held significant 
power in the Athenian Assembly is the election of generals with sea-faring experience, and a 
good military record. We might also expect to find, if the votes o f the “naval mob” were 
significant, ambitious politicians canvassing the vote o f this particular group.
This invites a wider question regarding the criteria on which generals were elected. Scholars 
have often assumed that the use o f election in Athens, and for the generalship in particular 
throughout the classical period, was to ensure competent incumbents; Hanson states that:
644 Aristophanes, Peace, 1. 164 ff; Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 84
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Some o f the most important ones [i.e. magistracies] were elected; the Athenians 
naturally had no desire to fight under a general picked out o f a hat.645
The assumption here is that by the process o f popular election someone more qualified would be 
able to be appointed, and Hansen highlights the generalship as one office where getting a 
qualified man would be especially important. Stavely states this even more explicitly:
By reason o f the fact that the nature o f their responsibilities demanded high 
technical qualifications, these officers [i.e. the generals] enjoyed the distinction, 
comparatively rare in democratic Athens, of being appointed by direct election.646
But Athens was no meritocracy, and the ability to lead an army was not the same as the ability to 
win an election. The division between rhetor (“speakers”, used to denote professional politicians 
particularly in the fourth century) and strategos, fighting men who lacked political skills and 
experience, must take into account the fact that the generalship was always a political role; 
generals were elected by the Assembly, were scrutinized by that body at the start and end of their 
tenure, and were accountable to it throughout their command.
An examination of the backgrounds o f Athenian generals belies the conclusion that competence 
and military experience, “highly technical qualifications” to use Staveley’s terms, were the most 
important factor in the minds of the Athenian electorate. An anecdote in Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia suggests this; Socrates is discussing the election of generals with a candidate who 
failed to get voted in. The disgruntled man, Nicomachides, ranted as follows:
kai hos, ou gar, ephe, o Sokrates, toioutoi eisin Athenaioi, hoste eme men ouch 
heilonto, hos ek katalogou strateuomenos katatetrimmai kai lochagon kai 
taxiarchon kai traumata hupo ton polemion tosauta echdn—hama de kai tas oulas 
ton traumaton apogumnoumenos epedeiknuen—Antisthene de, ephe, heilonto ton 
oute hopliten popote strateusamenon en te tois hippeusin ouden periblepton 
poiesanta epistamenon te alio ouden e chremata sullegein;
“Why naturally, Socrates, the people o f Athens, being what they are, have not 
elected me, although I am worn out with active service as an officer or a taxiarch, 
and have received all these wounds from the enemy”-as he spoke, he drew back his 
clothes and exhibited the scars-“but instead they have elected Antisthenes, who has 
never served in the infantry and has won no distinction in the cavalry, and knows 
nothing except how to manage his lands.”647
In other words, the Athenians, in their typical fashion, elected a member o f the landed elite in 
preference to a man with good fighting credentials. Playing Devil’s Advocate as usual, Socrates 
proceeds to inform Nicomachides as to why such an appointment made sense, which of course 
gives us a lot o f other qualifications for our generals; Socrates suggests that a rich man’s interest
645 Hansen, Athenian Democracy in the Age o f  Demosthenes, p. 160
646 Staveley, Elections, p. 40
647 Xenophon, Memorabilia, 3.4.1
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in building up his estate enabled him to keep his army supplied, that his liturgical obligations to 
play a prominent role in the city’s festivals made him used to leading men, and the competitive 
nature o f these activities made him used to striving for victory. Qualities o f an estate-manager in 
being successful, such as organizing their subordinates effectively and being conservative with 
possessions, were replicated in good generals. When it comes to the actual fighting, 
Nicomachides claims that the estate manager would be useless; Socrates again argues that this 
would not be the case, seeming to quickly persuade his interlocutor:
kai men, ephe ho Sokrates, oude oides ge ho Antisthenes oude choron didaskalias 
empeiros on homos egeneto hikanos heurein tons kratistous tauta. kai en tei
strategiai oun, ephe ho Nikomachides, allous men heuresei tous taxontas anth'
heautou, allous de tous machoumenous
“Antisthenes has no experience o f singing, or o f training a chorus, but he succeeded 
in finding the best people for his purpose.”
“So in his capacity as general,” said Nicomachides, “he will find other people to 
work out the tactics and do the fighting”648
Socrates and Nicomachides are here in a discussion about the technical qualifications needed to 
be a general; and according to this anecdote, fighting skills and tactics were not o f primary
importance in the election of generals. While it was recognized that there were technical skills
and practical experience that were relevant to military matters, a general did not need them if he 
was successful in finding others with the appropriate skills and making use o f them. What 
background information we have from the generals suggests that this anecdote may have some 
grounding in truth. This fact should perhaps not be surprising; even if the historicity of the 
conversation and Socrates’ comments can be doubted, it is more than likely the views expressed 
by the philosopher are those o f the work’s author, an Athenian and a military man himself; his 
discussion on what were the most necessary qualifications o f military leaders at Athens should be 
given due consideration.
A survey o f all the generalships we know about in an attempt to find out about the backgrounds 
of generals immediately encounters problems. The first and most major of these is the 
incompleteness o f the evidence. In each o f the 160 years between 480 and 320 BC ten generals 
were elected; a total o f 1,600 generalships. We know at least the names o f 204 generals, who 
between them occupied about 500 o f the total generalships; in other words, less than a third. To 
make matters worse, if we consider the 204 generals we do know the names of, some of them are 
just that; a name in a literary source or on an inscription which says that someone was a general 
in a particular year. It is impossible to assess the backgrounds o f such men. Even if we consider 
only those men who were important or skilled enough to be elected multiple times, our 
information is very incomplete.
648 Xenophon, Memorabilia, 3.4.4
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Of the 204 generals total, we have evidence for 84 who served in that capacity more than once. 
38 o f these generals are known to have considerable wealth prior to their first election as a 
general, either made by themselves or inherited. Mostly we know this because the wealthy were 
obliged to use part o f their fortune in the funding of liturgies, including the competing choruses 
which Nicomachides’ opponent is said to have been so successful in. Wealth appears, 
statistically, to be the most important advantage. 21 generals had previous generals in the family; 
given the importance connected to deeds o f one’s father in relations to one’s own standing, this 
could be counted as a considerable advantage in an election. Certainly in court cases, litigants 
cited the good deeds o f their ancestors, and their fathers in particular, in the expectation of  
gaining advantage. 11 are attested as having some sort o f previous political experience; this 
could have given them an advantage at the election, if they had already some experience o f  
politics in Athens, and particularly in speaking before the Assembly. O f course, a lot o f people 
had many or all o f  these advantages; personal and inherited wealth, a family with a pedigree o f  
generalships, and political experience in Athens. 42 appear to have none o f these things going 
for them.
While to would be nice to be able to conclude that these 42 people were elected based on their 
merit and military record, the evidence does not permit such an assertion. Just because they are 
not attested as being wealthy or politically active does not mean they weren’t, and of course most 
of this 42 are men about whom we have no background information whatsoever. In trying to find 
examples o f people who had nothing but their military ability to rely upon, we are thwarted from 
absolute certainty by the patchiness of the evidence. However, amongst this 42 there are a 
number o f interesting examples o f famous generals who we can perhaps see as similar to the 
embittered Nicomachides, but just finding electoral success where he failed; the fifth-century 
generals Phormio, Demosthenes and Laches, all of whom had good fighting reputations, are in 
this group.649 The general Lamachus, also among the 42, is somewhat a template for some of the 
others, in that we know a lot about him and his activities as a general, but almost nothing about 
his life before and his background. He was a general for the first time in 436 BC, and 5 times 
thereafter. Lamachus appears in the narrative o f Thucydides as a fairly important general, and a 
good fighting man; the image o f Lamachus as a bold, fiery and archetypical fighting general is 
strengthened by his portrayal in Aristophanes. In the play Acharnians, the warlike Lamachus is 
contrasted with the peace-loving hero, Dicaiopolis; in one scene, Dicaiopolis’ servant brings him 
nice things for a feast and party, while Lamachus’ servant on the other side o f the stage brings 
him weapons and armour for going into battle.650 Concerning his background, Plutarch states he 
was poor,651 and there are hints in Aristophanes that he pursued political and military offices for
649 The campaigning credentials o f these men are referred to by Aristophanes. Phormio; Lysistrata, 1. 804; Peace, 1. 
348. Demosthenes; Knights, 54-7. Laches; Wasps, 952-8 (this passage also implies, if  not that Laches was poor, then at 
least that he was not rich).
650 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 1097-1141, cf. 1174-1226
651 Plutarch, Nicias, 15.1, cf. Alcibiades, 21
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financial gain, rather than to be o f service.652 So, Lamachus was a man with an obscure, possibly 
poor background and a reputation as a warlike, courageous and heroic fighter; a circumstantial 
case at least for suggesting that his election was based on his primarily on his fighting skills.653
Another o f the 42 is the general Iphikrates, who was elected 17 times between 393 and 356 BC, 
and who appears at first sight to be our best example o f a soldier ‘rising from the ranks’ to lead 
the armed forces o f Athens. He had a reputation as being a man o f limited means and a poor 
background; his father was said to be a cobbler.654 He also had an active military career prior to 
his first generalship at Athens, winning distinction first as a marine;655 He also operated, probably 
as a mercenary, in Thrace, commanding a band o f light-armed skirmishers called ‘peltasts’. 
Distinguishing himself in such expeditions, he then rose to become a very successful general, 
both elected at Athens and as a mercenary. His military expertise is testified by the anecdotes 
and stratagems that are to be found in military writings;656 especially interesting in the context of  
this study the Iphikrates Method of training naval crews while on campaign.657 His early 
exploits were spotted by the Athenian general Konon, and this patronage certainly must have 
been a boon for him. While Iphikrates may have advanced because o f his obvious merits in 
isolation, in his case it is perhaps a combination of military skill and reputation, and the support 
of a powerful friend that helped him to the top.
Local Supporters
Electing one’s fellow deme- or tribesman to the post may also have been a significant factor in 
elections for generals; indeed when the post was first established, the strategos appears to have 
been envisioned as a tribe’s military leader, and so one general was elected per tribe. This rule 
soon became obsolete; Fomara’s work on the tribal representations o f generals in the fifth 
century BC has shown too many exceptions for us to easy contemplate the idea that the “one 
general per tribe” rule was still in force in the fifth century;658 the always imaginative and 
sometimes ingenious attempts to explain these electoral anomalies are best forgotten.659 But 
while there was no rule requiring every tribe to have a general on each board of strategoi, there 
nevertheless seems to have been some general desire amongst the electorate to vote for men from 
their own tribe. Despite the many exceptions, often caused by the repeated election of popular 
and powerful statesmen like Pericles, the evidence does show a reasonable spread of tribes 
amongst known generals, which may represent men supporting candidates from their deme, or 
voting along tribal lines.
652 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 597-617
653 Sources on Lamachus; Plato, Laws, 197c; Plutarch, Pericles, 20; Nicias, 15.1; Alcibiades, 18.2, 21.9; Thucydides, 
6.101.6;; Peace, 304, 473-4, 1290-4), Thesemophoriazusae, 841, Frogs, 1039.
654 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1367b 18; Plutarch, Moralia, 187a-b; Strauss (After the Peloponnesian War, p. 133) argues that, 
while he was by no means a wealthy man, his family was well-connected amongst the elite, and this contributed to his 
success in elections.
655 Plutarch, Moralia, 187a
656 Polyaenus, 3.9.1-63, credits him with 63 stratagems, far more than any other single commander.
657 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.27-32
658 Fomara, Generals, p. 71
659 See for example Staveley, Elections, pp. 42-7
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Such support for “local” politicians may also have had an effect, though it would have been less 
obvious, on other deliberations or debates in the Assembly; a man proposing a decree might 
expect more support from his tribe, and especially from his deme, than from the population as a 
whole. It is worth noting in this context that there were far fewer attested politicians from the 
deme of Piraeus than the its size and significance would lead us to expect.660 Unfortunately, there 
is very little weight that can be put on this circumstance, and it need not suggest anything about 
the political importance, or lack thereof, o f the “naval mob”; as Roy has pointed out, many 
politicians based in the Piraeus “will have had the demotic of some other deme”; as a 
consequence, “it is difficult to identify politically active residents of the Piraeus”.661 This was 
even more the case for Assembly attendees than it was for speakers. Any identities and loyalties 
built in demes, phratries and tribes would have been fostered and strengthened through festivals, 
contests, and military call-ups as well as the sharing o f civic duties such as serving on the boule, 
and such support could both overlap with and go beyond a politician’s own factional support 
base. These occasions could also provide a bridge between richer and poorer citizens, which 
might have had a mitigating effect on class tensions, and once again complicates our picture of 
Assembly-goers and their political attitudes and voting habits.662
Conclusion: general elections
We can say that in all probability, and as we might expect in a democracy, some men did get 
elected to the generalship principally on the basis o f their military ability and prowess. While a 
clear-cut example is hard if not impossible to definitively find given the state o f our evidence, it 
seems that people like Lamachus in the fifth century and Iphikrates in the fourth had little to offer 
the electorate aside form their military reputations. Rowers may have wanted to entrust their fate 
to former crewmates or trierarchs who had proved themselves in previous campaigns, rather than 
a glib speaker from the city who had not yet been to sea. Thus we might find, if the “naval 
mob”’s votes were decisive in the Assembly, men with military experience, or who had at least 
served extensively at sea, prominent amongst those elected. Due to the political nature of the 
appointment, those with the means and abilities to do well in Assembly debates could get the 
vote ahead o f those with fighting abilities. But as Socrates pointed out to Nicomachides, fighting 
ability not necessarily the most important thing to have in the person who was general; more 
important was the ability to provide and manage resources, and to be a competitive leader. If this 
was indeed reflective o f the selection criteria used by the Athenian people, it is easy to see why 
so many o f Athens’ social elite and traditional families supplied successful candidates for the 
generalship. Our evidence does not allow us to investigate in detail the previous careers o f many
660 Hansen 1989b p. 74 finds only five rhetors and strategoi who belonged to the deme Piraeus between 403 and 322 
BC, a lot lower than was the case for other large demes (pp. 32-72). Davis (1971, p. 617) also lists only five Piraeus 
demesmen in his catalogue o f  liturgical families between 600 and 300 BC, again a small number for such an important 
deme.
661 Roy, ‘Threat from the Piraeus’, p. 195
662 1 discuss the interactions between crewmen and wealthy liturgists performing hierarchies in Part 3, section 4.
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of the strategoi, and indeed even the names o f most of those who held the office are unknown. 
What we can be fairly sure o f is the elite origins of most o f the generals in the classical period, 
but the extent to which men were elected on their merit as ship’s captains, sailors or soldiers can 
not be accurately determined. A conversation of Socrates suggests that the better fighting man 
might have usually lost out to a good rhetoritician, which in turn might suggest that the candidate 
the “naval mob” would have preferred was not elected. The bias towards wealthy men, rather 
than perhaps those with extensive campaigning experience, might reflect a bias in the Assembly 
composition towards rich citizens. Alternatively it might reflect the strength of the factional 
system, in which the well-supported aristocrat would have found himself in an advantageous 
electoral position compared to the professional soldier or sailor, who had little or no previous 
political experience. But it might also reflect the desire o f poor men, including the “naval mob”, 
to give commands, and the large funds associated with naval campaigns particularly, to men who 
had experience and competence for handling such sums; as far as the sailors were concerned, 
their pay was to come largely from these monies. We might imagine a dynamic, ambitious and 
competent kubernetes securing support for his candidature as general from those on his 
expedition, and amongst a decent-sized fleet o f 60 ships, there might have been a potential 
maximum o f 3,000 citizens; not an inconsiderable number if  they could all have been persuaded 
(and indeed were able) to turn up at the Pnyx on the correct day and cast their vote for him. If 
there was ever such a man, our records do not bear it out. What we do have evidence for is a 
kubernetes being directly appointed to the command o f a fleet by a general.
The Commanders of Ships: Nauarchs and Archons of the Fleet
This section will examine the evidence pertaining to those who, in addition to the generals, 
commanded Athenian fleets. The focus here will be upon the somewhat shadowy and obscure 
group o f non-strategoi who are found from time to time on command o f squadrons o f ships. Van 
Wees suggests that there was little in the way o f a naval command structure “above the level of 
the trierarch and his ship”,663 which is true in the sense that the sources do not attest to a complex 
hierarchy with defined channels o f command. However, there are hints in the sources of some 
sort o f system o f command and control between the trierarchs and the generals.
It is clear from [Aristotle]’s account o f Athens’ military officials, compiled in the 330s BC, that 
there was for the army and the cavalry a number of other elected officials that formed a chain of 
command.664 He does not list any sort o f equivalent commanders for the navy,665 but our sources 
attest to such figures. There is clear inscriptional evidence for the existence of officials called
663 Van Wees, Myths and Realities, p. 212; he also suggests here that there were only two boards o f officials of specific 
and direct relevance to the navy; Jordan (Athenian Navy, pp. 21-60) lists and discusses a far broader range of 
appointees with some relevance to or jurisdiction over the navy, though some o f  these were sub-committees o f the 
boule rather than boards o f magistrates in their own right.
664 [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 61
665 Though he does report that the treasurers o f the sacred ships Paralos and Ammonias were elected.
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archontes tou vautikou, “commanders o f the ships”.666 There is support in the literary texts for 
non-strategos ship commanders. In his report of the battle o f Arginusae, Xenophon records the 
presence o f three nauarchoi, “ship commanders” 667 Jordan is doubtless correct to identify these 
two groups with one another, and to distinguish them from the strategoi, and is followed by 
Develin at least this far.668 Jordan’s further arguments are typically bold. He suggests (rightly) 
that we cannot assume that commanders not specifically labelled as strategoi in the sources were 
each in fact one o f  the ten generals for that year. He thus identifies many o f those men in 
command o f  ships and described by the word archon and its cognates as nauarchoi, rather than 
strategoi. Develin too believes in an official title along the lines o f “commander of ships”, but 
reserves the right to disagree with Jordan about individual identifications; in fact nearly all the 
non-strategos commanders that Jordan infers from the literary texts are accepted as strategoi by 
Develin, except when the sources use a term such as nauarchos explicitly.669 I discuss the named 
individuals who can potentially be identified as nauarchoi in Appendix 1.
While I would not go so far as Develin in dismissing Jordan’s individual identifications,670 there 
are good reasons to cast doubts his interpretation. The principal one is that, while our texts attest 
clearly to “archons o f  the fleet” as distinct from strategoi, our literary sources especially are not 
always scrupulous to show it. Even Thucydides, as Jordan himself admits, can use archon-terms 
to describe someone who was certainly a ‘full’ strategos.611 It is hard to distinguish between a 
general use o f  the term to describe the fact o f someone’s command, and an ‘official’ use 
indicating a specific office or post. While Jordan is right to insist that a man described only as 
an archon was not necessarily a strategos, he often overstates the certainty o f the contrary 
assumption; that those not so called were simply archons and not strategoi. In relation to 
Dietrephes’ mission to Thrace in 411 BC, for example, he argues that “As Thucydides does not 
call him a strategos, we must assume that his official title was archon epi Thrakes”.672 In fact, it 
is often impossible to be sure one way or the other, and “must” should not come into the 
identification o f individual cases.673
666 Bradeen, Hesperia 33 (SEG 21, 131), Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 124
667 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.29 cf. 1.7.30. It is clear that these are not generals, because all the strategoi for that year 
are all listed, either as part o f  this same force, or elsewhere.
668 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 122, cf. Develin, Athenian Officials, p.6
669 Develin surprisingly accepts the assertion o f  Jordan that Aristotle and Hierophon, commanders o f  Fleet 225 around 
Naupactos (see Part 1, section B.2), were not generals. Jordan’s principal evidence for his identification o f these two 
men as archons rather than strategoi is the parity in terminology with that used to describe the positions o f Leon and 
Diomedon prior to the winter o f  412/11 BC (see next note). Given that there are fewer testimonies for Aristotle and 
Hierophon, it is somewhat strange that Develin considers then as nauarchoi, while accepting Leon and Diomedon as 
strategoi.
670 I accept, for example, Jordan’s identification {Athenian Navy, pp. 126-7) o f  Leon and Diomedon as nauarchoi, up 
until the point that they are elected to replace Phrynichus and Skironides in the winter o f  412/1 BC. While Fomara and 
Develin both regard the pair as strategoi for all o f  412/11 BC, I think that the references compiled by Jordan suggest 
that they did indeed change their status during this year.
671 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 127 “it is true he [Thucydides] uses archien and arche inconsistently; and on a few 
occasions he uses archien particularly o f  strategoi.
672 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 124
673 In fairness, Jordan {Athenian Navy, p. 126) does at one point suggest a more moderate stance, arguing “In the cases 
o f all others [i.e. those not specifically called strategoi] we must suspend judgement until they have been proved to be 
strategoi.”
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A related problem is the inclusion by Jordan of people described as having command (arche) 
over ships in a particular place as nauarchoi rather than generals.674 Two of his examples relate 
to Naupactos, and he argues that both Konon and Diphilos were “fleet commanders”, as they 
were “nowhere called strategos.”675 The example of Dietrephes’ appointment in Thrace has just 
been mentioned. The problem with assuming that such people were not strategoi is that there is a 
concrete example o f an elected general taking command o f the Thracian region; Thucydides 
himself, in 424 BC.676 It is a similar case around Naupactos, where both Phormio and his son 
Asopios at the very least were full strategoi. That a strategos could exercise command in a 
specific region in this way seems clear. What is more debatable is whether or not non -strategoi 
could also take on such commands. The answer to this question depends on the interpretation of 
IG I3 375, dated to 410/9 BC.677 Line 10 if  this document, which details the dispersal o f funds to 
support Athenian commanders during the war in Ionia, records a payment made to Hermon, 
described as archonti es Pulos. Jordan argues that, as strategoi are referred to elsewhere in this 
document, “there is no possibility whatever that the term may refer to a general.”678 This is a not 
untypical overstatement by Jordan, although his essential point that the “commander of Pylos” 
was a distinct official from the generals is probably true, and accepted by Develin as such.679 
The next question is whether regional commanders such as Hermon at Pylos in 410 BC should be 
considered analogous with the “commanders o f  ships”. Develin prefers to separate the nauarchoi 
from such regional officials, and places the Archon o f Pylos along with the phrounachoi, 
“garrison commanders”,680 in a miscellaneous category o f “military or partly military positions... 
[that]... show that ad  hoc appointments could be made, perhaps by the generals, perhaps by the 
demos.”681 In other words, looking for formal separations o f powers and responsibilities is 
probably misguided, as the Athenians took a more pragmatic approach. A general with a fleet 
could be sent to take command in a specific a region; but if  one was not available, another 
official could be sent to do essentially the same job. A regional or garrison commander may or 
may not find himself being a de facto  “commander o f ships”, depending on the strategic situation 
and the naval forces currently deployed in the area.
Many of these possible sub-general archons appear to have been appointed at Athens, though by 
what body or process we cannot say. [Aristotle] claims that all Athenian military posts were 
elected,682 but given that such commanders are not explicitly mentioned in his account, and the 
fact that the trierarchs, “ship commanders”, were not elected but appointed, this general statement
674 E.g. IG I3 304 A, 11. 9-10; archonti es Pulos; Thucydides, 7.31 cf. 34, eirche Naupaktos; Thucydides, 8.64 es ta epi 
Thrakes archien.
675 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 123
676 Thucydides, 4.104.
677 ML 84=Fomara 154
678 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 125
679 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 166
680 e.g. IG I3 15,1. 21, a fragmentary inscription relating to Athenian interference in Erythrai.
681 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 6. Perhaps also to be considered part o f  this miscellaneous category are the “archons 
o f the cities”, argued by the authors o f ATL (Vol. 3, p. 145) to be found in places such as Miletus, Samos, Lesbos, 
Skiathos, Kos, Methone, Limnai and Agora.
682 [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 61
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cannot be taken as conclusive evidence.683 As well as this, there is good evidence to suggest that 
strategoi could give out appointments which seem very similar in nature to the nauarchoi. The 
best explicit evidence for such appointments comes in relation to the campaign under 
Timomachus in 362 BC, in which Apollodorus served as a diligent but long-suffering trierarch684 
On two occasions, the general appointed a man to Apollodorus’ ship with orders to detach from 
the fleet in order to complete some designated task.685 Jordan argues that “the general...ordered 
some o f the ships in the squadron to return to Athens. As commander (archon) of the force 
bound for home he appointed a certain Lykinos”686 Despite this description, is not clear from the 
speech on either occasion that any vessels other than Apollodorus’ were detached. On the second 
occasion it seems likely that Apollodorus’ was the only vessel sent, as the mission required the 
“best sailing ship”.687 Other descriptions o f naval operations are replete with fleets being split up, 
and one or more vessels being sent away for particular missions; it is not unlikely that on these 
occasions as well a general could have appointed a subordinate to command the detachment, and 
that Apollodorus is giving us some explicit evidence o f a common practice. Whether or not such 
people bore the official title o f  nauarchos, this would certainly be an adequate description of their 
role. It might be hypothesised that a nauarchos elected or appointed at Athens would have, like 
other military officials, a set term o f office, whereas those subordinates selected by generals 
would have command only for the duration o f  their designated mission; however we must bear in 
mind Develin’s verdict above on such positions, and openly admit our ignorance of details in 
these cases.
There is a concrete, and indeed notorious, example o f a non-general being appointed to the 
command o f a fleet for which there is a little more detailed evidence. It is perhaps surprising that 
Antiochus is not listed as a potential nauarchos by Jordan, nor considered as such by Develin,688 
but his appointment to a naval command by Alcibiades in 407/6 BC merits some discussion in 
this context. The story is recorded by Xenophon:
Alkibiades de akousas Thrasuboulon exo Hellespontou hekonta teichizein Phokaian 
diepleuse pros auton, katalipdn epi tais nausin Antiochon ton hautou kuberneten, 
episteilas me epiplein epi tas Lusandrou naus. ho de Antiochos tei te hautou nei
683 The exclusion o f naval officials and commanders from [Aristotle]’s discussion o f  military commanders is 
interesting in the light o f discussions in Part Three, section 1, where I argue that the navy was seen as more o f a job 
than a military duty. However, these gaps in [Aristotle] are more indicative o f  his weaknesses as a researcher than the 
relative ideological positions o f the fleet and the army.
684 The enthusiastic and expensive trierarchy o f  Apollodorus, and his legal attempt to recoup some o f the expenses 
incurred from his successor Polycles, is the subject o f  the speech usually referred to as [Demosthenes] 50. Though the 
situation cannot be described as ‘normal’ and is told from the perspective o f  the captain, it remains the best and most 
vivid case study o f a year, five months and six days in the life o f  the Athenian navy.
685 [Demosthenes], 50.53; 50.46ff.
686 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 125. Develin {Athenian Officials, p.268) describes both Lykinos and Kallippos as “Ship 
commanders”
687 [Demosthenes] 50.46
688 Jordan does not mention Antiochus in this context at all, and Develin {Athenian Officials, p. 6, cf. p. 175) lists him 
under “kybernates'”. As this was a position on board every trireme, this labelling would be misleading were it not for 
Develin’s careful note explaining that this singular example is only included because the man in question “was given a 
special charge”.
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kai allei ek Notiou eis ton limena ton Ephesion eispleusas par' autas tas prdiras ton 
Lusandrou neon pareplei.
Alcibiades, meanwhile, had heard that Thrasybulus had sailed out from the 
Hellespont and was organising a blockade of Phocaea from the land. He sailed 
across to see him and left his own pilot [kubernetes] Antiochus with the ships, with 
orders not to bring about an engagement with Lysander’s ships. But Antiochus 
with his own ship and one other and put out from Notium into the harbour of 
Ephesus, and then went sailing along right past the prows o f Lysander’s fleet.689
Like with the examples from Timomachus’ command, we see here a strategos splitting up his 
fleet and giving an appointed subordinate command over one portion of it; in this case the 
subordinate Antiochus was given the largest contingent, while Alcibiades presumably took only a 
single, or possible a few, vessels with him for another round o f desperate diplomacy. The 
appointing o f  a member o f the nautikos ochlos to this position is also significant;690 it suggests 
that other generals may have chosen to promote naval professionals to the command of 
detachments in this way, presuming they knew them to be reliable and dependable people.691 The 
parallels are striking, but it is difficult indeed to convincingly extrapolate standard practice from 
any given action o f Alcibiades. Xenophon’s reporting o f this incident may have been because it 
was unusual, but even if this is so it is not clear exactly which component (the appointment itself; 
the status o f the man appointed; the disastrous results o f the appointment; Alcibiades’ leaving the 
main fleet; the whole sorry affair) he was drawing attention to. It is worth noting that Thucydides 
records Alcibiades delegating an unnamed man to what looks like a regional command of the 
island o f Cos in 410 BC, a post that would probably have involve the command o f a few ships.692 
This incident, involving Alcibiades when he was an exile from Athens and the apparent 
commander-in-chief o f the Samos fleet, unfortunately does not help to determine whether such 
appointments accorded with the usual Athenian practice.
To conclude, this discussion has shown that there was a structure, probably quite ad hoc, o f naval 
command below the level o f generals and above the level o f  trierarchs. Despite quite a spread of 
testimony in both literature and epigraphy, there is little more than this that can be said with any 
degree of certainty, though it seems that both the Athenians at home and generals in the field 
could designate non -strategoi to the command o f individual vessels and fleets for specific 
purposes. It is notable that some o f the possible nauarchoi are known to have been elected 
strategoi at other times.
689 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.11-12
690 The story recorded by Plutarch (see next note) shows Antiochus was a citizen, and the fact he was a kubernetes, 
probably the most important position aboard a trireme after the captain, demonstrates in itself that he was a 
professional; thus under the definition given above, Antiochus was a member o f  the ‘“naval mob”’.
691 Plutarch {Alcibiades, 10) records a story that “Antiochus the pilot” rescued an escaped quail belonging to Alcibiades 
during an Assembly meeting, suggesting a personal connection prior to the events at Notium.
692 Thucydides, 8.108
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Other Magistracies and Political Bodies
Athenian democracy was characterized by a bewildering variety o f magistracies, or more 
correctly magisterial boards, which carried out the orders o f the Assembly and reported any 
relevant matters (and their own budgets) before the people. Nearly all of the these magistracies 
were selected under democratic, rather than oligarchic, principles; in other words, rather than 
holding elections to find the best man for the job, the Athenians selected their officials randomly 
from those who put themselves forward, the Lot paying no attention to birth, wealth, intelligence, 
honesty, nor any vice or virtue. The vast majority of such posts were held for one year only, and 
many o f them (particularly the more senior archonships) could be held only once in a lifetime. 
Most magisterial boards were both specific in their remit and limited in their powers. With 
regard to the navy, the single most important administrative institution was the boule, or 
Council.693
Rhodes argues that the role o f the boule was to “ensure that all the necessary equipment, both 
human and inanimate, was available for fighting a war.”694 Its principal duty was seeing to the 
construction o f new ships, as decided by the Assembly. The boule had a direct supervisory role 
over the various boards o f magistrates connected with the navy; some o f these boards were sub­
committees o f the boule itself, their members picked from amongst the 500 councillors. Others 
were selected, probably by Lot, from the citizen population as a whole. The most notable of 
these boards were there Curators o f the Dockyards,695 who were responsible for overseeing 
Athens’ ships and naval equipment, and their records from the middle quarters o f the fourth 
century provide a wealth o f  technical and administrative detail.
For the purposes o f this investigation into the extent that the “naval mob” wielded power within 
the democracy, there is not much evidence to be found amongst these boards. As Sinclair has 
argued:
A serious aspirant to the leadership o f Athens would seek rather to become a 
strategos or establish a reputation as a rhetor in the Assembly and the law courts.696
The use o f the Lot to select the boule and the majority o f the officials, the limited tenure and 
remit o f most boards and their collegic nature; these factors made the naval administration 
unlikely places to foster political power and certainly not long-term dominance o f the democracy. 
About the most we can conjecture is that a member o f the “naval mob” who wished to make a 
year long contribution to the administration o f their city might well have put their names forward 
for magistracies that related to their profession. Jordan sees expert volunteers in the fact that 
about half o f the known Curators o f the Dockyards came from coastal demes; “men familiar with
693 [Aristotle], Athenian Constitution, 43-9, esp. 46; Jordan, Athenian Navy, pp. 24-30; Rhodes, Athenian Boule, p. 
113-122.
694 Rhodes, Athenian Boule, p. 114
695 Jordan, Athenian Navy, pp. 30-46
696 Sinclair, Democracy and Participation, p. 193
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matters o f the sea who chose to stand for specialized office”.697 This is a likely speculation, but 
the evidence is hardly solid.
6. Conclusions: a naval democracy?
There is very little evidence that substantiates the idea that the “naval mob” made a significant 
direct contribution to politics in Athens, still less that these men were politically dominant. The 
evidence for the “naval mob”’s indirect influence on politics is more ambiguous, suggesting that 
the trireme crews were not shown any favour and were even somewhat neglected; but the fact 
that charge o f wronging the “great yo-ho” could be levelled effectively at political opponents and 
guaranteed to stir up the Assembly does suggest at least a minimum level o f concern for the 
sailors. Nevertheless, the idea o f political dominance, or even significant participation of the 
“naval mob” appears to be something of an illusion. Indeed, we have seen that the idea o f any 
given interest group being able to control politics to any serious extent is extremely unlikely. 
The balance between rich and poor in the Assembly meant that even these largest o f class groups 
could not (or at least did not) dominate the other to any significant extent; sub-groups amongst 
these broad classes, which is what the ‘“naval mob”’ can be considered, can therefore have had 
little effect on Assembly decisions. The dynamics o f factional politics, where a leader could rally 
support for his policies and proposals from a large network o f contacts and clients, and call in 
personal obligations and friendships, cut across these class divides, splitting them up amongst 
competing politicians; the members o f “naval mob” did not vote as a block, but in support of the 
leader to whom he had ties o f  mutual benefit. The democratic system required and encouraged 
active participation from a vast array o f citizens; in these circumstances it is perhaps unsurprising 
that a group often away from Athens, although several thousands strong, could not dominate the 
Athenian Assembly. It appears that, except in the broadest terms, proposals were not passed by 
politicians motivating an economic class or professional group to back them, but they instead 
called upon on the direct support o f a more disparate cross-section o f citizens from a personal 
network, and relying on oratorical persuasion to carry the rest.
We are left with the conclusion that, if the “naval mob” did not form an active and significant 
group in political contexts, then perhaps it can said that crewing triremes gave Athenian citizens 
political awareness and confidence on the level o f the individual. And this may well have been 
the case; a man who served on board ship for long periods o f time, perhaps rising through the 
ranks to become a member o f the hyperesia, who engaged regularly with his social superiors in 
debates and deals regarding pay, who formed bonds with comrades on board from all across the 
Aegean, who wintered in foreign ports and encountered danger on the seas cannot have been 
unaffected by these experiences; they may well have had an impact on a man, which manifested 
itself politically. But then again, a man who never stepped on board a trireme in his life might
697 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 31
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gain confidence in deme assemblies and the agora, competing in festivals, managing his land and 
the participation in local community life. On an individual level, the influence and effects of one 
particular experience, in this case working in Athens’ navy, are indistinguishable. The somewhat 
frustrating conclusion is the same one that Amit drew; “if we look for evidence showing direct 
influence o f  the nautikos ochlos on the conduct o f affairs in particular cases, the result is 
disappointing.”698 It may be simply that our evidence is not sufficient for the task of detecting the 
presence o f the “naval mob”, but a far better conclusion is that, as a group, the “naval mob” were 
of very limited political significance. The greatest and most striking exception comes in 411 BC, 
with the political turmoil in Athens and, more importantly in terms o f this study, the related 
events on the island o f  Samos.
698 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 63
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B: The Samos Fleet Democracy of 411 BC
1: Political Turmoil at Samos
It seems to be the case that, in terms o f the day-to-day operation of the Athenian democratic 
system, the input o f members o f the “naval mob” was o f negligible importance. However, the 
sources are clearer on the active role o f the nautikos ochlos during the oligarchic coup in Athens 
in 411/0 BC. Naval crews (most notably the men of the trireme Paralos) played a key role in 
resisting the oligarchy and in setting up their own democratic system on Samos in order to 
continue the war; good evidence, it seems, for the links espoused in modem writing between the 
“naval mob” and the democracy. A casual reading o f the sources indicates naval opposition to 
oligarchy manifesting itself in Samos, and destroying the oligarchic counter-revolution there 
before pledging opposition to the 400 in Athens. The oligarchic coup o f the 400 is well served 
by good discussions in modem scholarship. But it seems that one o f the most significant events 
o f this period, the breaking away from Athens o f the fleet, is an issue which receives 
comparatively short shrift in much o f the writing about these revolutions. Strauss calls this the 
most dramatic manifestation o f solidarity amongst the rowers, and is right to emphasise the 
importance o f  the steps taken here.699 However, the participation o f the naval crews in this 
manifestation o f democracy may have other explanations than their attachment to this particular 
political system, and the nature and participants in the politics at Samos need to be examined 
carefully; it may be wrong to view these events simply in terms o f an ideological conflict 
between the democratic fleet and the oligarchic city o f Athens.
The scholarship on this unique and turbulent year focuses primarily on the parallel accounts of 
Thucydides and [Aristotle]’s Constitution o f  Athens regarding events in Athens. As this is one of 
the only periods for which we have a substantial and largely independent narrative which can be 
compared and contrasted with Thucydides’ account, such a focus is wholly understandable. 
However, the effects o f this is to concentrate primarily on the minutiae o f events in Athens itself; 
the establishing o f the oligarchic conspiracy amid an atmosphere o f fear and violence, the 
meeting at Kolonos where the ekklesia voted in the oligarchy o f  400, the discussions (if reported 
genuinely in the Constitution o f  Athens) o f the future constitutional arrangements and the 
composition o f the 5000, and the factions within the oligarchs and the ousting o f the 400 in 
favour of the 5000. By comparison, there is very little detailed examination o f what the fleet at 
Samos was doing politically throughout this time, and how it was organizing its affairs. This is a 
significant omission, and an analysis o f the naval democracy at Samos will form the bulk o f this 
section. Firstly, I will look briefly at the origins o f the oligarchic conspiracy, which began 
amongst the fleet before spreading to Athens, and the effect o f the fleet on events in the city (and
699 Strauss, ‘School o f Democracy’, p. 317
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vice versa). I will then turn to the fleet democracy itself, looking at its origins and purpose, its 
franchise and form, and finally its actions and activities.
A very brief outline o f the basic sequence o f events may be helpful at this point. Having heard 
rumours o f the abuses o f the oligarchy of the 400 that took over in Athens in the summer of 411 
BC, the Samos fleet constituted itself as an independent democracy. This democracy elected its 
own leaders and held four (recorded) assemblies, and continuing to fight the war against the 
Peloponnesians and engage in bitter diplomacy with the oligarchs at Athens. The fleet 
democracy recalled the exiled Athenian general Alcibiades, and under his leadership the war 
effort progressed and increasingly co-operative negotiations between the city and the fleet 
continued apace. In 407 BC, the fleet returned to Athens, its existence as an independent 
democracy over. Though the life o f this fleet democracy was brief, it is not without interest and 
significance. Not only is it the best and most solid evidence for political activity undertaken by 
the “naval mob”, but the democracy that was formed at this time had a uniquely multi-national 
character.
Decisions at Athens
Thucydides is emphatic about where the oligarchic movement that led to the establishment o f the 
400 began; “The agitation began on the expedition [on Samos], and from there spread later to the 
city.”700 Leading men in the expedition, including the wealthy trierarchs, were sounded out about 
a radical proposal by Alcibiades; abandon the democracy and recall him, and so befriend the 
Persian satrap Tissaphemes and have him bankroll their victory. From the trierarchs and other 
leading men, the idea was spread to the rest o f the expedition:
es te ten Samon elthontes xunistasan te ton anthropon tous epitedeious es 
xundmosian kai es tous pollous phaneros elegon hoti basileus sphisi philos esoito 
kai chremata parexoi Alkibiadou te katelthontos kai me demokratoumenon
Upon their return to Samos they formed their partisans into a conspiracy, and 
openly told the many that the King would be their friend, and would provide them 
with money, if Alcibiades were restored, and the democracy abolished.701
It is significant that the fleet as a whole agreed to this proposal, albeit reluctantly; the decisive 
factor was the prospect of receiving pay from the Great King o f Persia. The agreement having 
been made, there followed a complex series o f intrigues. Phrynychus, who had spoken out 
unsuccessfully against Alcibiades’ plan, attempted to neutralise his opponent by alerting the 
Spartan admiral to Alcibiades’ movements. But by this time envoys from the conspirators had 
already been sent to Athens, and events leading to the oligarchy were already in motion there. 
What is notable in this episode is the political role o f the members o f the expedition; here, as in 
other places in Thucydides’ narrative, we see a dialogue between the leaders (usually the
700 Thucydides, 8.48
701 Thucydides, 8.48.
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generals) and the led.702 But here it is taken a stage further, setting an important precedent for 
what followed; on this occasion the camp was consulted on policy, and its decision (to reluctantly 
acquiesce to the proposal) affected the subsequent political outcome. Apparently unable to count 
on any wide support, Phrynichus’ opposition to the plan was based not on trying to rally like- 
minded men amongst the camp, but on intrigues with the enemy.
The contribution made to the Assemblies in Athens by naval crews at this time need not detain us 
long; the large number o f ships launched in 412 BC, as well as the losses at Sicily, would have 
had the result that very few o f “naval mob” would have been in the city. The conclusion that the 
poorer citizens in general and the “naval mob” in particular were under-represented in Athens at 
that the time o f the oligarchic ploy seems valid. This is one o f the explanations o f the 
effectiveness o f the campaign o f terror and the wave o f political murders in quelling potential 
opposition; in a more thinly populated city, it is easy to see how the perception that the coup was 
more widespread than it actually was could have taken hold. As well as this, the stratagem (for 
want o f a better term) o f holding the crucial meeting outside the city walls at Kolonos may well 
have discouraged those without arms from attending.703 While this could surely have decreased 
still further the potential representation o f the unarmed “naval mob”, we should not perhaps place 
a great deal o f emphasis on this interpretation, ff  the Assembly included armed men in great 
numbers, an unarmed individual might feel that he was protected sufficiently by their presence so 
as not need weapons himself. Even so, it must be the case that the “naval mob” could have had 
no direct say in the Assembly debates concerning the negotiations with the Persians and the 
establishment and running o f the oligarchic regimes, nor the subsequent disbanding of the 
oligarchy and democracy’s restoration; there were simply not enough of the “naval mob” in 
Athens to have had any significant effect, and, as will be discussed later, the fleet on three 
separate occasions declined to involve itself directly in affairs at Athens during this year.
Participation in the Democracy at Samos
On the course o f events at Samos, we have to rely almost solely on information from Thucydides. 
But here we run into the problem that his account breaks o ff half way through the year 411/0 BC, 
while the fleet was still acting independently o f the city. His successors, Xenophon and 
Diodorus, give us few details o f the political activities o f the fleet, and their narratives of even the 
military campaigns are often patchy, conflicting, or simply inadequate.
Several questions present themselves regarding the political arrangements o f the fleet. While 
Thucydides is quite clear in stating that the fleet organized itself democratically,704 he seems to
702 See for example Phormio responding to the worries o f  his crews when outnumbered near Naupactos in 429 BC 
(Thucydides, 2.88), and Nicias addressing the invaders o f  Sicily in their peril in 413 BC (Thucydides, 7.61)
703 Thucydides, 8.67. HCT  ad loc 8.67 makes reference to this interpretation, though rightly urges caution from whole­
heartedly accepting it.
704 Thucydides, 8.75; refers to democracy being the rule at Samos; this must apply to the fleet, as democracy was 
already established amongst the Samians.
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have thought his readers needed no more information than that. But who was entitled to 
participate in this new democracy? Would participation have extended only to those who 
enjoyed citizen rights in Athens? This is possible, and has indeed been the tacit assumption of 
modem scholars. There is some justification for the assumption; Thucydides speaks of the 
Argive ambassadors coming over in the Paralos to aid the “Athenian demos on Samos”,705 and it 
is certainly the case that the leaders whom the fleet elected were Athenians, and many of the 
concerns in Thucydides’ reports o f the fleet’s meetings were especially pertinent to Athenians. 
Strauss shows this assumption in his discussion. For him, the events o f 411 BC represent the 
Athenian sailor at his most politically assertive.706 His argument is that service in the fleet had a 
unifying effect on the Athenian citizen rowers and hyperesia, resulting in the confidence in the 
poorer citizens to be politically assertive; but could the solidarity and group identity he speaks of 
in fact belong to others as well? The principal difficulty with Strauss’ argument is the fact 
(which he recognizes) that the trireme crews were composed o f a wide range o f social groups. 
Strauss is forced to argue therefore that the ‘school o f democracy’ that was the trireme only 
taught lessons to those onboard (almost certainly a minority in most fleets) who happened to be 
Athenian citizens, and not those slaves, metics and xenoi who rowed alongside them as part o f  
the same team. In the city o f Athens itself these social lines were, though permeable, perfectly 
visible and tangible. On campaign, however, things may well have been different. As we have 
seen, non-Athenians, even slaves, could be members o f the hyperesia, giving orders to those 
who, at Athens, would have been considered their social superiors. Crewmen were all paid the 
same basic wage, and, as far as we can tell, lived and worked under the same conditions.707
Before 411 BC, Thucydides reports a number of ‘camp assemblies’ called by generals in 
response to pressure from the ranks. We should not believe that it was only Athenian citizens 
who took part in these meetings; indeed, both common sense and our most detailed example of  
such a meeting would suggest that they were general gatherings o f the whole force. In 413 BC, 
when Nicias was addressing the remains o f the force that invaded Sicily, he explicitly addressed 
Athenian citizens, their allies, and metics.708 So when in 411 BC a camp Assembly outgrew itself 
and became an independent democracy, could the Athenians have been willing or able to exclude 
those who had previously been able to attend? We are perhaps not entitled to assume, as a matter 
of course, that a new, revolutionary, and forcibly independent fleet would draw distinctions 
between its members along the same lines as the Athenian democracy had.
Of course, there is no conclusive reason to assume that the Athenians wouldn’t stick to such tried, 
tested and habitual political distinctions, and the burden o f proof must surely rest with those
705 Thucydides, 8.86
706 Strauss, ‘School o f democracy’, pp. 316-9
707 Some slaves rowed alongside their owners, and it is unlikely that these individuals would have been allowed to feel 
like equals.
708 Thucydides, 7.60 (“Soldiers o f  the Athenians and their allies”), 7.63 (“you, though not really Athenians... have been 
considered as Athenians”), 7.64 (“As for the Athenians amongst you”).
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seeking to demonstrate that something radically different was happening on Samos at this time. 
Here there are problems; neither Thucydides, nor any other source, talks specifically o f the 
enfranchisement o f non-Athenians,709 though it should be pointed out that no details are given as 
to who exactly could and could not speak in the fleets assemblies, and who (apart from the two 
mentioned, Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus) took over as trierarchs and generals. No source says that 
in 411 BC all those who rowed in the fleet and participated in the expedition, regardless of their 
previous status in Athens, and participated equally in a new democracy. If this had been the case, 
then its singular and momentous importance would surely have been noticed and noted by 
someone. But by whom? Thucydides’ narrative, which concentrates primarily on the military 
and diplomatic developments at this time, does not seem much interested in the specifics of 
constitutional reform, either at Athens or elsewhere.710 His narrative o f the year 407 BC, when 
the fleet and its leaders were finally reconciled with the democracy at home, may well have made 
the arrangements clear, as might his treatment o f the prosecution of the Ionian war under 
Alcibiades’ overall leadership from 411 BC; however, his narrative abruptly breaks off leaving 
the oligarchy o f the 5,000 in command at Athens and Alcibiades only recently voted into control 
of the fleet. His work, though admirable in comparison with most ancient literary evidence, is 
not free from significant omission.711 In the most unfinished section of this unfinished work, it 
might be expected that such discussions were to be added after the framework of events was fully 
in place, and their absence should not surprise.712 It is Xenophon and Diodorus who give us our 
narrative information after this point, and denying an event because neither of these writers 
manages to report it is an even more dangerous a technique with them than it is with 
Thucydides.713 We have no surviving works from Aristophanes after the point when the fleet 
broke away from the city714 until Frogs o f 405 BC, when priorities other than the political 
machinations o f the (then reconciled) fleet had come to the fore. More striking perhaps is the 
lack of mention of this dangerous and populist development in political writings of the fourth 
century BC by authors such as Isocrates and Plato.
709 But see discussion below on Thucydides 8.75 and the position o f  the Samians.
710 It is in this respect that his account contrasts sharply in tone with that o f the Aristotelian Athenian Constitution, 
which contains several documents supposedly written in this period, and many more details o f constitutional and 
institutional matters than Thucydides cared to include.
711 The tribute reassessment in 424 BC and (more debatably) the Peace o f  Kallias o f 450 BC and are perhaps the most 
documented and noteworthy o f these omissions.
712 It is an oft-noted fact that Book 8 does not contain any full speeches, a feature it shares only with book 5. It is likely 
that the reported speech o f the first Assembly, to be discussed in detail below, could have been worked up into a lull 
speech had Thucydides completed his work. If so, it may have (like N icias’ speech on Sicily) made the status of the 
listeners clear.
713 Thucydides’ failure to mention important things, such as the Peace o f  Kallias, should not overly damage our trust in 
the fact that he does choose report, but nor should his silences be used to counter positive evidence.
714 Two Aristophanes plays survive from the year 412/1 BC; on the most likely reconstruction (there is vast 
scholarship on this; see the introductions to Sommerstein’s translations for succinct statements o f the position and 
references) Lysistrata in the Lenaea festival early in 411 BC, and the Thesmophoriazusae at the City Dionysia, a 
couple o f months later in the spring o f 411. The contribution o f these plays to our understanding o f the events and 
chronology o f the political turmoil in Athens is both interesting and complicated, but will not be detailed here; suffice 
to say that neither play illuminates the state o f affairs at Samos at all, and on any chronology both were written before 
the uprising in the fleet.
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While an argument from the silence of most of our sources should not be pressed given the 
fragmented state o f ancient testimony, we must certainly seek positive affirmation of such a 
radical idea. But before turning to individual passages, the context, which is of primary 
importance, must be considered. Whether or not we characterise the Athenians as jealous 
guardians o f their citizenship and its privileges, it is certainly the case that the final quarter of the 
5th century saw considerable mass enfranchisement and loosening of the rules.715 Famously, the 
younger Pericles was enrolled as a citizen, despite his father’s own law that sons not bom of two 
astoi parents should not be citizens.716 While Pericles was o f course a prominent statesman and a 
special case, the fact that the restored democracy o f 403 BC had to specifically reinstate the law, 
but not apply it retrospectively, suggests that it was quite commonly ignored or circumvented 
before this time. During the war, Athens contemplated several mass grants of citizenship; to the 
slaves (and metics, if  there were any?) who agreed to row in the fleet that fought at Arginusae 
and later at Aigospotamoi, and to the Samians after the democracy was restored. Plataeans 
enjoyed citizenship rights in Athens following the first ‘destruction’ of their city in 421 BC.717 
The extension o f citizenship to large groups was acceptable practice in exceptional 
circumstances, and those o f 411 BC would certainly count as ‘exceptional’, even by turbulent 
Greek standards.
There were two major groups on Samos in 411 BC, along with the Athenian “‘naval mob’” and 
soldiers, who could have been considered eligible for participation in the new democracy: firstly, 
the Samians themselves; and secondly the non-Athenian members (xenoi, metics, slaves) of the 
naval crews, likely to have been a significant proportion o f the total number. For both these 
groups there is some evidence, albeit slight, that they participated in the new democracy.
The Samians
The first group about whom there may be some shred o f evidence to suggest their participation in 
the democracy at Samos is the Samians themselves. The relationship between the fleet and the 
Samians was incredibly close in this period. Only a little prior to the break-away of the fleet, 
some of the Athenians had fought with the Samians to preserve their democracy from the 
counter-insurgency started up by Pisander. Amongst those Athenians taking part were 
Thrasybulus, Thrasyllus, Leon, Diomedon and the crew o f the Paralos. Following the quelling 
of the coup, the Paralos left Samos to report to Athens the developments. It is another 
significant setting o f precedent that the decision to send the ship was taken jointly by both the 
“Samians and the stratiotaF ,718 Not realizing that the 400 were in power in Athens by this time, 
some of the Paralos crew were arrested, and the rest sent round Euboea in a troop-transport. One
715 The duties pertaining to citizenship (paying taxes, serving as a hoplite, performing liturgies) were given out pretty 
freely to appropriately rich metics.
716 The citizenship law o f 451 BC is discussed above, Part Two, section A.3
717 Aristophanes, Frogs, 694; Thucydides, 3.55.3. They perhaps had the rights to citizenship prior to this; see 
Homblower, Commentary, ad loc. 3.55.3
718 Thucydides, 8.74. The meaning o f the term stratiotai will be discussed in the following section. The Loeb 
translation o f “Athenian soldiers” is inaccurate in both its terms.
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man, Chaereas, escaped and returned to Samos with exaggerated tales o f oligarchic tyranny and 
depredation.719
The fleet at Samos was on the point o f returning to Athens and killing the oligarchs, but was 
persuaded by Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus to stay in Samos and to establish itself as a democracy:
meta de touto lampros ede es demokratian boulomenoi metastesai ta en tei Samdi 
ho te Thrasuboulos ho tou Lukou kai Thrasulos houtoi gar malista proeistekesan 
tes metaboles horkosan pantas tous stratiotas tous megistous horkous, kai autous 
tous ek tes oligarchias malista, e men demokratesesthai te kai homonoesein kai ton 
pros Peloponnesious polemon prothumos dioisein kai tois tetrakosiois polemioi te 
esesthai kai ouden epikerukeusesthai. xunomnusan de kai Samion pantes ton auton 
horkon hoi en tei helikiai, kai ta pragmata panta kai ta apobesomena ek ton 
kindunon xunekoindsanto hoi stratiotai tois Samiois, nomizontes oute ekeinois 
apostrophen sdterias oute sphisin einai, all', ean te hoi tetrakosioi kratesosin ean te 
hoi ek M iletoupolemioi, diaphtharesesthai.
After this Thrasybulus, son o f  Lykos and Thrasyllus, the chief activists in the 
revolution, made plain their desire to set up a democracy. They made everyone on 
the campaign, especially those connected to the oligarchy, swear the most binding 
and solemn oaths to maintain the democracy and live in harmony, to continue 
zealously the war against the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies o f the 400 and not 
treat with them. All the Samians o f military age swore the same oath along with 
them, and the campaigners made co-operated with the Samians in all affairs and
• 720were ready to share with them whatever ensued from the risks they were running.
Thucydides describes Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus speaking in favour o f setting up a democracy 
at Samos and the swearing o f the oaths in one breath. It seems clear that the one was brought 
about by the other; that it was those willing to swear the oaths were to be the ones to participate 
in this new democracy. By making these oaths as solemn and as binding as possible, it seems 
that Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus sought to ritualize the beginning o f their new democracy. As 
well as this, on a more mundane level, they also bound the whole fleet to their particular policy 
agenda; enmity to the 400 and war with the Peloponnesians. These provisions can be described, 
very broadly, the manifesto o f the Samos democracy.
What is most interesting about this episode is that the Samians o f military age swore these oaths 
too, on equal terms with the fleet. To which democracy were the Samians swearing fealty? 
Perhaps their own, just recently preserved from the oligarchic threat? But the loyalty of most of 
the Samians to their own democracy was surely not in question; following the successful counter­
revolution and the lenient settlements provided for the oligarchs, a peaceful settlement had 
already been made. The oligarchic ringleaders were either killed or in exile, and the rest had been 
incorporated equally and successfully into the Samian democracy.721 It seems clear that the 
Samians were swearing the same oaths, concerning the same democracy, as the fleet. Their
719 This narrative o f  events derives from Thucydides, 8.73-4.
720 Thucydides, 8.75.2-3
721 Thucydides (8.73) describes the settlement in positive terms, suggesting peace amongst the Samians.
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position towards the fleet, and its new ‘constitution’, was the pressing concern. After stating that 
the Samians o f military age swore these oaths equally with the members o f the expedition, 
Thucydides places great emphasis on the ‘togetherness’ o f the Samians on the one hand and the 
fleet on the other, their common interests and dangers. These common goals and common oaths, 
and the fact that the expedition “co-operated with the Samians in all affairs”,722 surely attests to 
their direct involvement in the political events on Samos that followed.723
In 405 BC, after the fleet and Athens had been reconciled, a decree was passed in Athens 
granting the Samians citizenship at Athens.724 Several passages in the decree refer back to 
previous arrangements between Samos and Athens, now re-confirmed following the 
reconciliation. There is reference to a grant o f autonomy, which was originally given to the 
Samians in 412 BC.725
tois de nomois chresthai tois spheterois auton autonomos ontas, kai talla poien 
kata tos horkos kai tas sunthekas kathaper xunkeitai Athenaiois kai Samiois
They shall use their own laws and be autonomous, and they shall act in all other 
respects in accordance with the oaths and treaties just as agreed by Athenians and 
Samians.726
The reference to previous oaths and agreements between Athenians and Samians, followed by 
provisions for common action in political and military matters, seems to have much in common 
with the arrangements and joint activities between the fleet and the Samians in 411 BC described 
above:
[e]an de ti anagkaiog gignetai dia ton polemon kai proteron peri tes poli[t]eias, 
hosper autoi legos in hoi preshes, pros ta paronta holeuomenos poien [he]i an 
dokei beltiston enai. Peri de tes erenes, eag gignetai, enai kata tauta [kjathaper 
Athenaioism kai tois nun oikosiv Samon. Ean de polemen deei, 
parask[e]uazesthai autos hos an dunontai arista prattontas meta ton strategon. 
[ea]n de presbeian po i pemposin Athenaioi, sumpempen kai to ezamo parontas, 
[ea]n tina bolontai, kai sunboleuen ho ti an exosin agathon.
And if any emergency arises because o f the war even earlier as regards the 
constitution, just as the envoys say themselves, they shall deliberate in the light of  
present conditions and act in whatever manner it seems to them to be best. As to 
the peace, if  it comes, the same terms shall apply for the Athenians and also for 
those who inhabit Samos. If it is necessary to wage war, preparations shall be 
made by them as best the can, acting with the generals. If the Athenians send an 
embassy anywhere, those present from Samos shall jointly with them send any 
envoy they wish, and they shall offer whatever good advice they possess.727
722 Thucydides, 8.75
723 It is worth noting that it is the members o f  the expedition, toi stratiotai, with whom the Samians swear the oaths; 
“Athenians” as a group are not mentioned at all in this or the following section.
724 IG I3 127=Fomara 166=ML 94.
725 Thucydides, 8.21
726 Fomara, 166,11. 15-18
727 Fomara, 166,1. 18-25
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Could the arrangements for the “Samians to be Athenians” be confirming the de facto  situation of 
411 BC too?728 Granting the Samians citizenship had not been decided in the Athenian Assembly 
itself before, and such a grant, even if  promised previously by the fleet, would not have been a 
simple confirmation.729 If the Athenians, following the reconciliation with the fleet in 407 BC, 
were dragging their feet on the issue o f Samian citizenship, the events o f 406 BC would have 
thrown the question into sharp relief; at this time the Athenians granted citizenship to all who 
joined the Arginusae fleet, and this was still clearly a live political issue in 405 BC (as 
demonstrated by Frogs, produced in that year). This would provide a good context for the 
arguments regarding the citizenship o f Samians to be addressed. Given the later treatment of the 
Samians by the restored democracy (this decree o f thanksgiving and a grant of citizenship after 
the fleet and city o f Athens were reconciled; and the extension o f the franchise again to the 
islanders in the restored democracy o f 403 BC written on the same stele)730, we should not shrink 
from the possibility that they were equals to the Athenians in 411 BC too.
The Crews of the Samos Fleet
The question as to whether the non-Athenian free men amongst the fleet in 411 BC participated 
in the new democracy is perhaps less certain than that o f the Samians. As was argued above, it 
was by no means only Athenians that attended assemblies o f  troops and sailors on campaign, and 
thus we should not dismiss out o f hand the idea that the non-Athenian citizens participated in the 
democracy o f the Samos fleet. There is little in the way o f direct evidence, and the question turns 
on who Thucydides is talking about when he uses the word stratiotai.
Stratiotai is most commonly rendered ‘soldiers’ in translation. This translation is appropriate in 
many contexts, but just as strategoi commanded land and sea forces, this and other strat- terms 
should not be understood in the narrow context o f land warfare. The case in 411 BC is 
instructive, as the Athenian force at Samos is described often as to stratopedon despite the fact 
that it was primarily a naval force.731 Clearly the translation ‘army camp’ is inappropriate here; 
the Greek term admits of, indeed demands in this context, a broader meaning. An unsuspecting 
reader could assume that the democracy at Samos was a hoplite-based franchise like that which 
the 400 in Athens purported to be. ‘Force’ or ‘expedition’, and ‘those on the 
expedition/campaign’ are more accurate, though more awkward, renderings of stratopedon and 
stratiotai, and ones which have the benefit (like the Greek term) o f  including both land and sea 
forces, and necessarily excluding neither. As Amit says, “Thucydides uses the word stratiotes
728 It will be argued later in this chapter that the Samos fleet Assembly was not the Athenian Assembly in exile, as it 
has been conceived in modem writing. Even if  they were on equal terms with the Samos fleet in the 411 BC 
Assembly, they would not thus have been Athenians. After the restoration o f the fleet to the city, however, to give the 
Samians the equal status that they had in 412 BC would necessitate making them Athenians.
729 cf. [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 40.2, when a promise o f  enfranchisement to those who fought against the 
Thirty was blocked after democracy was restored.
730 IG II2 l=Harding 5=RO 2.
731 e.g. Thucydides, 8.76, and 7.70 discussed below
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for sailor as well as for soldier”.732 What Amit, and indeed all modem scholars, have often failed 
to appreciate is that this word is used also to encompass non-Athenians. In this context, 
therefore, oi stratiotai could have been not simply the Athenians on Samos, but all the free men 
in the Samos fleet.
‘The Samos fleet’ is the name given to the large force o f ships stationed on the island of Samos 
from 412 BC, which broke from Athens’ control in 411 BC, to be reconciled four years later in 
407 BC.733 It is a modem name; the various phrases used by Thucydides to describe it will be 
discussed below. The Samos fleet did not spring fully formed onto that island, but was created 
by the pooling o f  half a dozen or so smaller fleets operating in the Aegean.734 Thus when the 
Samos fleet came together in 412 BC, some o f the ships in it had already been on active service 
for long periods o f time. While it was not the largest fleet in Athenian history, it was certainly 
big. It was also one o f the longest in continuous service; it is probable that some ships and sailors 
were in continuous service from the spring o f 413 BC to the autumn o f 407 BC, six and a half 
years. Only the ultimately disastrous invasion o f Egypt in the 450s BC involved such a big fleet 
being in service for so long. As there is little detailed evidence about this earlier expedition,735 
the Samos fleet is o f singular importance to any study o f the Athenian navy and its crewmen. It 
is unfortunate, then, that we are as much in the dark about the composition o f the crews in the 
Samos fleet as we are about most others. Most o f the fleets which were eventually consolidated 
together at Samos were launched in the aftermath o f the Sicilian defeat. In terms of manpower, 
this disaster was significant, but there is no indication that the Athenians resorted to conscription 
to launch these ships. The fall-out amongst the allies, and the increasing amount of Persian 
money being used to bankroll the nascent but expanding Peloponnesian fleet, would probably 
mean a heavier than usual reliance on Athenian citizens, metics, and their slaves. But it is very 
clear that there was still a market for oarsmen in operation at this time, and the scale o f Athenian 
fleet operations (more fleets launched in 412 BC than in any other year in the classical period) 
surely implies that Athens was still, for the moment, willing and able to hire mercenaries; it was 
at this time that the Athenians broke into the 1,000 talents stashed away at the start o f the war.736 
When the Samos fleet was created in 412 BC, therefore, it probably still boasted a good number 
of mercenaries from the Aegean island cities, in many cases cities whose political status in 
relation to Athens was somewhat changeable in this turbulent period. It is likely that many of  
these sailors would have deserted or defected at this point, and it is probably this which accounts 
for the fact that the Samos fleet’s number o f  active vessels seems to drop, even though it
732 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 44 ff. Kagan, Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 169, talks o f  the political decisions taken 
“by the Athenian democrats on Samos”, cf. p. 173 “the Athenians on Samos putting an end to the divisions among 
them”
733 By this point it is often referred to as the ‘Hellespont fleet’, as the main theatre o f  operations had by then moved 
northwards.
734 Thucydides, 8.30
735 Some scholars have doubted that all o f the 200 ships (later reinforced by 50) remained in Egypt for the 6 years o f  
the invasion and were thus all destroyed. Gomme, HCT, ad loc 1.110.1
736 Thucydides, 8.15, cf. 2.24.
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frequently captured extra ships in battle.737 At its initial congregation, Thucydides reports that 
114 ships were divided amongst the commanders. This number is considerably short of the total 
number o f ships which we might expect. Thucydides’ account up to that point o f the various 
squadrons that ultimately composed the joint fleet indicates that there were around 24 more ships 
operating in the eastern Aegean than were divided up at Samos, as well as an unspecified number 
o f “ships in other areas” that he mentions here for the first time.738 While desertion is a likely 
possibility, there could be various ways to account for the discrepancies in the figures, all beyond 
proof.
In terms o f participating politically at Samos only that portion o f the fleet that was stationed on 
the island would have been able to easily and regularly contribute. While this number varied 
considerably over the period with ships sent all over the eastern Aegean on various missions, it 
seems that at the crucial moment when the fleet broke away from Athens, there were around 80 
ships, up to 16,000 crewmen, at Samos. As well as the sailors, there were some soldiers at 
Samos. Two o f the fleets which composed the Samos fleet carried troops as well as their 
marines;739 if  all o f  these troops remained on Samos (which is very unlikely), there would have 
been at the most 3,000 hoplites on the island, in addition to the Samians’ own forces. But it 
seems that those out in the fleet in this period recognized the legitimacy of the democracy formed 
at Samos in 411 BC, and followed its leaders. The whole ‘Samos fleet’, even those parts of it not 
currently on Samos, seems to have split from Athens and forged its own path.
Hoi stratiotai
As stated above, the phrase hoi stratiotai is a common one on this section of Thucydides’ 
narrative, and o f considerable significance in the discussion o f the political situation of 411 BC. 
Between the separating o f the fleet and the city and the point where Thucydides’ narrative breaks 
off, he gives some details o f four meetings o f the force at Samos.740 Though the phrase “the 
Athenians at Samos” is a common one throughout this section o f the narrative, and the phrase hoi 
en tei Samoi Athenaion stratiotai occurs in the context o f the Samos fleet,741 it is significant that 
whenever the democratic Assembly gathered or made decisions, it is described as hoi stratiotai.
737 The fact that more ships than the initial 74 left at Samos in winter 412/11 BC could be manned the next summer 
(Thucydides, 8.79) is perhaps evidence o f the Samians o f military age joining the stratiotai and contributing to the 
manning o f the ships. This should not be pushed too hard, because the explanation o f  Andrewes (HCT  vol. 5, pp. 28- 
29) that ships detached in winter had rejoined by the summer is also credible.
738 Thucydides, 8.30. Andrews {HCT ad loc 8.30.2) remarks that “the number is by some twenty less than we should 
expect from the data Thucydides has explicitly provided”.
739 Both fleets 121 and 136 carried 1,000 hoplites, and the former carried a large number o f allied hoplites too. Fleet 
119 specifically carried conscripted hoplites amongst its marines, and carried out a large number o f land based 
operations.
740 First meeting (Thucydides, 8.76-7): the fleet broke from Athens, elected new leaders, and came to terms with its 
actions. Second and third meetings (Thucydides, 8.81-82): after several implied but undescribed meetings, the Samos 
fleet in the second described meeting voted to recall Alcibiades. This led immediately to the third meeting, in which 
Alcibiades was also elected as general and “matters are put in his hands”. Soon after this, at the fourth meeting 
(Thucydides, 8.86) the fleet gave a hostile reception to ambassadors from the 400; like in the third meeting, they were 
persuaded by Alcibiades to not attack Athens. These assemblies and the decisions taken are discussed in more detail 
below.
741 Thucydides, 8.47
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We should not, as most scholars seem to, treat these phrases as synonymous. Indeed, Thucydides 
gives us a very clear indication o f whom he means by the phrase hoi stratiotai in the context of a 
public meeting in book 7. At the closing stages o f the disastrous adventure to Sicily, Nicias 
noticed that the morale o f hoi stratiotai was (understandably) flagging, and he sought to remedy 
the situation through persuasive oratory.742 During his speech, he addressed explicitly not only 
Athenian citizens,743 but also the metics744 and the allied troops;745 everyone present on the 
campaign except for the slaves. In other words, all the free people who were to be taking part in 
the coming battle were considered by Nicias (or rather by Thucydides, who no doubt composed 
this speech as something appropriate to say to the disheartened invaders) to be stratiotai, and 
when the word is used in an unqualified way, we should interpret it widely.
Indeed, when Thucydides wishes to single out some group or other from the stratiotai as a whole, 
he can do so. When he talks about oi. . .Athenaion stratiotai at 8.47, he is singling out one 
particular national group, the Athenians, from the rest o f the people on the campaign. It was these 
“Athenian campaigners on Samos” who perceived that Alcibiades was close to Tissaphemes, and 
thus began to plot with a view to restoring him and overthrowing the democracy.746 Other 
phrases used in the context o f the Samos fleet, nautikos ochlos, hoi en tei Samoi Athenaioi, ev tei 
Samo ton Athenaion demo?41 are all singling out groups amongst the stratiotai as a whole. The 
very widest and most inclusive term used by Thucydides is pantes hoi stratiotai,748 It seems at 
first glance that this term is essentially synonymous with the wide interpretation of hoi stratiotai, 
and the adding o f “all” is simply a matter o f emphasis. This is an unsatisfactory solution, but 
fortunately the context o f the one use o f pantes hoi stratiotai provides a far better one. While hoi 
stratiotai is used generally o f the whole fleet, and particularly in its political manifestation, the 
one usage of pantes hoi stratiotai is in connection with the oaths sworn just prior to the first fleet 
Assembly. While there was no ‘national’ division amongst the fleet in regard to attendance at the 
Assembly, it is unlikely that all o f them could participate and decide, no more than all o f the 
demos could have participated in the Athenian Assembly; not through any sort of segregation, but 
just due to the severe logistical limits attendant upon gathering mass meetings. Not all the sailors 
could or would have come. Wherever it was that the Samos fleet’s meetings were held, there 
would surely not be room for the 10,000 or so free men stationed on the island.749 This, a 
minimum figure, is 4,000 more than could fit in the Pnyx at Athens, and too big a number to
742 Thucydides, 7.60.5 Like an earlier example o f such a gathering (Thucydides 2.88), Nicias holds this assembly in 
response to concerns expressed by his troops
743 Thucydides, 7.64.1, tous te Athenaious humon, “the Athenians amongst you”.
744 Thucydides, 7.63.3, hoi teos Athenaioi nomizomenoi, kai me ontes, “those o f  you considered Athenians without 
being so”, surely a reference to the metics.
745 Thucydides, 7.61.1, Andres stratiotai Athenaion te kai ton allon xummachon; “Men o f the campaign, both Athenian 
and their allies”.
746 cf. 8.78, where Thucydides similarly seems to be distinguishing the Spartans from the other groups in their force.
747 Thucydides, 8.72, 8.86.4 and 8.86.8 respectively. It should be noted that while none o f these are synonymous with 
hoi stratiotai, the phrases referring to the Athenians in 8.86 seem to be essentially synonymous with each other.
748 Thucydides, 8.75.2
749 This is a very approximate figure. It assumes the 16,000 trireme crew mentioned earlier, minus 8,000 (half the 
total) for slaves; this would surely be a smaller proportion. Added to this 2,000 troops carried on the ships and eligible 
to attend gives 10,000, without any allowance for the “Samians o f military age”, whom I have argued above were 
eligible to attend as well.
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easily imagine meeting for discussion. So while the Assembly represented all the forces, it did 
not consist o f  all those on the expedition. But in terms of the oaths, Thucydides seems to be 
emphasising that exactly this effort was made to ensure that all the free people present on Samos 
swore the appropriate oaths. There is therefore a subtle but important difference between the 
wide interpretation of hoi stratiotai on the one hand, and pantes hoi stratiotai on the other.
Thucydides choice o f language in relation to the Samos fleet’s activities is thus interesting and 
revealing. As we have seen, he could single out the Athenians, or even groups amongst the 
Athenians, when it was relevant to do so. In isolation his phrasing is not always obvious, but 
when considering the context it is always clear to whom he is referring.750 When referring to the 
ships and fleet movements, Thucydides uses, as he does through the rest o f the narrative, the 
convenient but somewhat misleading rubric “the Athenian fleet.”751 Incautious readers could 
conclude that the people on board such vessels were all Athenian, whereas it is clear from 
Thucydides’ narrative as much as any other source that the crews were mixed. In the context of 
fleet movements, though, the ships even in this period can correctly be considered “Athenian”, 
and references to the fleet under this heading in military contexts does nothing to undermine the 
arguments set out above regarding political terminology. It is clear then that, if it had been just 
the Athenians who engaged in the fleet democracy at Samos, Thucydides could have said so. He 
doesn’t. His language makes it clear, consistently, that it was hoi stratiotai, “those on campaign” 
taken as a whole, who were making the political decisions at Samos from 411 BC.
Citizens Only: The ‘real’ Athenian demos on Samos?
Having declared itself independent o f Athenian control, the fleet constituted itself as a democracy 
and resolved to continue the war against the Peloponnesians in its own way.752 Thucydides, in 
reported speech, records some o f the ways in which the fleet came to terms with what it had done 
in its first Assembly. Amongst the claims the fleet made for itself was the assertion that it was 
the city, not the fleet, that was in fact in revolt, because the city was the minority.
he polis auton aphesteken: tous gar elassous apo sphon ton pleonon kai es panta
porimdterdn methestanai
The city had revolted from them; for it was the smaller turned from them, who
were the larger and better able to provide resources.753
750 For example, the use o f the phrase hoi en te Samo ton Athenaion phrase in 8.63 at first glance looks to be referring 
to all the Athenians on Samos, as other similar phrases do in other places (of. Thucydides 8.47, 8.86), but the context 
makes it clear that he is talking about only those Athenians involved in the plot; it is clearly not all o f the Athenians on 
Samos, as these men pledge their private wealth to secure the oligarchy.
751 Thucydides, 8.78, in the first fleet movement after the split from Athens, the Samos fleet is described as to vautikon 
ton Athenion, “the Athenian fleet”. In the following section, (8.79) Thucydides uses hoi Athenaioi and hoi 
Peloponnesioi to differentiate the two sides. This is o f course inaccurate in terms o f the people on board; though the 
ships themselves, possibly excluding the captures, could correctly be considered “Athenian”.
752 Thucydides, 8.75
753 Thucydides, 8.76.3
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It seems to be this claim, and the subsequent one that the fleet were following “the laws of their 
fathers”,754 that has led to the near-universal and normally unspoken and unquestioned 
assumption in modernity that the new democracy on Samos was one composed of only o f  
Athenian citizens.755 Amit, referencing this passage of Thucydides, goes a stage further when he 
claims that the fleet at Samos “declared themselves [to be] the demos o f Athens”.756 While these 
statements o f Thucydides are indeed the strongest evidence to counter the argument I have 
advanced here, it seems that his report does not go as far as saying that the fleet o f Samos equated 
itself with the Athenian demos.757 According to Thucydides, their legitimacy was not based on 
thinking o f themselves as the ‘true’ Athenian demos, but in thinking of themselves as more 
numerous and better equipped. These remarks are not dealing with objective statements of fact, 
but rather mutual reassurance and self-justifying propaganda. Nowhere is this more clear when 
the Samos Assembly claimed to be (unlike the city), preserving the laws o f their fathers. 
Obviously they were not doing this,758 but the claim to follow the “laws o f their fathers” was a 
common slogan o f  revolutionary groups who made significant changes to the laws; the same 
phrase, and with exactly the same dubious factual accuracy, was made by the oligarchs at Athens 
in 411 BC.759 Similarly then, even if this section is interpreted as the Samos fleet Assembly 
declaring itself to be the demos o f Athens, it does not follow that only those considered citizens 
of Athens attended. Such claims should not be considered too literally, and who would be 
considered part o f the demos could be as flexible as what measures constituted as the “laws of 
their fathers”.
Amit uses the very fact o f this rebellion to support his view that the crews o f Athenian triremes 
were mostly Athenian citizens, posing the rhetorical question “is it possible that mercenaries and 
slaves would revolt for the sake o f the democratic regime at Athens?”760 It is perhaps a little 
unfair to single out Amit here, as he at least raises the issue o f non-Athenian contribution in the 
politics at Samos, even if  it is only to dismiss it.761 But Amit’s assumption, that the non-citizens 
would hardly rebel for the sake o f Athens’ democracy, misses a fundamental point. It overlooks 
the suggestion that the mercenaries, slaves and metics in the fleet could have different and valid 
motives for taking part in this same action; possibilities include loyalty to their comrades, fear for 
their families and property (in the cases o f  slaves and metics living in Athens), general outrage at
754 Thucydides, 8.76.6 tous men hemartekenai tous patrious nomous katalusantas, autoi de soizein
755 Jordan, for example, talks o f  “the decision o f  the Athenians at Samos to depose their generals”; Athenian Navy, p. 
118 (my emphasis).
756 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 44.
757 Though the Argive ambassadors o f 8.86, and perhaps the 400 at Athens, seem to make that assumption, or perhaps 
realize the importance o f  the Athenians amongst the cosmopolitan Assembly.
758 To name two definite examples o f  going against time-honoured Athenian procedure (aside from the issue o f  
enfranchisement discussed in this chapter), the Samos fleet appears to have elected its trierarchs rather than appoint 
them from the rich, and extended its college o f generals to allow Alcibiades to have command.
759 [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 29.3 and 31.1.
760 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 44.
761 Contrast, for example, Fosdyke, who claims {Exile, Ostracism and Democracy, p. 187) that Chareas’ reports
“convinced the Athenian sailors on Samos to revolt from the government in Athens and, ultimately, to establish their
own democracy in exile.” (my emphasis)
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the crimes o f the 400, and desire to fight the war (and thus hopefully receive pay) rather than 
accept a peace treaty.762
The Wide Franchise of the Samos Democracy
If the Samos fleet was a multi-national democracy o f a new kind, many questions immediately 
present themselves. If it is the case that many, if not most, o f the participants in the ‘Samos fleet 
democracy’ were non-Athenian, we may wonder at why all the leaders were Athenians, why the 
Argive ambassadors come to Samos to support specifically “the Athenian demos in Samos”,763 
why the agenda o f the reported Assembly meetings seemed so concerned with specifically 
Athenian issues, and, as Amit asks, why, if  the new democracy “was composed of mercenaries 
and slaves, would the oligarchs have treated them as they did, send delegations etc.?”764 This last 
question at least need not detain us; the realpolitik o f the 400’s situation in 411 BC (that the 
Samos fleet was militarily stronger than they were, and all knew it) would demand that they send 
representatives to negotiate, regardless o f whether or not they found it undignified or distasteful. 
But in fact, it seems that, like Amit, the oligarchs at Athens did  take a “citizen-centric” view of 
the fleet. When they despatched envoys to negotiate with the fleet, they instructed them to say 
that they were not intending to harm “the citizens”,765 and give other reassurances to do with 
political representation:
didaxontas hds ouk epi blabei tes poleos kai ton politon he oligarchia kateste, 
all'epi soteriai ton xumpanton pragmaton, pentakischilioi te hoti eien kai ou 
tetrakosioi monon hoi prassontes...alla t'episteilantes ta preponta eipein 
apepempsan autous euthns meta ten heauton katastasin, deisantes me, hoper 
egeneto, nautikos ochlos out' autos menein en toi oligarchikoi kosmoi ethelei, 
sphas te me ekeithen arxamenou tou kakou metastesosin
They [the ten delegates chosen] were to explain that the oligarchy had not been 
established to do any harm to the city or the citizens, but in order to preserve the 
state as a whole, and that it was not 400 but 5,000 who shared the 
government....They were also told the right line to take on other points, and were 
sent out directly after the new government was installed, since the Four Hundred 
feared (and their fears were justified by the event) that the naval mob [nautikos 
ochlos] would not be willing to keep in their own place under the oligarchic 
system.766
Of course, when the envoys themselves arrived, after some delay, at Samos, they were also 
obliged to answer the wider concerns o f all in the fleet, particularly those resident in Athens who 
doubtless formed the majority o f the Samos fleet’s Assembly. When they were eventually
762 It should also be noted that these more personal motivations could also have applied to the Athenian citizen; this 
action on Samos, as will be argued more fully below, should not simply be seen as an ideological conflict between 
Athenian Oligarchs and Democrats
763 Thucydides, 8.86.8 toi en tei Samdi ton Athenaion demoi. Note the misleading translation in the Penguin and Loeb 
editions, “Athenian democracy in Samos”.
764 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p.45
765 Ton politon, 8.72. It is in this passage and this context (referring to the thoughts o f  the oligarchs) that Thucydides 
uses the phrase nautikos ochlos for the first and only time in his work. The context suggests, though not conclusively, 
that the phrase is meant (like Aristotle’s usage, and my own definition in this work) to refer to professional citizen 
sailors, and to exclude non-citizens.
766 Thucydides, 8.72.
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allowed to speak, they did address some o f the political representation issues that they have been 
charged with, but they also sought to deny the wider charges brought against the regime, some of  
which did not apply only to Athenian citizens:
hoi te oikeioi auton outh'hubrizontai, hdsper Chaireas diaballdn apengeilen, oute 
kakon echousin ouden, all'epi tois spheterois auton hekastoi kata choran menousin
[the delegates said that] their relatives had neither suffering outrage, as Chaereas 
had slanderously reported, nor other ill-treatment to complain of, but were all in 
undisturbed enjoyment o f their property just as they had left them.767
These charges were originally relayed to the fleet just prior to its split from Athens. As 
mentioned above, the Paralos was sent back to Athens after the civil strife amongst the Samians, 
only to find the 400 in charge and the crewmen themselves threatened with arrest. Chareas, one 
o f the crew o f the Paralos, escaped from the 400 and returned to Samos, bringing reports of the 
abuses o f the oligarchs.768
angellei tois stratidtais epi to meizon panta deinosas ta ek ton Athenon, hos 
plegais te pantos zemiousi kai anteipein estin ouden pros tous echontas ten 
politeian, kai hoti auton kai gunaikes kai paides hubrizontai, kai dianoountai, 
hoposoi en Samoi strateuontai me ontes tes spheteras gnomes, touton panton tous 
prosekontas labontes eirxein, hina, en me hupakousosi, tethnekosin: kai alia polla  
epikatapseudomenos elegen.
Returning to Samos, he [Chareas] drew a picture to the campaigners o f the horrors 
enacting at Athens, in which everything was exaggerated; saying that all were 
punished by flogging, that no one could say a word against the constitution, that 
their wives and children were outraged, and that it was intended to seize and shut 
up the relatives o f as many o f those who were on campaign at Samos who were 
not o f the government's way o f thinking, to be put to death in case of their 
disobedience; besides a host o f other injurious inventions.769
Though Thucydides states that many o f these stories were untrue, the key points are that the fleet 
believed them, and that the stories concerned a wider audience than citizens and wider issues than 
political rights. Chareas did make some accusations which were o f particular relevance to the 
Athenian citizens; he emphasized that all were being subjected to the punishment of flogging, to 
which Athenian citizens were normally not subjected. But in making these claims, such as that 
their wives and children were being abused, he was addressing the stratiotai as a whole. Perhaps 
the most serious charges he made were that the families o f  hoposoi en Samoi strateuontai, “as 
many o f those who were on campaign at Samos”, were being kept as hostages and threatened 
with death if they did not fall in with the new regime; the use o f  this broader term makes clear 
that the abuses o f the 400 were being perpetrated against non-Athenians as well as citizens. It 
was the reaction amongst the assembled stratiotai against these wider concerns that provoked the 
split between the city and fleet in the first place. It was these wider charges also that the envoys
767 Thucydides, 8.86.3
768 Thucydides, 8.73-4.
769 Thucydides, 8.74.3
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from the 400 attempted to deny before the Samos fleet’s fourth Assembly; they did not win over 
their audience.
None o f these questions pose significant problems to the view that all the free men in the Samos 
fleet participated in the assemblies. A primarily Athenian focus in the issues reported by 
“Thucydides the Athenian”770 should not be surprising, especially given the fact that the matters 
under discussed were important ones; it would be more surprising they were not discussed by the 
Samos fleet. As well as this, it must be remembered that we only have accounts of the 
assemblies that Thucydides chose to report; two of those (the first and the fourth, which are the 
longest accounts) were primarily concerned with the political interactions of the city and the 
fleet; it is likely that there were other assemblies in which other issues came to the fore,771 not 
least the strategy to be pursued in war, and in these meetings the ‘Athenian-ness’ of the 
assemblies would have been much less evident. We should not be surprised to find a strong 
‘Athenian’ bias in the issues discussed by the Samos fleet; even on this model o f a wide franchise 
in the fleet’s democracy, the Athenians would most likely have been the single most significant 
group (with the possible exception of the military-age Samians discussed above), and the most 
homogenous. Their significance is highlighted by Thucydides in the fourth fleet Assembly. At 
this time, the fleet assembly proposed various courses o f action. Only one of these is specified; 
the policy o f attacking Athens, advocated zealously by the “Athenians at Samos”.772 It was the 
fact that this particular group was so set on such a potentially ruinous policy that made the 
situation so dangerous; they influenced the rest o f the crowd to such a degree that, according to 
Thucydides, only Alcibiades was able to restrain them.773 Apart from the Samians, who as noted 
above, jointly with the stratiotai sent ambassadors to Athens,774 no other national group on 
Samos is singled out in this way.
The disparate groups o f xenoi would have had a significant and cohesive group identity, but that 
identity would be as crewmen in the Athenian navy. In addition, there were doubtless many 
metics in the fleet with long-term connections and roots in Athens; these people would have been 
just as interested in events in Attica and the fates o f their families under the 400, even if they 
were no better or worse politically under the 400 or the democracy. The close co-operation 
required to efficiently run a trireme, as well as the often adverse conditions in which the men 
worked under, would no doubt have cemented relations between these disparate social groups, 
and indeed the Athenian citizens may have felt greater solidarity with their fellow rowers (part of 
the demos in their own cities, or immigrants living in Athens) than they would their fellow 
citizens participating in the oligarchy at Athens. In the somewhat desperate and unusual
770 This is how he introduces himself at the beginning o f  his work; Thucydides, 1.1.1
771 This is somewhat speculative; though, as will be discussed below, it seems likely that there were other meetings at 
least between the first and second reported Assemblies in which Thrasybulus tried to persuade the Samos fleet to treat 
with Alcibiades. Thucydides, 8.81.1
772 Thucydides, 8.86.4 Ton en Samoi Athenaion.
773 Thucydides, 8.86.5.
774 Thucydides, 8.74.1
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circumstances in which the Samos fleet found itself in 411 BC, the Athenians would not have 
wanted to exclude their companions from joining with them against their common enemies. As 
the Samians demonstrated by swearing the same oaths, they perceived their fate as tied to that of 
the Athenians;775 this was doubtless true o f the other, less numerous national groups in the fleet 
who also swore these oaths.
The effect o f desertions and defections should also be considered at this point. The debates 
concerning pay for sailors, which occur both in the narratives o f Xenophon and Thucydides, 
imply that large numbers o f men served in the navy for financial reward.776 While these debates 
focus on the defections o f xenoi, financial motives were as important for the Athenians and 
metics as they were for foreign mercenaries, and so it should not be assumed that only the later 
group would desert the fleet when pay was not forthcoming.777 Some of the xenoi would have 
some tricky decisions to make, and no doubt there were many desertion and defections. For 
those o f the crewmen whose cities had ceded from Athens, their devotion to her people and her 
fleet must already have been challenged, even before the (crucial) consideration of pay was 
added to the mix; the stratiotai in this period were “providing for themselves” and not receiving 
pay.778 There would have been many who felt some sense o f community with their crewmates 
and wished to stay on at Samos with them. Doubtless one o f the purposes in getting all the 
members o f the expedition to swear the oaths was to make individuals in such a dilemma nail 
their colours to the mast; there can be no doubt, though, that many deserted. Despite the uniting 
the Samos fleet by these oaths with the military-aged men o f Samos, and the gradual acquiring of 
new vessels through capture, the Samos fleet does not appear to grow significantly in terms of the 
number of active vessels afloat. The subsequent drop-off in numbers on active duty throughout 
this period, despite the Samians joining the stratopedon and the new acquisitions of ships, seems 
to suggest that large numbers deserted or defected.779 It seems reasonable to argue that the 
numbers o f non-Athenians deserting Samos would have been significantly higher than those of 
the Athenians and metics, though they should not be totally exempted from abandoning their 
fleet. If this was the case, it would have left the remaining stratopedon consequently more 
‘Athenian’ in character.
It was clearly recognized in the first Assembly o f the fleet democracy that maintaining the ships 
was the key to winning out against both the 400 and the Peloponnesians. It was because “they
775 Thucydides, 8.75.5
776 See the discussion o f this issue in Part One, section c. 1 and Part Three, section 2
777 This is o f course the assumption that Pericles made, in his pre-war speech to the Athenian Assembly; Thucydides, 
1.143.1. But at this period in history, with the Athenians Phrynichus and Alcibiades as two o f the principal characters, 
we should be careful in ascribing absolute loyalty to the Athenians on Samos. It may be hard to believe that many 
would defect to the other side; but many surely deserted at this time, either because they weren’t getting paid, they 
thought they would be defeated (a not unreasonable assumption), or they were worried about their families in Athens 
and wished to return.
778 Thucydides, 8.76.6 autoi eporizonto hoi stratiotai
779 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.13 reports that the “whole fleet” numbered 86 ships in 410 BC, less than the number 
divided between the commanders at Samos a year earlier (Thucydides, 8.30), which was less in turn than the total 
number o f ship reported by Thucydides as active in the region o f Ionia in that period.
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had the whole fleet” that they would be able to exact tribute from the cities,780 and “because they 
had the ships” that they could secure resources.781 Given the central importance of the fleet, it 
seems singularly unlikely that the Athenians would have been able to exclude the skilled and 
experienced non-Athenian citizen members o f  the naval crews from participating in the new 
democracy, even if  they had wanted to. In the immediate context, where the stratiotai were 
“providing for themselves” and any future money would be dependent on a strong navy, and with 
the Peloponnesians looking a better prospect for winning the war and providing steady pay, any 
attempt at excluding non-Athenians would surely have led them to defect at once.782
While it is true that all the leaders we know o f  were Athenians, it is also the case that we only 
know the names o f two elected at this Assembly. A third Athenian is added later, if we include 
the exile Alcibiades. While we may fairly regard him as an Athenian general, his citizenship 
status at this point was emphatically ambiguous; he was an exile from Athens who had 
campaigned with the Spartans and was then intriguing with the Persians. Citizenship status was 
not likely to have been o f primary concern in the election o f any o f the fleet’s generals. If the 
stratiotai were looking for competent commanders and staunch democrats without the taint of 
collusion with the oligarchs, they could have found many amongst the Athenians. The Delian 
League provided a precedent for a diverse ‘multi-national’ organization with exclusively 
Athenian leadership. The fact that the generals we know about were Athenian does not in any 
way prove, or even indicate, that the people who elected them were necessarily all Athenian.
The idea o f a widened franchise along the lines o f the Samos fleet democracy, far from being 
unthinkable, was being aired in Athens just prior to these events in 411 BC. Aristophanes voiced 
such a view at exactly the time as the oligarchic conspiracy was plotting to narrow it. In 
somewhat enigmatic terms, Aristophanes has the eponymous heroine o f his play Lysistrata 
advocate adding into the citizen body the metics, foreigners who were useful to Athens, and the 
people o f Ionian cities, believed to have been colonists o f  Athens; using the metaphor of making 
wool, Lysistrata explains how women were able to handle the city’s affairs, and the policies she 
would pursue:
eita xainein es kalathiskon koinen eunoian, hapantas katamignuntas tous te 
metoikous kei tis xenos e philos humin, kei tis opheilei toi demosioi, kai toutous 
enkatameixai: kai ne Dia tas ge poleis, hoposai tes ges tesd' eisin apoikoi, 
diagignoskein hoti tauth' hemin hosper ta katagmata keitai 
chdris hekaston: kait' apo touton panton to katagma labontas deuro xunagein kai 
sunathroixein eis hen, kapeita poiesai tolupen megalen kait' ek tautes toi demoi 
chlainan huphenai
780 Thucydides, 8.76.4 echonton gar sphon to pan nautikon
781 Thucydides, 8.76.4 spheis echontes tas naus
782 It is likely even that a blind eye would have been turned to “independent” slaves (by this I mean those whose 
masters were not present with them on Samos) who tried to attend the Assembly. If the examples o f  Decelea and 
Sicily are instructive here, though, it is probable that a lot o f the slaves, even those with masters present, would have 
taken the opportunity to desert to the nearby Peloponnesian base.
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Then card the wool into a work-basket o f union and concord, mixing in everyone; 
and the immigrants, and any foreigner who’s friendly to you, and anyone who’s in 
debt to the treasury, they should be mixed in as well. And yes, there are also all the 
states that are colonies o f this land: you should recognize how you now have them 
lying around like little flocks o f wool, each one by itself; you should take the 
human flock o f all o f them, bring them together here and join them into one, and 
then make a great ball o f wool, and from that weave a warm cloak for the people to
783wear.
It was from the immigrants {metics), friendly foreigners and the Ionian ‘colonies’ of Athens that 
much o f the manpower o f the navy was drawn. The idea o f enfranchising the naval crews 
specifically as a matter o f general policy, including the slaves this time, was advocated by 
Aristophanes six years later, in the play Frogs.™4
Conclusion
The precedent o f military assemblies in which the generals addressed all their troops, and the 
implications o f the more appropriate and wider translation of stratiotai in Thucydides, strongly 
suggests that the democracy on Samos was founded on the basis o f participation of all the free 
people in the force. The foundation of this democracy was ritualized by the swearing of binding 
oaths on the part o f  “all the campaigners”, along with the Samians of military age.785 Nothing 
contradicts the conclusion that the free crewmen o f the triremes stationed on the island were 
participants in the Samos fleet democracy. The positive evidence is not conclusive, but it is 
certainly more likely than the prevailing assumption that the Samos fleet democracy was an 
Athenian-only affair. Thucydides’ reporting o f the fleet does suggest (as we would expect) that 
the Athenian presence in this multi-national mix was far the strongest. The idea o f such a wider 
enfranchisement, far from being unthinkable, was being floated in Athens just prior to these 
events, and was to become active policy later in the war in relation to both the Samians and the 
naval crews. The principal difference between the situation o f the Samos fleet o f 411 BC and 
that o f the city in 406 BC was that, in the latter’s more desperate situation, the franchise was 
extended to slaves as well as non-citizen free men.
2: The Operation of the Samos Fleet Democracy
While broadly chronological in its approach, this section inevitably falls short o f a full history o f  
the fleet between 411 and 407 BC, and the intrinsically related subjects o f the 5,000 at Athens, 
the restoration of democracy there, and the prosecution o f the Ionian war. It is rather an attempt 
to highlight several issues connected with the political operation o f the fleet in this period and to 
examine those features o f the fleet’s political activity which caused Thucydides to describe it as a 
democracy.786 Two features of the fleet’s democracy can be listed at once; the use o f mass
783 Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 11. 579-86
784 Aristophanes, Frogs, 11. 702
785 Thucydides, 8.75.2-3
786 Aside from the extent o f participation, discussed in the previous section.
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assemblies to make decisions and the election of military leaders. In addition, this section will 
examine the issue o f the fleet’s relations with the city o f Athens and its various governments.787 
It almost goes without saying that the state o f the evidence allows us to ask questions and make 
speculation, but rarely affords us concrete answers and strong conclusions.
Deposing Strategoi
In its first Assembly, sometime in the summer o f 411 BC, the Samos fleet democracy “deposed 
their former generals, and those o f the trierarchs who were suspected, and selected other generals 
and trierarchs”.788 This statement has not received the attention it deserves. Does it entitle us to 
assume that all ten Athenian generals elected for the year 412/11 BC were deposed at this time? 
As a practical matter, those o f the generals who were not in Samos at the time were probably not 
deposed by the new democracy and retained their commands. But if this is so, can we presume 
that the Samos fleet elected ten generals? Or would it be better to assume that they elected one 
new general for each one deposed? Needless to say, the evidence is not full enough to permit 
certainty on these points, but they should still be addressed and discussed.
It is often remarked upon that Leon and Diomedon, two generals in Samos at this time and 
staunch democrats, lost out at this election.789 The evidence for this statement is their 
disappearance from the narrative at this point. It so happens that we know the names of at least 
eight o f the generals serving in this year, and to a limited extent it is possible to trace the 
locations o f most o f them at the point the Samos fleet broke from the city.790 They nearly all 
disappear from the narrative after this point, and the exception, Strombichides, should caution us 
from the assumption that the entire college o f  412 BC was deposed on the vote o f the Samos 
Assembly. Can we be more exact about which o f  “their generals” were removed from 
command?
Three o f the named generals o f 412/11 BC, Leon, Diomedon and Charminos, were certainly on 
Samos when the fleet broke from Athens.791 One was certainly not on Samos; Strombichides, 
who will be discussed in detail in the next paragraph, was in the Hellespont, based probably at 
Sestos. The information regarding the other seven generals o f this year is less certain.792
787 See Andrewes’ reconstruction (‘Athenian generals’, p. 2-9), which argues for some degree o f political division 
between the city and the fleet, and contrast that o f  Kagan, (Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 265 ff.) who suggests a far 
more harmonious relationship.
788 Thucydides, 8.76.2
789 Andrewes, HCT, ad loc 8.76
790 Develin {Athenian Officials, pp. 157-8) Fomara {Generals, p. 66) list the same 10 names under 412/1 BC. Not all of  
these men were generals in the summer o f 411 BC. Jordan’s argument {Athenian Navy, p. 127, cf. Part Two, section 
A .5 and Appendix 1) that Diomedon and Leon became strategoi only upon replacing Phrynichus and Skironides, and 
that their command up until this point was as nauarchoi, is persuasive. If one does not follow this argument, then Leon 
and Diomedon must be considered full strategoi for the year, and hence we know the names o f all ten originally 
elected. In this case, two (unknown) new people were presumably elected at Athens after the deposing o f Phrynichus 
and Skironides to make the college up to 10. For the purposes o f  the discussion here, though, it makes little difference, 
as there is no indication that these generals went to Samos.
791 Thucydides, 8.74-5
792 One uncertainty is caused by the epigraphic testimony at this time for officers called archon t onn autikon; 
commanders o f fleets who appear not to be members o f  the 10-man strategic college. Therefore, in cases where an
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Onamakiles and Euctemon, who had been besieging Chios in 412 BC, presumably fled when the 
siege was broken.793 It is likely that this Onomakles was a member o f the 400, making a return to 
Athens prior to the fleet’s defection probable, and an appearance in Samos at this time 
unlikely.794 There is no indication where Euctemon and the remaining eight ships went, but 
Samos is the most likely destination.795 Thrasycles was named sailing for Miletus in the summer 
of 412 BC;796 he is not named thereafter, but it is likely that he and the ships he commanded were 
pooled at Samos later that year along with the rest o f the fleets in the region, and that he was one 
o f the leaders on the island until 411 BC. The generalship o f Eucrates, and its concern with the 
Thracian region, are both inferred from Aristophanes;797 it is uncertain where he was in the 
summer o f 411 BC. Dieitrephes, elected general under the 400, is reported as taking command of 
the Thracian region in summer 411 BC; Fomara suggests that he took up his command, under the 
auspices o f the oligarchs, before his due time, and if this is correct it seems likely that he deposed 
Eucrates by doing so.798 O f the two remaining generals needed to make up the ten, it is not 
unlikely that one held command at Naupactos.799 Though there is no explicit evidence of an 
Athenian commander there at this time, there is evidence for a fleet there in 413 BC and then 
again in 410/9 BC, it is not unlikely that a force was based there in the interim.800 As for the final 
general, there is no evidence at all to suggest where he might have served, but it is likely, given 
the Spartan presence in Decelea, that he was stationed in Athens. Indeed, a single general in the 
city may be considered an absolute minimum, given the extent and proximity of the threat.801 It 
is almost definite that there were five Athenian generals on Samos at the time that the fleet broke 
away from the city.802 It is certain that these generals were deposed by the fleet, but the other 
half o f the strategic college o f 412/1 BC probably continued in their posts. Indeed the only one of 
these remaining generals that Thucydides mentions by name, Strombichides, seems to have 
remained in command.
Strombichides’ Generalship in 411 BC
The case o f Strombichides is interesting. He arrived, with two other generals, at Samos in the 
winter o f 412 BC. He was therefore part o f  the gathering o f the Samos fleet, and its division
individual is not explicitly described as a strategos, it is uncertain whether they should be considered as ‘true’ generals, 
or as other types o f elected commander. I discuss these officers in Part Two, section A. 5
793 Thucydides 8.63 They are both mentioned at 8.30 when they were despatched with Strombichides to attack Chios, 
and not named thereafter. It seems certain, though, that when Strombichides took a detachment o f ships from Chios to 
the Hellespont, he left these two generals at Chios commanding the remainder.
794 He later became a member o f the Thirty. See HCT  ad loc 8.25.1
795 Thucydides, 8.63; given the threatening moves o f the Peloponnesian fleet towards the Athenian base at Samos, it is 
likely that Euctemon’s force fled there, to protect itself and reinforce their allies.
796 Thucydides, 8.17
797 Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 1. 103
798 Thucydides, 8.64, Fomara, Generals, p. 66
799 Andrewes {HCT, ad loc 8.13, cf. 8.54.3) suggests that Hippokles was in command o f the Naupactos fleet in 412/11 
BC, but points out correctly that he need not have been a strategos..
800 See the case study above, Part One, section B.3
801 HCT, ad loc 8.54 states that “Athens needed three generals at home”. There is no evidence to support this assertion, 
but it is not unreasonable to assume that the Athenians would want some strategoi at home in this period. Thus if we 
relegate any o f the generals discussed above (the Naupactos commander in particular) to archons, freeing up a place on 
the strategic college for 412/1 BC it is reasonable to suggest that these people were likely to be in Athens, and not 
Samos.
802 Leon, Diomedon, Charmios for certain; Thrasycles and Euctemon virtually certain.
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anew amongst the commanders that winter. He was despatched, with around 35 ships803 and two 
colleagues, Euctemon and Onomacles, to continue the siege of Chios.804 The fleet took part in 
various operations before it reached Chios, during which none of the three generals are 
mentioned by name. The following year, in the spring o f 412 BC, Strombichides alone led 24 
ships to the Hellespont, took Lampsacus and then based himself at Sestos, in order to “watch and 
guard” the entrance to the Hellespont.805 Strombichides was still stationed there when the 
political turmoil enveloped Athens and the Samos fleet.
Strombichides is next mentioned in the context o f the first military actions undertaken by the 
Samos fleet democracy. The Athenian fleet refused battle with the Peloponnesians who had 
sailed out from Miletus to challenge them, on the grounds that they were awaiting reinforcements 
from Strombichides, to whom they had sent a despatch.806 These ships, and their leader, duly 
arrived the next day. Strombichides reunited with the Samos fleet, and the entire force put out to 
challenge the Peloponnesians, who, now outnumbered, refused battle in turn. The first point to 
make is that Strombichides is quite clearly in command o f his ships after the fleet Assembly’s 
first meeting. This suggests that Strombichides, despite being a general o f the Samos fleet, was 
not one o f “their generals” who was deposed.807
However, it is also clear that these confrontations took place very soon, a matter o f days, after the 
elections;808 if  the fleet had decided to depose Strombichides, they would not have had a chance 
to tell him so, and in the light o f the Peloponnesian attack and the need for his aid, they would 
have been wise to reconsider. But there is no suggestion of this in Thucydides’ narrative. It 
appears that, finding themselves in trouble, the leaders o f  the Samos fleet sent to an Athenian 
general for help. The messenger (and the crew o f his ship) can hardly have concealed the events 
at Samos and the changes in leadership there, and given this it is significant that Strombichides 
responded so readily. Notwithstanding the fact that the Peloponnesian fleet was a clear, present 
and common foe, Strombichides appears to have accepted the decision o f the Samos fleet, and to 
work with the new leaders.809 After his return to Samos and rejoining the fleet, Strombichides 
disappeared from the historical record of the war.810 Could this suggest that he too was deposed 
and replaced? Perhaps, but it seems more likely that, given the fragmentary state o f even
803 Thucydides (8.30) says 30 ships, and then adds some troop carriers. I have somewhat arbitrarily assumed that there 
were about five such vessels, a reasonable number to help carry the 1,000 soldiers listed.
804 Thucydides, 8.30
805 Thucydides, 8.62
806 Thucydides, 8.79
807 Thucydides’ language at 8.76, which indicates that generals and trierarchs were deposed and others were chosen to 
replace them, seems to exclude the possibility that Strombichides was deposed, only to be re-elected straight away in 
his absence.
808 The Peloponnesians decide to attack because o f  the turmoil in Samos; having learnt this, the Athenians send to 
Strombichides. Thucydides, 8.79
809 An alternative reconstruction, that Strombichides was relieved o f command on his return to Samos and his ships 
were simply added to the fleet which put out for Miletus without their former commander; it is not explicitly stated 
who took the fleet to Miletus, but the tone o f  the narrative certainly suggests co-operation on the part o f Strombichides 
and the Samos generals.
810 Strombichides is not mentioned in again until Lysias, 13.13, in which he was protesting to the Theramenes 
regarding the peace negotiated with Sparta in 403 BC.
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Thucydides’ testimony, Strombichides joined the Samos fleet democracy and his actions were 
simply recorded with those o f the “other generals” who played second-fiddle to Thrasyllus, 
Thrasybulus, and later, Alcibiades.
The Samos Fleet’s Generals
Having deposed these (probably) five generals, whom did the Samos fleet elect? There is no 
basis to assume, as Fomara does, that ten were elected;811 a preferable assumption is that the fleet 
elected one general for each that they deposed, but in fact there is little evidence to assume any 
particular number. Thucydides names only two, Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus, but it is clear that 
there were more.812 By 409 BC, there were at least five generals. Diodorus speaks of “Athenian 
generals at Sestos”813 at a time when Thrasyllus, Thrasybulus and Alcibiades were all 
elsewhere;814 as Alcibiades was elected only after his recall, this suggests that at least four 
generals were elected by the first fleet Assembly. It is very likely that Chareas o f the trireme 
Paralos, whose reports from Athens sparked the split in the first place, and who was later to be 
found in command o f troops at the battle o f Cyzicus,815 was elected at this time.
Aside from the ‘supplementary’ election o f the recalled Alcibiades, there is no other election or 
re-election o f leaders mentioned in the sources; given the continued leadership o f Alcibiades, 
Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus until their return to Athens, it seems safest to assume that there were 
no other ‘formal’ elections. The case o f Alcibiades may suggest that the generals o f the fleet did 
not have to stand for regular re-election. As has been discussed above, Alcibiades’ recall to the 
fleet and subsequent election was based largely on his supposed closeness to the Persians, and his 
promise to secure an alliance with (and thus bring money from) the Great King. His capture 
while attempting to negotiate with Tissaphemes following the battle o f Abydos, and his 
untroubled resumption of command following his escape, perhaps indicates that Alcibiades and 
the other generals did not face regular re-election and votes before an Assembly. This is not an 
inevitable conclusion, however. Alcibiades’ ability to influence a crowd was considerable, and 
he could perhaps have won re-election despite this blow to his credibility. After all he could (and 
no doubt did) present himself as the man who ‘saved the day’ at the battle o f Abydos, arriving in 
the nick o f time to rescue a doomed situation. It could also have been the case that his 
leadership, diplomatic abilities and generalship, over and above his supposed influence in Persia, 
were considered by the fleet to be indispensable. Whatever can be drawn from this particular
811 Fomara, Generals, p. 67 presumes Alcibiades to be the fleet’s eleventh general. That the Samos fleet claim to 
follow the “laws o f their fathers” is not to be taken literally, and so should not be pressed to suggest that, like the city, 
the fleet would elect a college o f ten.
812 Thucydides (8.76) says that Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus were “amongst those” chosen as generals, implying 
obviously that at least one more man was elected.
813 Diodorus, 13.49.2. One o f these generals was surely Chareas. It is possible that Strombichides was also here. If so, 
and if there were only these two generals in Sestos at this time, then there need only have been three generals (Chareas, 
Thrasyllus, Thrasybulus) elected at the first Assembly.
814 At Athens, Thrace and Lesbos respectively.
815 Diodorus, 13.50
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episode, there is no evidence that the fleet’s Assembly held any further election of leaders after 
putting affairs in Alcibiades’ hands in 411 BC.
If this was indeed the case, it is inevitable to assume that any named individual found in 
command of the Samos fleet between 411 and 407 BC was elected at this first meeting. Chareas 
has been mentioned already. The only other commander explicitly named who may have been 
elected by the fleet is Eumachos. He is first mentioned as taking command of the Hellespont 
tollhouse with Theramenes following the victory at Cyzicus.816 However, as Theramenes was 
not elected by the fleet but by the city, it is possible that his colleague here too was a general of 
Athens.817 There is o f course no certainty regarding these issues, and it highlights some of the 
practical difficulties surrounding the deceptively simple action o f the Samos fleet in deposing its 
generals and electing new ones.818
The Fleet’s Assemblies
Having elected its leaders, Thucydides reports that many in the Assembly made encouraging 
speeches. In indirect speech, he records the essence o f these comments, some of which I have 
already referred to above;819 the power o f the fleet in relation to the city was stressed, and its 
ability to provide resources for itself; the relative weakness o f Athens; Samos’ strength and its 
position controlling sea routes to the Piraeus; as mentioned earlier, the appeal to the “ancestral 
constitution” and independence of the fleet in terms o f  leadership and money; the fleet’s 
likelihood to win over Alcibiades, and thus Persia. The restoring o f the democracy was referred 
to twice; the fleet would be better able to restrict the Athenians at home from the sea, if the 
constitution (ten politeian) was not restored; they would preserve the ‘ancestral constitution’ 
{tous patrious nomous), and persuade the oligarch to do so as well.820 The final conclusion is 
that, if the worst came to the worst, the fleet could sail o ff and find a new city and territory 
elsewhere.821 This Assembly, then, can be viewed as the fleet coming to terms with the gravity of 
its actions. While the possibility o f reconciliation is expressed, the fleet is also defiant and 
confident o f its independent strength. The city might need the fleet, but the fleet certainly did not 
need the city.
816 Xenophon, 1.1.22
817 On the other side o f the argument, if  there was some degree o f  tension between the fleet and the city, having one 
general from each ‘faction’ to control this vital outpost might have represented a reasonable compromise. But see 
Andrewes, ‘Generals in the Hellespont’, p.4 n. 13 o f the slight epigraphic case for making Eumachos Theramenes’ 
colleague.
818 It should be noted that some trierarchs were removed from their posts and replaced at this time; there are no details 
about who was selected. The only named trierarch o f  this period is Thrasybulus, who was elected as a general at this 
time. Perhaps Charias o f the Paralos was that ship’s trierarch; it is not certain whether these men continued captaining 
their ships as well as their duties as strategoi. Given that Charias appears later commanding infantry, it is perhaps 
most likely that replacement trierarchs were selected.
819 Thucydides, 8.76
820 Thucydides, 8.76.5-6
821 cf. similar likening o f cosmopolitan military expeditions to cities by Nicias on Sicily (Thucydides, 7.77), and 
Xenophon in relation to the Ten Thousand (Xenophon, Anabasis, 6.5-6).
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The second Assembly described by Thucydides has the Samos fleet, on Thrasybulus’ motion, 
vote for the recall o f Alcibiades.822 No details are given about the arguments deployed, but we 
can guess that the views expressed in the first Assembly sum up the ‘for’ argument; against the 
prospect o f money from the King, suspicion of Alcibiades for his collusion with Sparta, 
accusations o f his impiety and his role in the setting up of the 400 in Athens would have been 
more than enough to instil doubt. Thucydides seems to suggest that in meetings prior to this one 
Thrasybulus had failed to win his point.823 This indicates not only an Assembly that met with 
some regularity, but also one which was strong, vocal and not prepared (at this stage) to 
sheepishly follow the views o f its most prominent leader.
Shortly after, another Assembly was held, at which Alcibiades presented himself. Having made 
his case with some eloquence (and much exaggeration o f his influence with the Persians), 
Alcibiades was elected as general, and “matters were put into his hands”.824 Interpretation o f the 
strength of this phrase varies; it may suggest that Alcibiades became formally the Commander- 
in-Chief o f the Samos fleet, or on a moderate view, that Thucydides was commenting only on the 
de facto  position o f Alcibiades as a leading player in the direction o f affairs.
The fourth and last reported Assembly held by the Samos fleet was convened in response to the 
arrival o f ambassadors from the 400, which has been discussed above.825 It appears that on this 
occasion the fleet’s Assembly was still very vocal and strong; first o f all they shouted down the 
ambassadors, and even after they were persuaded to listen they were not moved, and they put 
forward various proposals for action. Thucydides details only one o f these; the proposal, 
probably made by the Athenians in the Assembly, to attack Athens itself.
Insofar as we can characterize the Samos fleet and its policies from these brief accounts o f it 
meetings, Thucydides gives the impression o f a dynamic and forceful Assembly, with a large 
number speakers participating in robust debates. Until Alcibiades’ election, the generals seem to 
have played a leading, but far from dominant, role in the assemblies. With regard to policy, the 
Samos fleet seems to have instinctively favoured direct and violent actions. Just prior to the first 
Assembly, the stratiotai called for the immediate stoning o f those responsible for the change of 
government in Athens, and had to be restrained.826 A similar call was made at the fourth 
Assembly. Twice the Assembly advocated sailing to Athens to attack the 400;827 on both 
occasions, Alcibiades persuaded the Assembly to reconsider. It is in relation to the second of 
these occasions that Thucydides praised Alcibiades lavishly:
822 Thucydides, 8.81
823 Thucydides, 8.81.1 describes Thrasybulus as “finally succeeding in a meeting to persuade the majority”, which 
implies, though does not require, previous unsuccessful meetings.
824 Thucydides, 8.82
825 Thucydides, 8.86.4-5
826 Thucydides, 8.75
827 Thucydides, 8.82 (third meeting); 8.86 (fourth meeting).
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kai dokei Alkibiades proton tote kai oudenos elasson ten polin ophelesai... kai en 
toi tote alios men oud' an heis hikanos egeneto kataschein ton ochlon, ekeinos de 
tou t' epiplou epause
For the first time, Alcibiades did the state a service, one that was 
unsurpassed...And at that moment, when no other man would have had the power 
to hold back the mob, he put a stop to the intended expedition.828
Andrewes remarks that it is “odd that the second report takes no notice at all o f the earlier 
occasion”,829 suggesting that the Assembly at this point was more angry and dangerous than the 
previous occasion. Doubtless this was the case, but is also worth noting that this is the last time 
that the idea o f the fleet sailing to attack Athens is mentioned. O f course, given the fact that 
Thucydides’ narrative ends shortly after this point with no more assemblies reported, and neither 
Xenophon nor Diodorus report any, there is no obvious context for such a view to have been 
voiced. But Alcibiades’ speech to the delegates following this seems to have tried to take the 
first steps towards an eventual reconciliation, and thus what Thucydides is surely highlighting is 
Alcibiades ending permanently the wish of the fleet to attack the city, and the beginning o f more 
harmonious relations. It is on this specific occasion, therefore, that Alcibiades deserved high 
praise.
It has been noted above that Xenophon’s narrative o f  the fleet makes no mention of assemblies. 
The generals, and especially Alcibiades, seem to have taken all of the major decisions 
themselves. This appears to contrast with the impression given by Thucydides, who reports on 
four specific meetings in the space o f some ten chapters and perhaps suggests that there were 
others, portraying a frequently convened and very strong Assembly. It could be argued that this 
is indicative o f the inferior quality o f Xenophon’s reporting, focusing on the major players and 
crediting them with taking decisions that in fact were reached by debate and consensus. 
However, the impression given by Xenophon should not be dismissed outright. Even on the 
mildest interpretation, Thucydides’ narrative seems to suggest that Alcibiades had a predominant 
role from the time he was elected onwards. Having persuaded the Assembly from its disastrous 
course o f action in the fourth Assembly, Alcibiades seems to take it upon himself to answer the 
ambassadors from Athens on behalf o f the fleet.830 Shortly after this meeting, the 5,000 in 
Athens sent ambassadors “to the fleet and to Alcibiades”; a single delegation, but one which 
seems to emphasize Alcibiades’ importance.831 This compares to a later episode in Xenophon’s 
narrative, where Alcibiades’ presence was required to satisfactorily conclude a treaty with the 
Persians, despite the fact other fleet commanders had all agreed to it beforehand.832 Both 
episodes indicate Alcibiades’ prominence in the fleet’s leadership, and also the separateness of
828 Thucydides, 8.86. The exact translation, and thus extent o f the praise given is debated, but the nuances matter little 
in to this discussion.
829 HCT, ad loc 8.86.4, p. 286-7.
830 Thucydides, 8.86.6, and HCT  ad loc (p. 288) “the wording...makes this very much the personal answer of 
Alkibiades”
831 Thucydides, 8.97.3 and HCT  ad loc (p. 340) “Thucydides need not mean two separate messages, but the language 
comes near to treating Alkibiades as a power separate from the fleet”
832 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.8 cf. Diodorus, 13.66, Plutarch, Life o f  Alcibiades, 31.
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his status. While it is by no means unlikely that there were further meetings o f the fleet’s 
Assembly which Xenophon does not report, it is also not unlikely, nor inconsistent with 
Thucydides, that Alcibiades dominated proceedings to the extent that policies and actions could 
be fairly ascribed to him personally. One is reminded of Thucydides’ verdict on Periclean 
Athens; it was called a democracy, but it was controlled by its first citizen.833
The City and the Fleet
The status o f Alcibiades as almost a separate power from the rest o f the fleet and its leaders is an 
important point to bear in mind when considering the extent to which the fleet operated 
independently and its relations with Athens.834 The degree and nature o f the division that existed 
between the two is a difficult and complex issue. A good starting point for this discussion is the 
claim o f the Samos fleet Assembly (as written by Thucydides), that a city controls a force 
principally by providing leadership and money.835 Applying these two criteria to the Samos fleet 
between 411 and 407 BC implies, at first glance, that it was indeed separate from the city. Most 
of the generals leading the fleet, particularly Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, held their commands 
on the authority o f their election by the men o f the fleet alone. Strategic decisions and military 
plans seem to have been made by these generals, independent o f the political rulers in Athens, 
whether the 400, the 5000 or the restored democracy. What is more, the members of the 
expedition, who were “providing for themselves” in 411 BC,836 and appear to have received no 
money from Athens during their campaigns.837 Alcibiades’ status as an exile, and his nervousness 
about his return to Athens in 407 BC,838 certainly suggest that relations before this time of 
reconciliation were somewhat strained. But the roles o f the generals Strombichides, and 
particularly Theramenes and Thrasyllus, suggest a closer relationship between the city and the 
fleet, and there is some evidence of money flowing from places that the fleet controlled back to 
the city, and from the city to some of the fleet’s operations.
The division between the fleet and Athens under the 400 was total. To be enemies of the 400 was 
amongst the solemn oaths sworn by all the stratiotai immediately prior to their break from the 
city, and the mood of the first meeting o f the fleet democracy was defiant and aggressive to the 
oligarchy. The bitterness o f the sentiment in the fleet was demonstrated by their hostile and near- 
violent reception of the 400’s ambassadors, whom had already delayed their appearance before 
the fleet for fear o f reprisals. But even in the first Assembly, it is clear that the fleet envisaged 
reconciliation with the city; by their breaking from Athens, and through superior access to 
resources and control o f the sea routes to Piraeus, the fleet intended to compel the oligarchs to
833 Thucydides, 2.65
834 The essential work in this topic is Andrewes, ‘The Generals in the Hellespont 410-407 BC’
835 Thucydides, 8.76
836 Thucydides, 8.76
837 The epigraphic testimony for the separate finances o f the city and the fleet is discussed by Andrewes ( ‘Generals in 
the Hellespont’, pp. 5 ff ) , and argues (p.6) that “they [the Hellespontine generals] were acting independently o f the 
financial system which covered Athens, Eretria, Pylos and Samos... [they] did not send their accounts to Athens”
838 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.10
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preserve the “laws o f their fathers”, as they themselves claimed to be doing.839 The fleet’s 
determination to sail off and find other cities and lands is a sign o f their confidence and 
independence, but it is advocated only as a last resort, if  their other objectives fail. The division, 
then, was not so much between Athens and the fleet as between the oligarchy and the fleet. This 
is made clear by Alcibiades, in his reply to the ambassadors o f the 400. Alcibiades’ words to the 
delegates marked the first stage in the complicated series o f interactions between the fleet and the
autos de apokrinamenos autois apepempen, hoti tous men pentakischilious ou 
koluoi archein, tous mentoi tetrakosious apallassein ekeleuen autous kai 
kathistanai ten boulen hosper kai proteron, tous pentakosious: ei de es euteleian ti 
xuntetmetai hoste tous strateuomenous mallon echein trophen, panu epainein. kai 
talla ekeleuen antechein kai meden endidonai tois polemiois: pros men gar sphas 
autous soizomenes tes poleos pollen elpida einai kai xumbenai, ei de hapax to 
heteron sphalesetai, e to en Samoi e ekeinoi, oud' hotoi diallagesetai tis eti 
esesthai.
He [Alcibiades] dismissed them [the ambassadors] with an answer from himself, 
to the effect that he did not object to the government o f  the 5,000, but insisted that 
the 400 should be deposed and the boule o f  500 reinstated in power: he was 
entirely in favour o f any measures of economy which would result in better pay for 
the campaigners; and in general he urged them to hold fast and make no 
concessions to the enemy, saying that, so long as the city was preserved, there 
were good hopes of some kind of agreement being reached between the two 
parties, whereas if either were once destroyed, that at Samos, or that over there 
[i.e. Athens], there would no longer be any one to be reconciled to.841
While it was recognized that the fleet and the city were most defiantly independent of one 
another and any reconciliation would be for the future, the two had a common enemy. Neither 
would be served by the other’s destruction. It is this answer which indeed precipitated the 
downfall o f the 400, and began the process o f reconciliation between fleet and city.
After the removal of the 400, the principal issue dividing the city and the fleet, better relations 
between the two might have been expected. However, the 400 were not replaced by the “laws of 
their fathers”, but by another, albeit wider, oligarchy. Although Alcibiades had suggested 
acceptance o f the 5,000, they could not assume this, especially as they did not restore, as 
Alcibiades had suggested they should, the democratic boule.*42 According to Thucydides, the 
Athenians still considered the Samos fleet “in revolt” in this period.843 They therefore sent 
diplomats to “the fleet and Alcibiades”.844 These messengers were to report the offer to recall 
Alcibiades and “others with him”, and to persuade them to take a hand in matters.
839 Thucydides, 8.76.
840 Thucydides, 8.86
841 Thucydides, 8.86.6-7
842 Thucydides, 8.86
843 Thucydides, 8.%. 1
844 Thucydides, 8.97
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Thucydides’ narrative ends before the arrival o f these messengers, and there is no direct 
indication o f the reception they received from Alcibiades and the fleet. However, as will be 
detailed below, Xenophon seems to assume an improvement in relations between the fleet and 
the city. While it is true that the two were not totally reconciled, and were for example operating 
somewhat separate financial systems,845 Xenophon’s narrative shows there was much co­
operation between the forces o f city and the fleet. This impression could be the result o f 
Xenophon’s oversimplification o f a complex relationship; no doubt this is the case to some 
extent, but Thucydides’ narrative provides a reasonable foundation to expect the type of co­
operation we find in Xenophon.
If then, as is likely, the ambassadors from the 5,000 received a favourable response from the 
fleet, it is somewhat surprising that Alcibiades did not return to Athens until 407 BC, and was 
clearly an exile at that time. But it is likely that the democracy, which succeeded the 5,000 in 
summer 410 BC, would not have honoured the offer o f recall made by the 5,000.846 This could 
well be so, but it does not explain why Alcibiades, in the nine months o f  the 5000’s rule, appears 
not to have accepted their offer. This is a significant fact which argues for some degree o f  
separation and suspicion still existing between Alcibiades and the governments o f the city. 
Despite this, though, there is clear and consistent evidence o f  close co-operation between the 
forces o f the city and those o f the fleet democracy.
Thucydides’ narrative describes the first stages o f  regular diplomatic exchanges between the two. 
Following the battle o f Cynossema, a ship was sent to Athens to report the victory, raising morale 
in the city.847 Some months later, following the victory at Abydos, another messenger is sent to 
the city. On this occasion the envoy was the general Thrasyllus, and as well as reporting the 
victory, he requested reinforcements from the city, still ruled at this time by the 5,000.848 
Thrasyllus, on the most likely chronology,849 remained in Athens for an extremely long time 
before bringing these new forces,850 but a fleet under the leadership o f Theramenes was 
despatched from Athens soon after, and perhaps in response to, Thrasyllus’ arrival.851 According 
to Diodorus, Theramenes’ mission took him to Paros, where he overthrew an oligarchy, extorted 
money from the oligarchs, and restored democracy. As well as being lucrative, Kagan is no doubt 
correct to interpret this action as an attempt to establish “his own and the Five Thousand’s 
credentials in the eyes o f the Athenian democrats both at Athens and with the fleet in the
845 Andrewes, ‘Generals in the Hellespont’, p. 6
846 Andrewes, HCT  ad loc 8.96
847 Thucydides, 8.106.4-5
848 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.8
849 The principal points o f which are admirably summed up by Andrewes ( ‘Generals in the Hellespont’, p. 2) as 
follows; “The battle o f  Kyzikos in March or April 410, Trasyllos’ expedition to Ionia in summer 409, the recovery o f 
Byzantium and Kalchedon in 408, Alkibiades’ return to Athens in 407, the battle o f  Notion in 407 or early 406.”
850 Thrasyllus arrived back in the Hellespont in the autumn o f  409 BC, around two years after the victory at Abydos, 
towards the end o f 411 BC.
851 This suggestion is made by Kagan (Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 234 n. 83), but admits the point is not certain. 
The launching o f  Theramenes’ fleet is recorded by Diodorus, 13.47.6-8
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Hellespont”.852 As a leading member of the oligarchic conspiracy that established the 400, 
against which the members o f the fleet swore enmity, it is easy to see why Theramenes would 
have been keen to present himself as a democrat. After this, Theramenes sailed to the north 
Aegean, where he joined with Thrasybulus and his money-collecting fleet.853 A fuller account of 
this meeting would no doubt be revealing.854 Both generals were to lead their forces to Cyzicus, 
and Theramenes joined the Samos fleet until its full reconciliation and return to Athens in 407 
BC. It is unsure as to what conditions this co-operation came with, if  any, but it certainly seems 
that the city and the fleet shared the fruits o f the victory. Perhaps Theramenes placed his ships at 
the disposal o f the Samos fleet and provided some money from the city, on condition that he 
shared command in the Hellespont,855 that the grain-route would be held open for Athens, and 
some o f the spoils from the Hellespont campaigns would find their way to Athens to relieve the 
citizens o f their tax burdens. This is no more than speculation, however; our sources present 
nothing more or less than full co-operation between the commanders and their forces at this time. 
Any differences or difficulties seem to have been resolved easily.
It is perhaps significant that the Athenians sent money to the fleets in this region at this time, 
suggesting a good deal o f  co-operation between the forces here.856 As has been noted above, no 
money from Athens was sent to the generals in the Hellespont; perhaps Alcibiades’ assumed 
presence there was a factor in this, but it is also unlikely that the city was able provide funds on 
the scale required by the extensive campaigns in the Hellespont, even if  it had wanted to.857
These two generals then rejoined the main ‘Samos’ fleet, now in the Hellespont, and participated 
in the battle o f Cyzicus in the spring o f 409 BC. The descriptions o f this battle in both Diodorus 
and Xenophon (particularly in the Diodorus’ superior account) indicated a high degree o f co­
operation between all the commanders involved.858 Indeed, the strategy pursued in this battle 
demanded the fullest possible co-operation and co-ordination between the forces and 
commanders on the scene. There is no indication in the sources o f  any hostility between the 
generals or fleets at this stage, such as might be expected if the rift between the fleet and the city 
was still large and acrimonious. It seems to have been the case also that the spoils o f this joint 
victory were shared between the fleet and the city. The toll-house and fleet established, under
852 Kagan, Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, pp. 234-5. It is notable that this author, who argues against (p. 265 ff.) serious 
political divisions between the fleet and die city, nevertheless sees the two as separate and distinct political entities.
853 Diodorus, 13.49.1-2
854 Xenophon’s account has no record o f the generals meeting at this time; Theramenes is first mentioned at Hellenica, 
1.1.12, bringing ships from Macedon to the Hellespont, arriving at the same time as Thrasybulus from Thrace.
855 It is worth noting that it is in this context that Diodorus, 13.49 describes Thrasybulus as “Commander in C hief’ of 
the fleet. Perhaps Theramenes was required to submit to his overall command.
856 Andrewes, ‘Generals in the Hellespont’, p. 6-7. The argument is principally based on two epigraphic texts, IG I2 
108 and 301. Andrewes suggests that “This evidence shows that both Thrasybulus’ squadron and Athenians from the 
city [presumably under Theramenes] were active in the Thraceward region in these years, but does not quite permit us 
to disentangle the relations o f the two parties...There can be no question here o f  competition between the city and 
Thrasyboulos.”
857 Alcibiades was usually in the Hellespont in this period, though at the time Thrasybulus and Theramenes were 
operating in the north Aegean, Alcibiades was probably either in Persian captivity, or had just escaped it to Lesbos.
858 Diodorus, 13.50, Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.15-22. Kagan {Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 238-246) gives a good 
account o f both the course o f the battle and the descriptions o f it in the sources.
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Theramenes and Eumachos,859 provided money for both the fleet and the city, and allowed grain 
to pass from the Black Sea safely to Athens. This was surely not because there was now enough 
money to fully fund the Hellespont fleet, and the surplus was sent to Athens; money-collecting 
missions continued to be a feature o f the fleet’s activities until 407 BC. Indeed, on two o f these 
occasions Diodorus cites relieving the Athenians from the burden o f paying the eisphora as the 
motive for the mission.860 Andrewes suggests that the fleet “let the com ships through to Athens, 
perhaps some revenue also” as a partly political gesture, foreshadowing a future reconciliation; 
he is surely correct in conceiving o f the fleet and the city as having individual spheres o f power, 
and they being separate, though allied, political entities.861
Theramenes’ joining o f the fleet coincided with Thrasyllus’ continued presence in Athens; it 
seems almost as if  the city and the fleet exchanged one general for another. Thrasyllus’ stay in 
Athens was long, and not without incident. He was in Athens when the Spartans offered peace, 
and for the subsequent fall o f the 5,000.862 He was presumably elected as general at some point, 
possibly under the restored democracy,863 or alternatively under the 5,000; in any event, when the 
Spartan army under Agis sallied out from Decelea to the walls o f Athens in the summer o f 410 
BC, Thrasyllus was in command of the Athenian defence.864
While these events took place in Athens, Alcibiades, Theramenes and Thrasybulus (amongst 
others) remained in charge o f the fleet. There is some question in modem scholarship over the 
formal legitimacy o f these generalships at Athens, and whether these were ‘irregular’ commands. 
Fomara suggests that Theramenes, Alcibiades and Thrasybulus all held “irregular” commands in 
this period, until the fleet returned to Athens and fresh elections were held.865 Andrewes 
similarly suggests that Theramenes, Alcibiades and Thrasyllus were not elected in Athens when 
the democracy was restored and (in his view) held new elections, but that no attempt was made to 
remove them from their commands either, and they were allowed to continue in an unofficial 
capacity.866 Kagan is somewhat dismissive o f this, stating (correctly) that there is no evidence of 
a re-election in 410 BC, that nothing would have been gained by labelling the Hellespont 
generals irregular, and that the possible offence o f this could have brought the fleet down on 
Athens.867 It is certainly the case that, as a matter o f practicality, the city could have done very 
little about who was commanding the fleet, even if it had wanted to. Kagan’s interpretation 
seems to presume, without saying so directly, that the Hellespontine generals were ‘officially’ 
elected at Athens between 409 and 407 BC, presumably while they were still absent on
859 Xenophon, 1.1.22
860 Diodorus, 13.47 (Theramenes collecting booty from the islands); 13.64 (Alcibiades plundering the territory o f 
Persian satrap Phamabazus)
861 ‘Generals in the Hellespont’, p. 5
862 Kagan’s view ( Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 253) that it was the divisive debate over the peace offer, rather than 
the fleet’s victory at Cyzicus, that sparked the fall o f  the 5,000 seems sound.
863 McCoy, ‘Thrasyllus’, pp. 275-6
864 Thrasyllus’ election; A gis’ attack; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.33
865 Fomara, Generals, p. 68-9
866 Andrewes, ‘Generals in the Hellespont’, p. 4.
867 Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 266-8
192
campaign. However, Xenophon’s account seems to contradict this, as it suggests Alcibiades was 
not elected general in Athens until his return in 407 BC; 868 he was an exile up until this point, 
and as Andrewes argues, “the mere fact that he [Alcibiades] found reassurance in his election to 
the generalship...[of 407/6 BC]...shows he was not general before.”869 Until he personally 
returned to Athens to face his countrymen, it is unlikely that any of the various governments o f  
this time would have elected him to the generalship. Thrasybulus, the other significant 
commander who did not return to Athens prior to 407 BC, was also unlikely to have been elected 
in his absence.870 Unlike Alcibiades, he did not have the stigma o f  religious sacrilege and treason 
hanging over him. He was, however, Alcibiades’ closest ally, and the most persistent advocate, 
with the city and the fleet, for his recall. It seems likely, therefore, that the Athenians did not 
elect either o f these men, nor any of the other generals o f the fleet who had not come back to 
Athens.871 These generals had all the legitimacy they needed from their endorsement by the fleet, 
and the high level o f co-operation with the city’s generals does not indicate any jealousy between 
the commanders. If the restored democracy (as seems certain) annually elected ten generals, it 
would have been unwise o f them to ‘use up’ at least three o f the places in the strategic college 
each year on commanders over whom they had no control whatsoever, even if  those commanders 
were currently acting in the city’s interest. The cases o f Thrasyllus and Theramenes were 
somewhat different, as both o f these men were elected to the generalship at Athens. There would 
have been (at least in theory) some degree of control over their actions and input into their 
decisions, and both, to some extent at least, depended on funding from Athens.872 Election o f  
these two men in their absence would have been far easier for the Athenians to countenance than 
it would have been for Thrasybulus or especially Alcibiades. Whatever the degree o f legitimacy 
regarding the generalships o f these men in the debates o f scholars, it seems not to have been an 
important issue with them or the forces under their command, and it is this co-operation between 
groups that could so easily have become opposed and squabbling factions that is the most 
important feature o f this period.
Xenophon claims that in the wake of this victory over Agis the Athenians acceded to Thrasyllus’ 
request for reinforcements for the Hellespont;873 whether there was a vote on the matter at this
868 Hellenica, 1.4.12. The speaker o f Lysias 19 (On the Property o f  Alcibiades, 52) says that Alcibiades was general for 
four or five consecutive years, a testimony which must refer to this period and which Kagan (Fall o f  the Athenian 
Empire, p. 267) uses to suggest that there was no perception that Alcibiades’ generalships were in any way irregular. 
Surely though this brief and inexact recollection o f  Alcibiades’ military career should not be pressed in this way; the 
speaker need be indicating nothing more than the fact o f  Alcibiades’ period o f  military significance. On whose 
mandate he held these generalships is not relevant to his point.
869 Andrewes, ‘Generals in the Hellespont’, p.3
870 According to Diodorus, he had been the messenger who reported the victory o f Cynossema, giving perhaps a 
context for him to be ‘legitimized’ as general. This is possible, and the fact that Thucydides (8.106) does not name the 
messenger, though he reports a trireme being sent back, cannot absolutely prove that Thrasybulus was not the 
messenger.
871 Chareas, possibly Strombichides and Eumachos, and possibly some unknown individuals.
872 As discussed above, Theramenes seems to have received funding until he took his ships to the Hellespont. 
Thrasyllus received large sums o f money, which go through the books at Athens but are in fact received on campaign 
directly from the allies (see the discussion o f the inscriptional evidence in Andrewes, ‘Generals in the Hellespont’, p. 
5-9, which “shows the Hellespontine generals standing outside the financial system operated from the city”)
873 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.34
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time or not, it appears that the actual force was not ready until a year later, in the summer o f 409 
BC. This fleet arrived by a somewhat circuitous route, taking part in an ultimately unsuccessful 
campaign in Ionia. It may have been the case that there was some political motive behind this 
destination, and that the new democracy wanted to prove itself in the field, giving itself a victory 
to rival Cyzicus.874 Kagan has argued against a political interpretation, emphasizing the strategic 
reasons for sending a fleet to the Ionian coast.875 When Thrasyllus’ force eventually joined the 
rest o f the fleet in the Hellespont, there was tension between the two sides. While this could be a 
sign o f political tension between the fleet democracy and the government at Athens,876 the reason 
for the trouble as given in the sources, that Thrasyllus’ men had suffered a defeat while the fleet 
were only victorious, seems plausible and sufficient.877 It is certainly the case that the generals 
themselves, whomever they were elected by, co-operated well in the subsequent campaigns 
against Chalcedon and Byzantium;878 as Kagan says, “at least Alcibiades and Theramenes and 
probably Thrasyllus shared in the formulation and execution o f these policies.”879
Between the attacks on Chalcedon and Byzantium, the generals ne^fiated a treaty with the 
Persians.880 This treaty ended hostilities between Athens and Chalcedon^at the cost o f Chalcedon 
paying her outstanding tribute. The generals also agreed not to attack the territory o f the Persian 
Empire, and they received from Phamabazus 20 talents and a promise to convey them to the great 
King for further negotiations. Who was to receive this money? Would it be sent back to Athens, 
or alternatively distributed there and then amongst a fleet badly in need o f funds, and receiving 
none from the city? It seems likely that the tribute, assessed at its former level, and the arrears, 
would have gone to Athens; it was after all Athens to whom the tribute was originally paid and 
the arrears owed.881 But it seems not unlikely that the twenty talents paid by Persia would have 
gone towards maintaining the fleet.882 An arrangement like this, which shared spoils between 
Athens and the fleet, seems to suit the context o f these two being separate but co-operating 
forces; without corroborating evidence, however, this reconstruction remains purely hypothetical.
Diodorus credits Theramenes, the city’s elected general, with a leading role in the negotiations; 
but Xenophon’s testimony that all the generals took part is more likely. Both agree, however, on 
the special status accorded to Alcibiades at this time. As noted above, the Persian satrap 
Phamabazus required Alcibiades’ presence before the treaty could be validated; at the time o f the 
negotiations he was away plundering along the coast. Alcibiades took the opportunity to
874 McCoy, ‘Thrasyllus’, p. 279; Andrewes, ‘Generals in the Hellespont’, p. 4-5
875 Kagan, Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 266-9
876 As argued by McCoy, ‘Thrasyllus’, p. 284.
877 Xenophon, 1.2.15
878 Chalcedon; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.1-8 (Chalcedon). 1.3.14-22, Diodorus, 13.66 (Byzantium)
879 Kagan, Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 284
880 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.8-12; Diodorus, 13.66.3
881 But cf. the rhetoric o f the Samos fleet in its first assembly, declaring the de facto right to levy tribute. Thucydides 
8.76, discussed above.
882 At the lowest likely rate o f 3 obols per day, such an amount represented the wages o f  80 ship’s crews for two 
weeks. Alcibiades’ money-collecting mission at the time o f the negotiations demonstrates, if  demonstration were 
needed, the constant need for funds experienced by the fleet.
194
emphasize his own importance by swearing the oaths along with Phranabazus, rather than simply 
adding his oath to that o f the other generals.883
The eventual return of the fleet to Athens in 407 BC marked the end o f its period o f  
independence;884 when the crews next embarked on their vessels, it was to be under leaders 
elected in the Pnyx and funded from the Athenian treasury.885 Xenophon’s suggestion is that, 
while the fleet was largely reconciled long before this time, a similar reconciliation could not be 
assumed in the case o f Alcibiades. Regardless o f his privileged status within the fleet, and his 
ability to take the credit for the achievements o f others as well as himself,886 Alcibiades was not 
certain o f the welcome he would receive in Athens. His unforced delays and hesitancy in making 
his arrival demonstrate his acute awareness o f this fact.887 It confirms again that Alcibiades and 
the fleet were to some extent separate powers.
Conclusion
Fosdyke’s statement that “the sailors stationed at Samos responded to the alleged violence of the 
oligarchs [the 400 at Athens] by constituting themselves as an independent political 
community”888 is an admirably succinct summation of the events o f 411 BC. While this political 
community was initially conceived as democratic in character and in opposition to oligarchic 
Athens, compromises were soon made, and the fleet’s history as a (virtually) independent 
democracy was a brief one. Like the short-lived oligarchies at Athens, the importance of the 
political events here is not in their durability, but in their nature. It appears (though our sources 
are not conclusive on this) that in electing Alcibiades and putting matters into his hands, the fleet 
had voted itself a powerful leader, the most prominent among a small number o f elected generals 
who increasingly seem to have taken the major decisions; in other words, a situation more 
characteristic o f an oligarchy than a democracy. The narrative o f Xenophon indicates Alcibiades, 
Thrasybulus, later Theramenes and to a lesser extent Thrasyllus as having the dominant role, and 
there is no hint o f the previously vocal fleet Assembly. Xenophon’s narrative, unlike 
Thucydides’, seems to presuppose that, while the fleet and the city were separated from one 
another, relations were co-operative and cordial. Indeed, it is unlikely that a reader not already 
familiar with the background to the events reported by Xenophon would suppose any sort o f
883 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.8 cf. Diodorus, 13.66, Plutarch, Life o f  Alcibiades, 31.
884 According to Diodorus (13.68), two generals, Diodorus and Manitheus were left a force to hold the Hellespont. It is 
uncertain whether these generals were elected by the city or came from the fleet. The former is more likely and thus 
this can be seen as the fleet handing the Hellespont completely back to Athens.
885 We note again the two criteria that, for Thucydides (8.76), represented the claim for cities to control fleets; 
provision o f leadership and money.
886 The verdict o f Cornelius Nepos (Thrasybulus, 1.3), that Alcibiades did only part o f the work but “by some gift o f  
his nature, gained the credit for everything”, is made in relation to Thrasybulus, but seems to be generally applicable.
887 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.10-12. Alcibiades’ detour is admittedly very lucrative; he brought 100 talents back from 
Caria.
888 Fosdyke, Exile, Ostracism and Democracy, p. 190. I have interpreted the phrase “sailors stationed at Samos” here 
differently from the way Forsdyke appears to use it. I include the metics, foreigners and allies, as I believe they took 
part in the political community on Samos. Fosdyke sees the democracy on Samos as comprising Athenian citizens only 
(p. 187 “the Athenian sailors at Samos...established] their own democracy”), and it is likely she has Athenians only in 
mind when she refers to the “sailors stationed at Samos”.
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division between the Samos fleet and the city at this time, until Alcibiades’ homecoming. Both 
of these things (the ‘general-centric’ viewpoint and the ease o f relations between the city and the 
fleet) could be indicative o f Xenophon’s simpler narrative, and a genuine continuation of  
Thucydides would have given us a more nuanced and complicated picture. However, Kagan is 
right to say that no source talks o f a significant conflict or hostility between the city and the 
fleet,889 and Thucydides’ narrative at least hints at Alcibiades’ special position and the 
strengthening o f relations between city and fleet. While it can be speculated that the fleet and 
the city were more independent of one another than Xenophon suggests, or that the men of the 
fleet played a more prominent role than he allows, there is little testimony on which to base such 
a case; it is only the (fragmentary) epigraphic record that suggests a degree o f separation, in that 
the fleet in the Hellespont did not receive funding from Athens. It may be argued that, by 
Thucydides’ two criteria (money and leadership) the fleet was largely free o f direct Athenian 
control until 407 BC, but it nevertheless must be concluded that the city and the fleet (due 
probably to diplomatic work started by Alcibiades and continued by Thrasyllus and Theramenes 
under the 5,000) were pulling in the same direction for most o f this period. From 409 to 407 BC, 
the fleet was being led, apparently without significant difficulty, by two generals elected by the 
fleet and not the city (Alcibiades and Thrasybulus; the former an exile), a general elected by both 
the fleet and Athens (Thrasyllus), and a general elected by the oligarchs at Athens and not by the 
fleet at all, and who had been a participant in the regime to which the fleet swore enmity to 
(Theramenes). Personal friendships amongst these generals notwithstanding, it certainly seems 
that there was a close alliance between the city and the fleet, even if full reconciliation and direct 
control would not occur until 407 BC.
889 Kagan, The Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 266
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PART 3: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE NAVY
1: The Democratic Navy?
Amit’s statement that the events of oligarchic conspiracy and the Samos democracy “give us a 
special opportunity for examining the importance o f the crews o f the Athenian navy in the 
political life o f the polis”890 is also true for examining the ideology o f these men. The political 
motivations o f the nautikos ochlos are in the spotlight during these years in a way that they are 
not at any other time. However, as discussed in the previous section, the Athenian sailors o f the 
“naval mob” were not alone in their political activity in this period. The ideological standpoint 
ascribed to the stratiotai on Samos as a whole may not be accurately indicative o f that o f its 
constituent parts. Nevertheless, as the Athenians were probably the largest and most significant 
group amongst the stratiotai, and the trireme crewmen most numerous amongst the Athenians, it 
would be surprising indeed if there was not a large degree o f correlation in the respective 
ideologies of the force at Samos and the “naval mob”. Several obvious pieces of evidence point 
to the commonly held view that the Samos fleet, and the men o f the Athenian navy, were 
essentially democratic in their ideology; the statement o f Thucydides regarding the “naval mob”, 
the nature o f the political system that the fleet set up and the oaths they took, and the clear 
dedication to democracy shown by the Paralos crew (and others) all seem to point in the 
direction of a “thoroughly democratic navy”.891 However, the evidence in fact points to a far 
more nuanced and complicated ideological pattern, and the picture is not simply one of  
ideological conflict between the oligarchic city on the one hand and the democratic navy on the 
other.
Oligarchic City vs. Democratic Navy?
Such polarized interpretations of this period spring largely from Thucydides’ comment at the 
point o f the Samos fleet splitting from Athens; “so they were now locked in a duel, one side 
attempting to force the city to accept democracy, the other to force the army to accept 
oligarchy.”892 Clearly this polarization had some degree o f applicability for that moment in time, 
and even for the period of the 400’s rule at Athens.893 Fosdyke argues, when discussing the 
setting up of the Samos democracy, that “Thucydides’ narrative reveals...the strong democratic 
sentiments o f the sailors at Samos”894; in fact, it is clear from Thucydides’ narrative that while the 
navy on Samos was at that point democratic, and in opposition to the oligarchic city, such a 
clear-cut political and ideological stance was not the case either previously or subsequently. The 
discussion in the previous section concerned the relations between the city and the fleet
890 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 64
891 Kagan, Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p. 266
892 Thucydides, 8.76
893 Andrewes (HCT, ad loc 8.76) notes that the phrasing here can apply to “the coming months as well as the present 
moment”.
894 Fosdyke, Exile, Ostracism and Democracy, p. 190
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concluded that good co-operation between these two factions was begun under the oligarchy of 
the 5,000, and there was no immediate furthering o f positive relations, far less full reconciliation, 
when democracy returned to Athens in 410 BC. In other words, the relations between the two 
sides were not informed primarily by ideological standpoints on forms of government; common 
interests and enemies, personal alliances and enmities and some degree o f mutual suspicion seem 
to have been more significant in determining the relationship. This point has not always been 
fully appreciated. Kagan, for example, says “it hardly seems likely that the democrats in Athens 
would have been at odds with the thoroughly democratic fleet and its generals” ,895 It seems that 
while there was co-operation between these two sides, they remained as two separate forces 
despite their (apparently) similar ideologies.
Prior to the break from Athens, Thucydides gives us tantalising glimpses o f the thoughts and 
opinions o f the fleet on Samos. He is clear, for example, that the oligarchic conspiracy began at 
Samos amongst the Athenians in the fleet in 412/11 BC.896 The supposed influence o f  Alcibiades 
in Persia was common knowledge amongst the Athenians, and was the basis for the conspiracy. 
However, it was not amongst all o f the Athenians at Samos that the plot was initially pursued:
epeide gar eisthonto auton ischuonta par' autoi hoi en tei Samdi Athenaion 
stratiotai, ta men kai Alkibiadou prospempsantos logous es tons dunatdtatous 
auton andras hoste mnesthenai peri autou es tous beltistous ton anthropon hoti 
ep' oligarchiai bouletai kai ou poneriai oude demokratiai tei auton ekbalousei 
katelthon kai paraschon Tissaphernen philon autois xumpoliteuein, to de pleon 
kai apo sphon auton hoi en tei Samdi trierarchoi te ton Athenaion kai 
dunatotatoi hormento es to katalusai ten demokratian.
When the Athenian campaigners on Samos realized that he [Alcibiades] had 
great influence with him [Tissaphemes], they took action largely o f their own 
accord, but also because o f the messages sent by Alcibiades to the leading men 
amongst them to tell the best men that that if there were only an oligarchy in the 
place o f the rascally democracy that had banished him, he would be glad to 
return to his country and to make Tissaphemes their friend. Thus the Athenian 
trierarchs and the leading men set themselves the task o f overthrowing the 
democracy.897
The tactics used by the principal conspirators are interesting; it seems that the fleet as a whole 
could not be expected to be sympathetic to such a proposal, and so the influential men, and 
particularly the trierarchs, were sounded out first. These men then formed a conspiracy which 
was extended to ton anthropon tous epitedeious, “the suitable men”, before putting their 
proposal to the fleet as a whole. How large this group of suitable people was is unclear; it was 
probably fairly small, but it was certainly wider than the “leading men and trierarchs” who were 
in on the plot from the very start.898 It indicates some level o f support for the conspiracy amongst
895 Kagan, Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, p.266
896 Thucydides, 8.48.
897 Thucydides, 8.47.2
898 Andrewes (HCT  ad loc 8.48.2) suggests that this group “perhaps included the ‘other ranks’”, and rightly links them 
with tous beltistous ton anthropon, “the best men”, at 8.47.2.
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the more ‘ordinary’ Athenians on Samos. More tangible persuasion was needed to convince the 
majority to support, or at least not oppose, the idea:
kai ho men ochlos, ei kai ti parautika echtheto tois prassomenois, dia to euporon 
tes elpidos toupara basileos misthou hesuchazen
The general opinion of the crowd may have been upset for the moment, but 
calmed down because the prospect o f pay from the [Persian Great] King seemed 
easy o f attainment.899
This acquiescence may have been somewhat reluctant on the part o f the fleet, but it appears that 
the prospect o f money was enough to make them agree to forsake democracy in favour o f  
oligarchy. When a similar proposal shortly thereafter was put to the Assembly at Athens, 
however, it took more than the thought o f pay from the King to win the crowd’s agreement. 
While the King’s money is mentioned, it is done so in the context o f the very survival o f  
Athens.900 As well as this, another factor is mentioned by the leader o f the conspirators, 
Pisander:
ho de demos to men proton akouon chalepos ephere to peri tes oligarchias: 
saphos de didaskomenos hupo tou Peisandrou me einai alien soterian, deisas kai 
hama epelpizon hos kai metabaleitai, enedoken.
The idea o f oligarchy was very badly received by the people at first, but when 
Pisander made it perfectly clear that there was no other way out, their fears (and 
also the fact that they expected to be able to change the constitution later) made 
them give in.901
For the Assembly at Athens, acquiescence at this point to the idea o f an oligarchy was not 
dependent simply upon pay from the King;902 the desperateness o f the situation, and the necessity 
of securing Persian funds to win the war, were crucial in winning over the Assembly, as was the 
mentioning o f a ‘safety clause’, whereby democracy could be restored. Neither of these ideas 
seems to have been needed to win over the fleet. If Thucydides has transmitted sufficiently 
accurate details, it would suggest that the actions o f the Athenian assembly were informed by a 
greater ideological connection and loyalty to democracy than those o f the fleet. Even if  
Thucydides’ account can not be pressed into making such a comparison, the fact remains that he 
presents the devotion to democracy amongst the Athenians on Samos as less strong than their 
desire for regular and plentiful payment from a foreign monarch.
899 Thucydides, 8.48.3
900 Thucydides, 8.53
901 Thucydides, 8.54.1
902 Andrewes (HCT, ad loc 8.54) that on neither this occasion, nor that involving the Samos fleet at 8.48, did the 
audiences vote in favour o f an oligarchy. However, the acceptance o f the conspirator’s arguments on both occasions 
seems to make them comparable for the purposes o f the present discussion.
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The next insight into the ideology o f the fleet is reported by Thucydides in 411 BC, a little prior 
to the split from Athens, during the civil strife in Samos itself. The Samian democrats, fearing an 
oligarchic coup, try to rally support amongst the fleet to help them defend the democracy:
hoi de aisthomenoi ton te strategon Leonti kai Diomedonti houtoi gar ouch 
hekontes dia to timasthai hupo tou demou epheron ten oligarchian to mellon 
semainousi kai Thrasubouldi kai Thrasuloi, toi men trierarchounti, toi de 
hopliteuonti, kai allois hoi edokoun aiei malista enantiousthai tois xunestosin
They [the Samian democrats] got wind o f what was coming, and told two o f the 
generals, Leon and Diomedon, who, on account o f the credit which they enjoyed 
with the people, were unwilling supporters of the oligarchy; and also Thrasybulus 
and Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a galley, the latter a hoplite, besides certain 
others who had ever been thought most opposed to the conspirators.903
They did not appeal to the fleet as a whole, but instead to individuals whom they expected to be 
sympathetic to their cause. As well as Leon and Diomedon (two Athenian generals), Thrasyllus 
and Thrasybulus were mentioned by name - at this time a trierarch and a hoplite respectively - 
and these individuals rallied further support from the stratiotai, again giving particular attention 
to those expected to be sympathetic. The crew o f the trireme Paralos are particularly mentioned 
in this context as perpetual anti-oligarchs.904 What is striking about the sequence o f events here 
is that it closely follows that undertaken by the Athenian oligarchic conspirators outlined above; 
appeals are made to like-minded individuals, who themselves add to the conspiracy by word-of- 
mouth, rather than a mass appeal to the whole force. Perhaps it suggests that, like the oligarchs, 
these democrats could not expect widespread support for their cause amongst the fleet. Certainly 
it attests to the presence o f diverse ideological viewpoints in the fleet. They ranged from the 
Paralos crew’s opposition towards oligarchy on principle, to Leon and Diomedon’s position as 
somewhat reluctant supporters o f the new oligarchic arrangements in Athens, to more vocal and 
dedicated supporters of the oligarchic ‘regime change’.
The fact that there were some enthusiastic supporters o f the oligarchy still on Samos in the 
months following the 400 taking power is evidenced by the oaths that Thrasyllus and 
Thrasybulus made the fleet and the military age Samians swear. Indeed, Thucydides reports that 
the oaths were aimed particularly at those who were part o f the oligarchic faction.905 What these 
oaths demonstrate is that the democratic ideology of the Samos fleet should not be taken for 
granted by modem scholars, any more than it was by Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus. The very fact 
that the leaders o f the Samos fleet felt that adherence to democracy needed to be solemnly sworn 
demonstrates that such loyalty could not be assumed. Support for their key policies, continuation 
of the war and opposition to the 400, was solidified in the same way. Even in this context, at its 
most politically active, it is hard to see the navy as “thoroughly democratic”, though it seems to
903 Thucydides, 8.73.4
904 Thucydides, 8.73.5
905 Thucydides, 8.73.2 kai autos tous ek tes oligarchias malista
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have taken far less persuasion to get the fleet to adhere to democracy than to acquiesce to 
oligarchy.
The fleet’s choice to become a democracy is significant, especially given the wide political 
participation allowed on Samos.906 But this was democracy that soon made pragmatic 
compromises and choices. It is noteworthy that in the Samos fleet’s first meeting, in which the 
speakers tried to reassure one another, the agreeable prospect o f  alliance with the King is a key 
issue again, as well as the issue o f securing resources. It is likely that the issue o f  Alcibiades and 
the Persian alliance was one o f the reasons for the “change o f  feeling against the idea o f  
oligarchy” that Thucydides said took place on Samos. Talks between Pisander and the oligarchs 
on the one hand with Alcibiades and Tissaphemes on the other had broken down,907 and soon 
after the Peloponnesians signed the first in a series o f treaties with the Persian King.908 Pisander 
and his fellow conspirators909 turned against Alcibiades and his recall, but pressed ahead with 
their plans to install an oligarchy at Athens. It is easy to see how the sailors at Samos would have 
turned against the oligarchy when they perceived that it was not honouring its stated 
commitments to recall Alcibiades, treat with the Persians, and thus secure their pay.910
As noted above, the fleet went on to co-operate with the oligarchy o f  the 5,000 at Athens, and the 
fleet’s democracy itself soon became effectively a narrow oligarchy o f  elected generals, amongst 
whom Alcibiades was the first amongst equals. It was Alcibiades who framed an answer to the 
envoys from the 400, an answer probably made before the fleet’s assembly, and with that 
audience in mind:
autos de apokrinamenos autois apepempen, hoti tous men pentakischilious ou 
koluoi archein, tous mentoi tetrakosious apallassein ekeleuen autous kai 
kathistanai ten boulen hosper kai proteron, tous pentakosious: ei de es euteleian ti 
xuntetmetai hoste tous strateuomenous mallon echein trophen, panu epainein. kai 
talla ekeleuen antechein kai meden endidonai tois polemiois: pros men gar sphas 
autous soizomenes tes poleds pollen elpida einai kai xumbenai
He [Alcibiades] dismissed them [the ambassadors] with an answer from himself, 
to the effect that he did not object to the government o f  the 5,000, but insisted 
that the 400 should be deposed and the boule o f 500 reinstated in power: he was 
entirely in favour o f any measures o f economy which would result in better pay 
for the campaigners; and in general he urged them to hold fast and make no 
concessions to the enemy, saying that, so long as the city was preserved, there
906 I argue this in Section Two, section B.2
907 Thucydides, 8.56
908 Thucydides, 8.58.
909 Thucydides, 8.63.4. The phrase used for these people is oi en tei Samoi ton Athenion, “the Athenians on Samos”. 
On its own, this phrase would imply quite a wide group, but the reference to these people contributing their private 
means to the cause later in this passage confirms that this group was the affluent and influential men amongst the 
Athenians on Samos amongst whom the conspiracy began.
910 It appears that the Samos fleet did not know the full details o f  the conference between Pisander, Tissaphemes and 
Alcibiades, and the lack o f real influence he had in Persia. When they formed their own government, they are still 
confident that the recall o f  Alcibiades will result in a treaty with the King (8.76, cf. 8.81). There is a similar lack o f  full 
knowledge amongst some o f  Pisander’s oligarchic faction in Athens, who had murdered the demagogue Androcles to 
appease Alcibiades (8.65); as Andrewes observes (HCT , ad loc 8.65.2) “it was a help to the conspirators to keep the 
breakdown [of the negotiations with Persia] as secret as possible till they had secured their grip on the city.”
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were good hopes o f some kind o f  agreement being reached between the two
911parties.
Alcibiades suggests here that a reconciliation could occur under a wider oligarchy in Athens, 
provided that the war would continue and the fleet’s pay would be secured. While Thucydides 
does not record the fleet’s reaction to these proposals, Alcibiades’ continued leadership would 
suggest their tacit agreement with his sentiments. This compares well with the occasion earlier 
in 411 BC, discussed above, when the fleet agreed to the idea o f an oligarchy because o f  financial 
considerations. Despite breaking from Athens and operating independently and swearing the 
most binding o f oaths to democracy, it appears that a democratic constitution at Athens was not a 
precondition for reconciliation between the fleet and the city; but regular pay for the fleet was. It 
seems then that, while the “naval mob” might prefer democracy to oligarchy, it was prepared to 
accept either on the reliable promise o f regular wages.
There remains the question o f how to interpret Thucydides’ description o f the ‘“naval mob’” , a 
phrase used for the one and only time by him in the context o f the events o f 411 BC. 
Thucydides reports that the oligarchs sent ambassadors to the fleet at Samos immediately upon 
coming to power, and explains why the 400 considered this move to be such a priority:
deisantes me, hoper egeneto, nautikos ochlos out' autos menein en toi 
oligarchikoi kosmoi ethelei, sphas te me ekeithen arxamenou tou kakou 
metastesdsin.
They [the 400] feared (and their fears were justified by the event) that the naval 
mob would not be willing to stay under the oligarchic government, and that the 
trouble might start there, and end in the new government itself being thrown
91?out. 12
While this passage could possibly be interpreted as suggesting a generalized anti-oligarchic 
ideology amongst the “naval mob”,913 it need mean no more that they were opposed to that 
particular oligarchy of the 400. As suggested above, even before the (possibly exaggerated) 
reports o f abuses in Athens has reached Samos, the fleet had good reason to be suspicious o f the 
400, who had not recalled Alcibiades and still less secured them pay from the King. The picture 
is further complicated by Thucydides’ authorial description the Paralos crew, whom he credits 
with being then and always opposed to oligarchy as a matter o f principle.914 How does this effect 
our interpretation o f the “naval mob’”s political ideology? Was the attitude o f the Paralos crew 
shared by the navy as a whole, and thus suggesting a wide interpretation of the passage quoted
911 Thucydides, 8.86.6-7
912 Thucydides, 8.72.2
9,3 As I have argued in a previous section o f this work, the sorts of issues that the 400 tell the ambassadors to discuss at 
Samos (that they mean no harm to the citizens and that 5,000 share the constitution) suggest that the “naval mob” they 
fear are those o f Samos fleet who were Athenian citizens. However, I do not believe that such an interpretation o f  the 
term in this context is inevitable. While I use the term “naval mob” too include only Athenian citizens, it should not be 
considered certain that Thucydides used it in this way.
914 The relevant passage is quoted below, in the following section.
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above? Or alternatively were the Paraloi unusual in their opposition to any oligarchy, and the 
“naval mob” as a whole only opposed to such oligarchies as did them disservice?
The Paralos and her crew in 411 BC915
In the build-up to the Samos fleet’s break from Athens, the crew o f  the Athenian trireme Paralos 
played a prominent role. They were amongst those democrats from the fleet who were involved 
in resisting the oligarchic coup on Samos in 411 BC. Upon returning to Athens with the news and 
finding the 400 in command, several members o f the crew were arrested, before the rest were 
sent to Euboea in a troop-transport, on patrol duty.916 Some little time later, the Paralos crew 
were ordered to convey diplomats from the 400 to Sparta, but instead they stopped at Argos, 
imprisoned the oligarchs, and sailed (in the Paralos itself) to Samos. The reason for their actions 
appears to be largely ideological. When describing the Paralos crew, Thucydides says:
tous Paralous, andras Athenaious te kai eleutherous pantos en tei nei pleontas
kai aiei depote oligarchiai kai me parousei epikeimenous
Those who sailed on the Paralos being Athenians and free men one and all, and
had always been thoroughly opposed to the idea o f an oligarchy, even when
there was no question of such a thing existing.917
It is unclear as to why the Paraloi were trusted with this mission by the 400 so soon after they 
had been packed off around Euboea. It must surely be considered a risky move, if  not reckless 
one, on the part o f the oligarchs, unless the democratic credentials o f the Paraloi were 
established by this very episode. Such an interpretation, however, would mean disregarding 
Thucydides’ remark that they opposed oligarchy even before there was the possibility o f one. It 
is also unclear how the Paraloi got their ship back. Perhaps they were restored to their ship for 
the diplomatic mission by the 400, or perhaps they recaptured it somehow: the former is perhaps 
most likely.
Whatever the details o f this sequence o f events, Thucydides’ statement o f both the ideology o f  
the Paralos crew and its composition is o f crucial importance in this study. The Paralos crew 
were Athenian citizen trireme crewmen, the two key factors in my definition o f the “naval mob”. 
It is thus possible that their standpoint in respect o f oligarchy, clearly stated by Thucydides, is 
indicative o f the political ideology o f the “naval mob” as a whole. However, while the Paralos 
crew share the two essential characteristics o f the “naval mob”, they also are, in several ways, 
exceptional. As concluded in Part One, section C.2, the differences between the Paraloi and the 
wider “naval mob” are as striking and significant as the similarities. As Jordan argues, they acted 
as they did in 411 BC because they “were held together in an organisation [i.e. the cult o f
915 The evidence connected with the Paralos generally, and with the other famous ‘sacred’ trireme the Salaminia, has 
been discussed in Part One, Section C.2
916 Thucydides, 8.74
917 Thucydides, 8.73.5
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Paralos] with ties stronger than those which spring from common political sympathies or from 
loyalty to shipmates.”918 Given these factors, it would be unwise to suggest that the ideology o f  
the “naval mob” was necessarily similar to that o f the Paralos crew. It cannot be argued that that 
“naval mob” was, as a matter o f principle, anti-oligarchic simply because the Paraloi were.
Conclusions: the pragmatic navy
In the course o f 411 BC and in subsequent years, the men o f  the fleet displayed a clear preference 
for democracy; the system under which all o f the Athenian citizens had been bom, all the metics 
had chosen to live, and to which every (free) person on the expedition had sworn allegiance to. 
But is it then correct to interpret this period as an ideological contest between democrats and 
oligarchs? Several things count against such a view. The oligarchic movement began amongst 
the fleet at Samos, and was assented to by the stratiotai as a whole, as it would mean (so they 
believed) pay from the king. The immediate reasons for the anger o f the members o f the fleet and 
their determination to cede from Athens was not so much about their political disenfranchisement 
and the change o f regime, as it was about the (perhaps exaggerated/invented by Chareas) abuses 
carried out by that regime. After the initial split during the rule o f the 400, relations between the 
fleet and city started to improve under the oligarchic 5,000. After being elected to the fleet 
Alcibiades answered envoys from the 400 (probably before the fleet’s assembly and with this 
audience in mind) that a government o f the 5,000 would be acceptable; he also stated that he 
would favour any economic measure to secure pay for the stratiotai, as he would be for a 
continuation o f the war. Perhaps he was trying to associate these ideas; Athens under the 5,000, 
paying her sailors and soldiers to fight on. Thirdly, while relations between the fleet and the city 
continue to be largely co-operative when democracy was restored, there was not a full 
reconciliation at this time; this is troubling to a strict ideological interpretation opposing a 
democratic navy with the oligarchic city. While some in the fleet, particularly the leading 
generals Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus and the crew o f the Paralos, were certainly staunch 
democrats, these people can not be taken as representative o f the fleet as a whole, nor o f the 
“naval mob”. The impression we get o f the navy at this most important and singular moment o f  
political identity and action is that while there were some staunch oligarchs, and more staunch 
democrats, most o f the stratiotai were ideologically more neutral and pragmatic. They fiercely 
opposed the 400 not because it was a narrow oligarchy, but because that particular oligarchy 
acted against their interests. The events o f 411 BC suggest that the “naval mob”, and the rest o f  
the navy too, were more democratic than they were oligarchic, but were essentially more 
pragmatic than democratic.
However, it would be over simplistic to assume that any o f the crews o f the Athenian navy had 
an ideology that was consistent and durable. While the crew Paralos, as argued above, cannot be 
taken as representative o f navy crews as a whole, the fact that attitudes and ideologies were not
918 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 173
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constant aboard this most famous o f  Athenian ships is probably reflective o f the reality o f the 
Athenian navy. A passage in Aristophanes’ Frogs, produced in 405 BC, suggests that there was 
considerable change in the attitudes o f the Paralos crew throughout the fifth century. In this 
passage Dionysus and the (dead) playwright Aeschylus nostalgically recall Athens’ ‘golden age’:
Aischulos: eit' au lalian epitedeusai kai stdmulian edidaxas, he 'xekendsen tas te 
palaistras kai tas pugas enetripsen ton meirakion stdmullomenon, kai 
tons Paralous anepeisen antagoreuein tois archousin. kaitoi tote g' 
henik' ego 'zon, ouk epistant' all' e mazan kalesai kai ‘rhuppapai ’ eipein.
Dionusos: ne ton Apollo, kai prospardein g'es to stoma toi thalamaki, kai 
minthdsai ton xussiton kakbas tina lopodutesai: nun d' antilegei kouket' 
elaunon plei deuri kauthis ekeise.
Aeschylus: Then again, you’ve taught people the habit o f chatter and babble, 
which has emptied the wrestling-schools and worn down young men’s 
buttocks as they sit blabbering - and has encouraged the crew o f the 
Paralos to talk back to their officers. Why in the old days, when I was 
alive, all they knew how to do was call for their grub and shout “yo-ho”
Dionysus: Yes, by Apollo-and also to fart in the face o f bottom-bench Charlie, 
to smear a messmate with shit, and to go ashore and nick someone’s 
clothes. Now they dispute their orders and won’t row anymore; first 
they sail this way and then back that w ay.919
This passage suggests, though without much precision, that the attitudes of the Paralos 
crew were subject to change over time, within their general ideological viewpoint in 
favour of democracy. This passage should not be pressed as authoritative evidence, but 
there is a suggestion here of a time in the past where the Paraloi were not as strong- 
willed or vocal as they were in 411 BC, or indeed in 405 BC, and that they became 
increasingly undisciplined and disobedient. But these are vague indications that allow 
little in the way of precision, and there is certainly not sufficient information to 
accurately trace developments in the ideology and activity of the Paralos crew. It is 
worth noting that, while Thucydides gives a categorical assertion of their anti-oligarchic 
credentials, within this the attitudes of the Paralos crew were imprecise and changeable; 
and that there is little hope of accurately assessing the mindset of the crews of the 
hundreds of less well-known Athenian triremes.920
2: Pay and Patriotism: national service, or mercenary labour
market?
This section will explore further an issue raised in Part One o f this work; the professional status 
of Athenian naval crews. It was argued there that the phrase “naval mob”, as well as other 
passages relating to the naval crews in Thucydides and Aristotle’s Politics, suggested that there
919 Aristophanes, Frogs, 1069-77.
920 See discussion below, Part Three, section 4.
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was a significant number o f sailors who made their sole or primary living from working in the 
trireme fleet. In addition, although there was a great deal o f variation in the numbers o f triremes 
at sea at any given time, the manifold year-round occupations o f the navy required in turn full­
time rowers and specialists. I have used the phrase “naval mob” in this work to denote 
specifically the Athenian citizens amongst this group o f  professionals, a definition which has 
some grounding in the (very limited) ancient usage. Additional arguments in favour o f the 
presence o f significant numbers o f professional trireme crewmen, citizen and non-citizen, will be 
set out below, and the essentially vocational nature o f the classical Athenian navy will be made 
clear. This characterisation o f the navy as a professional organisation calls into question the 
common perception of crewing triremes as a military service, and the appropriate ideological 
location o f crewing triremes. It should be acknowledged at the outset that some o f these points 
have been made before; in his study o f metics, for example, Whitehead remarked that crewing a 
trireme was not so much a military obligation, but simply “a job o f work”.921 It is nevertheless a 
view worth setting out fully, not least as this argument has consequences for the commonly 
perceived relationship between the men of the fleet on the one hand, and Athenian democracy on 
the other.
Professional Sailors
There is other evidence which can be brought in to demonstrate the presence o f a numerous 
group o f professional sailors. Trundle states that “it is obvious that regular wages and 
professional service go hand in hand”,922 to which should be added the important qualification 
that there was a difference, both practically and ideologically, between payments to facilitate 
public service and full-time earnings.923 While it should not be denied that conscripts were 
drafted to the oar benches in times o f emergency, these were clearly exceptions to the norm; 
triremes were crewed largely by paid volunteers, citizen and non-citizen alike 924 Many o f these 
men did so in a professional capacity, which is to say that their sole, or at least predominant, 
source o f income was working aboard triremes. In the fourth century, some o f  Apollodorus’ 
crewmen asked their captain for extra pay for the upkeep o f their households, indicating that 
they earned their living primarily at the oar.925 He says o f his deserters that, being skilled
921 Whitehead, Athenian Metic, p. 86.
922 Trundle, Mercenaries, p. 19
923 Again, Trundle is elsewhere {Mercenaries, p. 96-7) aware o f  this distinction. He argues that there is a relationship 
between “wage-earning in the service o f the state as a hoplite and service o f  the state as a juror”, 2-3 obols a day, and 
that this was different from the wages for skilled and unskilled labourers, which “demonstrate an approximation with 
mercenary wages”, from 3 obols to 2 drachmae per day.
924 Gabrielsen, Fiinancing the Athenian Fleet, p. 112 “For most o f the fifth and all o f the fourth century conscription 
was the exception rather than the rule.” See also Trundle {Mercenaries, p. 23), who argues that “most o f the personnel 
in the Athenian and Spartan navies during the Peloponnesian war...were professionals, in that they were paid for their 
services, even the Athenian lower-status oarsmen”.
925 [Demosthenes] 50.12. Gabrielsen {Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 107) has argued that the use o f  conscription at 
Arginusae, and at times in the fourth century, is “a clear indication o f  a manpower shortage among the groups 
traditionally used for naval service.” The fact that (as Gabrielsen him self notes) conscription was unusual even in the 
fourth century indicates that it was not so much a case o f there being no oarsmen available; there was rather at Athens a 
shortage o f money to pay for crewmen, both from the state and from trierarchoi willing to lavish money on their ships’ 
crew. The ‘pr°fessi°nal’ seamen were still there, but when there was no work at Athens, they sought employment in 
the navies o f other states; see [Demosthenes], 50.16, cf. 50.14, where specific alternative employers are mentioned.
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oarsmen, they were confident o f being able to find employment in navies elsewhere; clearly they 
were plentiful opportunities for employment even in the fourth century BC.926 The hyperesia, 
undoubtedly professionals in their relative fields, were often drawn from amongst the oarcrew; 
this again implies a number amongst the latter who were employed full time on board 
triremes.927 Amit states that “the creation o f a permanent navy offered renumerative (sic) work 
for the poorer citizens”,928 and Whitehead is doubtless correct in asserting that trireme service 
“never...acquired the quasi-liturgical character o f hoplite service”.929
The levels o f wages paid to hoplites and sailors is one potential indicator of this difference, but 
the evidence for sailors’ pay is slim and that for hoplites even slimmer. As Pritchett notes in his 
full account o f military pay, two obols, three obols and a drachma have all been argued as the 
basic ‘peacetime’ daily wage o f the Athenian armed forces.930 After a thorough review o f all the 
source material, he concludes that three obols was the ‘standard rate’ for both hoplites and 
trireme crews, and that “military service, then, was financially unremunerative.”931 This rate o f  
pay could be supplemented if  the campaign was to be a particularly long one; two examples from 
Thucydides, our best source on this issue, relate to the siege o f  Potidaea in 428 BC and the 
invasion of Sicily in 415 BC; in both cases, a drachma a day was paid to hoplites and trireme 
crews alike.932 He adduces only one testimony o f the pay for hoplites which was not connected 
with an ‘extended’ campaign; in the terms o f a treaty between Athens and three other cities in 
420 BC, three Aeginetan obols was the level of pay given to hoplites (and other types o f soldier), 
and is described as sitos, “ration-money”.933 While these coins were slightly higher in value than 
the Athenian equivalents, and could thus be considered a very generous allowance for a man’s 
rations, this was not a sufficient level of remuneration to maintain a household. In addition, such 
payments were only to be given if a campaign lasted more than 30 days. That this was deemed 
an appropriate level o f payment by the four different cities involved perhaps tentatively suggests 
to us a generally acceptable level o f remuneration for hoplites in this period.934
926 [Demosthenes] 50.16.
927 Aristophanes, Knights, 11. 542-4
928 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 61
929 Whitehead, Athenian Metic, p. 86.
930 Pritchett, Greek State at War I, p. 23.
931 Pritchett, Greek State at War I, p. 24.
932 Potidaia; Thucydides, 3.17. Sicily; Thucydides, 6.8.
933 Thucydides, 5.47. Three Aeginetan obols was approximately equivalent to four Attic obols. On this passage (HCT  
ad loc 5.47.6), the authors remark that “It would not be fair to compare the rates o f pay... since this is explicitly a 
ration-allowance”. Terminology for wages and ration-money was not, however, remarkably consistent in fifth-century 
sources (primarily Thucydides). Loomis (Wages, pp. 41-2) interprets the sitos here as the total “gross pay”, rather than 
in the strict sense o f ration-money alone. These figures do indeed represent more than a man might need for daily 
rations. It is perhaps the case that the level o f ration-money was set at a higher rate than usual in order to discourage 
the signatories from calling the troops o f their allies away from their homes and occupations for extended periods o f  
time; as is remarked in the HCT  note on this passage (cited above, cf. vol. 1, p. 10-2), this treaty implies that “a month 
is thought to be a reasonable length o f time for a campaign”. If there was indeed this element o f deterrent in the setting 
o f this somewhat generous ration allowance, then it is significant that three Aeginetan obols per day is still an 
appreciably lower level o f payment than the one Attic drachma per day given to sailors at this time.
934 And if not a normal level for hoplites (and indeed other infantry), then a high one; see previous note.
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Pritchett argues that there was no difference between the rates o f pay for hoplites and crewmen, 
and that both were paid normally paid at a level comparable to other sorts o f public service; he 
also suggests that “if pay for army service was not instituted at the same time as dikastic misthos 
[i.e. jury pay], it may be expected to have followed soon thereafter”.935 In other words, that pay 
for both hoplites and juries was introduced by Pericles. There is however good evidence to 
suggest that sailors in the fleet were being paid long before money was routinely given for these 
public services in Athens, and that they were paid more generously. The sailors at Salamis were 
all given money, though this was a singular payment and not any sort o f wage. Plutarch states, 
perfectly plausibly, that the tribute from the allied states was used to pay wages to oarsmen in the 
years between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.936 In his campaign against the Persian 
stronghold o f Eion 477 BC, Kimon is said to have ransomed the captured prisoners to provide his 
sailors with pay.937 In addition, convincing arguments can be made to suggest that the usual pay 
for trireme crews was a drachma a day in the fifth century BC; twice as much as the usual daily 
rate o f a hoplite or juror in that period, and well within the realms o f gainful employment.938 In 
415 BC, the Egestans sent Athens money to cover the wage bill o f  a 60-ship trireme fleet for a 
month.939 The amount was 60 talents, in other words a drachma per day for each of the 200 crew. 
Almost two decades earlier, an inscribed account for an Athenian naval campaign strongly 
suggests that the same assumption regarding naval pay was being made.940 The campaign is 
narrated relatively fully in ten chapters by Thucydides, including a full battle report and a pair o f  
short speeches.941 In brief, a ten-ship squadron was sent to Corcyra to counter Corinthian activity 
in that area. A short time later, the Corinthian and Corcyraean fleets fought a sea-battle off 
Sybota, with the ten Athenian ships participating, though cautiously, on the side o f the islanders. 
During the closing stages o f the battle, a second Athenian fleet, 20 triremes strong, arrived on the 
scene. Shortly after the battle, there was a brief round o f diplomacy with the now outmatched 
Corinthians, after which the Athenian fleet returned home. There is no explicit indication o f the 
campaign’s duration, but the narrative suggests that the Athenian intervention in Corcyra was 
brief, and certainly completed within the course o f a single summer. In terms of duration, all that 
the inscription implies is a gap o f 23 days between the launching o f the two fleets, or at least 
between the payments made to the respective commanders o f these expeditions.942
935 Pritchett, Greek State at War, vol. 1, p. 13
936 Payments for the sailors at Salamis; according to [Aristotle] (Constitution o f  Athens, 23.1) each man was given 8 
drachmae to support himself and his family by the Council o f the Areopagus. Wages for trireme crews during the 
pentekontaetia; Plutarch, Life o f  Kimon, 11.2, cf. Life o f  Pericles, 11.4.
937 Plutarch, Life o f  Kimon, 7
938 It is worth noting that, even if  Pritchett is correct to argue a usual rate o f  three obols a day for sailors, it was very 
common in the classical period for triremes to be in service for long periods o f  time; thus they would be likely to 
qualify for the higher rate o f a drachma a day given for extended service.
939 Thucydides, 6.8
940 IG I3 364=ML 61=Fomara 126
941 Thucydides, 1.45-55.
942 This is based on the virtually certain restoration o f “first” in line 22, making the payments for both fleets occur in 
the same prytany. Gomme {HCT, vol. 1, pp. 196-7) admits that there are other formal possibilities, and his statement 
that “almost all modem scholars agree on this” remains true today; see for example Homblower, Commentary, ad loc 
1.50.5
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Of most relevance to the present discussion on levels o f  sailor’s pay are the figures given in the 
inscription for the total amounts expended on the squadrons.943 These monies were entrusted to 
the relevant strategoi, whose predominant expense on such a campaign would have been 
payment o f wages to the crews.944 It is unfortunate therefore that the amounts depend on 
restorations; but these are relatively secure and the stone makes a useful contribution to this 
discussion. The first figure, on line 12, relates to the first squadron, o f ten ships. There are two 
blank spaces for figures, which can be most minimally restored to give a figure o f 26 talents.945 
Assuming this to be correct, the generals would have had enough money to give each of the 
2,000 crewmen manning their vessels a drachma a day for 78 days; such a time-scale accords 
very well with Thucydides’ narrative. If however we assume that the rate o f pay was only 3 
obols per day, this would represent over 5 months’ worth o f pay for the crews, which is difficult 
to reconcile with Thucydides’ description of the campaign. In other words, “the smallest 
restorations that are epigraphically possible support a minimum rate o f 1 dr. p.d for the 
rowers.”946
The second figure, in line 23, is more uncertain. There is one space on the stone for the amount, 
which limits the number o f formal possibilities. As this sum related to a squadron o f 20 ships, 
ten talents would seem too small an amount; as the fleet was deployed only on a short 
commission, 100 talents would seem to large. 50 talents is therefore is the most likely figure, and 
the one accepted by most scholars.947 At a drachma per day, this money could have kept the 
sailors paid for 75 days.948 This restoration is not entirely unproblematic, as it gives more money 
than this fleet probably needed; it was probably not in service for longer than two months. 
However, this problem is compounded if we assume anything less than a drachma per day as the 
rate for pay for the sailors; if the rate was only 3 obols per day, the second set o f generals had 
funds enough for five months. It is possible that the 50 talents were envisioned as a general fund 
to pay the expenses for both fleets, which evidently operated together in Corcyra. In any case, 
the scale o f payments given for these fleets make it highly unlikely that anything less than a 
drachma per day was given to the sailors.949
943 IG I3 364,11. 12 and 23.
944 The ship’s captains are likely to have been responsible for the costs o f  up keeping the vessels and any bonus 
payments to sailors, and nothing in either the inscription or Thucydides’ account (neither his description o f the 
launching o f  the fleets, nor his narrative o f the events) suggest that any additional troops were carried by these fleets. 
Virtually all o f  the cash given to the strategoi, then, was used for the basic pay the sailors.
945 66 talents would be the next smallest possible restoration, which would seem absurdly large for this fleet.
946 Loomis, Wages, p. 39
947 Fomara and Meiggs both resorted 50, and it is accepted by Homblower (Commentary, vol. 1, p.88, ad loc 1.45.2)
948 Again, a rate o f 3 obols per day would suggest a fleet in commission for 5 months, which is not compatible with 
Thucydides’ narrative.
949 Similar conclusions have been reached by Fomara (‘Samian War’, pp. 12-14) regarding the inscription IG I3 363, a 
fragmentary inscription recording expenses for the siege o f Samos between 441 and 439 BC, though this is not a short 
term fleet and so not directly relevant to the argument here. The minimum restored figures suggest payments at a rate 
of 1 talent per ship per month. While Loomis (Wages, p. 39) is correct to point out that this argument is somewhat 
“based on circular reasoning”, the figures are nevertheless hard to reconcile with rates o f pay lower than a drachma per 
day.
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When the Persian satrap Tissaphemes reckoned up the cost o f paying the wages o f the 
Peloponnesian fleet at a drachma per head per day, he was no doubt basing his figure on the usual 
Athenian rate.950 However, he needed the permission o f the Great King to make payments on this 
scale, and suggested paying three obols a day in the meantime, raising the pay to the “full 
drachma” upon obtaining royal consent.951 Gabrielsen argues correctly that this phrase strongly 
suggests that a drachma per day was the level o f pay expected by oarsmen at this time, in both the 
Athenian and the Peloponnesian navies.952 When Alcibiades advised Tissaphemes on how much 
money to pay crewmen, he suggested that he would do well to follow the Athenian practice:
Athenaioi ek pleonos chronou epistemones ontes tou nautikou tridbolon tois 
heauton didoasin, ou tosouton pertiai hoson hina auton me hoi nautai ek 
periousias hubrizontes hoi men ta somata cheiro echosi dapanontes es toiauta 
aph' hon he astheneia xumbainei, hoi de tas naus apoleipdsin ouch 
hupolipontes es homereian ton prosopheilomenon misthon
The Athenians, who had had experience in naval matters for a long time, gave 
only three obols to their sailors, not so much through lack o f  money as with 
the purpose o f keeping their sailors insolent by reason o f abundance; for some 
would injure their health by spending their money on things which bring 
sickness, while others would not desert their ships, for they would not leave 
behind part o f their pay that was still due.953
As Morrison and Williams have argued, Alcibiades is here referring to the Athenian practice of 
giving their sailors half o f their pay, three obols, while on campaign, with the balance withheld to 
prevent drunkenness and desertion.954 The practice o f withholding pay in the Athenian navy is 
attested in relation to the fourth century,955 and a phrase in Aristophanes’ Knights indicates that 
during the Peloponnesian war at least the balance should have been made good “when they [i.e. 
the sailors] come into port.”956 That this was a policy aim for the rejuvenated Demos in the play 
suggests that the real-life sailors were having trouble getting their dues in the 420s BC, a time 
when Athens’ revenue was relatively secure and she still had her 1,000 talent reverse intact upon 
the acropolis. Though Athens’ financial situation was far worse in the wake o f Sicily, it is likely 
that the wage expected by Athenian trireme crews was still a “full drachma” per day, and there is 
no direct evidence to suggest that the Athenians deliberately reduced naval wages at this time.957
950 Thucydides, 8.29, cf. 8.45. The unlikely alternative, as Andrewes {HCT, ad loc 8.45) pointed out, is to assume that 
Tissaphemes immediately agreed to double sailors’ wages.
951 Thucydides, 8.29.1
952 Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 112.
953 Thucydides, 8.45.
954 Morrision and Williams, Greek Oared Ships, pp. 269 ff, followed by Gabrielsen, Athenian Navy, p. 112.
955 Polyeanus, Strategems, 3.9.51
956 Aristophanes, Knights, 11. 1366-7. The line also suggests that this policy is not operating efficiently at this time. 
Knights was performed in 424 BC.
957 Andrewes {HCT, vol. 5, p. 97 ad loc 8.45.2) regarded the passage o f Xenophon discussed below as proof o f an 
Athenian pay cut in 413 BC, but it falls far short o f being so. The statement in Plutarch {Alcibiades, 35) that the 
Athenian general had trouble raising three obols for his men at a time when Lysander and the Persians were paying 
theirs four need refer to nothing more than the cash in hand given on campaign. In any case, Plutarch’s statement is 
probably based is on nothing more than his interpretation o f this passage o f  Xenophon, and so it has little value as 
independent testimony.
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If it is accepted that the Athenian navy, in theory at least, paid three obols per day to their sailors 
on campaign and a further three for each day when they returned to port, there remains the 
question of how to interpret Lysander and Cyrus’ discussions, reported by Xenophon, regarding 
naval finances in 406 BC:
ekeleuon auton taxai toi nautei drachmen Attiken, didaskontes hoti, an houtos 
ho misthos genetai, hoi ton Athenaion nautai apoleipsousi tas naus, kai meio 
chremata analosei. ho de kalds men ephe autous legein, ou dunaton d' einai 
par' ha basileus epesteilen autoi aliapoiein. einai de kai tas sunthekas houtos 
echousas, triakonta mnas hekastei nei tou menos didonai, hoposas an 
boulontai trephein Lakedaimonioi. ho de Lusandros tote men esiopese: meta 
de to deipnon, epei autoi propion ho Kuros ereto ti an malista charizoito 
poion, eipen hoti ei pros ton misthon hekastdi nautei obolon prostheies. ek de 
toutou tettares oboloi en ho misthos, proteron de triobolon.
They [the Spartan ambassadors] urged him to make the wage o f each sailor an 
Attic drachma a day, explaining that if  this were made the rate, the sailors o f  
the Athenian fleet would desert their ships, and hence he would spend less 
money. He replied that their plan was a good one, but that it was not possible 
for him to act contrary to the King's instructions; besides, the original compact 
ran in this way, that the King should give thirty mina per month to each ship, 
whatever number of ships the Lacedaimonians might wish to maintain.
Lysander accordingly dropped the matter for the moment; but after dinner, 
when Cyrus drank his health and asked him by what act he could gratify him 
most, Lysander replied: “By adding an obol to the pay of each sailor.” And 
from this time forth the wage was four obols, whereas it had previously been 
three.958
At first glance, these discussions suggest that the Athenian rate o f pay was not as much as a 
drachma per day; Lysander and the Peloponnesian ambassadors argued that if such a rate was 
offered in the Peloponnesian navy, they would have been able to poach rowers from the 
presumably less generous Athenians. On the view o f Athenian pay advocated in this study, 
Cyrus’ offer to raise the pay given by an obol per day would still leave the Peloponnesian sailors 
getting, at least in theory, a total salary of two obols per day less than their Athenian counterparts. 
This is problematic, but it is not a fatal objection. The issue for the sailors looking for the best 
deal would not simply be one o f which navy offered the highest daily wage, but also which one 
was most likely to be able to make good on its offers, and which side was most likely to win the 
war. Cyrus and Lysander’s tactic here seems to have been to outbid the Athenians with regard to 
the amount o f pay actually given out while on campaign. No doubt this appealed to many o f the 
crewmen in Athens’ fleet. In the more challenging times following the failure o f the Sicilian 
invasion in 413 BC, the Persian-sponsored Spartans would doubtless have seemed more able to 
give regular pay; this was especially the case, as Cyrus was able to settle all arrears for 
Peloponnesian sailors, and even give them a month’s pay in advance.959 With the balance of 
power at sea no longer overwhelmingly in favour o f the Athenians and their sources of revenue 
under extreme pressure, returning safely to the Piraeus to claim the remainder of one’s pay would
958 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.4-7
959 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.7
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not have seemed such an attractive or likely scenario as it had in previous years. The greater 
levels o f ‘cash in hand’ offered by the Peloponnesians was therefore a big incentive, particularly 
for those crewmen with the fewest ties to Athens. It seems that Cyrus realized that a modest 
level o f pay that could be guaranteed and given in full was a better incentive (and cheaper for 
Persian coffers) than a large increase that would not necessarily be sanctioned and sustained in 
the future. It is worth pointing out that the underlying assumption in the discussion between 
Cyrus and Lysander is the same as that which underpinned the thinking o f Thucydides and the 
agents in his work; that operating the right economic levers was the best way to influence naval 
recruitment. Neither author was a lover o f the men who crewed the navies, but it would be 
unwise to dismiss their entire approach to this area as product o f their bias.
The evidence we have suggests, though not quite conclusively, that trireme crews, for most o f the 
period under discussion, expected to receive eventual payment o f a drachma per day; whether 
Athens was always able to meet such expectations was another matter entirely. This conclusion 
should not be surprising, nor should this be seen as a relatively high wage. The same amount was 
given to building workers in last decade o f the fifth century,960 and to a band o f Thracian 
mercenaries in 413 BC.961 It would be surprising to conclude that the trireme crews o f Athens 
received less pay than these people; indeed, there is explicit evidence to suggest that the sailors 
would have baulked at such a situation; Dicaiopolis, the hero o f Aristophanes’ Acharnians, 
assumes that the top-flight oarsmen would have resented getting less money than a bunch of 
Thracian sel 1-swords.962
The drachma a day for the hoplites at Potidaea and Sicily merely raised their wage to the standard 
level earned by trireme crews, to compensate them for being away from their homes and their 
regular work for a long period of time; Thucydides was here emphasizing the expensiveness and 
lavishness o f these campaigns, and thus labours the point that hoplites were paid the same “full­
time” wages as trireme crewmen 963 The navy as an institution, therefore, recruited its rowers on
960 IG I3 475 and 476; see discussion below
961 Thucydides, 7.27
962 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 11. 151, quoted below. If we were to accept the conclusion that the Athenian trireme 
crews were paid less than such people, it would be a significant piece o f evidence suggesting their lack o f political 
muscle in Athens.
963 Other conclusions have been reached regarding levels o f pay. Amit (Athens and the Sea, pp. 51-2) suggests that a 
rate o f 3 obols was usual up until the Peloponnesian war, when it rose to a drachma, only to be reduced again in the 
wake o f  Sicily. In the fourth century, the money given was usually just for rations. He thus concludes that a man 
could not support a family if  he worked for 8 months in the navy, and would need to find other work. As noted above, 
Pritchett (Greek State at War Vol. 1, p. 23-4) regarded 3 obols as the usual rate for both sailors and soldiers in the fifth 
century BC, as well as other sorts o f public service, and thus that such service was “financially unremunerative”. 
Testimony o f a drachma a day is interpreted by Pritchett as a hardship allowance for extended service. Rosivach 
(‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p. 54) generally follows Pritchett’s interpretation. Loomis (Wages, pp. 55-8) argues 
that pay for soldiers and sailors was the same; they were usually paid a drachma per day for much o f the fifth century 
BC, up until the wake o f the Sicilian disaster when it was reduced to three obols. He argues that the evidence for the 
fourth century BC suggests pay for soldiers o f 2 obols a day for rations, often supplemented by 4 obols o f actual pay, 
for a total wage o f  a drachma per day. Trundle (Mercenaries, p. 96-7), against Pritchett, views the wages o f crews and 
hoplites as being nearer to the rates given to professionals and mercenaries, rather than those given to public servants; I 
agree in the case o f  sailors, but not in the case o f soldiers. Gabrielsen (Financing the Athenian Fleet, pp. 110-8 ff) 
essentially follows Morrison (Athenian Trireme, p. 119) in viewing a drachma per day as the expected standard rate for 
naval crews throughout the period, a portion o f which was routinely withheld; he additionally points out that the
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what might loosely be termed a ‘professional’ basis, in that the sailors were given a viable living 
wage for their efforts, rather than compensation or expenses for performing a public duty. This 
contrast between the remuneration given to sailors and hoplites is made clear by two o f the pieces 
of evidence cited above, which both deal with relatively short campaigns. The first o f these is the 
incomplete inscription that records the expenses paid for the two squadrons sent to Corcyra in 
433 BC, and for which the smallest plausible restorations strongly suggest a minimum rate o f a 
drachma per day per sailor.964 This contrasts with the second document; the treaty quoted in 
Thucydides that was agreed between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis in 420 BC. Under its 
terms, infantry were to be provided a generous ration allowance, equivalent to just over four 
obols per day. This was paid by the city that called the army together, but only after 30 days; any 
provisioning before that was left to the individuals, or their home cities, to provide. These 
testimonies, though 13 years apart, seem to give a clear indication o f the difference in the nature 
and the scale o f payment between hoplites and sailors. Along with the level o f remuneration, the 
perception of what the money was for was o f importance. The money given to hoplites in this 
instance, as was often the case with public office-holders, was presented as “ration-money”,965 
while trireme crew were usually given misthos, “wages”; the latter term implied a more 
mercenary or vocational situation. The terminology, though inconsistent, hints at a perceived 
difference between public service and professional work. This difference is made clearer in my 
view by the differing levels o f remuneration given to sailors on the one hand and hoplites and 
office-holders on the other.
A Sliding Scale of Professionalism
The fact that the navy paid a ‘living wage’ does not mean that everyone who crewed triremes 
depended solely upon such work for their livelihood. In fact we can be absolutely certain that not 
every man in the Athenian navy was a professional, in the sense that they rowed full-time. The 
vast difference in the numbers o f ships in service in any given year is itself sufficient testament to 
that, as is the indefinite length o f time that any given fleet spent at sea. Amongst the Athenian 
naval crews, there was probably a sliding scale ranging from the career trireme crewmen through 
to the man who once was conscripted to pull an oar in a national emergency. The ad hoc labour 
market operating in the Piraeus and the high, though inconstant, demand for rowers and specialist 
crews must have led to a somewhat chaotic, shifting and indefinite situation.966 Even a member 
of the “naval mob” might have been unable to find himself a berth on a trireme in a very quiet 
year, whereas trierarchs might have needed to trawl fishing boats and merchant ships to find 
enough rowers if  a big fleet was being launched and demand was high. Aristotle’s description of
crewmen often did not receive such remuneration from the state, and they increasingly looked to the private sector (i.e. 
the trierarchs) for their pay. He also emphasizes that they often had additional sources o f income, principally bonus 
payments from their captain.
964 IG I3 364=ML 61=Fomara 126, cf. Thucydides, 1.45 and 1.51.
965 This was the case even when, as with the treaty o f  420 BC, the amount o f  money given was larger than what was 
required for a man’s rations.
966 The chaos caused in Athens by the launching o f a large fleet is described vividly, and probably accurately, by 
Aristophanes: Acharnians, 11. 545-55
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“the maritime sort” o f people seems to indicate that there was a good deal o f fluidity between 
such areas as fishing, ferrying, crewing triremes, and the merchant marine.967
Not all ‘professional’ or frequent rowers would have been Athenian citizens. No doubt many of 
the non-Athenians working in the fleet also depended on trireme service for their livelihood. As 
had been discussed previously, the competition for such oarsmen between Athens and Sparta 
during the Peloponnesian War is well attested, and the opportunities for employment discussed 
above were available and attractive to Athenians and non-Athenians alike. Van Wees argues that 
many o f those who came to Athens, and who subsequently settled there, did so “precisely 
because they hoped to find semi-permanent employment as rowers”;968 this was probably more 
the case in the fifth century than the fourth. Like the “naval mob”, such men could also find 
work in related fields when rowing in triremes was unavailable, and vice versa for those who 
came to Athens for opportunities in the merchant fleet and other naval industries.
There were also evidently a large number of men who rowed in triremes occasionally, returning 
to other occupations when their fleet returned to the Piraeus. These men had an “economic 
relation to their rowing that was substantially different” from the ‘professionals’ discussed above, 
in that their main livelihood was earned elsewhere.969 It is likely that a substantial number o f this 
group were ‘seasonal’ rowers, who rowed only at certain times o f the year. This group of 
seasonal rowers would have largely comprised poor farmers or farm-labourers, who took to 
rowing for extra income in the slow part of the agricultural calendar.970 Rosivach has put forward 
a convincing argument to suggest that “only farmers would appear to have been seasonally 
unemployed in sufficient numbers to man the large summer fleets”,971 especially those farmers 
who had been dispossessed by the annual invasions o f the Spartan army during the early years of 
the Peloponnesian War, and who would therefore have been available for the retaliatory strikes 
made by the Athenian navy. While his discussion is confined to the years 433-426 BC, his 
argument probably has relevance in other periods too. 431-426 BC was probably unusual in the 
scale o f this employment o f farmers and farm-labourers, but the phenomenon itself was probably 
not completely unique to this period. The motivation for such seasonal employees taking work in 
the trireme fleet is impossible to establish with certainty, but one can speculate; the desire for 
retaliation against Spartan incursion into Attica was probably a substantial motive for those
967 Aristotle, Politics, 1291b 18-25
968 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 211
969 Rosivach, ‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p. 53.
970 Rosivach (‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p. 53) argues that “Greek farmers harvested their grain in mid- to late 
May...[and]...they picked their grapes in September”, and that the timing o f large short-term summer fleets he 
discusses (pp. 44 ff.) fell between these times.
971 Rosivach, ‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p. 54. He is probably wrong to follow Pritchett and envisage a rate o f  three 
obols per man per day for ‘summer’ fleets, and a drachma a day per man for fleets manned by professionals and in 
service for extended periods o f time. Whilst such a distinction might have been made for hoplite armies that found 
themselves in service for longer than a summer, it seems that the rate o f pay given to rowers in the Athenian navy by 
the state was always a drachma per day. In any case, as discussed in Part One o f this work, it would not have always 
been obvious from the outset whether a naval expedition was to be a short or long term deployment, and such 
uncertainty must tell against any differentiation in pay between rowers in “summer” fleets and those in extended 
campaigns.
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rowing the large “summer fleets” o f the Peloponnesian war. In other times, Rosivach argues that 
occasional navy service was both “uniquely attractive”972 and “economically advantageous”973 for 
poor Athenian farmers, and that supplementing their income in an otherwise idle part o f the year 
was their principal motivation.974 Slaves were also hired out to ships by their owners for similar 
economic reasons.975
As well as those who rowed during the off-season o f their regular work, there would have been 
many who rowed occasionally on long-lasting campaigns. It seems likely that the lead characters 
and chorus-men of some o f Aristophanes’ plays, who are often presented as poor-to-averagely- 
wealthy farmers, could fairly be considered in this category o f occasional rowers. The chorus- 
men o f the Wasps, for example, seem to have been farmers rather than members o f the “naval 
mob”,976 but they certainly claim to have done some rowing, and to have taken part, in some 
capacity, in several extended campaigns 977 The men who volunteered to serve for the Sicilian 
expedition probably fall into this category too; the scale o f the invasion force, as well as 
simultaneous operations in other parts o f the Mediterranean,978 must lead to the conclusion that 
the “professionals” alone would not have been able to provide all the necessary man-power, and 
that many joining this emphatically long-term fleet were doing so in preference to their regular 
occupations.979 Thucydides accounts for the keenness to participate in this expedition as follows:
ho de polus homilos stratiotes en te toi paronti argurion oisein kai prosktesesthai 
dunamin hothen aidion misthophoran huparxein980
The masses in general and those on the expedition saw the prospect o f getting pay 
for the time being981 and of adding to the Empire so as to secure permanent paid 
employment in the future.982
972 Rosivach, ‘Manning the Fleet’, p. 55
973 Rosivach, ‘Manning the Fleet’, p. 54
974 This picture contrasts somewhat with the argument in Gabrielsen (Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 98), related to 
the service o f trierarchs, that “naval expeditions often coincided with the critical period o f  peak agricultural activity 
when the crops needed care or harvesting (barley and wheat become ripe between mid-May and the end o f June)”
975 [Xenophon], 1.11.
976 Aristophanes, Wasps, p.264 ff. An alternative interpretation would be to see the old jurors as members o f the “naval 
mob” who earned sufficient money to buy some farm land, though not enough to keep themselves in leisure in old age, 
and hence their dependency on the jury pay.
977 Aristophanes, Wasps, 11. 1096-7 (Chorus-men serving as oarsmen); 11. 354-6 and 236-7 (serving in some capacity on 
extended campaigns).
978 In 414 BC, for example, a fleet was sent to Naupactos (fleet 102, discussed in detail in a previous section) and 
remained on station for over three years, and another (fleet 108, Thucydides, 7.9) was sent to blockade Amphipolis. 
Such long-term commissions, particularly that to Naupactos, demanded “professional” manpower.
979 Thucydides, 6.31 remarks at its outset that the expedition was not uniquely vast in terms o f  the number o f  ships and 
men, but in the fact that a fleet o f such size was intended to be in commission for an extended period o f  time.
980 Thucydides, 6.24.3
981 This, o f course, would be the same for any other long-term naval expedition, so perhaps should be regarded as a 
necessary but not sufficient factor for these occasional rowers. It might have been the case that, whilst state pay was 
the same for this expedition as for any other, the trierarchs may have been more competitive, and thus more generous 
with bonuses, than was the case in other fleets.
982 This would not be the case for most long-term expeditions, as (potential) conquest on such a scale was unusual. 
The “paid employment in the future” is not necessarily to be interpreted as naval employment; the revenue from the 
Empire not only provided allowances for public services, but also funded gainful employment in, for example, the 
manifold construction industries described by Plutarch (Pericles, 12).
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Such occasional rowers are testament to the diverse and varied nature o f economic activity 
amongst Athens’ poorer classes; van Wees is mostly accurate when he describes the navy as a 
whole as being “manned by lower-class professionals”,983 though I would prefer to reserve the 
word ‘professionals’ for the full-time trireme crew described above. As Rosivach has argued, it 
was important “both from an economic and a psychological point o f view” for these ‘seasonal’ 
and ‘occasional’ rowers to not be fully dependent upon the navy for their livelihood, and that it 
was “something which they did in addition to (or instead of) what they normally did.”984
At the farthest end of this sliding scale there were those Athenians985 who rarely acted as trireme 
crew, and perhaps most o f these would only have rowed when compelled to do so. Conscription 
was the exception rather than the rule for the majority o f the classical period; the incidences we 
know of are connected with state emergencies.986 This rarity serves to highlight the voluntary 
nature o f crewing triremes in less desperate circumstances. Doubtless many o f the richer citizens 
of Athens were amongst this group of very occasional crewmen, though amongst the poorer 
shop-keepers and smallholders too there would have been some who would never have taken an 
oar unless they were drafted.987 Thucydides records an instance where conscription was 
apparently used raise a fleet’s crew, but a specific exclusion was made for the richest two classes 
of citizen, the hippies and the pentakosiomedimnoi?u  It is worth remembering that the heavy 
liturgical burden o f the hierarchy fell exclusively amongst the very richest individuals, and so 
many of the Athenian elite, especially in the fifth century, would have been directly and regularly 
involved with the Athenian navy.989 It was thus the hippeis, or “knights”, who as a group 
probably had the least direct involvement with the navy. Many o f them were probably not rich 
enough to have regularly undertaken the heavy financial burden o f a hierarchy, the most 
expensive o f the liturgies;990 they were also not amongst those who crewed the vessels, even on 
those rare occasions when men were conscripted. It is for this reason that Xenophon makes a 
particular mention of their presence during the mass call-up for the Arginusae campaign of 406
983 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 213.
984 Rosivach, ‘Manning the Athenian fleet’, p. 53. To avoid possible confusion, I should point out that Rosivach makes 
this argument in connection with the rowers who manned the “big summer fleets” sent out by Athens between 433 and 
426 BC. I am applying his idea expressed here, o f men wishing to avoid the potential stigma associated with being a 
professional rower, to a wider and more general group o f ‘seasonal’ and ‘occasional’ trireme crews than he did.
985 And indeed non-Athenians living in Athens.
986 For example, Thucydides, 3.16 (conscripts called up to fight o ff an imminent Peloponnesian attack in 427 BC); 
Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.24-5 (the battle o f Arginusae, 406 BC).
987 cf. Apollodorus’ reluctant and poor-quality conscripts; [Demosthenes], 50.7
988 Thucydides, 3.16
989 In the fourth century, not only were there less ships put out to sea on active duty, but reforms to the hierarchy (on 
which, see Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, pp. 173-217) resulted in a greater degree o f  the funding o f the 
ship being shared amongst rich collectives, rather than a single wealthy paymaster/captain. The inevitable result o f  
loosening adherence to “the principle “one man to a ship”” (Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 174) was that 
fewer rich men in the fourth century BC acquired extensive experience in directly commanding the vessels that they 
paid for than had been the case in the previous century.
990 See Davis, Wealth and the Power o f  Wealth, p.30-1 (cf. Athenian Propertied Families, xxvi) on the difficulties o f  
identifying the Pentakosiomedimnoi, let alone the Hippeis, as part o f  the liturgical class.
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BC.991 It is not unlikely that they served as marines rather than sailors, as Kimon and his friends 
did at Salamis,992 but it is impossible to be certain.
Professionalism and the navy: conclusion
Exactly how many people occupied each o f  these broad categories is impossible to determine,993 
as is the relative balance o f social statuses at each point o f  the sliding scale.994 What is clear is 
that, outside o f the mass levies in times o f emergency, it is only at the level o f the trierarchs that 
serving on a trireme should be considered to be solely a patriotic duty or a “quasi-liturgical” 
obligation.995 While the professional rowers and the occasional rowers, as Rosivach argues, had 
differing economic relations to the navy, the navy itself was nevertheless a voluntary institution 
in which individuals were paid a living wage for their work, rather than expenses or ration-money 
for their period of service. As well being given a higher rate o f pay, it was not uncommon for 
sailors (in fourth century BC at least) to be given advances prior to the expedition’s launch.996 
Skilled rowers and sailors could have expected to be given additional bonus payments by their 
captains. In addition to this, employment as a rower in the navy led for some to promotion to a 
position amongst the hyperesia, or “specialist crew”;997 it is only a little too fanciful or 
anachronistic to speak in terms of a career path on board triremes. The contrast between the naval 
labour market on the one hand, and the arrangements for provisioning soldiers and public 
servants on the other, seems vivid.
3: Fighting at Sea 
Aristophanes’ Old Sailors: patriotic sea fighters?
In making the contrast between paid professionals and compensated public servants, one must be 
careful not to draw distinctions too sharply. There is some evidence, particularly from 
Aristophanes, that crewing triremes was indeed seen in the similar way to hoplite service; a 
praiseworthy and patriotic duty in defence of one’s city. It is not surprising many such 
sentiments come from the plays o f Aristophanes, but even these have been described, only a little 
too dismissively, as “a few back-handed compliments” 998 One often quoted example is the 
remark o f Dicaiopolis in Acharnians describing the highest rank o f oarsmen, the thranitai, as the 
“saviours o f the city”.999 What needs to be emphasized more with regard to this remark is both
991 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.24.
992 Plutarch, Kimon, 5.
993 I suggested in a previous section that the 60 ships in regular service to which Plutarch (Pericles, 11) refers may be 
indicative the fifth-century demand for full-time crewmen, suggesting a figure o f  around 12,000 “professional” trireme 
crew in Athens at this time. I also emphasized that very little weight should be attached to this figure, though it is 
probably o f the right order o f magnitude.
994 As has been noted, Rosivach argued that foreigners would be disproportionately represented in the long-term fleets, 
attracted by the prospect o f extended employment.
995 Whitehead, Athenian Metic, p. 86
996 For example, [Demosthenes], 50.7; 51.11.
997 Aristophanes, Knights, 542-4
998 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 200
999 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 1. 162.
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the context and the somewhat ironic tone; these “bulwarks o f the city”1000 are resenting some 
foreign mercenaries receiving decent pay, and presumably higher wages than them:
Theoros: toutois ean tis duo drachmas misthon dido katapeltasontai ten Boiotian 
holen.
Dikaiopolis: toisdi duo drachmas tois apepsolemenois; hupostenoi mentan ho 
thranites leds ho sosipolis.
Theorus: These men, if you pay then two drachmas, will pelticize all Boeotia into 
the ground.
Dicaiopolis: Two drachmas for these foreskinless wonders? The upper-oar folk, 
saviours o f the city, would resent that a bit, I fancy!1001
Many other passages in Aristophanes refer to past services,1002 including naval services, though 
as van Wees argues, these are generally painting a picture o f an “idealised earlier 
generation...credited indiscriminately with naval and infantry victories over Persia”,1003 which 
are then contrasted favourably with the youth of Aristophanes’ own day. Even in such apparently 
praiseworthy passages, the economic realities o f the Athenian navy show through. In an 
exhortation to Poseidon, the chorus o f Knights claim that he is pleased by “triremes, with their 
deep-blue rams, their swiftness...and their pay.”1004 Neither the true patriotic Persian-fighting 
sailor o f the past, nor the weak and corrupt young men and insubordinate hired rowers o f the 
present,1005 need be accepted as the literal truth. Despite some o f Aristophanes’ rose-tinted 
rhetoric about the older generation, the navy and its crewmen were probably not, for the most 
part, motivated primarily by their desire to serve Athens; what is clear from the evidence 
discussed in the previous section is that the navy was most likely a wage-paying “professional” 
institution even at the time when the fleet’s efforts were directed primarily against the Persians. 
According to [Aristotle], this fact was recognized early, and it was the people who p a id  the 
rowers at Salamis who first gained political credit for the victory.1006 There is much truth in the 
argument o f van Wees; that the connection between the service o f poor citizens in the navy and 
the growth of democracy was to a large extent a retrospective justification, rather than a primary
A central prop of the argument connecting naval service with political power and privileges is the 
opening statement o f the treatise o f the Old Oligarch, a work usually dated to the 420s BC, which 
is interpreted as suggesting that the poor exercised the greatest political influence in the city due 
to the value to Athens of their naval skills.1008 Some near-contemporaneous evidence regarding
1000 js s ommerstejn’s translation o f the phrase rendered above as “saviours o f  the city”.
1001 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 159-63
1002 Examples o f passages extolling the glories o f the past in the works o f  Aristophanes include Acharnians, 1. 181 ff, 
694 ff; Knights, 567 ff, 781 ff, 1366-8; Wasps, 678, 684-5, 711, and 1075-1121.
1003 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 82
1004 Aristophanes, Knights, 554-5
1005 Aristophanes, Frogs, 1076
1006 [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 23
1007 Van Wees, ‘Myth o f the Middle Class Army’, p. 83
1008 [Xenophon], Constitution o f  Athens, 1.1-2. See Part Two for further discussion o f this passage and its implications.
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the relation between naval crews and the democracy is more ambiguous. These two examples 
from Aristophanes plays both relate to the wider respect and political capital that was (or was 
not) accorded to the naval crews. The first is from Acharnians, produced in 425 BC.
Choros: hoi gerontes hoi palaioi memphomestha tei polei: ou gar axios 
ekeinon hon enaumachesamen geroboskoumesth' huph' humon, alia 
deina paschomen
Chorus-leader: You do not care for us in our age in a manner worthy o f the 
naval battles we have fought; instead you treat us disgracefully.1009
The second comes from Wasps, produced three years later in 422 BC.
Choros: tou to d' est' algiston hemin, en tis astrateutos on ekrophei ton 
misthon hemon, tesde tes choras huper mete kopen mete lonchen mete 
phluktainan lab on.
Chorus-leader: that is very galling for us [the old men o f the juries], if  
someone who evades military service gulps down our pay, when he’s 
never had an oar or a spear or a blister in his hand.1010
The first o f these passages suggests that past service in naval battles should accord respect and 
even political favour, but that it was not in fact forthcoming at Athens. The second also suggests 
that there was very little connection between military service more generally and political 
privileges, in this case, jury pay.1011 These passages together should be weighed against the Old 
Oligarch, as they somewhat contradict his simplistic scheme.1012 The testimony o f the Old 
Oligarch, like these Aristophanes passages, cannot be treated as presenting objective factual 
information, and the uncritical accepting of his statement has led to much misunderstanding 
regarding the relationship between the navy and democracy.
The Battle of Salamis
In the rose-tinted extolling o f the older generation present in the works o f Aristophanes, it is the 
conflicts o f the Persian Wars that, understandably, are especially praised. While the individual 
campaigns and battle are often not rigorously differentiated, it is notable that it is the hoplite 
battle o f Marathon fought in 490 BC, rather than the naval battle o f Salamis ten years later, that is 
more frequently singled out.1013 The playwright Aeschylus is thought to have fought in both 
battles, but mentioned only Marathon in his epitaph. The ideological battle over the significance 
o f Salamis is an interesting story in itself. The earliest extant ancient source that describes the
1009 Aristophanes, Acharnians, 677-8
10,0 Aristophanes, Wasps, 1117-9, cf. for example 678, 684 and 1121. The idea that the profits and privileges o f  
military victories and the Empire were not being accorded to those who did the work for it is a recurrent theme in the 
play.
1011 cf. Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae 11. 832-9, where the chorus leader suggests that the good service o f brave 
men ought to bring tangible recognition to their mothers in terms o f seating at festivals.
1012 cf. Aristophanes, Frogs, 11. 692 ff., where Aristophanes contrasts the giving o f  citizen rights to slaves who had 
served in one naval battle (Arginusae), while at the same time denying rights to men who had participated in many. 
Once again, it suggests a situation far more complex than the simple scheme proposed by the Old Oligarch.
1013 See the passages cited above, note 1002.
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battle is Aeschylus’ tragedy Persians produced in 472 BC. Set in the royal court just after the 
battle, Xerxes’ mother awaits news of her son’s fate from a messenger. As van Wees has pointed 
out, the play displays some curious attitudes in relation to the navy and the battle of Salamis.1014 
While the naval action is described in full and gruesome detail, the messenger’s report gave great 
prominence to an isolated skirmish involving hoplites on a small island, which he describes as 
more calamitous by far for the Persians than anything that happened at sea.1015 When the Queen 
enquires about the Athenians, she is told their strength lies in their army, and their supplies o f 
silver; no word is mentioned of her navy or sailors.1016 It was noted above that the credit for the 
victory o f Salamis was claimed by (or at least ascribed to) the Council o f the Areopagus, who had 
paid the ships’ crew, and who had increased their political power in the years following 480 BC 
as a result. Marincola has recently argued that Herodotus’ account o f the battle emphasizes the 
roles o f the Greek leaders, with the common men, “a group that is constantly criticiwed for its 
fear and indecision in ancient historiography”, as largely scared witless throughout.1017 As the 
comedies o f Aristophanes show, the battle o f Salamis could by the 420s BC be represented as a 
glorious victory o f the Athenian people as a whole; although it was perhaps less magnificent that 
the more exclusively Athenian victory at Marathon.1018 By the fourth century BC, Plato could 
claim it was a truth universally acknowledged that the naval fighting at Salamis was the decisive 
moment in the freeing o f Greece from the Persian invaders; he himself, however, was sure that 
the common knowledge was wrong, and he emphasized the importance o f the hoplite battle o f  
Plataea in 479 BC.1019 Like Herodotus, Diodorus focused his account on the leaders, with the 
masses as “victims o f fear, dread and disorder”.1020 This is a good demonstration not only o f the 
selectiveness o f Greek historical memory, but also the subjectivity and diversity o f views 
ascribed to the same series o f events by different people at different times.1021
Ideal Sea B attles
Success in sea battles was conceived of as a matter o f skill, techne, and experience, epistemei, 
rather than the amateur bravery characteristic of hoplite battles. These two qualities are 
contrasted by the pair o f speeches that Thucydides claims were made by each side on the eve o f  
the Peloponnesian war.1022 The Corinthian speaker, addressing the Peloponnesian League, 
claimed superiority in bravery for his audience, and while he conceded to the Athenians a greater 
level o f naval skills, he argues that they would be easily able to buy or learn these arts and thus
1014 Van Wees, ‘Politics and the battlefield’, pp. 158-9, cf. Harrison, Emptiness o f  Asia, p. 97
10l5Aeschylus, Persians, 435-71 (cf. the different, more restrained, and probably more accurate account o f  the same 
land-fight in Herodotus, 8.76 and 95).
1016 Aeschylus, Persians, 234-40
1017 Marincola, ‘The Persian wars’, p. 119
1018 It is worth noting that Thucydides, while his speech-makers tend to make relatively little o f  the Persian Wars, he 
has an Athenian ambassador claim sole credit for Marathon, deliberately ignoring the role played by the Plataeans 
(1.73).
1019 Plato, Laws, 707 b-c
1020 Marincola, ‘The Persian Wars’, p. 119
1021 This is the central argument o f Van Wees in ‘Politics and the Battlefield’, and this article gives many other 
examples o f this kind o f reconstructing o f the past by the Greeks.
1022 Thucydides, 1.120-4 and 1.140-4.
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win a decisive battle over Athens.1023 In the parallel speech made by Pericles to the Athenians, 
he does not deny that skill was the essential ingredient to deciding success at sea; rather, he 
develops the point, and suggests that the Peloponnesians would be slow to learn naval skills.1024 
As if to demonstrate this point, Thucydides gives two detailed account o f relatively small-scale 
sea battles, both o f which illustrated his perception of the ideal conflict at sea. These battles both 
took place in 429/8 BC, and involved an Athenian fleet stationed at Naupactos, under the 
command o f Phormio.1025 Despite being significantly outnumbered in both battles, Phormio’s 
forces won two victories. In the first battle, skill and timing were everything:
kai ten epicheiresin eph' heautoi te enomizen einai, hopotan bouletai, ton neon 
ameinon pleouson, kai tote kallisten gignesthai... tote de kata ton kairon 
touton semainei, kai hoi Athenaioi prospesontes
He [Phormio] considered that, as his ships were the better sailors, he could 
attack when he liked, and that the best moment for making the attack was 
when the wind got up...It was at this moment that he gave the signal and the 
Athenians attacked.1026
The resulting Athenian victory left the Peloponnesian forces, though reinforced, nervous on the 
eve o f their second battle with Phormio’s fleet. In their rousing speech prior to this battle, the 
Peloponnesian commanders (or rather Thucydides) made an even more explicit discussion of the 
dynamic o f courage and skill:
humon de oud' he apeiria tosouton leipetai hoson tolmei prouchete ... techne de 
aneu alkes ouden ophelei
Nor are you so behind the enemy in experience as you are ahead o f him in courage 
.. .skill without courage is no use at all.1027
Once again, the speech made by Phormio to his sailors can be seen almost as a reply to this one, 
answering this very point. Phormio, as one might expect, refutes the idea that the Athenians 
lacked courage, but he did not deny the great value of skill at sea, and indeed elaborated on some 
of the tactics that capable fleets could use.1028 He also stated that the type o f courage the 
Peloponnesians had in relation to land battles, far from being enough to overcome their lack o f  
proficiency, could not be transferred to the sea at all.
epeita hoi malista pisteuontes proserchontai, hos prosekon sphisin andreiois einai, 
ou di' alio ti tharsousin e dia ten en toipezoi empeirian ta pleio katorthountes, kai 
oiontai sphisi kai en toi nautikoi poiesein to auto, to d' ek tou dikaiou hemin 
mallon nun periestai, eiper kai toutois en ekeinoi, epei eupsuchiai ge ouden 
propherousi, toi de hekateroi ti einai empeiroteroi thrasuteroi esmen.
1023 Thucydides, 1.121
1024 Thucydides, 1.142
1025 A detailed case study o f the sequence o f Athenian naval operations in Naupactos and their significance is given in 
Part One, section B o f this work.
1026 Thucydides, 2.84.2-3
1027 Thucydides, 2.87.4
1028 Thucydides, 2.89.3 and 8-11.
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As for the manliness which they seem to think is a special attribute o f theirs, and 
which is the reason for their confidence when they attack us, their courage only 
arises from the success which their experience in land service usually gives them, 
and they think it will be the same story by sea. But this advantage will in all 
justice belong to us on this element, if  to them on that; as they are not superior to 
us in courage, but each of us are brave in our area o f experience.1029
Rather than contrast courage and experience, Phormio argued that the one flows from the other. 
The events o f the second battle eventually proved him right in this instance.1030 At first though, 
the Peloponnesian fleet started to win the day, capturing several Athenian ships and putting the 
rest to flight. Then a moment o f individual brilliance tipped the balance:
etuche de holkas hormousa meteor os, peri hen he Attike naus phthasasa kai 
peripleusasa tei Leukadiai didkousei emballei mesei kai kataduei...tois men 
oun Peloponnesiois genomenou toutou aprosdoketou te kai para logon phobos 
empiptei, kai hama ataktos diokontes dia to kratein
There happened to be a merchant ship anchored off shore, and the [final
fleeing] Athenian ship, reaching it first, circled right round it, and then
rammed the pursuing Leucadian boat and swamped her. It was an unexpected 
and unlikely action, and it caused panic among the Peloponnesians, who at 
this time, elated by their victory, were sailing up in pursuit in no proper 
formation.1031
The move here was not lacking in courage, but could only be pulled off by an extremely skilled 
crew. While everyone on board would have played their part in pulling off such a manoeuvre, 
most o f the credit should be given to the hyperesia, and possibly to the captain.1032 The oarsmen, 
though they would have to follow their orders briskly1033 and maintain the stroke in testing 
circumstances, could not for the most part see out of the ship; the performance o f this audacious 
move could only be initiated because o f the situational awareness and tactical skill o f the
specialist crew. The outcome o f the battle was turned by this single moment, not only one of
skill; but skill coupled with a particular sort of audacious bravery that came only with 
professional mastery.
The contrast between these two ‘ideal’ sea-fights described by Thucydides, and the idea off a set- 
piece pitched hoplite battle, with armies drawn up on a flat piece o f ground and involving no
1029 Thucydides, 2.89.2-3
1030 Compare also Diodorus’ account (13.39-40) o f the battle o f Cynossema in 411 BC where a larger Peloponnesian 
fleet, superior in arete (“military virtue” or “bravery”) are defeated by an Athenian fleet that was superior in techne. 
Strauss, ‘Athenian naval tactics’, p.316.
1031 Thucydides, 2.91.3-4. Note again, as was pointed out in the Naupactos case study, the importance o f maintaining a 
good formation to fight effectively at sea.
1032 In the fifth century BC, we are still in the age o f the amateur gentleman captain. While some would no doubt have 
been competent seamen and able leaders, many would surely have left the actual running and manoeuvring o f the ship 
to the professionals. We are not told who deserved the credit in this specific case; it is something o f a shame that 
Thucydides chose not to record his name.
1033 As Phormio exhorted them to do; Thucydides, 2.89
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tactical ploys, individual initiatives or fancy signals, could not be starker.1034 Thucydides does 
not quite give any paradigmatic description o f the ‘ideal’ hoplite battle to contrast his 
descriptions o f Phormio’s victories at sea. The closest he comes to such an account is the section 
concerning the battle o f Delion1035 in the winter o f 424/3 BC, which Homblower describes as 
“one o f the more fully and reliably described hoplite battles o f classical Greek history”.1036 This 
battle featured a head-on clash o f heavily armoured men and much up-close killing and shoving 
of shields,1037 though the issue seems ultimately to have been decided by the Theban commander, 
whose redeployment o f his cavalry panicked the Athenians and put their army to flight. The only 
other large-scale infantry engagement described in detail by Thucydides was the battle o f  
Mantinea, fought in the summer of 418 BC. Thucydides states that “utterly outdone in the matter 
o f skill \epistemei], the Spartans were that much superior in manly courage [andreiai]”;103* and it 
was the Spartans that won the battle. The contrast is made clearer when Thucydides wished to 
describe a conflict at sea decided without clever tactics and skilful manoeuvring; it is notable that 
he often compared such fights to a battle on land.1039
There were in fact many battles at sea that were not decided by the technical naval skills o f the 
crew or commander.1040 The relative size o f fleets, the numbers o f fighting men aboard, the local 
“terrain” conditions could all be more crucial to the outcome that the skill o f the crewmen. Fleets 
that did not utilize fast manoeuvres and ramming tactics could be described somewhat sneeringly 
as “old fashioned” or “unskilled”,1041 but even battles involving supposedly sophisticated fleets 
were not infrequently decided by more primitive tactics; the vicious fighting in the harbour of 
Syracuse in 413 BC is a good example o f this,1042 as is the battle o f Arginusae in 406 BC.1043 In 
this latter encounter, the side with the more skilled crews was defeated by the tactics and 
organisation o f the less skilled Athenian fleet. In a similar way, many hoplite battles were not the 
“single, magnificent collision o f infantry...brutal killing with edged weapons on a battlefield 
between free men...battle where they face their enemy at arm’s reach to kill and be killed”;1044 
hoplites had a wide range combat experiences outside the phalanx, and even the pitched battles 
involved the use o f tactics, deception and stratagems far more often than is sometimes
1034 An idea which Hanson (‘Hoplite Battle’, p. 201-2) admits is “in some senses an abstraction”, but one for which 
there can be found in the sources “valid generalizations about the preferred and ideal form o f  ancient warfare”; 
evidence describing idealized notions o f hoplite warfare includes Herodotus, 9.48-52 and Polybius, 13.3-6
1035 Thucydides, 4.96-7
1036 Homblower, Commentary, vol. 2, p. 303
1037 The debate as to exactly what this “shoving” involved (suggestions have included a mass armoured scrimmage or a 
series o f individual shield-to-shield duals) is summarized by Homblower, Commentary, ad loc 4.96.2
1038 Thucydides, 5.72.2 alia malista de kata panta tei empeiriai Lakedaimonioi elassothentes tote tei andreiai edeixan 
ouch hesson perigenomenoi
1039 Thucydides, 1.49, 2.89 and 7.62. See also 4.14, where Thucydides makes a double contrast; the Spartans are said to 
fight a sea battle from land, and the Athenians a land battle from sea.
1040 By contrast, Rawlings (Ancient Greeks at War, p. 122) argues that the relative skill o f the conflicting fleets was o f  
primary importence in deciding the outcome o f sea battles.
1041 Thucydides, 1.49, in reference to the sea-battle between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians in 433 BC. In discussing 
this battle, Thucydides again contrasts courage and skill; “spirit (thumoi) and strength (rhumei) counted for more than 
professional skill (epistem eij’
1042 Thucydides, 7.70-1. cf. 7.62 when the tactical circumstances are discussed.
1043 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.24-38
1044 Hanson, Western Way o f  War, pp. 9 and 12.
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supposed.1045 However, what is important here is the difference between the concept o f the ideal 
hoplite battle (emphasizing bravery, standing one’s ground, up close fighting and killing, and 
collective action) and that o f the ideal sea battle (emphasizing skill, manoeuvre, evasion, fighting 
with ships’ rams rather than deck-to-deck, and with the potential for individual initiatives). As 
Thucydides had Phormio state in 429 BC, and as van Wees has argued more recently, “amateur 
bravery”, an ideal that was held in such regard by the Greeks,1046 had “become an irrelevance at
Thetes as Hoplites and Marines
While many hoplites, and certainly ‘ideal’ hoplites, were amateur warriors who served Athens 
out o f a “quasi-liturgical” civic duty, many who fought for the city with shield and spear were not 
so overtly patriotic. Van Wees has recently argued that a large proportion, perhaps more than 
half, o f the hoplite army came from the richer part o f the thetic class.1048 According to this 
argument, such men could have served as hoplites as they could afford to have provided 
themselves with appropriate weapons, but also that they were not obliged to do so; “they would 
render service to the community only for a reward.”1049 It is o f  particular significance to this 
study that the marines (epibatai) who served aboard Athenian vessels most likely formed a 
considerable proportion of these thete-class hoplites.1050 The marines present an interesting 
ideological nexus. It seems clear that they were considered part o f a trireme’s regular crew, 
along with the rowers and hyperesia, and were undoubtedly paid at the same basic rate; a “living 
wage” of a drachma a day.1051 And yet there is no difficulty in believing that their activities were 
considered as a public service to Athens. Van Wees argues that “marines were held in the same 
high regard as the rest o f the infantry”, and cites a range o f sources that support this assertion.1052 
One o f the most striking o f these testimonies is that of Lysias, in his speech Against Andocides.
1045 See especially Rawlings ‘Alternative agonies’, which describes the many ways o f  fighting that hoplite soldiers took 
part in, and Krenz, ‘Deception in archaic and classical warfare’, which details the use o f  stratagems, ambushes and 
other sneaky tactics in the context o f hoplite battle.
1046 In his preface (p. xi) to Hanson’s Western Way o f  War, Kagan writes “that at the root o f  infantry battle in classical 
Greece lay the value o f personal courage”.
1047 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 230. The argument in the section from which this quote is taken suggests that the 
ideal was dead by the middle o f the fourth century, the period when even trierarchs did not serve personally as amateur 
sea captains, but were more like collectives o f ship-sponsors.
1048 Van Wees, ‘Myth o f the Middle Class Army’, esp. pp. 53-4
1049 Van Wees, ‘Myth o f the Middle Class Army’, pp. 60-1
1050 Thucydides, 8.24.2 refers to “hoplites who had been called up from the regular lists and compelled to serve as 
marines”, suggesting that it was unusual, and that epibatai were normally thetes. Such is the view o f  Andrewes (HCT 
ad loc 6.43), but his further argument that these thetes “would require to be armed at public expense” does not follow; 
as van Wees, ‘Myth o f the middle class army’ has demostrated, many o f  the richer thetes could afford hoplite gear.
1051 The marines are listed along with the other crewmen in the inscribed crew-list IG I3 1036, suggesting that they were 
considered part o f the crews o f the individual ships (as opposed to, for example, part o f  any army carried by the 
vessels). As discussed in previous sections, the evidence for ship’s pay seems to have worked on the assumption o f a 
crew strength o f 200 all drawing an equal wage, a number which makes most sense if  one makes the assumption that 
around a dozen armed men (epibatai and archers) regularly formed part o f  the crews. While the number o f marines on 
any given ship may have varied according to the particular mission and tactical circumstances, it seems a reasonable 
assumption that there were always some epibatai present on every Athenian vessel.
1052 Van Wees, ‘Myth o f the Middle Class Army’, p. 60; Thucydides 3.84 (describes a group o f  marines lost in battle as 
“the best men from the city o f Athens to die in this war”; Aristotle, Politics, 1327b9-ll (excludes marines from his
prohibition o f the “naval mob” becoming citizens in the ideal state, because they “belong to the infantry”), Plutarch,
Kimon, 5 (Kimon and his high-priced friends serving as marines at Salamis).
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In chastising his opponent for not having been of service to Athens, Lysias lists the roles in which 
he has failed to demonstrate his patriotism:
all' oudepopot’ ek tes poleds estrateusato, oute hippeus oute hoplites, oute 
trierarchos out' epibates, oute pro  tes sumphoras oute meta ten sumphoran, 
pleon e tettarakonta ete gegonds.
He has never gone on any expedition from the city, either in the cavalry or 
in the infantry, either as a ship's captain or as a marine, either before our 
disaster, or after our disaster, though he is more than forty years old.1053
Given the importance o f the navy to fifth-century Athens in general and the period o f the 
Peloponnesian War in particular, it is surprising at first glance that this list does not mention 
Andocides’ potential service as a rower, or as a member o f the hyperesia. What seems clear from 
this list is that serving in the navy as a marine could be more easily conceived o f as a national 
service and patriotic duty than could serving a sailor, on the same terms and pay, at least when 
discussing members o f the elite.1054 The distinction between sailors and marines is also made by 
Aristotle, when he considered membership o f the ideal community; the “naval mob” should be 
excluded, but not the marines who are “free man and belong to the infantry.”1055 While being 
free distinguished marines from only some of the ship’s company, being part of the infantry made 
them distinct from all the nautai and hyperesia', I have argued above that sailors were not 
routinely equipped for hand-to-hand fighting, and were only in unusual circumstances called 
upon to take the role o f light-armed troops.1056 Belonging to the infantry entailed two important 
differences between the epibatai and the rest of their crewmates which help to explain the 
ideological difference between them; firstly, the type o f fighting that the epibatai engaged in, and 
secondly, their use in that fighting o f personally supplied weapons.1057
Being “part o f the infantry” meant that the marines had the equipment to participate in the agonal 
and ideal hoplite pitched battle described above; though in fact, as is made clear from a variety of
1053 Lysias, 6.46
1054 It is possible that Andocides’ social class made service as a rower inappropriate; it may tell us more about ways o f  
serving Athens amongst the elite than it does whether the navy was perceived as a civic service generally. (“Serving as 
a marine-though not apparently as a sailor or rower-fell within the range o f  what a member o f the elite might 
conceivably do”, van Wees, ‘Myth o f the Middle Class Army’, p. 60). However, if  serving in the navy was seen as a 
way to serve Athens, we might still expect the speaker to list it here, even if  it would not in fact be appropriate for a 
man such as Andocides to serve in that capacity. In the context o f a law court speech, it would strengthen Lysias’ 
argument to add  as many things as possible to the list that were considered as public services, while it would weaken it 
to exclude a potential means o f service, even if it was not strictly an appropriate one for the individual in question. 
The omission o f sailors here thus seems significant. In any case, the text does show a divide in terms o f  status between 
marines and rowers.
1055 Aristotle, Politics, 1327b9-l 1
1056 I have argued in Part One, Section A .l that while it was possible for ship’s crew to take to the field in land 
campaigns, it was exceptional for them to do so, and they were not generally equipped for any serious fighting.
1057 This analysis, like most ancient sources, largely ignores the toxotai, archers, who were listed separately, and armed 
differently, from the epibatai. While they no doubt had a significant effect both in land campaigns and ship-to-ship 
fighting, there is very little evidence pertaining to Athens’ ship-bome archers. The archer was often an ambiguous 
figure, and if not a despised one, in Greek military ideology, fighting in distant, cowardly manner and with the 
characteristic weapon o f the Persian barbarians. Hanson, Western Way o f  War, p. 15, is largely right to argue that 
archer (and other missile troops) was a “universal object o f  disdain in Greek literature”.
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sources, the usual combat experience o f the epibatai on board ship was considerably different 
from that o f fighting in the phalanx.
ethisihenai, pukna apopeddntas, dromikos eis tas naus tachu palin  
apochorein, kai dokein meden aischron poiein me tolmontas apothneiskein 
menontas epipheromenon polemion, all' eikuias autois gignesthai prophase is 
kai sphodra hetoimas hopla te apollusin kai pheugousi de tinas ouk aischras, 
hos phasin, phugas. tauta gar ek nautikes hopliteias rhemata philei 
sumbainein, ouk axia epaindn pollakis
[naval hoplites] are habituated to jumping ashore frequently and running back 
at full speed to their ships, and they think no shame o f  not dying boldly at 
their posts when the enemy attack; and excuses are readily made for them, as a 
matter o f course, when they fling away their arms and betake themselves to 
what they describe as “no dishonourable flight.” These “exploits” are the 
usual result o f employing naval hoplites, and they merit, not “infinite praise,” 
but precisely the opposite.1058
Even given the tendency towards hurling missiles and hit-and-run raids, the fact that the marines 
were personally engaged in combat with their own weapons was a far cry from the yet more 
distant and less immediate combat experience o f the sailors. As described above, sea-battles 
were conceived of as issues of professional audacity and skill, an even more explicit contrast to 
the amateur bravery and shield-bearing steadfastness of the hoplite.
Serving with Property
In both practical and ideological terms, fighting with one’s own weapons was incredibly 
important. Hanson states that “this equipment was paid for by the hoplite out o f his own purse, 
an item o f family honor to be hung up over the hearth on his return.”1059 Even given the 
tendency to reduce large-scale and prominent displays o f weapons in favour o f other forms o f  
conspicuous consumption, van Wees argues that “many Athenian citizens had at home a full set 
o f arms and armour...used only in war.”1060 The providing o f oneself with weapons remained a 
crucially important feature o f military service. What did serving with property and providing 
weapons entail in the naval context? While the age o f aristocrats personally owning and 
providing crew for warships was largely a thing o f the past by the fifth and fourth centuries 
BC,1061 it was the institution of the trierarchy1062 that provided a mechanism for members o f the 
elite to serve with “their bodies and their property”1063 in a naval context. In a similar way, but
1058 Plato, Laws, 706c. cf. Laches, 183d-184a, when he mocks a marine who gets into trouble using a custom weapon.
1059 Hanson, Western Way o f  War, p. 63.
1060 Van Wees, ‘Greeks Bearing Arms’, p. 333
1061 Gabrielsen (Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 1-2) is surely right to argue that Klienias, who provided his own 
vessel and crew for Athens’ Salamis fleet in 480 BC, was the last o f his breed o f  aristocratic warrior-captains.
1062 Gabrielsen (Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 220) is also correct to argue that the idea o f  serving in person as a 
trierarch became less important than the provision o f money during the fourth century, and particularly after the 
reforms under which groups o f individuals (symmories) paid for the upkeep o f the vessel. However, the idea o f putting 
one’s self at risk by personal service was still a powerful one, and was used frequently in law court speeches by 
(allegedly) zealous former trierarchs (e.g. Lysias, 19.62; [Demosthenes], 50 59.)
1063 The idea o f serving the state with both property/resources and one’s own person occurs in many contexts in the 
sources; for example, [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 29.5 and Thucydides, 8.65 (regarding the 5000), Xenophon, 
Cavalry Commander, 1.9 and [Aristotle], Constitution o f  Athens, 41.2 (regarding knights), Demosthenes, 10.28
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on a less lavish scale, cavalrymen, marines and hoplites served with their property at least to the 
extent that they provided their own equipment.1064 The provision o f one’s own equipment was 
not only important in terms of contributing materially to the defence o f one’s city, but also in the 
context o f competition amongst one’s peers. Mention has already been made of Thucydides’ 
report that the trierarchs despatched to Sicily competed with one another to have the most 
splendid, as well as the most efficient, vessel; the hoplites on this great venture were similarly 
competitive with the lavishness of their arms and armour.1065 The oarsmen and other trireme 
crewmen, though, were totally excluded from this kind o f  contribution and competition. The key 
symbol and tool o f the rower’s trade, the oar, was provided not by the individual, but by the 
state.1066 Indeed the crewmen themselves could be seen as prizes to be won by expenditure o f  
property in the competition between trierarchs; acquiring a good crew was part and parcel o f the 
trierarch’s property contribution, and the recruiting o f skilled seamen could be boasted about in 
the same breath as the purchase of excellent rigging and splendid paintwork. Apollodorus, a 
trierarch between 362 and 360 BC, made this claim before an Athenian jury:
daneisamenos argurion prdtos eplerdsamen ten naun, misthosamenos nautas hos 
hoion t' en aristous, doreas kai prodoseis dous hekastoi auton megalas. eti de 
skeuesin idiois ten naun hapasi kateskeuasa, kai ton demosidn elabon ouden, kai 
kosmoi hos hoion t' en kallista kai diaprepestata ton trierarchon. hupe resian 
toinun hen edunamen kratisten emisthdsamen.
I was the first to man my ship, hiring the best sailors possible by giving to each 
man large bonuses and advanced payments. More than that, I furnished the ship 
with equipment wholly my own, taking nothing from the public stores, and I made 
everything as beautiful and magnificent as possible, outdoing all the other 
trierarchs. As for the specialists, I hired the best that could be had.1067
The discussion so far should lead to the questioning o f some assumptions still held regarding the 
navy. The idea o f a link between the military service o f lower class in the navy and their power 
is in the democracy is still a widely held one, and has been built on the works o f  Aristotle and the 
Old Oligarch in particular. The simplistic nature o f this conception has long been recognized. 
Amit has argued that “sea-power alone does not explain democracy”, citing examples of  
oligarchic and even monarchical naval powers; he believed though that theory was true of  
Athens, and it was having “the example of Athens before their eyes” that gave rise to the
(services “with body and property” that it is the duty o f Athenians to perform), 21.165 (liturgists who supplied ships, 
and also served with their bodies as ship-captains).
1064 Richer hoplites and cavalrymen would also have been liable to pay eisphora, and it is the payment o f  these war- 
taxes, along with the trierarchy, that comprised the more substantial part o f serving with one’s property. Indeed, a line 
can be drawn through the middle o f the hoplite class in terms o f “serving with property”, between those who paid war- 
taxes and those who did not. For this distinction, and its particular importance to the oligarchic coup in Athens in 411 
BC, see van Wees, ‘Myth o f the Middle-class army’, p. 57
1065 Thucydides, 6.31. For this aspect o f  competitive display amongst hoplites, see Van Wees, Greek Warfare, pp. 52- 
4.
1066 There is direct evidence for this in the fourth century BC at least; each trireme appears to have had 200 oars, 
including 30 spares, as part o f  its “wooden gear”, and was thus the preserve o f the Curators o f  the Dockyards and 
trierarchs. There is no reason to suppose that the situation was significantly different in the fifth century BC.
1067 [Demosthenes], 50.7, cf. Lysias, 21.10
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theory.1068 More recently, Ceccerelli and van Wees have seriously challenged such 
interpretations o f political power and military service in to Athens itself, arguing (for example) 
that Athenian thetes served in the hoplite army prior to Athens’ thalassocracy and were yet 
denied the political equality assumed to go with such service.1069
The Old Oligarch’s argument, expanded upon in Aristotle, is an attempt to bring the navy into the 
ideology o f military service and political power. In reality, it is a poor fit, even at Athens. The 
evidence o f the “naval mob” as professional wage-eamers, and the navy as a whole as a source o f  
both permanent and seasonal employment, further challenges such interpretations o f public 
service and politics. The “professional” status o f the institution, the cosmopolitan nature o f the 
crews, the characteristic means o f fighting at sea (itself a rarity; and for the Athenians conceived 
o f as mainly a matter o f technical skill on the part of naval professionals), and the fact that the 
rowers and hyperesia did not make any sort o f contributions o f  “property” in the broadest sense 
all help to explain both the ideological inferiority of the navy as opposed to the hoplite army in 
particular, and the exceptions sometimes made for the marines to this negative view. The less 
one can see naval crews only in terms of patriotic contributors to the city’s defence, the more one 
sees them as essentially mercenaries, or even just paid workers.
4: The Ideology of the Navy: skilled craftsmen, money-grabbing 
professionals or something else?
The characterisation of the navy as a professional “job o f work” more than a military obligation 
leads naturally to a discussion of the more precise ideological location o f trireme crews. If sailors 
were not democratic and patriotic sea-fighters, what ideological position did they occupy? This 
section will look at several possible comparisons; the naval crews as skilled craftsmen, the naval 
crew as wage-eamers, and the naval crew as mercenaries. There are considerable degrees o f  
overlap within these broad categories and several points o f close comparison, but none seem to fit 
exactly. All o f these ideas, and indeed much of the discussion so far, is really the ideology about 
the naval crews, rather than the ideology o f  the naval crews;1070 the final sections in this part will 
attempt to provide, so far is possible with the available sources, a picture o f the ideology o f the 
navy crews themselves.
Naval Craftsmen and Labourers: sailors as banausoi
While describing the educational arrangements that it would be desirable for be put in place in 
order to improve cities, Aristotle gives this detailed definition o f  banausic occupations:
1068 Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 60
1069 On this specific matter, see ‘Myth o f Middle-class army’ p. 57. On the issue o f the supposed link between military 
service and political power, see Ceccarelli, ‘Sans thalassocratie, pas de democratic?; van Wees, ‘Politics and the 
battlefield’ and discussion in Part Two.
1070 An apt distinction made by Whitehead (Athenian Metic, p.3) in relation to his study o f the ideology o f metics.
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banauson d' ergon einai dei touto nomizein kai technen tauten kai mathesin, 
hosai pros tas chreseis kai tas praxeis tas tes aretes achreston apergazontai 
to soma ton eleutheron [e ten psuchen] e ten dianoian. dio tas te toiautas 
technas hosai to soma paraskeuazousi cheiron diakeisthai banausous 
kaloumen, kai tas misthamikas ergasias: ascholon gar poiousi ten dianoian 
kai tapeinen. esti de kai ton eleutherion epistemon mechri men tinos enion 
metechein ouk aneleutheron, to de prosedreuein lian pros akribeian enochon 
tais eiremenais blabais. echei de pollen diaphoran kai to tinos heneken prattei 
tis e manthanei: to men gar hautou charin e philon e di' areten ouk 
aneleutheron, ho de tauto touto pratton di' allous pollakis thetikon kai 
doulikon doxeien an prattein.
The term banausos should properly be applied to any occupation, art, o f  
instruction which is calculated to make the body, or soul, or mind o f a 
freeman unfit for the pursuit and practice o f goodness. We may accordingly 
apply the word banausos to any art or craft which adversely affects men’s 
physical fitness, and to any employment which is pursued for the sake o f gain; 
these preoccupy and debase the mind. It is the same for those branches o f  
knowledge that are fit for a freeman and it is not out o f keeping with a 
freeman’s character to study these up to a certain point; but too much 
concentration upon them, with a view to obtaining perfection, is liable to 
cause the same evil effects that have just been mentioned. Much depends on 
the purpose for which acts are done or subjects are studied but the same act, 
when done repeatedly at the instance o f other people, may be counted menial 
and servile.1071
The rest o f our extant sources are in accord with this idea that depending for one’s livelihood on 
others, either through wages given by an employer or income from customers, carried a
1 C\T) 1considerable stigma. The majority o f this material is written from a very elite perspective; 
but the idea o f self-sufficiency and self-reliance (autarkeia), particularly as a farmer, is a very 
strong theme not only in the philosophical sources, but also in more populist works such as the 
plays o f Aristophanes.1074 In a fragment from the lost play Islands, Aristophanes advocates the 
idyllic country life, a theme that is familiar from many of his extant works but is here expressed 
perfectly:
You’ve everything you need here-on your small-holding, free from the bother 
of the agora, with your very own pair o f oxen, where you can hear the sound 
o f bleating flocks, and of the grape-juice as it is pressed out into the vat; 
where you can feed on finches and thrushes.1075
It is therefore likely that this idea had a significant place in the ideology o f poorer Athenians. 
Indeed the aspirations o f poorer Athenians seem to have gone beyond simple self-sufficiency,
1071 Aristotle, Politics, 1337b8-22
1072 Austin and Vidal-Naquet, Economic and Social History, p. 11-12, arguing that “It remains true o f the whole o f  
classical antiquity that while the work o f the artisan was admired, he was neglected or down graded as a person.” See 
also Mosse (Ancient World at Work, p. 28) states that “to work for another man, in return for a wage o f any kind, is 
degrading.”
1073 Loomis (Wages, p. 105, n.5) remarks that “those who could afford not to work with their hands...frequently 
expressed disdain for all such workers”.
1074 See for example Stepsiades’ longing for the farm life in the opening o f  Clouds, 11. 44-6.
1075 Aristophanes, Islands, fra.gxntrfi=LACTOR 12, 6.
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and towards the attaining the lifestyle o f the leisured elite. Fisher has written about the ambition 
of many poorer citizens to plug into elite activities and ideology, and the “desire among many 
non-elite Athenians to shine, to rise socially and to share aspects o f the good life”.1076 Cohen has 
argued that this elite ideology contributed to a general “disdain for salaried employment” and that 
“Athenian men...avoided work that required regular and repetitive service for a single employer 
on an ongoing basis over a continuing period”.1077 This ideology o f self-sufficiency, still less 
luxurious leisure, did not in many cases conform to the reality o f fifth and fourth century BC 
Athens, as many free people, citizens and non-citizens alike, did indeed work and support 
themselves through such labour.1078 Such work was often bankrolled by the state itself. One 
significant sector o f the wage-earning economy for which we have some detailed evidence is the 
building industry. There is both literary and epigraphic testimony for the scale o f employment 
and wage-earning connected with the construction o f Athens’ monumental buildings, particularly 
those constructed under the auspices o f Pericles in the mid-fifth century BC.1079 This industry 
incorporated individuals with high levels o f skill and expertise in specific areas (sculptors, 
painters, architects and so on), and a large number o f less skilled (and indeed unskilled) men, 
working with their hands as labourers, quarrymen, scaffolders and suchlike. The same work 
resulted in the same pay, regardless of whether the workman was a slave, metic or citizen. 
Payments to these men were made in a variety o f ways; daily wages, monthly salaries and piece­
work are all attested.1080 The navy was another largely state-sponsored industry, with a similar 
mixture o f expertise, and which could also be interpreted in terms o f providing employment for 
the poorer men o f Athens.1081 There were consummate professionals on board every ship, the 
hyperesia. This group comprised at least one literate (and numerate) individual (the 
pentekontarchos), one skilled craftsman (the naupegos), and one musician (the auletes), as well 
as three experts (the kubemetes, prorates and keleustes) who were well versed in the variety o f  
seamanship and navigational skills required on sail- and oar-driven vessels. Along with these 
experts there were a far greater number of men, the sailors, with diverse ability levels, skills and 
experience. The state paid a flat rate to all such men, regardless o f  skill or social status. At first 
glance, the comparison between the naval crews on the one hand, and craftsmen or labourers in 
the other, seems pretty close.
1076 Fisher, ‘Gymnasia and democratic values o f leisure’, p. 103. He argues that this desire manifested itself not only in 
non-elite participation in gymnastic activities, but in “a markedly greater spread o f  elements o f  ‘sympotic’ style”.
1077 Cohen, ‘An Unprofitable Masculinity’, p. 100
1078 As a city, Athens itself as not self-sufficient, and was dependent on imports o f grain. See Keen, ‘Grain for 
Athens’.
1079 IG I3 449=Fomara, 120 records the accounts for the building o f the Parthenon in 434/3 BC, listing the money given 
for the project and the items o f  expenditure. Plutarch (Pericles, 12) lists the variety o f  craftsmen needed for the 
building projects o f the mid-fifth century BC, including “the painter, the pattern-maker, the engraver”.
1080 IG I3 475 and 476 record in detail a variety o f individual payments that were made to workers on the Erechtheion in 
409/8 and 408/7 BC respectively.
1081 Plutarch {Pericles, 11-2) interprets both the building programme that resulted in the Parthenon and the deployment 
o f a large scale standing navy as essentially public work schemes, important components o f  Pericles’ general policy 
towards bringing benefits to the poor o f Athens. While we might doubt that this was Pericles’ primary intention, it 
certainly had such an effect.
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Mosse argues that the there was little real difference in ancient thought between the “artisan who 
sells his own products and the workman who hires out his services... [because they 
both]...depend on others for their livelihood.”1082 Despite differences in expertise, craftsmen and 
labourers were both described as banausoi, people who “exploited a skill for their living”.1083 
Performing such tasks on a daily basis could be considered bad for one’s mental health as well as 
one’s social status:
kai gar hai ge banausikai kaloumenai kai epirretoi eisi kai eikotos mentoi 
panu adoxountai pros ton poledn. katalumainontai gar ta somata ton te 
ergazomenon kai ton epimelomenon, anankazousai kathesthai kai 
skiatrapheisthai, eniai de kai pros pur hemereuein. ton de somaton 
thelunomenon kai hai psuchai polu arrostoterai gignontai. kai ascholias de 
malista echousi kai philon kai poleos sunepimeleisthai hai banausikai 
kaloumenai. hoste hoi toioutoi dokousi kakoi kai philois chresthai kai tais 
patrisin alexeteres einai
The so-called banausic occupations are always being disparaged, and, as you 
would expect, are very poorly regarded in our states. For they ruin the 
physique o f those who practice and pursue them, making them spend the day 
sitting indoors, away from the sunlight, sometimes even by the furnace. And 
as the physique is softened, so is the mind also enfeebled. Such banausic 
occupations also mean that people have no time for attending to their friends 
or the state, so that those who follow them are reputed to be- bad at dealing 
with friends and bad defenders of their country.1084
This is a damning criticism o f the effects o f manual work on a man’s mental faculties, but it 
should be emphasized that for Xenophon, as for Aristotle, the deterioration noted results 
primarily from full-time employment. It was not so much the mere possession o f the skills o f a 
craftsman that was degrading in and of itself; what was degrading was to depend on these skills 
for a living, as to do so was to limit one’s freedom. While both craftsmen and hired workers 
shared this very important characteristic o f dependence, there probably was some differentiation, 
at least at the level o f the men involved in such activities, between artisans with high levels o f 
skill (techne) in their fields on the one hand, and unskilled labourers on the other.1085 
Craftsmen’s products and their skills could be praised and respected.1086 Some craftsmen were 
proud enough o f their trade to put it on their epitaphs, though examples are rare.1087 How closely 
does this relate to the ways in which the navy was perceived in classical Athens? Certainly it was 
recognized as an area where professional skill (techne) was important. The previous section 
discussed the importance o f naval crews’ skill in determining the outcome o f at least some sea 
battles, and certainly the ideal sea battle. More generally Thucydides’ Pericles could speak of
1082 Mosse, Ancient World at Work, p. 28
1083 Burford, Craftsmen, p. 12. Other rough translations o f  this term include “people who work with their hands”, or, 
less clumsily, “manual workers”.
1084 Xenophon, Economics, 4.2-3
1085 Loomis, Wages, p. 105, n.5 “It was recognized that training and apprenticeship were required for such “skilled” 
work as pot-making and stone-cutting, and “skilled” workers were proud o f  their skills.” cf. Burford, Craftsmen, pp. 
11-2, 82-91, 129, 156-7.
1086 Plutarch, Pericles, 4.
1087 Burford, Craftsmen, p. 176. She describes such self-declared craftsmen as “exceptional amongst the exceptions”, 
as it was unusual for Athenians to record anything other than their name on epitaphs.
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seamanship explicitly as a matter o f skill, and one that required more than a lifetime to master.1088 
In the same speech, he described the ultimate product o f this skill, “command o f the seas”, as a 
“great thing”.1089 Other writers were more cautious, if not hostile, to this commodity.1090 Plato 
showed a good deal o f worry about the threat from close proximity to the sea, and considered it a 
definite advantage if  a city did not possess the materials for building ships and pursuing sea 
power.1091 Aristotle was more ambivalent. He came down in favour o f a city having a “certain 
amount o f naval power”, and saw the establishment o f such power as a necessary step for the city 
wishing to play a role on the international stage.1092 He was however alive to the dangers that 
association with the sea and building up o f a navy could bring, suggesting a cautious approach to 
the matter.1093 In Aristotle it is most explicit that while sea-power might often be worth having, 
there was no need to accord respect to the sailors possessing the techne to bring it about; he 
described how there was no need to reward the men who rowed in a city’s navy with political 
rights, as non-citizen farmers could take the oars.1094 Thucydides’ words extolling sea power and 
seamanship skills are fully compatible with the rather disdainful view he expressed towards the 
sailors themselves.1095 As Strauss put it, “Thucydides loved the ships, but not the men who rowed 
them”.1096 This is somewhat similar to the double standard applied with regard to craftsmen and 
their products, Plutarch expressing the view most clearly while discussing various types o f art 
work; “a work may delight us with its charm, but there is no need to regard its creator with 
admiration.”1097
While they were certainly dependent wage-eamers and often skilled professionals, it is 
impossible to completely equate naval crews with ancient craftsmen. Most notably (and with the 
exception o f the naupegos), the sailors did not produce physical objects; it is craftsmen in the 
sense o f makers of, for example, ships, shoes and statues that attract the most discussion (both 
metaphorical and direct) in the ancient sources. Sea power can be regarded as the product of 
good seamanship and rowing skill only in a more indirect sense, and the crews o f Athenian 
triremes cannot be fairly described as craftsmen, in the sense o f men working raw materials into 
useful objects, 1098 or o f poets or musicians creating an artistic performance. The other key 
difference between labourers and naval men is the possibility o f the latter being involved in battle
1088 Thucydides, 1.142
1089 Thucydides, 1.143
1090 It is worth noting that nautical metaphors involving (for example, Plato, Laws, 758a) soundly-constructed ships 
weathering storms, or skilled pilots safely and skilfully manoeuvring their ships are used not infrequently to illustrate 
political points. The “ship o f state” is an ancient metaphor that is still familiar today.
1091 Plato, Laws, 704d, 705a, 706b, 707a-c.
1092 Aristotle, Politics, 1327a40 ff
1093 Aristotle, Politics, 1327bl 1 ff
1094 It is only in the Old Oligarch ([Xenophon], Constitution o f  Athens, 1.1), playing D evil’s Advocate, who advocates 
recognition o f the “naval mob”; he concedes reluctantly that as Athens’ power was based on the navy, it was thus fair 
that the naval professionals should hold more sway than the rich and the respectable. As discussed in the previous 
section, the connection between naval people and democratic politics on a practical level is something that is often 
overstated.
1095 On his slightly disparaging attitude towards sailors, see Thucydides, 8.84; 8.72.
1096 Strauss, ‘Perspectives on Death’, p. 267
1097 Plutarch, Pericles, 4.
1098 As such, they are not mentioned in Burford’s work, Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society.
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on Athens’ behalf. This might suggest something o f a patriotic turn o f mind amongst the 
Athenian crewmen, but it must be remembered that the same dangers were faced by the metics, 
slaves and the Greeks from other cities who formed the largest part o f the trireme crews. These 
factors suggest that a more telling comparison might be made with another significant group o f  
non-craftsmen wage-eamers; mercenaries.
Fighting for a Wage: naval mercenaries?
Trundle’s recent work into some o f the wider social, economic and political aspects of  
mercenaries makes a valuable contribution to the present debate. An Athenian fleet at sea, being 
composed o f a cosmopolitan mix of professional men employed for a particular task, and thus 
forming a mobile community with its own status divisions, personal relationships and hierarchies, 
bore some obvious resemblances to a mercenary army on campaign.1099 Trundle argues, surely 
correctly, that “mercenaries present interesting illustrations o f  identity creation beyond state 
boundaries”.1100 The discussion above on the Samos fleet democracy provides the most striking 
and important case-study o f this phenomenon in connection with the navy.1101 At the level o f the 
individual too, there are some similarities. Individual professional sailors looking for the navy 
that offered the best wages and conditions can be usefully compared to itinerant mercenaries 
looking for service in infantry forces. None o f this was lost on Trundle, who includes many 
references to navies, and in particular the classical Athenian navy, within his work. Despite these 
similarities, he is a little ambiguous as to whether Athens’ naval crews should be considered as 
mercenaries.
In his first chapter, he defines the term “mercenary” in such a way that the vast majority o f those 
crewing triremes would be excluded.1102 However, even if he does not consider them to be “true 
mercenaries” in his highly technical sense, Trundle views the crews as composing largely o f  
wage-earning professionals; he argues that the sailors o f the Greek navies “rowed and crewed for 
a daily wage...and were very unlikely to serve without the prospect o f pay”.1103 He also makes 
use o f comparative examples from the Athenian navy in other chapters when discussing aspects 
of, for example, mercenary recruitment and pay. In his concluding section, he traces the 
increasing use o f mercenaries throughout the Archaic and Classical periods, and his account 
begins with sailors; “naval warfare provided livelihoods for thousands o f poor men in the fleets 
of Athens, Persian and Sparta.”1104 Whether they are to be considered mercenaries or simply as 
professionals, Trundle argues that “even national crews had mercenary interests”, and it is
1099 And also in this sense contrast with artisans/craftsmen, who did not form any sort o f class identity, or become a 
significant and separate category. As Vidal-Naquet and Austin {Economic and Social history o f  Ancient Greece, p. 
12) argue, “there never was... any such thing as a category o f artisans.”
1100 Trundle, Mercenaries, p. 2
1101 See Part Two, section B .l and 2 and Part Three, section 1.
1102 Trundle, Mercenaries, pp. 22-3. Citizens and metics o f Athens could not be “proper” mercenaries, as they had 
some sort o f  stake in the community that they were employed by. Though Trundle does not refer to them specifically, 
slaves also could not be regarded as mercenaries, as they row under some degree o f  compulsion.
1103 Trundle, Mercenaries, p. 40.
1104 Trundle, Mercenaries, p. 165
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undoubtedly the case that the idea of rowing ships as a patriotic military duty is not much to the 
fore in the source material.
While it may be technically correct to do so, restricting the label o f “mercenary” to the non-metic 
xenoi in the fleet can perhaps be misleading; as Whitehead argues, “to talk o f [non-Athenian] 
naval ‘mercenaries’ creates the spurious impression of a distinct category, drawing on pay where 
others drew on patriotism.”1105 Trundle however is keen to stress that mercenary service should 
not simply be conceived o f solely as a matter o f personal gain and greed.1106 While conceding the 
general paucity o f evidence for the motivations o f mercenaries themselves (as opposed to their 
leaders and hirers), Trundle elicits some examples where paid mercenaries seem to be serving for 
a mixture o f motives;1107 in terms o f  an individual’s motivation to become a mercenary, pay must 
be considered as a necessary condition, but in some cases not a sufficient one.1108 However, none 
of his explicit examples concern men serving in navies, and the connection between money and 
naval deployments should never be underestimated. The necessity for pay is made very clear by 
Apollodorus, in his argument with Polycles, his would-be successor as trierarch. Polycles berates 
his opponent for spending far too lavishly on his vessel’s equipment and turning the crew lazy 
through over-payment. Apollodorus retorts with this challenge:
peri de ton nauton kai ton epibaton kai tes huperesias, ei phes hup' emou 
autous diephtharthai, paralabon ten triere autos sautoi kataskeuasai kai 
nautas kai epibatas kai huperesian, hoitines soi meden labontes 
sumpleusontai.
As for the sailors and marines and specialists, if  you say that they have been 
corrupted by me, take over the ship, and get sailors and marines and 
specialists for yourself, who will sail with you for nothing.1109
For naval crews in general the evidence that there is suggests a firm alignment between levels of 
wages and willingness to serve,1110 but there would also have been other factors in individuals’ 
choices and motivations. As was the case for ‘true’ mercenaries, wages may have been necessary 
but not sufficient; certainly the men who were supposed to be drafted onto Apollodorus’ trireme 
were not keen to serve even this rich and generous trierarch, and he alleged that many did not 
turn up.1111 However, it must be conceded that our lack o f direct evidence regarding the motives 
and attitudes o f the men crewing Athens’ fleets is almost total.
1105 Whitehead, Athenian Metic, p. 86
1106 Trundle, (Mercenaries, p. 42) argues that “personal gain did not underlie all mercenary service. Complex 
motivations and relationships beyond kerdos [personal gain] worked to drive mercenary service”.
1107 Trundle (Mercenaries, pp. 42-3, cf. pp. 59 ff.) adduces several other motivating factors such as ritualized 
friendships (xenia) or personal relationships (philia) with paymasters, or diplomatic relationships and claims of kinship 
(syngenes), on both the level o f the individual and the state.
1108 Trundle, Mercenaries, p. 42; “Personal motivation is rarely expressed in the sources... [but]...Individuals must 
have undertaken mercenary service with personal gain in mind.”
1109 [Demosthenes], 50.36.
1110 Indeed, Trundle (Mercenaries, p. 42) argues that “Personal motivation for better rewards is best illustrated among 
Athenian naval crews, signing on for high fees and staying with commanders who paid higher rates.”
1111 [Demosthenes], 50.7
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The Navy’s Ideological Character
Without direct evidence from the sailors themselves, we are left to reconstruct the ideology and 
characteristics o f the naval personnel from the scattered allusions in the sources, and from the 
mixture o f elements present in the comparisons discussed above. Needless to say, any picture 
constructed from such material involves a good deal o f conjecture, and thus one should adopt 
positions cautiously. Special attention will be paid to evidence drawn from the works o f  
Aristophanes. He should not be regarded as the true voice o f the common people, and certainly 
not the mouthpiece o f the “naval mob”; indeed, their portrayal in the comedies is less fulsome 
and more ambiguous than might be expected.1112 However, the works o f Aristophanes are 
significantly less o f the elite than all o f  the other literary sources and he seemed willing to put 
matters of concern to the navy onto the city’s agenda.1113
The preceding discussion in this section has demonstrated the professional nature o f the navy as 
an institution, and the primacy o f money in terms o f individual motives. Indeed, the problem of 
finding enough oarsmen to meet the huge manpower demand o f  a trireme fleet was nearly always 
a matter o f finding sufficient money to dish out in pay. Strauss sees Thucydides’ concentration 
on naval finances as opposed to naval men as evidence o f his political bias against the rowers, 
suggesting that “when it came to the death o f oarsmen or difficulty o f replacing them, his 
[Thucydides’] silence is deafening.”1114 He acknowledges that “money buys ships and, for a sea 
power, ships are important”;1115 but this seems to miss the point that the main thing that money 
was needed for was to pay crewmen. Compared to the costs o f running a trireme fleet, the capital 
costs o f building one were extremely small.1116 Thucydides could certainly be accused o f being
1112 Strauss, ‘Perspectives on death’, p. 262; “Seamen had a considerable presence in Attic drama...but were never as 
prominent as hoplites.” cf. van Wees, Greek Warfare p. 200, on the negative attitude present in some o f  Aristophanes’ 
comedy. However, van Wees seems to be mistaken in seeing a significant shift in Aristophanes’ attitude to the naval 
crews in Frogs, as compared to the earlier play (“no sooner had they been beaten by the Spartans in 405 BC than he let 
rip”). In the first place, Frogs was probably produced, and certainly written, before the huge defeat at Aigospotamoi in 
405 BC. It is also in this play, as will be discussed below, that the marine protagonist is mocked for not showing 
rowing ability. Aristophanes’ attitude in this play, as in his others, mixes ambiguous praise and light-hearted insult.
1113 Knights in particular has the most direct examples o f this, as discussed in Part Two, section A.3.
1,14 Strauss, ‘Perspectives on Death’, p. 275; Similarly, Gabrielsen (Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 108) argues that 
“Finding the cash needed was not so difficult as finding enough fit crews”, but this conclusion seems belied by his own 
arguments, and certainly by Thucydides. Conscription was rare, and while there were some occasional difficulties in 
finding oarsmen, they always seemed to be ready and available when there were generous and rich trierarchs around. 
Given the ad hoc nature o f naval recruitment and the large fluctuations in demand from year to year, it is remarkable 
that sourcing crew was not more significant problem.
1115 Strauss, ‘Perspectives on Death’, p. 274
1116 As noted by Hunt, Slaves, Warfare and Ideology, pp. 100-1. The highest modem estimates o f  the cost for building 
a trireme tend to suggest a cost o f around 2 talents for a new and fully equipped vessel (Gabrielsen, Financing the 
Athenian Fleet, p. 139, and p. 255 n. 34). Gabrielsen himself (p. 139-42) does not accept this or any other ‘standard’ 
figure, and argues (correctly) that there would be much variety in the price for a ship and that it “is impossible to come 
up with any particular sum representing the price o f  a ship in the fifth and fourth centuries” (p. 142); however, the 
figure o f 2 talents is convenient for the purposes o f  this study and is undoubtedly the right order o f magnitude. A  
trireme could potentially have a natural life exceeding 20 years (Amit, Athens and the Sea, p. 27, cf. Casson, Ships and 
Seamanship, p. 90). Rawlings rightly emphasises the large scale o f costs o f building the ship sheds and harbour 
installations, but is correct (Ancient Greeks at War, p. 114) to argue that “the greatest and most persistent financial 
expense... [in relation to the navy],..was its daily operation”. On my interpretation o f naval pay, the capital cost o f  one 
ship was approximately equal to two months’ wages for the crew, and only six months’ worth on the absolute lowest 
possible figures o f 2 obols a day (a minimal sum advocated by Demosthenes, 4.28, for a fleet that was never voted for). 
Thus the scale o f expenditure on running the navy dwarfed that o f building it.
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rather indifferent about the deaths o f oarsmen;1117 but the reason that he does not explicitly 
discuss the difficulty o f replacing rowers was because, for him, the solution was simple: Find the 
money to pay them.
It was not only Thucydides who thought that, in a very real sense, it was money that manned 
triremes. In Aristophanes’ final extant play, a character asks o f  the personification o f Wealth: 
“And another thing, tell me, don't you get our triremes manned?”1118 While the old men o f  
Aristophanes’ choruses could have their naval exploits described in terms of patriotic service and 
the public good, it is likely that, even in the years immediately following the battle o f Salamis in 
480 BC, men rowed in Athens’ fleet for their own gain. Even this idealized older generation 
spoke o f their “lost youth.. .on guard duty at Byzantium, and then at night we went out for a walk 
and stole the bread-seller’s mortar on the sly”,1119 and could be accused, without any real 
reproach, o f “going ashore to nick someone’s clothes”.1120
The extent to which trireme crews held the apparently widely accepted view that disparaged 
wage-eamers is unclear; they may have aspired to become self-sufficient landowners,1121 and 
Rosivach is no doubt right to suppose that it was an important thing to those occasional and 
seasonal rowers that they did not depend upon their rowing wages. How comfortable the 
professionals o f the “naval mob” were with depending upon a pay-master is impossible to say. 
Perhaps (like the reminiscing o f Aristophanes’ old rowers) the sailors preferred to focus not on 
the wages, but on the loot and plunder taken from the enemy. Profiting from the spoils of war 
could perhaps be considered a more respectable and legitimate method o f acquisition and 
enrichment than the receiving o f a wage; that the personal gain o f  the naval crews was a product 
of looting and depredation as well as wages may have had the effect o f mitigating the stigma o f  
dependence upon an employer. It is very unclear, however, the extent to which individual sailors 
profited from the spoils o f war; it is usually the case in the classical era that the city, in the first 
instance represented by the fleet’s strategoi, took charge o f and used the spoils.1122 Not 
infrequently they were used to provide the sailors with their basic pay. Generals were fairly often 
accused o f embezzling such monies for personal profit; no doubt the same charges could have
1117 As Strauss argues ( ‘Perspectives on death’, p. 274-5) there was no real obstacle to stop Thucydides finding out and 
recording at least the numbers o f  sailors lost in battles, in the same way as he routinely did for hoplite casualties, were 
he so inclined. That he did not do so suggests either economy o f  effort or indifference to this particular detail, 
especially as (except for in exceptional circumstances like the failed invasion o f  Sicily) the numbers o f human loses in 
sea battles were probably not numerically significant (p. 268 “an Athenian ran less risk o f  death in battle at sea than on 
land...Casualties in Greek naval battles were not necessarily high.”)
1118 Aristophanes, Wealth, 1. 172
1119 The Chorus-Leader o f  Aristophanes’ Wasps, 11. 236-8. cf. a similar incident being boasted o f  by the participants at 
11. 354-6
1120 Aristophanes, Frogs, 1075. This is Dionysus talking to Aeschylus about o f  the crew of the Paralos in the days 
when the playwright was alive. Aeschylus fought at the battles o f Marathon and Salamis, and thus can be considered 
the epitome o f  Aristophanes’ ‘golden generation’.
1121 Strauss ( ‘School o f democracy’, p. 322) argues that “many thetes aspired to a hoplite’s prosperity and prestige”.
1122 Pritchett (Greek State at War, p. 85) argues that the “hegemon in the field could dispose o f the proceeds from the 
sale o f booty...whatever was brought back became the property o f  the state.” Van Wees (Greek Warfare, p. 236-7) 
argues that the centralization o f  material resources was a key development o f  warfare in the classical period that 
differentiated it from preceding times.
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been levelled at many individual sailors, but there is no explicit evidence. It is also possible that 
trireme crews regarded their earnings in the same way as payments for performing public service; 
though as I argued above, the extant source material shows a clear divide between naval pay on 
the one hand and remuneration for serving the city on the other.
Outspoken sailors
Whatever their general attitude to the fact o f being dependent on a pay-master, the sailors on the 
whole were not backward in coming forward and expressing dissatisfaction when their money 
was not forthcoming. After concerns over their personal safety in dangerous situations,1123 often 
on the eve o f battle, concerns over not receiving their due are the most common difficulty 
expressed by sailors to their commanders in the sources. As discussed above, the Paraloi 
perhaps became more outspoken across the fifth century, but even in the more disciplined ‘good 
old days’ they would call out for their rations.1124 Thucydides reports a couple o f examples of 
sailors petitioning their commanders for funds during the Peloponnesian war.1125 Apollodorus’ 
crewmen in 362 BC took speaking up to the next level, by threatening to withdraw their service 
unless they were given more money.1126 A group o f  Cypriot oarsmen mutinied over pay when 
serving under Konon, having seen others on the campaign where treated preferentially in this 
respect.1127 Some o f these examples relate to the Peloponnesian navy in 411 BC, and it is in this 
context that Thucydides comments that violent outspokenness was a characteristic trait of  
sailors.1128 This comment is surely not intended to be limited to sailors o f the Peloponnesian 
fleet, but to also include men o f  the Athenian navy too, whom Thucydides would have had first­
hand experience o f when he served as a strategos. Indeed, it is likely that many of the 
individuals in the Peloponnesian fleet at this point had had previous experience rowing for the 
Athenians, and were acting in their usual forthright manner under their new commanders. In his 
letter to the Athenian people from the beleagured campaign in Sicily, Nicias reportedly 
complained o f the difficulty o f keeping unruly sailors in line.1129 It is unlikely that Aristophanes 
would have made so much o f  the crewmen’s problems over pay in Knights had the sailors 
themselves kept demurely quiet about their plight.1130
Strauss regarded the loquacity o f  the Athenian trireme crews as evidence o f the democratic 
ideology o f the navy, and a product o f  the strong sense o f collective identity built up between the 
crew members aboard these vessels.1131 His argument regarding the effects on the individual of 
serving in the navy is valuable, but it seems a mistake to restrict the lessons o f this ‘school of
1123 Xenophon argues (Memorabilia , 3.5.6) that sailors, unless faced with an immediate threat, were in general an 
unruly lot.
1124 Aristophanes, Frogs, 1073.
1125 Thucydides, 8.78 and 8.83-4
1126 [Demosthenes], 50.11
1127 Oxyrhnchus Historian, Hellenica, 20.1
1128 Thucydides, 8.84.3
1129 Thucydides, 7.14
1130 Aristophanes, Knights, 11. 1063-5 and 1364-78
1131 Strauss, ‘School o f  Democracy’, esp. p 316
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democracy’ to one particular group on board, the Athenian citizens.1132 The fleet’s identity 
could, amongst the free men aboard at least, overcome the normal dividing lines between men of  
different cities. The close living and working conditions, and being on campaign away from 
everyone’s home, meant that “the individual rower might develop a sense of allegiance to the 
group”.1133 The most obvious example o f  the strength o f this nautical community is the events in 
Samos o f 411 BC, described earlier. It was the equivalent “free people” of the Peloponnesian 
navy who were most forceful in voicing their concerns to their superiors.1134 Strauss points out, 
the reaction o f the officers to the activism o f their rowers was completely different in this 
case;1135 the Spartan commander tried to face down the mob and use violence with his stick, and 
was almost lynched for his trouble.1136 An Athenian commander in a similar position, as 
Phormio was in 429 BC, engaged with his men and tried to answer their concerns.1137
The Naval Career
I have argued in this thesis for the navy as a professional institution, and that most naval people 
most o f the time were motivated by primarily economic factors.1138 This must be true, at least to 
the extent that without such financial incentives, the men for the most part would not take to the 
seas. But even if  this conclusion is accepted, it needs to be developed. In the first instance, it 
must be acknowledge that there were other motivating factors; secondary to the financial aspects 
perhaps, but still powerful and significant.1139 Linked to this, there is a key further question 
regarding the naval profession; why would men choose to earn a drachma a day on the oar- 
benches, rather than in some other vocation? Compared to the building industry, for example, the 
navy offered working conditions that were probably more dangerous, certainly more unpleasant, 
took a man away from his home and family, and what is more carried the risk o f battle. What 
advantages did a naval career offer to offset this?
1132 Strauss ( ‘School o f  democracy’, p. 319) concedes that “some degree o f  fraternization among different kinds o f  
oarsmen as...inevitable”, but argues that “the tried-and-true strategy o f  clubbiness” would have totally undermined 
this. His paper gives eloquent testimony to the conduciveness o f  conditions on a naval campaign for forming a group 
identity and shaping a collective consciousness, and there is no evidence o f this being undermined by “clubbiness” 
amongst free men from different cities. Indeed, the most important and detailed example o f  a naval community shows 
(see Part 2, Section B .l)  co-operation between all the free men. It is more legitimate to exclude the slaves from this 
imagined community, though again we must assume some level o f  cooperation. In the first place, the divide between 
the slave and the free man was more profound than that between free men o f  different cities. This would be reinforced 
in the second place by the fact that many slaves would have been on campaign with their own masters; although they 
worked under the same conditions and for the same pay, they could never forget their servile status.
1133 Strauss, ‘School o f  democracy’, p. 317. His argument refers only to Athenian citizens; I have applied it to the 
wider group o f free people who served in the navy.
1134 Thucydides, 8.84; “Most o f the Syracusans and Thurian crews were free men, and were consequently all the more 
outspoken.” As remarked in HCT  (ad loc 8.84.2, p. 279), these free men were “not [exclusively] the nationals o f the 
states that provided the ships”; i.e. they were hired men.
1135 Strauss, ‘School o f democracy’, p. 319
1136 Thucydides, 8.83-4
1137 Thucydides, 2.88. It was a similar case with Nicias in Syracuse (7.76); he feels that the men o f the expedition were 
feeling (justifiably) disheartened, and he responded with a speech.
1138 Whether it was to earn professional wages (the “naval mob”), exploit potentially lucrative opportunities abroad 
(e.g. the Sicilian invasion o f  415 BC), or to earn money in the slow season o f  one’s regular employment (e.g. the 
farmers disposed by the Peloponnesian army in the Archidamian war); see above for discussion o f this sliding scale o f  
professionalism.
1139 I discuss such motivations below.
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Economic reasons can de deduced here. What seems clear in the navy, which was not so much 
the case for banausic professions, is that there was a direct material advantage to be gained 
through increased techne, professional skill. However strange it may seem, the Erechtheion 
building accounts demonstrate that there was no difference in the levels of pay given to manual 
labourers on the one hand, and skilled craftsmen such as carpenters on the other.1140 Even in the 
case o f sculptors making fine statutory for the sanctuary, there is nothing in the evidence to 
suggest that they usually earned more for their superior skill than a man paid simply to carry 
things.1141 It was a similar case for the architects on the project, who also appear to have earned a 
drachma per day.1142 In the navy, by contrast, although the basic rate o f pay was the same for 
everybody, competition for rowers meant that skilled men could command bonus payments, and 
the same was true for members o f the hyperesia. In the case o f the fleet that invaded Sicily in 
415 BC, in addition to bonuses paid to the specialist crews, more than a third o f the oarsmen,1143 
a total o f around 6,400 rowers, received higher wages than the basic drachma per day. Given the 
size and splendour o f the Sicilian force, extra payments on this scale were probably unusual; the 
concept o f paying bonuses to men with higher levels o f skill and experience was not.1144 Not 
only were rowers given greater financial rewards for greater skill and experience; but these 
qualities could also lead to promotion to the hyperesia. In what is just about the only direct 
passage relating to promotion in the trireme fleet, Aristophanes implies that attaining higher rank 
is a matter o f experience and merit:
Choros: ereten chrenai prota  genesthai prin pedaliois epicheirein, 
kait' enteuthen proirateusai kai tous anemous diathresai,
kaita kubernan auton heautoi
Chorus-Leader: Besides, one ought first to be an oarsman before trying 
one’s hand at the helm [pedaliois epicheirein]; then after that be a bow- 
officer [proirateusai] and look out for squalls; and only then steer for 
oneself [kubernan].1145
It need hardly be said that an allusion in a satirical play is not the best evidence from which to 
reconstruct the career path o f  the Athenian navy. The context o f this remark is a comparison with 
learning the skills o f comic writing. The chorus leader first mocks those comics who peaked
1140 IG I3 475,11. 65-71, cf. 11. 272-85. Loomis, Wages, pp. 105-6.
'141 ig  I3 476, 11. 144-81. These men were paid per piece, rather than a day-rate, so direct comparisons are difficult to 
make. Loomis (Wages, p. 118) argues that the amount o f  money paid to a craftsman for any given statue was “based 
on how long it ought to take”, and describes it as “an attractive plausibility” that the rate used in the calculation was 
one drachma per day.
1142 IG I3 476, 11. 59-62 cf. 11. 266-69. Loomis, Wages, p. 99, cf. p. 97. Such men seem to have been given a specified 
salary, rather than a daily wage. Though the actual amount o f  money equated to a drachma per day, the significance o f  
this would seem to be that architects, unlike labourers and carpenters, were paid this amount regardless o f the actual 
number o f  days work they put in.
1143 Thucydides, 6.31. The thranitae, who were all given bonus payments, numbered 62 men out o f the trireme’s 
maximum oarcrew o f  170.
1144 While the fact o f bonus payments to skilled crew is well attested, there is, frustratingly, no evidence at all to 
suggest how much more a professional might earn; still less indication o f  the extra salaries a man like Phantias, reputed 
to the best helmsman in Greece (Lysias, 10.11), might command. It seems likely that there were no fixed amounts; 
crewmen would ask for all they could get, trierarchs would spend their money on such men at levels appropriate to 
their own personal and patriotism and devotion to honour (philotimia), and, o f  course, the level o f resources they could 
raise (for an example o f a trierarch going the extra mile to raise money for his crew, see [Demosthenes] 50.17).
1145 Aristophanes, Knights, 11. 542-4
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early and are now a shadow o f  their former selves; by way of contrast he explains that 
Aristophanes learnt his craft slowly, stage by stage, akin to climbing the ‘promotion ladder’ o f a 
trireme. While the details remain vague, it is unlikely that such an analogy would have been 
made were it not correct in its essentials; the analogy would have not worked unless it was 
commonly recognized in Athens that skill and experience over time on the navy’s oar benches 
could lead to elevation. Having great techne seemed to pay o ff in the naval context far more than 
it did in similar banausic contexts, and this could well be one reason for the evident popularity of 
crewing triremes.
Secondary Motives for Joining the Navy
As with the mercenaries examined by Trundle, the fact that naval people were motivated 
primarily by personal gain does not rule out a range o f other motives; for many, pay could have 
been a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. Some o f  these factors are alluded to in the 
source material.
For many, the simple desire for travel and adventure, seeing new sights, experiencing exotic 
foreign ports and far-flung places was probably a powerful motivation. Thucydides describes the 
attitudes o f the young men in Athens as the Sicilian invasion was being debated:
to is d' en tei helikiai tes te apouses pothoi opseds kai theorias, kai euelpides ontes 
sothesesthai
The young had the longing for the sights and experiences o f distant places, and 
were confident that they would return safely.1146
It might have added to the attraction that many o f these places that the navy visited were in the 
Athenian Empire, and so the “naval mob” would have had the opportunity, should they have so 
desired, to lord their superiority, to bully, steal from and rape their “allies”;1147 such casual 
predatory action was, according to Aristophanes’ descriptions, part and parcel o f overseas 
campaigns.1148
Patriotism might be adduced as another secondary factor, at least for the “naval mob” of 
professional citizens; the navy was a context in which one might work for their city and its glory. 
Strauss has suggested that the oarsmen themselves rowed with their minds dwelling upon their 
“glorious contribution to the greatness o f  their polis.”1149 This explanation may well be true of 
some individuals, but we might also infer similar motives upon the men who earned their keep by 
constructing the Parthenon in the 440s and 430s BC, the Erechtheion in 409 BC, and the
1146 Thucydides, 6.24.3. Note the more hard-nosed attitude in this passage, quoted above, o f  the “masses” who were 
after pay.
1147 See for example Aristophanes, Acharnians, 11. 192-3, where trips to the allies are synonymous with “grinding them 
down”.
1148 Aristophanes, Wasps, 11. 354-6 and 236-7, cf. Frogs, 1. 1075
1149 Strauss, ‘School o f  democracy’, p.322.
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numerous other great buildings o f the city. Perhaps these labourers and builders were patriots 
who wished to help Athens construct the visible manifestations o f her grandeur and greatness; 
edifices that were impressive to themselves and their contemporaries and would, Thucydides 
suggests, fool subsequent generations into overestimating Athenian power.1150 These ‘higher’ 
motives are o f  course impossible to disprove in any absolute way, as there is simply not the 
evidence from the sailors (or builders) themselves to convincingly and finally rebut the 
suggestion that the “naval mob” were fervent patriots. The positive evidence for such a case is 
far from compelling.
Respect For Trireme Crewmen at Athens: a prestigious way of life?
There are some personal benefits that can come with motives o f patriotism; men could have been 
motivated to serve in the navy because o f the prestige and respect accorded to that way of life. 
Strauss accepts this idea, perhaps too readily,1151 arguing that as “rowers in the Athenian fleet, 
they garnered prestige and self-confidence...It is small wonder that thetic seamen were usually 
volunteers rather than conscripts.”1152 As evidence o f this, he cites the “saviours of the city” 
passage from Acharnians discussed above (though not the ambiguous and slightly tongue-in- 
cheek context), and the fact that, again from Aristophanes, the description “the land o f fine 
triremes” was sufficient to identify the city o f  an Athenian stranger.1153 He also argues that “the 
opportunity to become part o f  so disciplined a military team” as a trireme crew was itself a 
draw;1154 one can almost imagine a trierarch or a keleustes going around the harbour shouting 
about such opportunities to attract potential recruits. Certainly a man might get a reputation for 
skill amongst his peers in naval circles, but how strong is the evidence to suggest that sailors 
gained wider prestige and respect in their communities? There was certainly some credit to be 
had for having fought in the naval battle at Salamis, though this was not the case for other 
significant victories at sea, such as the battle o f  Eurymedon. The Old Oligarch certainly 
believed, though found it distasteful, that naval service more generally led to political power;1155 
though not necessarily admiration. Plato argued that one o f the drawbacks for the city with a 
navy was that they “Give honours, as rewards for their safety, to a section of their forces that is 
not their finest; for they owe their safety to the arts o f the kubernetes, the pentekontarchos and 
the rower-men o f all kinds and not too respectable”.1156 Aristotle claims that this intolerable 
situation could be avoided:
outhen gar autous meros einai dei tes poleds...plethous de huparchontosperioikon
kai ton ten choran georgounton, aphthonian anankaion einai kai nautdn.
1150 Thucydides, 1.10
1151 Particularly in view o f  some o f  his other statements regarding the lack o f  presence and prestige the trireme crews 
had in the city, referred to below.
1152 Strauss, ‘School o f  democracy’, p. 317
1153 Aristophanes, Birds, 1. 108
1154 Strauss, ‘School o f  democracy’, p. 317
1155 [Xenophon], Constitution o f  Athens, 1.1-2
1156 Plato, Laws, 707a-b
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There is no need for such people [the “naval mob”] to be part of the citizen 
body...if there are masses o f  serfs and farm-workers ready to hand, it should 
always be possible to draw an abundant supply o f sailors from this source.1157
Against these impressions we must weigh the complaints o f sailors (and former sailors) as voiced 
in Aristophanes, in which respect and social prestige and political rewards for their service seem 
to be somewhat lacking.1158 Perhaps it is unsurprising that the elite commentators felt that the 
sailors were accorded too much respect, and that they themselves felt undervalued. Is there any 
objective truth to be gleaned out o f these competing points o f view? Such evidence as there is 
tends to support the case o f the sailors.
Strauss has recently called attention to “the peculiar position o f the Athenian seaman in his 
culture.”1159 He argues that while there is much textual evidence describing Athenian fleets and 
sea power, it “is matched by an equally impressive set o f  texts indicating the invisibility o f the 
Athenian navy and its thetic seamen.”1160 That we cannot take for granted that seamen lost while 
serving in the Athenian fleet were recorded on inscriptions o f the war dead is significant in 
itself.1161 Even if we conclude that the names o f dead sailors were inscribed on such lists, and 
that the empty bier in the annual funeral procession1162 was a nod to the sensibilities o f naval 
families, this must be regarded only as a bare minimum o f  respect. Indeed these measures may 
well have had more to do with religious piety and scruples towards the treatment of any dead, 
rather than an indication o f respect for naval men themselves. The city o f  Athens certainly did 
not go out of its way to heroise its sailors.
Athens’ Imagined Community and the Cultural Invisibility of the “Naval Mob”
The virtual absence o f triremes and their crews from all forms o f  classical art, from painted 
pots1163 to the Parthenon frieze, is an eloquent testimony to the level o f prestige accorded to the 
navy. In commenting on Pericles’ pre-war speech, Gomme states that:
it is remarkable that at Athens the navy did not enjoy greater social 
prestige; that though the rich were ready enough to be admirals and 
trierarchs, no one was especially proud o f being a kubemetes or a 
subordinate officer, still less o f being a rower...[and]...exaggeration of 
the hoplite’s value was common, even in Athens. There is more 
recognition o f the importance o f the sailor in Aristophanes than in any 
other writer except Thucydides.1164
1157 Aristotle, Politics, 1327b
1158 Aristophanes, Wasps, 1117-9; Acharnians, 677-8
1159 Strauss, ‘Perspectives on death’, p. 262
1160 Strauss, ‘School o f democracy’, p. 313
1161 Strauss ( ‘Perspectives on death’ p. 265) summarizes the debate, before arguing that it is extremely probable that 
seamen’s names were recorded. Van Wees (Greek Warfare, p.225) argues that, even if  the Athenian citizens on board 
were recorded on such monuments, the rest o f  the crew were not.
1162 Thucydides, 2.34
1163 Cartledge (‘Machismo o f  the Athenian Empire’, p. 64-5) reproduces and discusses an exception to this rule, the 
Archenautes Stamnos; a wine-jar that has no particularly naval imagery upon it, but in which the man’s name, ‘Master 
Mariner’, is significant. The name is rare at Athens and the jar unique.
1164 Gomme, HCT, vol. 1, p. 460, ad loc 142.9
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Strauss similarly argues that “Without doubt, the surviving evidence of classical Athens, with the 
possible exceptions o f  Thucydides and Aristophanes, does not give thetic seamen their due.”1165 
There is some doubt even with these two authors. As Strauss himself argues, Thucydides’ 
attitude towards the sailors borders on indifference; it is the institution o f the navy that gets its 
due from him, rather than its men.1166 Only Aristophanes ever seems to fight the comer of the 
sailors themselves, and even he is far from an uncritical advocate.1167 It is possible that some 
men, seeing the (sometimes grudging) respect that the fleet itself had achieved in some circles in 
Athens, joined in the hope that they as sailors would gain similar prestige. Surely though, there 
cannot have been that many who were quite so naive, and those that had joined with such 
expectations would be justified in feeling disappointed.1168 It may be argued that such a 
viewpoint comes from uncritical acceptance o f source material emanating solely from the 
conservative Athenian elite, and so cannot be taken as indicative o f the beliefs and ideals of the 
poorer Athenian citizens. However, Cartledge is correct to argue that “the dominance of the 
hoplite ideology in democratic Athens is fully confirmed by examples drawn from...the two 
main publicly approved democratic discourses o f drama and oratory”,1169 and further points out 
that “If Athenian drama was importantly the city o f  Athens talking to itself, then it talked to itself 
as an ‘imagined community’ not o f  sailors but o f hoplites.”1170 Anderson explains the ‘imagined 
community’ in terms o f a collective consciousness o f a society and its people: “the members o f  
the smallest nation will never know most o f  their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear o f 
them, yet in the minds o f each o f them lives the image o f  their communion...Communities are 
distinguished...by the style in which they are imagined.” 1171 For all that Athens’ destiny was 
turned to the sea by the policies o f Themistocles,1172 for all that the city was bound to the Piraeus 
by the Long Walls,1173 and in the fifth century ruled a mostly maritime Empire, for all that the 
reality did not match the ideology, the Athenians liked to think o f  themselves as community o f  
men bom from their native soil,1174 citizen-soldiers ready to defend that soil with shield and 
spear. In Athens, the ideal warrior, indeed the ideal man,1175 was always the hoplite, and if not
1165 Strauss, ‘School o f democracy’, p. 320
1166 Strauss, ‘Perspectives on death’, p. 275: “Though an expert on sea power, Thucydides seems to have been tone 
deaf to the sound o f oars.” Given these views, it is a little strange that Strauss would also argue that prestige and 
respect were significant motivating factors for men joining Athenian trireme crews.
1167 Van Wees (Greek Warfare, p. 200) argues that Aristophanes “could barely muster a few back-handed 
compliments” for the sailors. While this is a perhaps a little too dismissive, it is closer to the truth than Hunt (Slaves, 
Warfare and Ideology, p. 125), who argues that “one leaves Aristophanes with the overwhelming impression o f the 
importance o f the navy and the esteem in which its crews were held”
1168 In advocating that the rowers o f  Athens were accorded respect, Hunt {Slavery, Warfare and Ideology, pp. 122-6) 
does not differentiate sufficiently between recognition o f  the navy’s power and usefulness on the one hand, and respect 
for the men who crewed it on the other.
1169 Cartledge, ‘The machismo o f the Athenian Empire’, p. 62
1170 Cartledge, ‘The machismo o f the Athenian Empire’, p. 62. The same conclusion can be drawn from analysis of the 
fourth-century orators; see Part Two, section A .2.
1171 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6
1172 Thucydides, 1.93; Aristophanes, Knights, 1. 815
1173 Thucydides, 1.107
1174 As Connor ( ‘Athenian Civic Identity’, p. 38) has correctly pointed out, this myth is “not a description o f  a social 
reality... [but]... a reflection o f the anxiety o f  a people who knew they were o f very diverse origins”
1175 Cartledge, ‘The machismo o f the Athenian Empire’, p. 63; “being a man in classical Athens is being a hoplite 
man”
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then the cavalryman; never the rower.1176 Although the personification of Demos in the Knights 
was a naval man to the extent that he fought at Salamis, he was also, like Aristophanes’ 
everyman heroes, a country-dweller.1177 The Athenians on the whole did not think of themselves 
as belonging to the “naval mob”.1178 Rowers and sailors were not widely respected, well praised 
or high valued throughout Athens, even by those who saw the advantages in the possession of 
ships and naval power. It seems then that the trireme crews, including the “naval mob” of 
professional sailor-citizens, had some justification in feeling that their abilities and efforts were 
not sufficiently appreciated.
Wreaths and Rewards: the singular case of Asklepiodorus
Despite Plato’s fears about the respect and rewards for sailors getting out o f hand, van Wees is 
largely correct to argue that the “only naval prize attested at this time is a wreath for the captain 
who got his ship manned and fitted out most quickly”,1179 a matter more o f leadership and 
“serving with property” rather than o f  naval skill and expertise; it was certainly not one that riff­
raff could hope to win, and it was the case that “credit given to the people who manned the fleet 
was hardly forthcoming.”1180 There is one possible, and intriguing, exception to this rule, in an 
inscription dating from sometime in the second half o f  the fourth century BC.1181 The document 
records honours given to a certain Asklepiodorus. These rewards included the granting, for 
himself and his descendant, the status o f isoteles; the right o f  immigrants settled in Athens to pay 
taxes in the same way as citizens. Given that, and the fact that an isoteles named Philon, son of 
Asklepiodorus, was buried in Athens,1182 it seems certain that the original recipient of these 
honours was a metic. Additionally, Asklepiodorus was crowned with leaves and dined at the 
Prytaneum. A rider was added to the original decree, which was likely to have contained further 
honours; the text o f this addendum does not survive. We know nothing about him or his service, 
save the brief note that is on the stone:
epeide [Ask]lepi[odoros aner] agathos eyeneto m[axo]menos p[ros tous] 
polem iousp[leo]n e\pi\ tes trir\ous tes\ Xaretos tou Aixon[eo]s
Asklepiodorus has been a good man by fighting the enemy while sailing in the 
trireme o f Chares o f  Aixione.1183
1176 Strauss, ‘Perspectives on death’, p. 262
1177 Aristophanes, Knights, 11. 40-44, cf. 784-5.
1178 The text which comes closest to such an identification is the rowing sequence in Aristophanes’ Frogs, discussed 
below. This play was produced at a time when a large-scale fleet, unusually manned through conscription o f Athenian 
citizens, was at sea, and this context may help account for the association o f  rowers and Athenians here.
1179 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 230. There is an extant Demosthenic speech, On the Trierarch Crown 
([Demosthenes], 51), that deals with a dispute over this award.
1180 Rawlings, Ancient Greeks at War, p. 110. There is a little more evidence regarding rewards for individual naval 
captains-, Herodotus (8.11, 8.17, 8.84, 8.93) reports the awarding o f  several prizes for various acts o f valour, such as 
being the first to capture an enemy vessel, in the context o f  the Persian Wars. There is no indication that such awards 
continued into the fifth century.
1181 IG II2 276. See Lambert, ‘Athenian State Laws and Decrees 352/1-322/1: III Decrees Honouring Foreigners, B: 
Other Awards’, p. 104 with nn. 28, 29, 30 for brief discussion and references to other treatments. I thank him for 
letting me have an early copy o f  this article.
1182 IG II2 7879
1183 IG II2 276,11. 6-9
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The mention o f Asklepiodorus’ trierarch perhaps gives a means to the date o f the inscription. 
Chares o f Aixione is attested as being part o f a syntrierarchy between the years o f  356 and 346/5 
BC.1184 However, this does not fit in well with the argument o f Tracy, accepted by Lambert, that 
the stone was cut by a man who was active between the years o f  340 and 320 BC.1185 It could be 
suggested that the meritorious service was performed right at the end o f Chares’ syntrierarchy, 
but not inscribed until the very beginning o f the stone-cutter’s career, but this interpretation 
seems a little forced. It seems a preferable interpretation to assume that Chares was trierarch on 
more than one occasion, and to look for a context within the twenty-year span of the cutter’s 
known career, though any such terminal dates must always be regarded as somewhat open-ended. 
These dates (340-320 BC) do not seem to offer much in the way o f naval activity during which 
heroics in battle could be performed. Aside from the conflicts o f the Lamian war, no sea battles 
are recorded for these two decades. There is o f  course no difficulty in believing that battles 
which occurred in this period have gone unnoticed in the extant sources; but the inscription’s 
reference to “fighting against the enemy” suggests that we are here dealing with something more 
significant here than a minor skirmish, or a single ship having a scrape with pirates. There was 
probably some conflict when the Athenians lost a huge shipment o f grain to the Macedonians in 
340 BC, but the triremes assigned to protect the merchantmen do not appear to have put up any 
sort o f resistance, Philip II appearing to have captured them with ease while the Athenian general 
Chares was absent on a diplomatic mission.1186 The context suggested by Lambert, the campaign 
against Philip o f Macedon at Byzantium in 340-39 BC, is indeed the most likely, but again not 
promising from the point o f view of heroism in sea battle. The fleets sent against to the 
Hellespont at this point succeeded in relieving the Macedonian siege o f Byzantium, and 
subsequently chased their fleet into the Black Sea, but there is no record o f any battles. Philip’s 
fleet escaped Athenian clutches by means o f a stratagem; he allowed a false message o f an 
uprising elsewhere to fall into his enemy’s hands, and slipped his fleet through the Bosphorus 
when the Athenian fleet sailed off in response to the disinformation.1187 Overall, it was a 
campaign that the Athenians would have probably been keener to forget than to commemorate; 
though this does not necessarily preclude an individual act o f heroism being recognized and 
rewarded, nor does it rule out the possibility that such an award could be seen in the context o f  
making something heroic out o f what was essentially a defeat. In terms o f Asklepiodorus’ 
inscription, the precise date, like the details o f his deeds or even identity o f the battle in question, 
must remain uncertain.
Also unknown is the position that Asklepiodorus occupied onboard Chares trireme; all that can 
be safely inferred from the stone is that he was not the ship’s captain. That this seems to be an 
individual reward for some personal act o f bravery in battle probably suggests that he was not a
1184 IG II2 1622,1. 751
1185 Tracy, Athenian Democracy in Transition, p. 96-103; Lambert, ‘Athenian State Laws and Decrees 352/1-322/1’, p. 
104, n. 28
1186 Frontinius, Stratagems, 1.4.13 cf. Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F162; Ellis, Philip II, pp. 179-80
1187 Frontinius, Stratagems, 1.4.13; Ellis, Philip II, pp. 183-4
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rower; as Strauss notably put it, the oar deck o f a trireme was not the sort o f place “to march to a 
different drummer”,1188 or perform actions that made one stand out in any way; indeed, keeping 
one’s place and staying in rhythm with the other 169 men was what praiseworthy rowing was all 
about. It seems most likely that Asklepiodorus was one o f the armed men aboard, either an 
archer or an epibatai; an interesting conclusion in itself, given that he was certainly a metic. 
However, the stone falls short o f giving us a definite example o f a metic marine, and it is perhaps 
just as likely that he was member o f the hyperesia', but it must be emphasised again that without 
more detailed evidence o f what his singular act o f braveiy was, there is no way to decide this 
question. A rower who took up his shattered oar to defend a struck vessel from boarders might 
be just as noticeable as a kubernetes performing some brilliant manoeuvre to bamboozle the 
enemy. It is also worth pointing out that the words on the stone do not require us to find a battle 
at sea as the context for this award, only a fight against an enemy.1189 It is possible that 
Asklepiodorus was a marine belonging to Chares’ crew whose act o f heroism occurred during a 
fight on land; possibly in relation to the relief o f Byzantium in 339 BC, an action for which the 
Athenians as a whole received considerable praise.1190
It remains a possibility that the award was in fact made to woo a significant man (i.e. a rich 
potential benefactor), and the act that prompted it need not be all that significant.1191 There is no 
evidence that this is the case however, as the honoured man is known only from this inscription, 
and that on the grave o f his apparent son. In short, this is a tantalising inscription about which 
very little can be said for certain. What is certain is that such rewards for the gallantry o f an 
individual naval crewman in battle is singular in our extant sources, and comes at a time when 
Athenian sea power was reaching it nadir; and thus any claims to rewards and respectability, 
especially from non-citizens, would logically have had less weight.1192
The Navy’s Self Perception
Despite the fact that they were looked down upon by society generally, the sailors o f the 
Athenian navy may have taken pride in their work. Not just because o f the professional skills 
{techne) they cultivated; there is also a sense in which the crewmen felt a kind of working-class 
pride in doing a hard, difficult and unpleasant job. This is made most clear in Aristophanes’ play
1188 Strauss, ‘School o f democracy’, p. 318
1189 Though we should not regard Asklepiodorus as a hoplite from the regular army who had been shipped into battle 
by the Athenian navy; the explicit mention o f the particular trireme that he “sailed in” strongly suggests that he was 
part o f the crew, not simply a passenger.
1190 Demosthenes, 18.90-1. This speech purports to records a decree o f the Byzantines, expressing o f gratitude after the 
Athenians “extracted us from great dangers”, and granting to them many honours. The extant text o f  the decree is 
surely spurious, but the fact o f the thanksgiving decree is attested by the speech, and this is in itself o f importance.
1191 cf. Plato, Symposium, 22 le, where Alcibiades claims that the reward for bravery in battle that he was given 
properly belonged to Socrates, who had saved his life, but the generals gave it to him on account o f his status. This is a 
slightly different matter, as the fact o f the brave act is certain; the credit simply goes to the wrong man. But it does 
attest to the idea that someone could be given an award for something they didn’t do due to their personal status.
1192 Van Wees {Greek Warfare, p. 83) makes this point in relation to the ascribing o f  political power to the “naval 
mob” by Aristotle; “these views were formulated at a time when oarsmen should, if  anything, have been easier to 
ignore”
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Frogs. It is in this play that he describes most explicitly and vividly some of the every day 
unpleasantness associated with crewing a trireme:
Aischulos: ouk epistant' all' e mazan kalesai kai ‘rhuppapai’ eipein.
Dionusos: ne ton Apollo, kai prospardein g'es to stoma toi thalamaki, kai 
minthosai ton xussiton kakbas tina lopodutesai: nun d' antilegei kouket' 
elaunon plei deuri kauthis ekeise.
Aeschylus: All they [the crew o f  Paralos] knew how to do was call for their 
grub and shout “yo-ho”
Dionysus: Yes, by Apollo, and to fart in the face o f  Bottom-Bench Charlie1193, 
to smear a messmate in shit, and go ashore to nick someone’s 
clothes.1194
The contrast between the lot o f  the rower, even one aboard one o f Athens’ sacred triremes, and 
that o f the marine is most striking:
Dionusos: epebateuon Kleisthenei- 
Herakles: kanaumachesas;
Dionusos: kai katedusamen ge naus ton polemion e dodek' e treis kai deka.
Herakles: spho;
Dionusos: ne ton Apollo.
Xanthias: kait' egog' exegromen.
Dionusos: kai det' epi tes neds anagignoskonti moi ten Andromedan pros 
emauton exaiphnes pothos ten kardian epataxe pos oiei sphodra.
Dionysus: I was a marine on board Cliesthenes’ ship.
Heracles: And were you in battle?
Dionysus: Yes, and we sank twelve or thirteen enemy ships.
Heracles: What, just the two o f you?
Xanthias: [aside] “And then I woke up.”
Dionysus: And, anyway, on the ship I was reading Andromeda to myself, and 
suddenly my heart was struck with a longing.1195
The surprising thing is not that there is a divide between the somewhat aspirational figure of 
leisure-class marine on the one hand, and the shit-covered, thieving, argumentative sailor on the 
other; what is surprising is that it is the marine’s situation that is ridiculed and disparaged in 
relation to that o f the rowers. This is made clear when the marine is forced to take the oars to 
row to the underworld, and is humiliated by his own incompetence at the task:1196
Charon: kathiz' epi kopen. ei tis etiplei, speudetd. houtos tipoieis;
Dionusos; ho tipoid; ti d' alio g' e hizo 'pi kopen, houper ekeleues me su;
Charon: oukoun kathedei det' enthadi gastron;
Dionusos: idou.
Charon:oukoun probalei to cheire kakteneis;
Dionusos; idou.
Charon; ou me phluareseis echon all' antibas elais prothumds;
1193 Sommerstein’s appropriate and imaginative translation o f thalamaki, a word denoting the lowest file o f a trireme’s 
thee files o f  oarsmen.
1194 Aristophanes, Frogs, 11.1073-6
1195 Aristophanes, Frogs, 11. 48-52
1196 As Sommerstein notes (ad loc 1. 197, p. 175), Dionysus’ misunderstanding o f  “semi-technical” language allows 
“anyone who had ever rowed a trireme to despise him”
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Dionusos: kaita pos dunesomai apeiros athalattotos asalaminios on eit' 
elaunein;
Charon: Sit to the oar. Anyone else who’s crossing, hurry long! [To 
Dionysus, who has sat down on an oar] Here, you, what are you 
doing?
Dionysus: What am I doing? Sitting to the oar, o f course, where you told me 
to.
Charon: Look, Big-Belly, sit down here, will you?
Dionysus: There you are.
Charon: Well, put out your hands and stretch will you?
Dionysus [stretching out his arms in front o f him]: There you are.
Charon: Will you stop this ridiculous behaviour, thrust your feet against the 
stretcher1197 and row with a will.
Dionysus: And how am I supposed to be able to row, unexperienced, 
unseamanlike, unSalaminian as I am?1198
A lack o f rowing techne is here a source o f  ridicule and humour, but also o f superiority; any of 
the “naval mob” in audience, being experts in rowing and understanding all the nautical terms 
that Dionysus misinterprets, would be able laugh even more heartily at the inept marine, and feel 
smug and superior to him. Despite its depravities, or perhaps even because o f them, 
Aristophanes seems here to be tapping into a sense o f pride that rowers felt for their world and 
their profession; it was a hard job, and an unpleasant job, but it was their hard and unpleasant job.
This is quite a lot o f weight to put on these passages o f Frogs, especially as the “marine” in 
question is the play’s protagonist, the god Dionysus. He seems to have been a fairly standard butt 
of jokes and is subjected to many pratfalls throughout this play, and also in the fragments of other 
comedies.1199 It would perhaps be dangerous to accept him as a representation of Athenian 
epibatai generally. However, it is likely that many rowers in the audience would find the image 
of the lazy time this marine had, reading and daydreaming on deck, familiar from their own 
experience; and they would have been glad to see him get his comeuppance upon meeting 
Charon 150 lines later.1200 This contrast between the strong working man and the idle, out-of- 
shape leisured individual is given a less earthy and more threatening spin by Plato.1201 One of the 
contexts in which the rich man may have seen the danger posed by the “lean, sinewy, sunburnt 
pauper” is when they served as shipmates. Crewing a trireme, and rowing one in particular, was 
physically demanding in the extreme; Aristophanes makes many other references to the physical
1197 This phrase is added by Sommerstein for the sake o f clarity (ad loc 1. 202, p. 175), and it is helpful for a modem 
reader; those in Aristophanes’ audience who were familiar with the technique o f  rowing would have needed no such 
aid, though Dionysus himself may have found it useful.
1198 Aristophanes, Frogs, 11. 198-206. The rowing scene continues for sometime after this, with Dionysus’ efforts 
‘helped’ by a chorus o f frogs calling the rhythm for him.
1199 Wilson, ‘A Eupolidean precedent for the rowing scene in Aristophanes’ F rogsT  argues that there was a scene in a 
lost comedy in which Phormio gives Dionysus a similar hard lesson.
1200 Lada-Richards, {Initiating Dionysus, p. 69) argues that “In the linear perspective o f  the play’s narrative discourse 
the active participation o f  Dionysus in rowing is to be set in contrast to his intellectual idleness as a sailor in 
Arginusae”. (Describing Dionysus as a sailor seems to be an error; he was certainly idle, but as a marine) She sees the 
scene as a more inclusive kind o f fun; “amusement with the soft and sluggish way in which the god was learning to 
become ‘like them’ [i.e. the audience]”.
1201 Plato, Republic, 556c-e. Contrast the portrayal o f the physique-ruining banaustic occupations in Xenophon, 
Economics, 4.2-3, quoted above.
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demands o f the job.1202 The idea that the “naval mob” possessed a kind of ‘working class’ pride 
for being willing and able, unlike one’s social superiors, to do such a dirty and difficult job is one 
that can be inferred from these passages.
Characteristics of the Naval Community
This sense o f being looked down upon may have helped the naval crews form their collective 
identity and facilitated the forming o f  bonds between individuals o f different status levels. There 
is much more to be said about the character o f  this community, a community shaped by the 
institutional characteristics o f  the Athenian navy. Some key characteristics o f this community 
have already been identified. The political character o f the navy has been discussed in a previous 
section, where I argued that the “naval mob” were not the die-hard democrats that they are often 
made out to be. Instead their attitude to politics was far more pragmatic, and they were willing to 
operate under practically any constitutional arrangements that were likely to secure regular pay. 
In this section so far we have explored the idea o f the navy as a professional body, and one in 
which merit led to greater pay and chances o f advancement. Members o f the “naval mob”, and 
non-citizen professionals too, were dependent wage-eamers; a stigmatized ideological location. 
For some, their loyalty belonged to the highest bidder, but many others will have found the wages 
on offer a necessary but not sufficient reason to crew triremes. It is a somewhat negative 
conclusion, but the truth o f  the matter that we simply cannot know what these secondary motives 
were to any reasonable degree o f certainty.
We have seen the sailors’ willingness to speak out as characteristic not only o f the navy of 
democratic Athens, but also that o f Sparta. Rather than connect the sailor’s willingness to 
Athenian sailors and the ideology o f  Athenian democracy, it is more correct to see it, as 
Thucydides does, as a characteristic o f  sailors in general. Given the nature o f  the naval labour 
market in the Greek world, it is likely that the same men would serve at different times in 
different navies, and they would take their willingness to debate, to discuss, to make demands of 
commanders and ultimately to riot to with them, regardless o f  their present employer. As Strauss 
correctly points out, what was different was how the commanders and captains of the individual 
navies and fleets dealt with their sailors.1203
While sailors were certainly outspoken and could be violently undisciplined when angered, they 
were also capable o f a high degree o f silence and disciplined efficiency. The most succinct 
testimony comes from Xenophon:
kai trieres de toi he sesagmene anthropon dia ti alio phoheron esti polemiois e 
philois axiotheaton e hoti tachu plei; dia ti de alio alupoi allelois eisin hoi 
empleontes e dioti en taxei men kathentai, en taxei de proneuousin, en taxei d' 
anapiptousin, en taxei d' embainousi kai ekbainousin;
1202 For example, see Aristophanes, Wasps, 1118-9, Knights, 784-5, 1366-8.
1203 Strauss, ‘School o f democracy’, p. 319; cf. Homblower, ‘Sticks, stones and Spartans’, p. 59
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And why is a trireme which is crammed with men a frightening spectacle for 
enemies and a pleasant sight to allies? Is it not because it sails quickly? Why do 
the men on board not get in each other’s way? Is it not because the crew sit on the 
benches in order, moving their bodies forward and backward in order, embark and 
disembark in order?1204
This is not the contradiction that it seems at first sight; the idea that a naval man could be 
efficient and professional while on duty, and significantly less so when ashore is something that 
was probably familiar to all navies o f  all ages. Ancient sailors a shore had a reputation for 
drunkenness and excess, liable to ruin their bodies and render themselves unfit for service 
whenever they had the funds to do so.1205 This general reputation for excess perhaps extended to 
sailors’ sexual behaviour. An Athenian woman in the play Ecclesiazusae, when asked why she 
had got no sleep the night before, says “because my other half is Salaminian, you see, and all 
night long he was rowing me under the covers.”1206 The reference here to a crewman of the 
trireme Salaminia, and use o f the verb elauno, to row, as a euphemism for sex, perhaps summed 
up a widely held view on the amorous character o f all oarsmen. But to suggest from innuendo 
relating specifically to Salaminians, o f one sort or another,1207 that Athenian sailors in general had 
a reputation for lewd behaviour and sexual stamina is perhaps too much pressure on these 
references in Aristophanes; about the most we can say is that, if  the sailors did have such a 
reputation, it was one they were to share with their counterparts in later ages.
What seems clear is that it was partly the imperative to work together in a co-operative fashion 
that helped to forge strong links between all the crewmen and to create their collective identity. 
The rowers and specialists were as mutually dependent on each other as the men in a close- 
ordered phalanx; not directly for their personal safety perhaps, but certainly to ensure a good 
performance from their ship. The sea trials o f the reconstructed trireme Olympias demonstrated 
not only the challenge o f keeping time for 170 oarsmen on three levels when only one third of 
them could see their strokes, but it also provided eloquent testimony for the value of a close 
relationship between each thranite, and the zygian and thalmian directly below him.1208 For many 
of the crewmen on the Olympias project, a lasting bond was formed, despite (or perhaps because 
of) the shared depravities and hard work entailed.1209 These friendships were forged, if not quite 
in adversity, then in the next best thing. It is extremely likely that similar relationships were
1204 Xenophon, Economics, 8.8
1205 Thucydides, 8.45 And hence part o f the reason for the policy o f  withholding a portion o f the sailor’s wages.
1206 Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae, 11. 39-40; cf. Lysistrata, 11. 57-60 for similar innuendo involving Salaminians.
1207 Lambert (Attic genos Salaminioi’, p. 103) suggests that the reference is both to “an Atheno-Salamininan” and “a 
lusty member o f  the crew o f  the Salaminia”. He rightly sounds a note o f  caution in “trying to infer realities from his 
[Aristophanes’] jokes and puns”.
1208 Morrison, Coates and Rankov, Athenian Trireme, p. 236, cf. 253-4.
1209 Douglas Glabi, a rower on Olympias in 1987, writes in his Purple Motes online journal that “being on the crew of 
an ancient Greek warship undoubtedly included great hardships and suffering. But by 1987, that job made for a very 
good time.” http://purplemotes.net/2007/02/! 1/science-in-action-the-trireme-olympias/
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experienced on the Athenian triremes o f  the fifth and fourth century BC, and were perhaps in 
themselves reasons for men to sign on to the oar-benches year after year.1210
As van Wees recognized, there was a strong competitive aspect to crewing warships.1211 It is 
possible that the very fact that the navy provided a forum for competition amongst and between 
the crews strengthened its appeal. The competition between individual trierarchs is well attested 
and has been discussed previously; it fits into the 'philotimic' world of liturgies and public 
service. However, we should not imagine however that it was just the captains who were 
interested in which vessel won the informal race to Aegina in 415 BC.1212 The crews would also 
be keen for their vessel to turn in a respectable speedy performance. The fourth century BC 
strategos Iphikrates skilfully harnessed this competitiveness as a means o f training up his fleet:
pollakis de kai hopei melloi aristopoieisthai to strateuma e deipnopoieisthai, 
epanegagen an to keras apo tes ges kata tauta ta choria: epei d' epistrepsas an kai 
antiproirous katastesas tas triereis apo semeiou aphiei anthamillasthai eis ten gen
Often too, when his force was just ready to take the morning or evening meal, he 
would turn the line around again so the triremes were facing the land, and at a 
signal make them race to shore.1213
There was also some degree o f  competitive spirit between crewmen on an individual level. In 
extolling their generation, the chorus o f  old men in Wasps claim to have cared nothing for 
speeches or law courts; “all we cared for was who would be the best oarsman.”1214 There is 
surely much exaggeration in the contrast made here, but the competitive nature o f sailors need 
not be doubted. As described above, a superior reputation as a crewman could lead to further 
employment and more generous remuneration as well. The matter at issue for the crews and 
rowers in these contests was their relative levels o f professional skill and physical stamina;1215 not 
in manly courage or the scale and lavishness o f their contribution to the state. For the more 
hostile side o f competitiveness over skill, showing contempt for those without, the passages of 
Frogs discussed above give eloquent testimony.
Public festivals at which Athenian oarsmen could display their skills and compete in formal 
contests are attested, but are less prominent that one might have expected.1216 There was a 
quadrennial trireme regatta o ff Cape Sounium, attested in Herodotus.1217 Tribal boat races played
1210 It is worth noting that many o f  the rowers o f  Olympias turned up for several o f  the series o f sea trials, which 
resulted in successively stronger crews. Morrison, Coates and Rankov, Athenian Trireme, p. 262-4. The contacts list 
on the Trireme Trusts’ website (http://www.atm.ox.ac.uk/rowing/trireme/ttaddress.html) shows that many o f  the 
rowers were veterans o f  multiple summers o f rowing.
1211 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 229
1212 Thucydides, 6.32
1213 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.28
1214 Aristophanes, Wasps, 11. 1097-8
1215 Van Wees, Greek Warfare, p. 229
1216 Jordan, Athenian Navy, pp. 153-5; Gardener, ‘Boat-Races Amongst the Greeks’ and ‘Boat-Races at Athens’.
1217 Herodotus, 6.87, cf. Lysias, 21.5
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a part in the Panathenaia;1218 although the vessels involved were probably not triremes, a team 
with hopes o f winning would have been well advised to source some o f  the “naval mob” from 
their tribe to compete. Late inscriptions attest to boats playing a part in several festivals and in 
the training o f ephebes, but it is unclear whether they did so in the fifth and fourth centuries 
B e  1219 While this presence o f naval events in Athenian festivals is not without significance, 
there is no indication that these events eclipsed the prestige o f the more traditional games and 
events. In addition, as was the case with dramatic choruses and trierarchies, the public 
recognition and credit for good performances was given mainly to the wealthy citizen who 
provided the funds.1220 Once again, it is tempting to see some justification for naval men’s claims 
at not receiving appropriate recognition in Athens.
The Structure of the Naval Community
The navy was an institution with a complex and multilayered hierarchy, at least up to the level o f  
ship’s captain.1221 The trierarch was at the top, and the marines, who were “in command and 
control onboard”, were beneath him; then the hyperesia; and below them the oarsmen, 
themselves arranged in three tiers. Such a structure could lead to the conclusion that the ships o f  
the Athenian navy had a very formal and strict chain o f command.1222 This complex hierarchy 
might also lead us to the conclusion that the navy was a very stratified society, with strong 
divisions between ranks and classes. Neither o f these impressions are really true.
While there were certainly many different posts and layers to the trireme’s social structure, clear 
lines o f authority there were not. Trierarchs were in charge o f their vessels and responsible for 
them, but this was not the age o f the all-powerful ship captain with supreme authority over 
everyone on his vessel. During Apollodorus’ hierarchy in 362 BC, a passenger on his ship tried 
to tell the pilot where to sail; he said he would follow instead the instructions o f Apollodorus, the 
man who pays him his money.1223 This is a timely reminder o f  the essential nature o f naval 
service; Apollodorus’ authority was not based primarily on the formal and legal power o f his 
office, but on the depth of his pockets. The reverse was also true for Apollodorus; when he was 
unable to secure pay for his men, some did not follow his orders and abandoned his ship.1224
Despite Aristotle’s statement regarding the authority o f the epibatai on board a trireme, it is 
unclear the extent to which they would be able (either as a matter o f authority or o f competence)
1218 An inscription from the first half o f the fourth century records prizes given for a boat race (IG II2 2311,1. 78).
1219 Festivals; IG II2 1006, 1 29-30 and 71-2; 1011, 1. 16 1028, 11. 20-1; Ephebes; IG II2 2130, 1. 49. Jordan {Athenian 
Navy, p. 155) thought it likely that such events were also held in earlier times, though there is no evidence to suggest 
this.
1220 A client o f Lysias (21.5) claims to an Athenian court that he spent 15 mina (1,500 drachmae) on winning the 
Sounion race.
12211 discuss the commanders o f Athenian fleets above in Part Two, section A. 5
1222 Van Wees, (Greek Warfare, p. 230-1), reacting against the picture o f  the egalitarian trireme as depicted by Strauss 
( ‘School o f democracy’) argues that the “sharp social distinctions” amongst the crew were reinforced by the trireme’s 
hierarchy and the different working conditions o f the men on board.
1223 [Demosthenes] 50.50
1224 [Demosthenes] 50.11
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to give orders to the rest o f the crew. It is probably best to interpret these men in a similar way to 
the marines o f Nelson’s navy; their role and importance in terms o f the vessel’s hierarchy was not 
based so much on their formal authority, but on the fact that they were routinely armed men in a 
community o f unarmed ones. It is certainly this fact about them that Aristotle highlights when he 
suggests that they were in command and control aboard ship.1225 Given the number o f sailors and 
their propensity to fall into violent passions when they did not receive their due, the marines can 
be viewed as enforcers and bodyguards to the trierarch, rather than figures o f authority. However, 
this was probably not the whole story. When the Sicilian expedition sailed in 415 BC, it was the 
marines only who shared with the archons in the public libations before the launch.1226
It is also unclear to what extent there was an internal hierarchy amongst the hyperesia. The 
sources are very specific on the authority o f the kubernetes, and he should surely be regarded as 
senior to his five colleagues;1227 but who, if  anyone, was second to him? Did the prorates 
outrank the keleustesl Given that most o f the hyperesia were specialists in distinctive roles, 
questions o f relative authority may not be relevant or important; the naupegos was deferred to 
when repairs were needed to the ship, the pentekontarchos on matters o f manning and supply. 
The auletes was probably junior to the keleustes, but for the rest there is no way to be certain. 
The fact that the different ranks are not listed in any consistent order on a singular inscribed crew 
list strongly suggests that there was no formal order o f rank amongst these different posts.1228 
Perhaps relative authority, if it was an issue at all, was a matter o f the reputation, skill and 
personal authority o f the individual holding a post, rather than the post itself.
And yet for all this hierarchy, and the specifically attested authority o f the pilot in particular, 
leadership in the Athenian navy was a consensual matter. Aristotle compares the kubernetai to 
doctors, as they are “never expected to mislead or use force in handling patients or crews”.1229 
As Homblower has remarked, discipline in the navy was not severe, at least in comparison to that 
of Sparta.1230 Best practice in the Athenian navy to ensure an effective ship was to encourage and 
inspire the men.
hoion kai en trierei, ephe, hotan pelagizdsi, kai deei peran hemerinous pious 
elaunontas, hoi men ton keleuston dunantai toiauta legein kai poiein hoste akonan 
tas psuchas ton anthropon epi to ethelontas ponein, hoi de houtos agndmones eisin 
hoste pleon e en diplasidi chronoi ton auton hanutousi ploun. kai hoi men 
hidrountes kai epainountes allelous, ho te keleuon kai hoi peithomenoi, 
ekbainousin, hoi de anidroti hekousi, misountes ton epistaten kai misoumenoi.
1225 Aristotle, Politics, 1327b9-l 1
1226 Thucydides, 6.32. It is not exactly clear who these archons were; probably it is a convenient general term to 
encompass the trierarchs, generals, and Athenian city officials. It seems to show that epibatai were not authoritative 
enough to be called archons themselves, but o f sufficient weight to be associated with them.
1227 See for example Pollux, Onomasticon, 1.98 and discussion in Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 139-41
1228 IG I3 1036
1229 Aristotle, Politics, 1324b
1230 Homblower, ‘Sticks, stones and Spartans’, p. 59
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Consider what happens aboard triremes, for example: when the rowers are out at 
sea and are supposed to complete a voyage within a day, some keleustai can speak 
and act in ways designed to stimulate the crew’s willingness to work, while others 
lack this flair to the extent that it takes them more than double the time to complete 
the same voyage. The crew o f the first ship disembark all covered in sweat, with 
the keleustes congratulating his men and the subordinates just as pleased with him; 
the crew o f the second ship arrive without having worked up a sweat, hating their 
boss and being hated in return.1231
There is some evidence indicating tension between some o f  the groups on board (such as the 
marines and nautai); but there is testimony too o f a certain degree o f equality and a lack o f such 
divisions amongst the crew, at least in the Athenian navy. The example of the independent naval 
democracy on Samos in 411 BC is the most significant and grand example, but there is evidence 
o f co-operation and good relationships on a smaller scale across the widest social divide on 
board; between the captain and the crew. During his trierarchy, one o f Apollodorus’ hyperesia, 
a pentekontarchos by the name o f Euctamon became ill; the generous captain discharged him 
from duty, paid his passage home, and sent him back to Athens with his full pay.1232 Euctemon 
was later able to repay this good treatment; he accompanied one o f Apollodorus’ family to 
petition Apollodorus’ nominated successor as trierarch, and by virtue o f his position on board 
was able to confront this man, Polycles, with details o f the payments made so far, to which 
Apollodorus felt he was entitled to have reimbursed.1233 A further example o f such co-operation 
in this speech involves one o f the nautai, a certain Callicles, who approached Apollodorus and 
warned him against transporting an exile and condemned criminal on his ship as he had been 
instructed; to do so would leave Apollodorus himself open to prosecution.1234 It is tempting to 
suggest that Callicles was prompted to come forward due to the good treatment and generous 
payment given out by Apollodorus; if he had been a trierarch who was negligent o f his duties and 
stingy with his cash, Callicles may have been less likely to give his captain such a warning. An 
intriguing question, but one for which there is little evidence, is to what extent this close and co­
operative relationship between a member o f the rich elite and his poorer crewmen was typical. 
The institution o f the trierarchy generally, like the festival and gymnastic liturgies and even the 
army, did allow such opportunities for the masses and the elite to interact and mix. How 
many took advantage o f these opportunities is unknown, and would surely be depend on 
individual circumstances; but Apollodorus at least furnishes us with a clear example o f how such 
a relationship could be mutually beneficial.
1231 Xenophon, Economics, 21.3
1232 [Demosthenes], 50.19
1233 [Demosthenes], 50.24-6. A cynical observer might remark that it was awfully convenient that Euctemon, the man 
with the figures for expenses at his fingertips, just happened to be sent home sick to Athens and so be on hand to help 
lobby Polycles. Even if  the illness was something o f  a conspiracy, it still attests to a good working relationship 
existing between the captain and a member o f his crew.
1234 [Demosthenes], 50.47-8
1235 Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.4.20; Cleocritus, the herald o f  the Mysteries, speaks o f  these things as contexts for good 
relations and shared experiences amongst all classes o f Athenians.
1236 Fisher, ‘Gymnasia and democratic values o f leisure’, pp. 103-4
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5: Conclusions: the nature of the naval community
The “naval mob” was part o f a community o f contradictions. Co-operation and friendly 
relationships between the crew sat side-by-side with fierce competitiveness, just as the men who 
in some parts o f Thucydides had a reputation for rowdy outspokenness, drunkenness ashore and 
mob-like behaviour were also the silent, attentive and disciplined rowers portrayed by Xenophon. 
The hierarchical command structure o f the Athenian navy hid a consensual variety o f leadership, 
and assorted foulnesses adorned sore and blistered men who were nevertheless proud of their 
skills and their dirty job. It was also a diverse community, a microcosm o f an extremely 
cosmopolitan city,1237 but one in which the boundaries between the rich and poor, and citizen and 
outsider were more blurred than on land. It was a community that was driven by money; the 
Athenian navy as an institution accounted for a significant proportion o f Athens’ public and 
private wealth. Despite the power and prominence o f the navy in Athenian foreign policy, the 
naval community was to a large extent marginalized, politically and especially culturally, by the 
Athenians as a whole. The “naval mob”, the most important Athenian element in this wider 
naval community, were outspoken, pragmatic, tough, skilled, competitive and to a significant 
extent mercenary. When our sources report the concerns and desires o f  naval people, they are 
nearly always to do with their personal safety in dangerous times or with their hopes for booty or 
pay in better days. Doubtless these sources, which to a greater or lesser degree are all products o f  
the cultural elite, fail to appreciate the full extent o f rowers’ concerns and beliefs, and they do not 
tell the full story. But to react too strongly against this and tell another story, like the one about 
the patriotic, staunchly democratic sailor, rowing his heart out for the glory o f his city and the 
prestige o f his calling, is to fly in the face o f the evidence, imperfect though it is, that we do have. 
The story o f Athens’ “naval mob” was not one o f military men receiving their (arguably) due 
political recognition for their vital role in securing Athens’ safety; this link, even for Athens, was 
more myth than reality, and the “naval mob” that crewed Athens’ fleet certainly did not control 
her Assembly. The ideological position o f the hoplite as the perfect servant and defender o f the 
city was never challenged by the rower or the kubernetes, not only because o f  our mainly elite 
source material, but because the central features o f elite ideology (respect for personal courage 
and face-to-face killing, disdain for people who worked with their hands and especially those 
who lived “slavishly” off o f a regular wage given by an employer, the importance o f serving with 
one’s property as well as one’s body) were held by many Athenians o f more modest means. 
Rowing in the navy itself did not lead to its sailors being disparaged; this activity could indeed be 
a noble public service in desperate times, and was occasionally undertaken by the great and the 
good. The problem was more to do with the particular features o f the institution at Athens; it was 
‘professional’ institution, one that offered regular employment and daily wages, one that 
encouraged the development technical skill, and one that offered tangible rewards for increasing 
expertise.
1237 Or more correctly, the men o f  such a city.
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CONCLUSION: A NAVAL DEMOCRACY OR A
DEMOCRATIC NAVY?
The Athenian navy accounted for significant portions o f Athenian revenue and was a large-scale 
though variable source o f employment for citizens and non-citizens alike. Athens’ period o f time 
as a significant naval power coincided, though not precisely, with her existence as a democracy; 
it would be an error to make a causal association between the two. Cartledge argues that despite 
the thetes’ “de facto  naval reign...there is no gainsaying the, to us paradoxical, fact that the 
nautai were -  in the Athenians’ conventional, moral-political parlance -  phauloi, ‘worthless’”. 
This is less o f a paradox than it seems; even if the thetes did rule Athens, it was not a “naval 
reign”. Any contribution of the “naval mob” to democratic politics has left very few traces in the 
evidence. While the Athenian citizens in 406 BC, desperate for news o f the fate o f their loved 
ones, probably hung on every word spoken by those o f  the “naval mob” who had returned from 
the Arginusae campaign, we have no other solid evidence to suggest that the trireme crews were 
a significant presence in the Assembly, either as speakers or as voters. This is not to say that 
members o f the “naval mob” did not attend the Assembly, when they were in port and able to do 
so; it is just that their presence was not particularly important in terms o f its numbers. They 
certainly did not dominate democratic politics, not even from a distance; the indications are that 
the Athenian Assembly, for all that it put considerable resources in to the navy and while it would 
take seriously direct attacks on the its people, did not take especial care o f their rowers. If the 
agenda o f Aristophanes’ Knights is representative, the Athenians were sometimes lax even on the 
crucial issue o f naval pay, and it is not unlikely that the Citizenship Law o f 451/0 BC would have 
had disproportionate effects on the children of the “naval mob”.
It is difficult to pin down the ideological relationship between the fleet and the city. While the 
sailors may not have been accorded respect or praise, ancient political thought and much modem 
analysis has posited that it was their service in the fleet that lay behind the political power o f the 
masses. We can doubt a close connection for several reasons, not least the chronology. Poorer 
Athenian citizens were politically self-conscious and aware o f their power long before the navy 
became a centrally important institution, though the tough experiences o f rowing in the fleet 
would certainly not have dampened such sentiments. Certainly it can be argued that the imperial 
tribute, a source o f revenue which the navy secured, was instrumental in the provision of pay for 
public offices, a key feature o f radical democracy; but such provision continued when Athenian 
thalassocracy was broken, and even extended to the Assembly despite the fact that Athens had 
been shorn o f her Empire. Whether or not this connection can be accepted on a practical level, 
any claims that this was deserved were somewhat undermined by key characteristics o f the navy 
that ran counter to the commonly accepted hoplite ideology; the navy as a professional, 
voluntary, wage-paying institution; the reliance on skill and daring, rather than amateur bravery, 
to win naval battles; the prominence o f the navy’s role as a transporter o f fighters, the
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cosmopolitan nature o f the crews; the lack of weapons or any sort o f property contribution. This 
ideology was held not only by the small circle of the educated elite from which most o f our 
literary evidence comes, but probably amongst the Athenians as a whole.
If the democracy was not “naval”, neither was the navy noticeably democratic. Its internal 
organization, while not authoritarian, was hierarchical. The events at Samos in 411 BC, so often 
cited as the quintessential example o f the democratic ideology o f the navy, in fact show a slightly 
different and far more interesting picture. The naval crews on Samos were more easily persuaded 
into abandoning democracy than was the Assembly at Athens, but were more determined and 
effective in their opposition when that oligarchy failed to live up to its promises and their 
expectations. It is interesting in this context that it was rumours of direct attacks on the families 
of the naval men that prompted their anger against the 400, demonstrating the danger o f making 
an “insult against the great yo-ho”.1238 That the naval crews in Samos responded by constituting 
themselves as a democracy is significant and striking, not least as the franchise appears to have 
been far more inclusive than was the post-451/0 BC Athenian democracy. No doubt a good 
many o f the nautai were zealously democratic and were looking to put in place their preferred 
system o f government; but there was pragmatism here too, in that it would have been practically 
difficult and strategically fatal to start excluding the non-Athenians in the crews, and their hosts 
the Samians, from political deliberations. For a brief moment, the democracy on Samos was an 
incarnation o f Aristotelian (and modem) ideas about the interconnection between military and 
political roles, in that it was those free men who were taking active part in the campaign that 
formed the political community.1239 Brief, not so much because the fleet was reconciled with 
Athens within four years, but because within a very few months the democracy began to look 
more like government through elected representatives (i.e. an oligarchy), with one o f these 
representatives in particular, having “matters put in his hands”,1240 seeming to call the shots. That 
the fleet appears to have accepted the successful leadership o f Alcibiades and his colleagues 
without the frequent debates and assemblies that characterized their democracy prior to his return 
is another indication o f their essential pragmatism.
A tendency towards political pragmatism was not the only detectable feature o f the trireme 
crews. Sailors in the Athenian navy were outspoken and forthright, competitive and disciplined 
onboard ship, somewhat less restrained ashore. Many were professionals, and some gained wide­
spread repute in Athens and beyond on account o f their skills. All were, to a greater or lesser 
extent, mercenaries. The navy ran on money, and this was the main concern for most o f the 
crewmen most o f the time, whether in the form o f wages or booty. But while the money may 
have been necessary for nearly everyone, for some at least it was not the full story. A simple
1238 Aristophanes, Wasps, 908-11
1239 Slaves, o f which there were probably not insignificant numbers even after desertions, were excluded; not even the 
Samos fleet democracy was perfect!
1240 Thucydides, 8.82.1
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sense o f adventure and wanderlust may have accounted for many a man’s first joining the fleet, 
and a sense o f loyalty and comradeship to his shipmates and the naval community could have 
made him stay. The navy paid professional wages and rewarded skilled individuals with bonuses 
and promotion; but this was not a way o f life which accorded much respect in the wider 
community.
It was not so much the act o f rowing a trireme in itself that was degrading, despite its many 
hardship and deprivations; it was the dependence upon an employer that prolonged service in the 
fleet entailed that was slavish and unsuitable for a free man. The parallel between rowing and 
‘banausic’ activities is not an exact one, but towards both is the same slightly inconsistent 
thinking; as a sculpture could be valued without the sculptor being accorded respect, so the sea- 
power generated by the navy could be praised, without any glory needing to reflect on the men 
that maintained it.
In his discussion of the cultural invisibility o f the rowers, Strauss sets up some rhetorical 
propositions, which provide a good summary o f some modern assumptions regarding the navy, 
ideology and politics:
If the navy was indeed the backbone of Athens’ military might, if thetes 
possessed considerable political power in fifth-century Athenian democracy, 
and if there was indeed a strong connection between thetic naval service and 
political strength, then it is necessary to explain the silences in the sources.1241
I shall take these ideas one by one. Firstly, the navy certainly was the backbone o f Athens’ 
military might and her power overseas, especially in the fifth century; but this was not universally 
recognized or admitted. Ideologically, in terms o f defending the polis, the hoplite was never 
surpassed. Even one o f the greatest naval victories, at Salamis, could be evaluated as a victory of 
hoplites as much as sailors, or virtually ignored in favour o f the land battles o f Marathon and 
Plataea.
Secondly, the thetes did indeed possess considerable political power through their numbers, but 
they are not to be identified solely as sailors; many thetes never took an oar, and many served 
instead as hoplites. The “naval mob” o f professional citizen crewmen certainly did not possess 
political power; and there was not in reality such a strong connection between political strength 
and naval ‘service’ as has been assumed in modem writings. We have seen that the conception 
of “military service” in the fleet, outside o f state emergencies and mass levies, is problematic, as 
is the connection between military strength and political status more generally. These factors go 
some way to explaining decidedly lukewarm attitude towards the navy that brought power to 
their city by the writers o f our literary sources, the near total lack o f visual representations o f  
sailors, and the ideological worthlessness o f nautai.
1241 Strauss, ‘School o f democracy’, pp. 313-4
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Appendix 1: List of named potential nauarchoi
426/5 BC: Aristotle and Hierophon (see Part One, section B.2)
Comparing the terms used to describe these two commanders with those used to describe Leon 
and Diomedon prior to winter 412 BC (see below), Jordan argues that they “can no longer be 
regarded as strategoi.”1242 Develin1243 accepts this case, though he does not accept the supposedly 
parallel case o f Leon and Diomedon, for whom in fact there is fuller testimony and thus a 
stronger argument for regarding as nauarchoi. Fomara is probably correct to regard these men as
• 1244strategoi.
414/3 BC: Konon (Thucydides 7.13)
Jordan argues that his command in Naupactos was as an archon, though he certainly served later 
as a strategos}245 Fomara1246 lists him without comment as a general. Develin1247 also regards 
him tentatively as a strategos, though citing Jordan admits “He could have been a nauarch”.
414/3 BC: Menandros and Euthydemos (Thucydides, 7.16, cf. 7.69)
Appointed by the Athenians “from the men present” to share command with Nicias on Sicily, 
until such time as elected replacements (Demosthenes and Eurymedon) should take over.1248 
Jordan suggests that before this step up they were likely to have been “archontes”.1249 Develin 
argues that “they must have held some position o f command to be chosen as extraordinary 
generals”, and seems to tentatively favour interpreting them as taxiarchs.1250 In fact there is no 
evidence at all to suggest what post, if any, they held before their promotion. Though his earlier 
words implied that they would be relieved of command by the new arrivals, Fomara points out 
that Thucydides seems to consider Menandros and Euthydemos as strategoi even after 
Demosthenes and Eurymedon had taken up their posts.1251 Thucydides describes Demosthenes as 
persuading Nikiav kai tous allous xunarxhontas, “Nicias and the other commanders”;1252 the use 
of the plural here indicates that there were commanders other than Nicias, Demosthenes and 
Eurymedon present. Later still, Menander and Euthydemos are mentioned along with 
Demosthenes as ton Athenion strategoi, “generals o f the Athenians”.1253 Fomara suggests that
1242 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 128-9
1243 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 127. He does not cite any evidence other than Jordan’s argument on this matter. 
Though he notes that their status “cannot be regarded as totally secure”, he is sufficiently certain to list the names 
under the title o f “Nauarchoi” without appending question marks. (Contrast, for example, the cases o f  Konon and 
Diphilus, below.) It is worth noting parenthetically that the assigning o f nauarchoi status to Aristotle and Hierophon 
stops 426/5 BC being a year with a double tribal representation on the board o f  strategoi, a view with which Develin is 
sympathetic.
1244 Fomara, Generals, p. 57-8.
1245 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 123
1246 Fomara, Generals, p. 65
1247 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 153-4
1248 Thucydides, 7.16
1249 Jordan, Athenian Navy, pp. 127-8
1250 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 154
1251 Fomara, Generals, p. 65, n. 113
1252 Thucydides, 7.43.
1253 Thucydides, 7.69
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this is not a contradiction with Thucydides’ earlier statement regarding Menander and 
Euthydemos’ position, as they could have been “temporarily given that role [i.e. as strategoi] by 
the other generals.” Develin accepts Fomara’s argument, and lists the pair unquestioningly as 
strategoi. It is perhaps surprising the casual way that Fomara suggests (in a footnote) and 
Develin accepts (without significant discussion) the proposal that strategoi could appoint other 
men to be strategoi, this bring probably the most significant magistracy in classical Athens and 
one that usually required a vote o f the Assembly. Such a significant proposal should surely 
require some discussion. An appeal to the autokrator status o f  the three ‘proper’ generals on 
Sicily, or the unusual and desperate circumstances o f the latter stages o f the Sicilian campaign 
might be cited as sufficient explanations for this,1254 but there are alternatives. Firstly, that 
Thucydides’ implication at 7.16 that Menandros and Euthydemos were to give up their 
commands upon the arrival o f the new strategoi is mistaken. His words seem clear on this point 
however; unless there are substantial and unjustifiable alterations, his narrative is inconsistent. 
Alternatively, it could be proposed that Menandros and Euthydemos were appointed not as 
generals but as archontes by the strategoi; as we have seen in Part Two, section A.5, there is 
evidence for generals appointing subordinates to take control o f  detachments o f their forces. If 
this interpretation is accepted, then Thucydides’ naming o f all these individuals as strategoi at 
7.69 would appear to be a very loose, not to say inaccurate, usage o f the term. This should serve 
to caution us from placing too much certainty on arguments derived from his (and other writers’) 
use o f ‘official’ terminology.
414/3 BC: Charikles (Thucydides, 7.2)
Despite Jordan’s view that there is something “emphatic” about the way Charikles is described as 
an archon,1255 Develin is happy to list him as a strategos.1256 The evidence is totally inconclusive 
however, and believing Charikles to be a strategos or a nauarch comes down to little more than 
personal preference.
413/2 BC: Diphilus (Thucydides, 7.34)
Jordan argues that, like Konon, he was “archon ton neon, and most probably Konon’s 
replacement” at Naupactos.1257 Fomara regards him as a general.1258 Develin, like with Konon, 
is more speculative. He includes Diphilus in the list o f strategoi but commenting that “he could 
have been a nauarch” and citing Jordan’s argument.1259
413/2 Strombichides (Thucydides, 8.15; 8.16, 8.30, 8.62, 8.79)
Jordan argues that “he was evidently an archon at the beginning o f his career”, and later 
promoted, like Leon and Diomedon, to the generalship. Unlike Leon and Diomedon, there is not
1254 Though neither Fomara or Develin in fact do this.
1255 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 124
1256 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 153. cf. Fomara, Generals, p. 65
1257 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 123-4
1258 Fomara, Generals, p. 65
1259 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 155
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direct evidence for this promotion. Fomara includes him on the list o f strategoi for 413/2 BC and 
412/1 BC.1260 Develin tentatively accepts this, and is probably right to; though he cites Jordan, 
he does not discuss the possibility o f  Strombichides being a nauarch,1261
412/1 Hippokles (Thucydides, 8.13)
Missing from Jordan’s list, and regarded as a general o f 413/2 by Fomara,1262 and more 
cautiously by Develin.1263 HCT  argues that he was a nauarch in 412/1, a year in which there are a 
good many generals. While this is not unlikely, it is difficult to be certain in individual cases.1264 
What is clear from this year, and as was probably the case in many others, is that more than 10 
leaders were needed to command all the forces operating. Even if Hippokles wasn’t a nauarch, it 
is likely that someone was.
412/1 BC: Diomedon and Leon (see Part Two, section B.2)
Jordan makes a convincing case to suggest that these two men were nauarchoi until the winter o f  
412/1 BC, at which time they were ‘promoted’ to strategoi in order to replace Phrynichus and 
Skironidies. The case depends entirely on Thucydides’ terminology, which he admits is not 
always to be relied upon.1265 However, the weight o f the evidence in this instance, though 
somewhat circumstantial, favours Jordan’s interpretation. Develin is not convinced, arguing that 
“that they [i.e. Leon and Diomedon] later replaced Phrynichus and Skironides does not show that 
they were not generals earlier”.1266 This statement is true, but it does not answer or address 
Jordan’s case.
411 BC Dietrephes (Thucydides, 8.64)
Sent by the oligarchs at Athens to the Thracian region. Jordan believes his official title was 
“archon epi Thrakes”, and if so Dietrephes could be regarded as holding a post comparable to 
that o f Hermon in 410/09 BC (see below). However, the ‘official’ title that Jordan would like is 
not supported by the evidence, and Develin lists him as a general.1267 Suffice to say that an 
appointment made under the regime o f the 400 is o f questionable comparative value to 
appointments made under the democracy. He was previously sent as strategos to the Thracian 
area in414B C .1268
1260 Fomara, Generals, p. 65-6.
1261 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 156-7
1262 Fomara, Athenian Generals, p. 65
1263 Develin , Athenian Officials, p. 156
1264 HCT  vol. 5, pp. 32 ff.
1265 Jordan {Athenian Navy, p. 127) lists the testimonies: Thucydides, 8.19, 8.20, 8.23, 8.24 (referring to Leon and 
Diomedon prior to their replacing Phrynichus and Skironides, and not calling them strategoi in any instance), cf. 8.54, 
8.55, 8.73, (when they have replaced the two generals, and are sometimes called strategoi themselves.)
1266 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 157.
1267 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 160
1268 Thucydides, 7.29; Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 153
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410/9 BC: Hermon (IG I3 375=ML, 84=Fomara 154)
As discussed above, Jordan1269 and Develin1270 both believe in the official title o f  ‘archon es 
Pylon’ as evidenced here, though Jordan associates this archon with a more general “military 
rank o f archon which was held by officers subordinate to the strategoi”.1271 It seems equally 
valid to compare this post with the garrison commanders and “archons of the cities”.
409/8 BC, Pasiphon and Theorus (Agora, 17.23.107 cf. IG I3 375=ML, 84=Fomara 154)
The first of these inscriptions is a casualty list, attesting to the post of “archon o f the fleet”, 
naming these two individuals as holders. Develin assigns their offices to successive years, but 
there seems to be no compelling need to do so.1272 Pasiphon thus appears to have been a 
nauarchos having served previously as a general; as Jordan remarks, “no difficulty arises from 
such an assumption.”1273
407 BC Phanosthenes (Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.18, cf. 16)
Xenophon lists 10 generals for 406/5 at 1.5.16, but two sections later describes Phanosthenes 
(who was not named in the list) in command o f 4 vessels taking over command from Konon 
(who was) at Andros. Jordan argues that “the case for Phanosthenes’ being an archon [in 406/5 
BC, rather than a strategos] becomes extremely strong.”1274 Develin, however, assigns him 
tentatively to the strategia o f 407/6 BC, for which time there is evidence o f Konon being in 
Andros.1275
407/6 BC Antiochus (Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.11-12)
The case o f Alcibiades’ kubernetes is discussed in detail above, Part Two, section A.5 
362 BC Lykinios and Kallippos ([Demosthenes] 50.53, 50.46 ff.)
It is clear that Lykinios was some sort o f subordinate archon appointed by the general, 
Timomachus. Jordan suggests that he was put in command o f “some o f the ships in the 
squadron... [i.e.]...the force bound for home”.1276 It is unclear form Apollodorus’ account if  in 
fact any ships apart from his own were part o f this “force”; he uses the singular in this passage, 
including in the line describing Lykinios’ position (“commander o f the ship”). Jordan does not 
mention a similar appointment made by Timomachus during Apollodorus’ trierarchy. Kallippos 
is not described as any sort o f archon, but appears to have been some sort o f  agent or assistant of 
the general, sent off on a particular mission. Develin at least found the two cases comparable,
1269 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 125
1270 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 166
1271 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 120
1272 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 165-6, cf. p. 170
1273 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 124
1274 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 122
1275 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 174
1276 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 125
262
listing Lykinios and Kallippos as “ship commanders”.1277 It does demonstrate, however, a 
general’s power to delegate tasks which required the use o f ships to subordinate officers.
389 BC Eunomus (Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.5-9)
Xenophon describes Eunomus explicitly as a nauachos, and Jordan argues that he makes a “clear 
distinction between nauarchos and strategos”,1278 and Develin also is “content to leave him with 
the title Xenophon gives him, rather than make him a strategos”.1279
346-40 BC Leodamus (Demosthenes, 18.73)
This man is recorded explicitly as a nauarchos, seemingly as distinct from a strategos', 
unfortunately, he is done so in one o f the documents referred to by Demosthenes, and inserted by 
a later writer. The introduction o f Loeb edition o f the speech observes that the many documents 
quoted in the text “were forged, with very little skill, by some exceptionally ignorant editor...the 
reader is advised to take no notice o f them”;1280 this would seem to be good advice on such a 
technical matter.
Nauarchoi and the autos formula in Thucydides
Jordan suggests that the indisputable evidence o f the existence o f sub -strategos naval 
commanders can be brought into several problematic passages in Thucydides where a command 
is described with what Jordan terms “the enigmatic autos formulae”.1281 Such a formula usually 
has a named commander along with “x others”. Jordan argues that it cannot be assumed in these 
others were all strategoi, but could have been archons instead. He says that on only two 
occasions1282 is it clear that all the commanders were in fact strategoi, and that in many of the 
other incidences, supposing that the “others” were archons is a preferable interpretation. Indeed 
in some cases Jordan’s proposition is attractive, as it is often a way to avoid amending the 
numerals in the text; attractive, but certainly not proven. His central contention, that some of  
these other commanders may not have been strategoi, is certainly worthy o f consideration. As 
we have seen from the discussion o f possible nauarchoi above, and despite Jordan’s sometimes 
strident prose, it is usually impossible to be certain o f any identifications; the same is true here. 
Fomara, in pursuance o f a different argument, cites the uses o f the autos formula with regard to 
generals, and it is from his work that the following list derives.1283
1277 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 268.
1278 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 122
1279 Develin, Athenian Officials, p. 216
1280 Vince and Vince, Demosthenes vol. 2, p. 17.
1281 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 129
1282 His footnote {Athenian Navy, p. 129 n.44) on this matter in fact cites three passages (2.79, 3.2, and 4.3). the second 
seems to be a mistake for 3.3. The third does not seem to have anything to do with the argument about the autos 
formula..
1283 Fomara, Generals, p. 28-9 Two o f the examples o f the autos formula cited by Fomara (Thucydides 1.46 and 
8.35)concem foreign cities (Corinth and Rhodes respectively); even if  they could be shown to demonstrate Jordan’s 
case (which they can’t) they can not be used to reflect on the specific Athenian situation
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433/2 BC: Archestratos and “ten others” (Thucydides, 1.57).
As our evidence for strategoi points to a college o f ten, there is clearly either an error or 
misinterpretation here. Jordan’s view is that these others are archons and not generals, an 
interpretation that has the virtue o f  preserving the text. Given the number o f named generals 
already accounted for in this year, this is some difficulty in assuming that four other strategoi 
(the only plausible emendation) would have been available for this mission, as the discussion on 
this passage in Gomme’s Historical Commentary makes clear. Jordan’s proposal in this case has 
something to recommend it.
432/1 BC: Kallias. (Thucydides, 1.61 cf. 1.62).
In the first of these passages, Kallias is described by the phrase pempton auton strategon. 
Jordan’s translation is odd. He proposes “the fifth (o f a group o f five commanders), as 
strategos”, attempting to extract the meaning that Kallias was he only one o f the group to be a 
‘full’ general. The second reference describes Kallias “the general o f the Athenians and those 
sharing command with him”.1284 This is just about compatible with Jordan’s reading, but the 
argument in this case seems rather forced. Fomara argues that the phrase sunarchontes does not 
suggest a difference in status between the named individual and the colleagues so described, and 
Jordan’s proposal here seems far from sound.1285
c. 440 and 431 BC: Pericles (Thucydides, 2.13 cf. 1.116)
On two separate occasions Thucydides describes Pericles as “one o f the ten generals”. Fomara 
discusses the alternative interpretive nuances that this phrase might have, from emphasizing that 
he was only one amongst a college o f generals, to suggesting that he had formal power over his 
fellow strategoi.1286 Fomara’s conclusion is that Pericles, and other strategoi named amongst 
sundry “others”, were mentioned not because they had any more formal power, but because “they 
were the more significant men, the natural leaders.”1287
430/29 Xenophon (Thucydides 2.79, cf. 2.70)
One o f the occasions where the autos formula was used explicitly o f a group of strategoi.
428 BC Clieppides (Thucydides, 3.3)
When Jordan cites Thucydides 3.2 as an example o f the autos formula being used o f strategoi, it 
is presumably this passage he means. As with Xenophon above, Clieppides is described tritos 
autos estrategei.
1284 ton Athenaion strategos kai oi xunarchontes.
1285 Fomara, Generals, p. 31. Fomara’s argument, however, assumes that “the others” so described are all strategoi, 
and was aimed at demonstrating that such phrases did not indicate a hierarchy amongst the generals.
1286 Fomara, Generals, pp. 34-5
1287 Fomara, Generals, p. 35
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428 BC Lysikles (Thucydides 3.19)
Jordan argues that his interpretation o f the autos formula has especially good results with this 
passage, presumably because five generals might seem rather a lot for a money-collecting 
operation involving only 12 ships.1288 There is some superficial appeal to this idea, though it has 
to be balanced with the clear testimony o f  large numbers o f generals in other relatively small 
operations. One example, attested by both Thucydides’ narrative and the epigraphic record, 
concerned Corcyra in 433 BC.1289 The first fleet sent to the island comprised only ten ships, but 
was commanded by three generals. When reinforcements arrive, there were six generals in 
command o f a total o f 30 ships. The ship per general ratios are not quite as low as for Lysikles’ 
money-collection mission, but are perhaps enough to instil some doubt in Jordan’s assertion. It 
is worth noting that this money-collecting mission took part in an ultimately disastrous land 
campaign in Caria at this time; though no troops are explicitly recorded as being attached to this 
fleet,1290 the high number o f generals can perhaps be connected with this aspect o f the operation.
425 BC Nicias (Thucydides, 4.42)
Nicias is described in exactly the same terms to Xenophon at 2.79; estrategei de Xenophon ho 
Euripidou/Nikias ho Nikeratou tritos autos. It is strange therefore that Jordan does not cite this 
as a further example o f the autos formula being used explicitly o f other generals.
Fomara also collected the Thucydidean references to the sunarchontes formula, meaning 
something like “colleagues in command”. He argues that the meaning is equivalent to the 
“autos” formula, and therefore could be o f relevance to the discussion here.1291 The two most 
illuminating instances o f this usage have been incorporated into the discussion above. 
Thucydides, 1.57.6 would have us believe in more than ten generals, which no scholar seems 
prepared to countenance; either Jordan’s suggestion must be accepted in this instance, or 
Thucydides’ text altered. Neither is an especially welcome proposal, and the most likely 
amendment to the text would still leave a very dubious-sounding quantity o f strategoi on this 
occasion. Thucydides, the only contemporary author with a narrative detailed enough to make 
such discussions, appears (from 7.43 cf. 7.69 especially) to have been lax in his terminology 
describing strategoi and other commanders, but as far as we can tell, the autos and sunarchontas 
formulae usually, but perhaps not invariably, referred to generals.
1288 Jordan, Athenian Navy, p. 129
1289 IG I3364=Fomara 126=ML 61 cf. Thucydides, 1.45 cf. 1.51. Fomara, Generals, p. 51 for a persuasive explanation 
as to why the names given in Thucydides for the second fleet do not correspond with that given on the inscription.
1290 As was discussed above (Part One, Section A. 1), it was not unusual for fleets to take part in land campaigns in this 
way without specifically described troops.
1291 The references are: Thucydides, 1.62 (Kallias; see discussion above), 2.58 (Hagnon and Cleopompus described as 
xustrategoi, “co-generals”, with Pericles. Fomara (Generals, p. 29) treats this as a variant o f  sunarchontes)', 4.54  
(Used o f three strategoi who were listed individually in the preceding passage); 7.31 (Demosthenes and Eurymedon, 
replacing Alcibiades and Lamachus in Sicily); 7.43 (Sicily again; Demosthenes, Nicias, and “other co-commanders”)
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Appendix 2: Wallinga on the Crew Levels of Athenian
Triremes
In an appendix to his work on archaic sea-power, Wallinga sets out an argument advocating the 
hypothesis that triremes were not usually manned with the full complement o f 200 men. The 
result, perhaps the purpose, o f this argument is to validate the figures that Herodotus gave for the 
Persian navy during the invasion o f 480 BC; multiplying the figures in Herodotus by the 
maximum complement o f 200 results in unfeasibly large numbers o f able-bodied men. If the 
number of men per ship is reduced, a more reasonable total can be extracted. Wallinga, quoting 
an argument o f Grundy, believes that “there are no solid grounds for doubting”1292 Herodotus’ 
ship numbers, and that all doubt is removed by the hypothesis that “these fleets were far 
undermanned, because a large number o f the ships came as reserves”.1293
While specific argument with regard to the Phoenician cities o f the Persian Empire is not strictly 
relevant to our purpose here, Wallinga describes it as “reason enough to inspect closely the 
evidence that leads to the equating the oar crew o f every trireme with 170 men”.1294 His starting 
point is to refer to the “disbelief’ provoked in modem scholars by the implications o f Herodotus’ 
figures for the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BC; 204,000 oarsmen would have been required 
for the benches o f the 1,200 triremes that Herodotus lists. He cites the specific example o f the 
Phoenician contribution o f 300 triremes to Xerxes’ fleet. He shows that the population o f Sidon 
and Tyre at the end o f the fourth century BC would have been insufficient to man the 300 ships 
attested for the beginning o f the fifth century, and therefore that Herodotus’ calculation “is 
fundamentally wrong”. Wallinga admits that there is no information regarding the Phoenician 
population in the early fifth century, but argues “it seems reasonable to assume that it was 
comparable to that of the fourth century”.1295
Where Wallinga’s arguments become directly relevant to this investigation is in his use of  
classical Athenian examples to support his hypothesis.1296 I shall discuss the evidence in the 
order that Wallinga does, with the intention o f disproving his hypothesis, at least with regard to 
Athens; before this, however, a few general remarks need to be made.
1292 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 185, referring to Grundy, The Great Persian War and its Preliminaries, 
London, 1901
1293 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 185
1294 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 170
1295 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 170
1296 In his work on the finances o f the classical Athenian navy, Gabrielsen (Financing the Athenian Fleet, p. 109, cf. p. 
249 n. 11) offers a brief rebuttal o f Wallinga’s view, saying that “his contention...is at best circumstantial.” While I 
agree with Gabrielsen’s view on the essential weakness o f the case, it does need a fuller rebuttal, especially as 
Wallinga has carried this argument forward into his 2005 work on the Persian wars. Such a rebuttal also raises some 
issues that make it worthy o f fuller discussion.
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The first point to make is that Wallinga is right to an extent when he describes 200 men per ship 
as a “paper figure”. It goes almost without saying that factors such as desertion, illness and 
injury, casualties in battle, and availability o f  crewmen would have resulted in some variation 
from ship to ship and fleet to fleet. Admitting to such variations, probably quite small in most 
circumstances, does not require belief in the idea that the vessels o f the Athenian navy were 
routinely and deliberately undermanned. The second is that I am in agreement to some extent 
with Wallinga’s central argument, that multiplying the fleet totals given by the maximum crew of 
200 is an inaccurate way o f gauging the manpower o f a fleet. As argued above, troop-transport 
ships were often described simply as triremes, and it is likely that in the case o f fleets described 
as having soldiers with them, some at least o f the ships were troop-carriers. While no vessel was 
routinely undermanned, troop-transports by their nature probably had a less numerous oarcrew 
than that o f the “standard” trireme. Wallinga makes clear, however, that he believes 
undermanning to have been routine in the case o f the “standard” triremes, and so his specific 
arguments need to be confronted. His argument begins with setting out the scale o f the 
difficulties:
Since each of them pulled his own oar, they all had to be trained men. For that 
reason the commission of a minor fleet o f sixty fully manned triremes would have 
been a major operation, entailing the mobilization o f some 12,000 trained men, a 
larger number than that o f the Athenian army at Marathon.1297
A new and revealing perspective on the level o f training needed by the oarsmen of trireme crews 
was given by the trials o f the reconstructed vessel Olympias. It demonstrated that the 
complicated oar system could be utilized effectively by novices; even those who had little 
previous experience o f rowing picked up the technique relatively quickly.1298 Olympias produced 
reasonably good performances, though short o f those attested in some o f the ancient sources, with 
mixed crews o f some experienced rowers, some with a little rowing experience, and many who 
had hardly handled an oar at all.1299 In a 1993 revision o f an 1982 paper, Wallinga cannot fairly 
be criticized for not taking this evidence into account, but the fact that not all a trireme’s crew 
needed to be trained men is hinted at in the ancient evidence; Nicias, in his despatch to Athens, 
suggests it was a minority o f the sailors who can effectively keep a ship going.1300
Less forgivable is the discussion of the manpower needs o f a sixty ship fleet; while these were 
indeed considerable, it seems very unfair to describe such a fleet as “minor”. Such an 
undertaking would be beyond almost every individual Greek city. Even in relation to Athens, the 
strongest naval power in the Aegean for much o f the classical period, the description is unfair; as 
has been discussed in Part One, the average size o f an Athenian fleet was around 32. A fleet
1297 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 169
1298 And at first at least, none o f  the modem rowers had had any experience o f  trireme rowing at all.
1299 Morrison, Coates, Rankov, Athenian Trireme, Chapter 13, esp. pp. 253 and 274. The sea-trials o f Olympias 
demonstrated both that triremes could be moved adequately even by inexperienced rowers, but also that stronger and 
more experienced crews resulted in far better performances.
1300 Thucydides, 7.14
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numbering around double the amount that was usual for a thalassocratic state can hardly be 
described as a “minor”.
Wallinga argues that the evidence o f  the Naval Dockyard Accounts, which shows that triremes 
carried 200 oars, 30 o f which were spares, attests only to the maximum possible rowing 
compliment.1301 While this is true, it is difficult to see a rationale for vessels that were routinely 
undermanned to always carry a considerable number o f  spare oars. He then cites literary 
evidence relating to the providing o f pay for crews that assumes 200 men per vessel, dismissing 
such testimony as “computed for a certain period in the future . . .at best testifies to the intention of  
negotiating parties and politicians to make the crews as full as possible...these are paper 
figures.”1302 Once again, there is some truth in this discussion, but some o f the examples need 
greater examination. While the figure o f 200 may have been merely an intention, it was a solid 
enough one for the Egestans in 415 BC to not only to have made calculations, but to have given 
60 talents o f silver to Athens, on that basis. Demosthenes too in his First Philippic calculates the 
city’s expense for a potential expedition at the rate o f 200 men per ship.1303 Demosthenes in this 
section seems to be keen to show that a viable expedition can be maintained with a minimum o f  
expenditure, suggesting that the soldiers and sailors need no more than ration money. If 
undermanning was usual practice in the Athenian navy, and the Athenians need only have 
employed (say) 80 oarsmen per vessel, it would surely have helped Demosthenes’ case to have 
mentioned it here; that he assumes that the crews would be full, as the Egestans did in 415 BC, 
suggests that such an assumption was a reasonable one. While the cases Wallinga cites do refer 
to future manning needs, they are not so far removed in time as to be totally abstract estimations. 
At the best, such testimonies are compatible with Wallinga’s view; but it as at least as easy to 
interpret them as suggesting that fully crewed vessels was the normal and expected practice in 
both the fifth and the fourth centuries BC.
Herodotus reports that the Athenian Klienas, an ancestor o f Alcibiades, supplied his trireme and 
its 200-man crew for the war effort against Persia,1304 and Wallinga suggests that this was 
mentioned because “the strength of the crew... was altogether exceptional”, and that “it would be 
rash to consider Klienas’ crew as typical”.1305 While it impossible to absolutely dismiss this 
suggestion outright, there is a more obvious and surely a far preferable interpretation; that what is 
being emphasised is the wealth and patriotic effort o f a powerful individual in supplying not only 
a vessel but its entire large crew.1306 To suggest that what was unusual in this case was the fact 
that the ship’s crew numbered 200, rather than the fact that it was one man paying for that crew, 
seems unconvincing.
1301 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 170
1302 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 170-1
1303 Demosthenes, 4.28
1304 Herodotus, 8.17
1305 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 171
1306 Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, p. 6
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Wallinga next discusses the manning implications o f the so-called Decree o f Themistocles that 
purports to relate to the call-up before the battle o f Salamis. His interpretation o f this document 
is that “100 oarsmen were all the Athenians could muster in 480” BC, and thus that the navy at 
Salamis was quite severely undermanned.1307 What the stone and Wallinga both ignore is the 
contribution of slaves to the war effort in 480 BC. The 100 rowers per vessel attested by the 
Themistocles Decree are drawn from two groups; the Athenian citizens and the metics. A third 
group mentioned earlier in the decree, the foreigners “willing to share the danger” may also have 
been included in this group.1308 I have argued above that slaves regularly contributed to the 
Athenian fleet, and follow the argument o f  Garlan that many slaves would have joined their 
Athenian masters on the oar benches during the desperate time o f the Persian invasion, as they 
were to do in subsequent decades.1309 There is no way o f  gauging the level o f contribution from 
slaves, but even if only half o f the 100 men brought a single slave with them, the triremes in this 
navy would have had 150 out o f 170 oars manned, as well as the marines, archers and hyperesia. 
Given that some individuals would have been able to contribute many slaves, this should be 
regarded as the minimum oar strength o f the Athenian triremes at this time. In short, the 
Themistocles Decree is not solid evidence for Wallinga’s hypothesis o f regular undermanning, at 
least not to the extent o f only 100 rowers per vessel.
Wallinga concedes that any undermanning at this early and exceptional time in Athenian naval 
history may not be representative, but goes on to give two later examples o f the phenomena. The 
first o f these does indeed seem to attest to under-strength crews:
Konon d' epei eis ten Samon aphiketo kai to nautikon katelaben athumos echon, 
sumplerosas triereis hebdomekonta anti ton proteron, ouson pleon e hekaton
When Konon arrived at Samos he found that the fleet was in a poor state of  
morale. He fully manned seventy triremes instead o f the number (more than 100) 
that had been in service before then.1310
Wallinga argues “even the Athenian navy in its prime furnishes some examples” o f significant 
undermanning, o f which this is one. I would suggest instead that Xenophon is presenting an 
unusual situation here; the fleet had just been defeated in a battle in which some men were surely 
injured or killed, and some were definitely (according to Xenophon) imprisoned;1311 as a result o f  
this morale was low, and therefore the rate o f desertion was probably high. It was in such a 
context that only 70 ships could be fully manned from the crews o f over 100. This does not 
therefore attest to Athenian ships being regularly undermanned, rather to the irregularity o f  
finding crews in such a depleted state. His second example is even less convincing. He refers to
1307 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 173
1308 If not, o f course, their numbers would be in addition to the 100 rowers per ship.
1309 Garlan, Slavery in Ancient Greece, pp. 165-6
1310 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.20, discussed by Wallinga, Ships and Seapower, p. 173
1311 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.14
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the three commanders at Sicily in 415 BC agreeing to Alcibiades’ plan for political engagement 
with the peoples o f Sicily, and thus “they fully manned” (.xumplerosantes) 60 ships for a spot o f  
gunboat diplomacy. Wallinga’s assertion that this episode shows that “The 80 fast ships o f this 
fleet appear not to have been fully manned: we must assume that the crews were concentrated as 
in Konon’s fleet just mentioned”1312 is not a necessary, or even a particularly likely, inference 
from the text.
Wallinga includes a lengthy discussion o f  the naval battle between Corcyra and Corinth at 
Sybota.1313 He argues that the tactics employed at the battle did not require full oar crews, and 
therefore the they did not have them; “His [i.e. Thucydides’] description definitely proves that 
not all fighting at sea was done according to diekplous tactics [i.e. battle manoeuvres that would 
require speed and agility], and that triremes for that reason were not invariably required to be 
fully manned.”1314 What Wallinga’s argument fails to demonstrate, because there is in fact no 
evidence to substantiate such a demonstration, is that the vessels fighting in this way actually 
were undermanned. He argues that the static nature o f the battle was due to the ships being 
undermanned, but Thucydides’ narrative suggests an alternative explanation; that ships locked 
together once one vessel had rammed the other.1315 It is clear that even in this most primitive and 
un-tactical o f naval battles, ramming took place. Wallinga fails to appreciate that the ramming 
power of a vessel would have been in direct proportion to the strength o f its oar crew. Whether or 
not the rowers, and especially the hyperesia, were sufficiently skilled to be able to choose where 
they struck, and perhaps disengage afterwards and strike again, the description o f this battle does 
not indicate or even imply that the oarcrews were significantly under strength. Wallinga also 
suggests that the size o f the fleets in the battle, and the populations o f the cities involved, requires 
there to have been less than 200 crewmen per vessel. Given that Thucydides is explicit that the 
naval manpower for Corinth, who had the larger o f the two fleets, was not provided by that city 
alone,1316 that he remarked upon the huge and unprecedented scale o f the fleets ,1317 and given 
also how little we know for certain about ancient population levels, caution should be exercised 
in accepting such conclusions.
Wallinga argues, both in general and in relation to Sybota, that fleets brought along undermanned 
ships as reserves and then consolidated the man-power o f the vessels when they came to 
battle.1318 He cites Thucydides’ description o f the Sicilian expedition as evidence: “they had 60 
fast ships and 40 troop-transports”.1319 Wallinga’s assertion that “the only difference between
1312 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 174
1313 Thucydides, 1.47-51
1314 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 172
1315 Thucydides, 1.49 Morrison’s translation (Athenian Trireme, p. 65) has “when the ships rammed each other they did 
not easily separate”, whereas Wallinga’s (Ships and Sea-power, p. 172) is somewhat less explicit, describing the forces 
as “coming to blows”. Morrison’s version is superior.
1316 Thucydides, 1.31, cf. 1.35
1317 Thucydides, 1.50
1318 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, pp. 174-5, and p. 178
1319 Thucydides, 6.43
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them was the size o f their (oar) crews”1320 ignores the earlier reference to the ships, where the 
distinction is made between empty vessels;1321 this suggests some sort o f structural difference 
between the two types o f trireme.1322 A troop-transport would have by its nature a smaller oar 
crew than a “fast” trireme, but the difference between the two was not simply a matter o f  how 
many men the vessel had aboard it at that moment. The examples Wallinga cites to support this 
idea are not convincing. He reports on the example o f  the Paralos crew, put into a troop-transport 
vessel by the oligarchs at Athens, and sent to patrol Euboea in that vessel. He argues that the 
troop transport “became a naus taxeia when its small crew (if  any) was reinforced by the addition 
o f the ParaloF. This seems unlikely. It is probable that the reason for putting the Paralos crew 
in the troop-transport was to give them a less powerful as well as a less glorious vessel than their 
own ship. It seems unlikely that the oligarchs would have bothered putting them in a troop- 
transport if the only difference in the performance o f these vessels was their relative ages, rather 
than the number of oar-ports available to work. His next two examples are even less 
convincing.1323 Firstly, he report Xenophon describing vessels as “more transport than fast”,1324 
which Wallinga interprets as meaning “rather undermanned”. Secondly, he refers to Thucydides 
describing some troop-transports,1325 and quotes Morrison’s remark on the passage that “the 
words suggest that some of the ships might have been stratiotides without actually carrying 
troops.” All these examples testify to two facts; firstly that there was an apparent structural 
difference between transports and “fast” triremes, and secondly that transports could be pressed 
into more general service when the need arose. They do not indicate that “troop-transports” was 
the term used to describe undermanned triremes.
Wallinga argues also that the description of a trireme as “fast” or “best sailing” was mostly 
matter o f having either a more numerous or a more skilled crew. His own analysis favours the 
former, suggesting that “the quality o f rowers was not a determining factor”,1326 but the evidence 
he cites does not support that conclusion. Wallinga cites a passage o f Xenophon’s Economics 
which he says testifies that “speed is clearly the result o f a full complement o f rowers.” This is a 
true statement in itself, but in fact the emphasis in Xenophon is rather different:
kai trieres de toi he sesagmene anthropon dia ti alio phoberon esti polemiois e 
philois axiotheaton e hoti tachu plei; dia ti de alio alupoi allelois eisin hoi 
empleontes e dioti en taxei men kathentai, en taxei de proneuousin, en taxei d' 
anapiptousin, en taxei d' embainousi kai ekbainousin;
And why is a trireme which is crammed with men a frightening spectacle for 
enemies and a pleasant sight to allies? Is it not because it sails quickly? Why do 
the men on board not get in each other’s way? Is it not because the crew sit on the
1320 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 175
1321 Thucydides, 6.31
1322 Probably the removal o f one or both o f the bottom two tiers o f  oars, a modification that probably could be reversed 
with a little time and effort.
1323 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 175
1324 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.36
1325 Thucydides, 8.62
1326 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 180
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benches in order, moving their bodies forward and backward in order, embark and 
disembark in order?1327
What is emphasized in this entire section, o f which the trireme metaphor is one o f an almost 
tediously long list o f examples, is the value o f order to ensure efficient situation. The point is not 
that “a full trireme is a fast trireme”, as Wallinga seems to suppose; in such a case, the men could 
have got in one another’s way. The point is rather that “a full trireme is a fast trireme when the 
crew work together and are well coordinated’. If they are simply numerous and not ordered, 
then they will obstruct each other and not be fast. Wallinga wants this passage to emphasize the 
idea that full crews resulted in speed, but it is as much a testament to the idea that it was the skill 
of the crews that was decisive.
He suggests that “when distinction is made within one navy... [he cites several examples]... the 
assumption that the faster ships had the better rowers, rather than they had more, seems 
improbable.”1328 This is surely not the case. The testimony o f Apollodorus makes clear that his 
ship was fastest because he had paid for the best rowers he could find.1329 Comparable with this 
Wallinga quotes another trierarch, the speaker of Lysias 21 discussing his liturgy, and he suggests 
that “he constantly harps on about his outlays, never on his discrimination in choosing his 
men”.1330 This is simply wrong, as the following excerpt from the speech makes clear:
eichon gar chremasi peisas kuberneten Phantian hapanta ton chronon, 
hos edokei ton Hellenon aristos einai, pareskeuasamen de kai to pleroma  
pros ekeinon kai ten alien huperesian akolouthon
I secured as my kubernetes for the whole time Phantias, who was 
esteemed the best in Greece, and a full oar crew [pleroma] and specialists 
[hyperesian] to match his abilities.1331
This man professes his discrimination in the clearest possible terms, and indeed this is one o f the 
most eloquent testimonies in the ancient literature regarding skilled trireme crewmen. For both 
of these trierarchs as well as for Xenophon, a fast ship was one with a full crew and a skilled 
crew. The reason why Apollodorus’ ship was the fastest o f  all was because it had a better crew, 
not that it had more rowers.
A possibility for accounting for differences in ship speed, that Wallinga takes the time to reject, is 
differences in the structure o f the vessel. Wallinga argues that such a distinction “ought to come 
out in the Naval Accounts, which it does not”.1332 The lists seem to classify vessels with regard 
to their age, however, and this in itself could affect performance. In their persuasive discussion
1327 Xenophon, Economics, 8.8
1328 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 180
1329 [Demosthenes] 50.7 and 50.15 as examples o f claiming to hire the best rowers, and 50.12 on having the fastest 
ship.
1330 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-Power, p. 180
1331 Lysias, 21.10
1332 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 176, n. 14.
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on the classification o f triremes as “fast”,1333 Morrison, Coates and Rankov suggest that the 
extent to which a trireme became waterlogged and befouled would have had considerable effects 
on its speed and turning. An old vessel would naturally be more susceptible to this sort o f effect 
than a newer one, though it is likely (and indeed borne out by their analysis)1334 that the relative 
quality o f oarcrews accounted principally for the differences between faster and slower ships and 
fleets.
Wallinga’s reconstruction o f fleet operations posits that “All larger fleets, therefore, will have 
been undermanned at the moment o f mobilization” in order for their to have been vessels in 
reserve; and then the crews would have been packed into fewer, fully manned and faster, vessels 
for battle. This seems unlikely, and indeed the evidence we have tells against such regular and 
large-scale movement between vessels. The Themistocles decree seems specifically, almost 
pedantically, to assign marines, trierarchs, hyperesia and sailors to particular vessels by lot; there 
would be little point in such fastidiousness if  the crews were to be intermingled for the imminent 
conflict. Apollodorus’ pentekontarchos, and all such officers, would have had an impossible job 
of keeping an accurate record of all the sailors his captain had hired for his vessel if they were 
always hopping from one ship to another in the way Wallinga envisions,1335 and there is some 
suggestion in the speech Against Polycles that the men were indeed responsible to a particular 
trierarch, and assigned to his vessel.1336 The impression o f specific crews for specific vessels is 
lent some weight by IG I3 1036, which lists separately the crews for (probably) eight different 
vessels. The fact that there are two trierarchs attested for some o f  these vessels, when only one 
such officer would command at a time, suggests that the list was intended to cover the whole 
period of their syntrierarchy; it thus implies that the names o f the crew were relatively static for 
that period, which tells against Wallinga’s interpretation. It appears that the example o f Konon 
consolidating the crews o f over 100 ships into 70 citied above was the exception, and not the 
rule.
I conclude that Wallinga’s hypothesis is unconvincing and unlikely in itself, and that the 
evidence he adduces to support it is capable o f alternative and superior interpretations. I have not 
addressed every single one o f his individual citations and interpretations, but I hope that I have 
done enough to show that Wallinga’s conclusion that “even in the Athenian navy undermanning 
was habitual”1337 is not borne out by the sources, and should be dismissed.
1333 Morrison, Coates and Rankov, Athenian Trireme, pp.276-9
1334 A poorly trained or tired crew could reduce speed by up to 32%, while the effects o f  a waterlogged and befouled 
hull could reduce speed by up to 14%.
1335 [Demosthenes] 50.24-5
1336 [Demosthenes] 50.16 Apollodorus raging against deserters from his ship, and talking about the other trierarchs 
whose sailors were assigned to them from the lists.
1337 Wallinga, Ships and Sea-power, p. 174
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Appendix 3: Fleet Tables
Sea Battles
Pate Location AthenianllllliM I!
Athenian
Captured
Enemy
Losses
Enemy
captured Primary References
Total ships 
(Athenian 
and allies)
Meet
number
480 Artemisium 15 Herodotus, 7.194 224 2
480 Artemisium 30 Herodotus, 8.6-11 224 2
480 Artemisium "heavylosses" 5 Herodotus, 8.15-19 278 2
480 Salamis 40 200 5
Diodorus, 11.18; 
Herodotus, 8.40; 8.56- 
64; 8.74-97
378 2
480 Skiathos 3 Herodotus, 7.179-182 3 2
467
Caria and 
Lycia
Diodorus, 11.60; 
Plutarch  ^Kimon, 12. 11
466
Hydras??
(Cyprus?
Syedra?_)
70 10 Plutarch, Kimon, 13 12
466 Eurymedon 100 100
Thucydides, 1.100; 
Diodorus, 11.60-1; 
Plutarch, Kimon, 12- 
13.
250 12
465 Chersonese 13 Plutarch, Kimon, 14 15
465 Sigeion 13 Plutarch, Kimon, 14; IG 1(2) 928 15
465 Thasos 33 Thucydides, 1.100-1 13
459 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 200 18
459_
458
Ceryphaha Thucydides, 1.105 20
Aegina 70
Thucydides, 1.105; 
Diodorus, 11.78 21
458 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 200 18
457 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 200 18
456 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 200 18
454 E£Ypt__ 1 45 Thucydides, 1.110 50 19
449 CypriotSalamis 100
Thucydides, 1.112, cf. 
Diodorus  ^ 12.3
140 25
440 Tragia Thucydides, 1.116 44 36
440 Samos Thucydides, 1.117 29 36
439 Samos Thucydides, 1.117 155 36
433 Sybota 30
Thucydides, 1.47-50, 
54.
110 43
433 Sybota Thucydides, 1.50-1 20 44
429 Budorum 3 Thucydides, 2.93-4 3 58
429 Patrae 12 Thucydides, 2.83 ff 20 55
429 Rhium 6 Thucydides, 2.90 ff 20 55
428 Mytilene Thucydides, 3.3-4 40 60
427 Corcyrea 1 Thucydides, 3.78 ff 12 66
425 Messina/Rhegium 1 Thucydides, 4.25
22 74
425 Messina/Rhegium 1 Thucydides, 4.25
21 74
425 Messina/Rhegium 1 Thucydides, 4.25
20 74
425 Prote 5 Thucydides, 4.13-15 50 75
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Sea Battles
Location Athenianllillill!
Athenian
Captured
Enemy
Losses
Enemy
captured Primaiy References
Total ships 
(Athenian 
and allies)
fleet
number
413 Pheia 1 Thucydides, 7.31 65 106
413 Syracuse 3 11 Thucydides, 7.22-3 60 100
413 Megara 1 Thucydides, 7.25 20 100
413 Syracuse Thucydides, 7.25 1 100
413 Syracuse 2 Thucydides, 7.37-8 75 100
413 Syracuse 7 2 1 Thucydides, 7.40-2 75 100
413 Syracuse
The ships 
with 
Eurymedon
18 Thucydides, 7.52 86 100
413 Naugactos 7 disabled. 3_ Thucydides, 7.34 33 104
413 Syracuse
60 in battle, 
and the rest 
of the fleet 
afterwards
24
Diodorus, 13.19 cf. 17; 
Thucydides, 7.60, 7.70- 
71
110 100
412 Melos 3 Thucydides, 8.39 10 128
412 Spiraeum j 1 Thucydides, 8.10 37 114
412 Spiraeum 4 Thucydides, 8.20 20 114
412 Avaia 4 Thucydides, 8.19 16 119
412 Lesbos 1 Thucydides, 8.23 25 119
412
Syme,
Chakce,
Rhodes,
Lycia
6 3 Thucydides, 8.41 20 118
412 Tropium 6 Thucydides, 8.35 118
412 Laucadia 1 Thucydides, 8.13 27 104
411 Chios 6 Thucydides, 8.63 8 118
411 Abydus 10
Xenophon, Hellenica, 
1.1.5-8; Diodorus, 
13.45-46
74 118
411 Rhoeteum Xenophon, 1.1.2-3 20 118
411 Eretria 22 Thucydides, 8.95 36 131
411 Elaeus 2 Thucydides, 8.103 67 118
411 Elaeus
1
(abandoned 
and burnt)
3, 1 with 
crew Thucydides, 8.102-3
18 118
411 Byzantium Thucydides, 8.80 8 118
411 Chios Thucydides, 8.61 32 118
411 Cynossema 15 21 Thucydides, 8.104-6 76 118
410 Cyzicus 47
Diodorus, 13.49 ff, 
Xenophon, Hellenica, 
1.1.16-22
85 118
410 Hellespont 3
Xenophon, Hellenica, 
1.1.36 9
135
409 Methymna,
Lesbos
4 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.12-13 50
136
407 Andros
Xenophon, Hellenca, 
1.5.18-19
4 139
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Date Location Athenian AthenianCaptured
Enemy
Losses
Enemy
captured Primary References
Total ships 
(Athenian 
and allies)
Fleet
number
407 Notium,Ephesus
22 (15 
according 
to
Xenophon)
Xenophon, 1.5.11-14; 
Diodorus, 13.71 75 138
406 'Open sea' Xenophon, Hellenica, 
1.6.19-21 1 138
406 Arginusae 25 77
Xenophon, Hellenica, 
1.6.24-38; Diodoms, 
13.97-104
152 140
406 Mytilene 10 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.6.22-23 12 141
405 Aegospotamai 171
Xenophon, Hellenica, 
2.1.23-30; Diodoms, 
13.105-7
180 140
390 Near Telos? 10 Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.24 10 149
389 Aegina Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.2 153
389 Aegina Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.5 155
388 Aegina Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.7 13 156
388 Cape Zoster Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.9 13 156
387 Abydos 8 Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.27 8 159
376 Naxos 18 24 8 Diodoms, 15.34 83 166
375 Leucas
Xenophon, Hellenica, 
5.4.65; Diodoms, 
15.36.6
60 175
373 Korkyra 9 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.33-36 70 177
363 Chalchidike Aeschines, 2.30-1 185
361 Stryme [Demosthenes], 50.21- 23
189
357 Chios Didodras, 16.7 60 200
322 Abydos
Diodoms, 18.15, IG 
1(2) 298 and 493
170 218
322 Lichadesislands
Diodoms, 18.15 218
322 Amorgos Plutarch, Demitrius, 11.3
218
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Land Battles
Date Location Primary References Troop-tnmsoott?
Fleet
number
479 Mykale Herodotus, 9.101-106; Diodorus, 11.35- 6. No 4
466 Eurymedon Thucydides, 1.100; Diodorus, 11.60-1; 
Plutarch, Kimon, 12-13. No 12
465 Kardia Plutarch, Kimon, 14; IG 1(2) 928 No 15
465 Paion Plutarch, Kimon, 14; IG 1(2) 928 No 15
465 Sigeion Plutarch, Kimon, 14; IG 1(2) 928 No 15
460 Memphis Thucydides, 1.104; Diodorus, 1.75 No 18
459 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 Yes 18
459 Halieis Thucydides^ 1.105; 11.78 No 20
458 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 No 18
457 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 No 18
456 Sikyon Thucydides, 1.108 Yes 23
456 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 No 18
455 Sikyon Thucydides, 1.111 Yes 24
454 Prosopitis Thucydides, 1.9-10 No 18
454 __ Egyj>t___ Thucydides, 1.110 No 19
449 CypriotSalamis Thucydides, 1.112, cf. Diodorus, 12.3 No 25
440 Samos Thucydides, 1.116; Plutarch, Pericles, 26. No 36
432 Potidaea Thucydides, 1.61-2. No 45
431 Alope Thucydides, 2.26 No 50
431 Aegina Thucydides, 2.27 No 52
431 Pheia Thucydides, 2.25 No 49
430 Carian and 
Lycian coast Thucydides, 2.69 No
57
429 Spartalos Thucydides, 2.70 No 229
428 Mytilene Thuydides, 3.6 No 60
428 Myos Thucydides, 3.19 No 64
428 Nerikos Thucydides, 3.7 No 66
426 Mylae Thucydides, 3.90 No 74
426 Oeneon Thucydides, 3.95 Yes 78
426 Caicinus Thucydides, 3.103 No 74
426 Ellomenus Thucydides, 3.94 No 78
426 Locri Thucydides, 3.99 No 74
426 River Halex Thucydides, 3.115 No 74
426 Idomene Thucydides, 3.112 No 225
426 Argos Thucydides, 1.107 Yes 225
426 Inessa Thucydides, 3.103 No 74
_425_
'425'
Solygia Thucydides, 4.42 Yes 82
Eion Thucydides, 4.7 No 81
425 Corcyrea Thucydides, 4.46 No 75
425 Pylos Thucydides, 4.28-38 No 75
425 Pylos Thucydides, 4.9 No 75
425 Messina/Rhejpum Thucydides, 4.25 No
74
425 Messina Thucydides, 4.25 No 74
424 Antandros Thucydides, 4.76 No 79
424 Sicyon Thucydides, 4.101 No 85
424 Cythera Thucydides, 4.54 No 83
424 Niscea Thucydides, 4.72 No 84
424 Cotyrta and 
Aphrodisia
Thucydides, 4.56 No 83
423 Scione Thucydides, 4.131-2 No 87
422 Amphipolis Thucydides, 8; 10-11 No 90
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Land Battles
Date Location Primary References Troop-transoort?
Fleet
nuntber
415 Syracuse Thucydides, 6.65-6 No 100
414 River Terias Thucydides, 6.94 No 100
414 Thapasus Thucydides, 6.3 No 100
413 Syracuse Thucydides, 7.52 No 100
413 Mycalessus Thucydides, 7.29 No 111
413 Syracuse Thucydides, 7.40-2 No 100
413 Syracuse Thucydides, 7.25 No 100
413 Syracuse Thucydides, 7.25 No 100
413 Syracuse Thucydides, 7.22-3 No 100
412 Miletus Thucydides, 8.24 No 116
412 Lesbos Thucydides, 8.23 No 119
412 Bolisso Thucydides, 8.24 No 119
412 Phanae Thucydides, 8.24 No 119
412 Leuconium Thucydides, 8.24 No 119
412 Miletus Thucydides, 8.25 No 121
412 Rhodes Thucydides, 8.55 No 118
412 Spiraeum Thucydides, 8.10 No 114
411 Lampsacus Thucydides, 8.62 No 118
411 Corcyrea Diodorus, 13.48 Yes 104
411
Harpagium 
and Priagus Thucydides, 8.107 No 118
411 Rhoeteum Xenophon, 1.1.2-3 No 118
410 Cyzicus Diodorus, 13.49 ff, Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.16-22 No 118
_4_09_
409
Pypela Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.3 Yes 136
Ephesus
Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.7-10; 
Oxyrhynchus Historian, (Cario 
fragments^ Diodorus  ^13.64.
Yes 136
409 Abydos Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.15-17 No 118
408 Calchedon Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.5-7; Diodorus, 13.66 No 118
407 Cyme Diodorus, 13.73 No 138
407 Andros,Gaureum
Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.22; Diodorus, 
13.69 No 138
407 Thasos Diodorus, 13.72 No 118
390 Mytilene Xenophon, 4.8.29 No 150
389 Aepina Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.5 No 155
389 Abydos Xenophon, 4.8.37 No 152
388 Aepina enophon, Hellenica, 5.1.10-13 No 157
373 Acamania Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.37 No 177
368 Pherae Diodorus, 15.71 No 181
357 Chios Didodrus, 16.7 No 200
355 Persia Didodorus, 16.22 No 200
323 Thessaly Diodorus, 18.12 Yes 218
Sieges
1 1 # Primary References Location Blockade? Fleetnumber
480 Herodotus, 8.108-11 Andros Yes 2
480 Herodotus, 8.121 Kaiystos No 2
479 Herodotus, 9.115-121; Diodorus, 11.37.5; Thucydides  ^ 1.89. Sestos Yes 4
478 Thucydides, 1.94; Diodorus, 1.44.2 Cyprus Yes 5
478 Thucydides, 1.94; Diodorus, 11.44.3; Plutarch, Aristides 23. Byzantium Yes 5
477 Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 7; Diodorus, 11.60; Herodotus, 7.107. Fomara, 6 IB Eion Yes 5
476 Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 8; Diodorus,11.60. j Skyros No 8
475 Thucydides, 1.98; Herodotus, 9.105 Kaiystos Yes 9
468 Thucydides, 1.99; Aristophanes, Wasps, 1. 355. Naxos Yes 10
467 Diodorus, 11.60; Plutarch, Kimon, 12. Caria and Lycia Yes 11
466 Plutach, Kimon, 12; Fomara 68. Phaselis No 12
465 Thucydides, 1.100-1 Thasos Yes 13
460 Thucydides, 1.104; Diodoms, 1.75 Memphis Yes 18
460 Thucydides, 1.104 Cyprus 1 No 18
459 Thucydides, 1.109 Memphis Yes 18
459 Thucydides, 1.105; 11.78 Halieis No 20
458 Thucydides, 1.105; Diodoms, 11.78 Aegina Yes 21
458 Thucydides, 1.109 Memphis Yes 18
457 Thucydides, 1.105; 1.108; Diodoms, 11.78 Aegina Yes 21
457 Thucydides, 1.109 Memphis Yes 18
456 Thucydides, 1.108 Chalkis No 23
456 Thucydides, 1.109 Memphis Yes 18
456 Diodoms, 11.84 Methone No 23
456 Diodoms, 11.84 Zakynthos No 23
456 Fomara, 84 Kythera No 23
456 Fomara, 84 Boiai No 23
456 Thucydides, 1.108; Fomara, 84, Diodoms, 11.84 Gytheum No 23
456 Diodoms, 11.84, Thucydides, 1.103 Naupactos No 23
455 Thucydides, 1.111; Diodoms, 11.85. Oeniadae No 24
454 Thucydides, 1.9-10 Prosopitis No 18
450 Diodoms, 12.3 Marium No 25
450 Thucydides, 1.112; Plutarch, Kimon, 18-19; Diodorus, 12.3 Citium Yes
25
449 Diodoms, 12.4 Cypriot Salamis Yes 25
446 Thucydides, 1.114; Diodoms, 12.7; Plutarch, 
Pericles  ^23.
Euboea No 31
440 Thucydides, 1.115; Diodoms, 12.27 Samos No 35
440 Thucydides, 1.116; Plutarch, Pericles, 26. Samos Yes 36
440 Thuicydides, 1,117; Diodoms, 12.28 Samos Yes 36
437 Thucydides, 2.68 Argos No 67
432 Thucydides, 1.61 Therme No 45
432 Thucydides, 1.61 Pydna Yes 45
432 Thucydides, 1.61 Pydna Yes 45
432 Thucydides, 1.61 Strepsa No 45
431 Thucydides, 2.30 Sollium No 49
431 Thucydides, 2.30 Astacus No 49
431 Thucydides, 2.25 Methone No 49
431 Thucydides, 2.25 Pheia No 49
431 Thucydides, 2.26 Thronium No 50
431 Thucydides, 2.27 Aegina No 52
430 Thucydides, 2.56 Epidauras No 54
430 Thucydides, 2.56 Prasie No 54
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430 Thucydides, 2.58 Potidaea No 54
430 Thucydides, 2.58 Potidaea Yes 45
427 Thucydides, 3.28 Antissa No 60
427 Thucydides, 3.34 Notium No 60
427 Thucydides, 3.35 Pyrra No 60
427 Thucydides, 3.35 Eresus No 60
427 Thucydides, 3.51 Minoa No 72
426 Thucydides, 3.90 Messina No 74
426 Thucydides, 3.99 River Halex No 74
426 Thucydides, 3.103 Inessa No 74
426 Thucydides, 3.115 River Halex No 74
426 Thucydides, 3.90 Mylae No 74
426 Thucydides, 3.94 Leucas No 78
425 Thucydides, 4.28-38 Pylos No 75
425 Thucydides, 4.46 Corcyrea No 75
425 Thucydides, 4.49 Anactorium No 225
424 Thucydides, 4.76 Antandros No 79
424 Thucydides, 4.54 Cythera No 83
424 Thucydides, 4.57 Thyrea No 83
424 Thucydides, 4.54 Scandea No 83
424 Thucydides, 4.68-9 Megara No 84
424 Thucydides, 4.69 Niscea Yes 84
423 Thucydides, 4.130 Scione No 87
423 Thucydides, 4.130 Mende No 87
423 Thucydides, 5.1 Delos No 89
422 Thucydides, 5.2-3 Torone No 90
422 Thucydides, 5.6 Galepsus No 90
422 Thucydides, 5.6 Stagirus No 90
416 Thucydides, 5.114 Melos Yes 95
416 Thucydides, 5.116. Melos Yes 95
416 Thucydides, 6.7 Omaea No 97
415 Thucydides, 6.51 Catana No 100
415 Thucydides, 6.62 Hyccara No 100
414 Thucydides, 6.94 Centoripa No 100
414 Thucydides, 6.94 Megara No 100
414 Thucydides, 7.9 Himeraeum Yes 108
413 Thucydides, 7.29 Mycalessus No 111
412 Thucydides, 8.23 Polichna No 119
412 Thucydides, 8.20 Erae No 119
412 Thucydides, 8.23 Lesbos No 119
412 Thucydides, 8.35 Cnidus No 118
411 Thucydides, 8.62 Abydos No 118
411 Thucydides, 8.62 _____ Lampsacus_____ No 118
411 Diodoms, 13.47 Euboea No 134
411 Diodoms, 13.49 Pydna No 134
411 Thucydides, 8.100 Eresus No 118
411 Thucydides, 8.107 Cyzicus No 118
410 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.119-20 Cyzicus No 118
410 Diodoms, 13.49 Pydna No 134
409 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.3 Pygela No 136
409 Diodoms, 13.64 Chalcedon, Byzantium Yes 118
408 Diodoms, 13.68 Hellespont cities No 118
408 XenojDhon, 1.3.2 Calchedon Yes 118
408 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.10 Selymbria No 118
408 Xenophon, 1.3.14 Byzantium Yes 118
407 Xenophon, 1.5.11 Phocaea Yes 118
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407 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.9; Diodoms, 13.69 Thrace, Thasos No 118
407 Diodoms, 13.68 Hellespont cities No 118
407 Diodoms, 13.69 Andros Yes 138
407 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.22; Diodoms, 13.69 Andros, Gaureum Yes 138
390 Demosthenes, 20.59 ff. Thasos No 150
390 Diodoms, 14.99 Rhodes No 150
377 Diodoms, 15.30 Hestiaea j No 166
376 Diodoms, 15.34 Naxos No 166
375 Xenophon, 6.2.3, Diodoms, 15.45 Zacytnthos No 175
375 Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.4.62 Kerkyra No 175
373 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38 Peloponnesian territory No 177
373 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.33 Kephallonia No 177
372 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38 Peloponnesian Coast No 177
371 Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38 Peloponnesian Coast No 177
366 Isokrates, 15.111-2 Samos Yes 186
365
Diodoms, 15.81; Isokrates, 15.108, Polyainus, 
3.10 Torone No
186
365 Polyainus, 3.10 Olynthus No 186
365 Demosthenes, 23.150; Amphipolis No 186
364 Nepos, Timotheus, 1.3; Diodoms, 15.81 Kyzicus No 186
364 Isokrates, 15.112 Crithote No 186
364 Isokrates, 15.112-3; Sestos No 186
363 Isokrates, 15.112-3 Poteidaia No 186
363 RO 38 Macedonian coast No 184
363 Isokrates, 15.112-3 Chalchidike No 186
361 JDemosthenes], 50.21-23 Stryme No 189
361 Diodoms, 15.95 Panormos No 190
360 Demosthenes, 23.160,168 Alopeconnesus No 202
359 Demosthenes, 23.167 Alopeconnesus No 202
357 Diodoms, 16.7 Chios Yes 200
353 Diodoms, 13.34 Sestos No 203
Blockades
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480 Andros Herodotus, 8.108-11 4 2
479 Sestos Herodotus, 9.115-121; Diodorus, 11.37.5; 
Thucydides, 1.89.
9? (a garrison left in 
place for longer, 
according to 
Diodoms)
4
478 Cyprus Thucydides, 1.94; Diodorus, 1.44.2 20? 80 5
478 Byzantium Thucydides, 1.94; Diodorus, 11.44.3; Plutarch, 
Aristides, 23. 20? 80 5
477 Eion
Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 7; 
Diodorus, 11.60; Herodotus, 7.107. Fomara, 
61B
20? 60 5
475 Kaiystos Thucydides, 1.98; Herodotus, 9.105 9? 9
468 Naxos Thucydides, 1.99; Aristophanes, Wasps, 1. 355 9? 10
467 Caria and Lycia Diodoms, 11.60; Plutarch, Kimon, 12. 12? 11
465 Thasos Thucydides, 1.100-1 24 13
460 Memphis Thucydides, 1.104, 109; Diodoms, 1.75 42 200 18
458 Aegina Thucydides, 1.105, 1.108; Diodoms, 11.78 9 21
456 Prosopitis Thucydides, 1.09 42 200 18
450 Citium Thucydides, 1.112; Plutarch, Kimon, 18-19; 
Diodorus  ^ 12.3 12 140 25
449 Cypriot
Salamis Diodoms, 12.4 12 140 25
440 Samos Thucydides, 1.116; Diodoms, 12.28;Plutarch, Periclesi 26. 18 155 36
432 Pydna Thucydides, 1.61 30 70 45
432 Potidaea Thucydides, 2.70 30 70 45
431 Potidaea Thucydides, 1.64; 2.58 25 47
428 Mytilene Thuydides, 3.6 15 40 60
427 Mytilene Thucydides, 3.27-8 15 40 60
425 Pylos Thucydides, 4.23 18 73 75
425 Pylos Thucydides, 4.23 18 53 75
424 Niscea Thucydides, 4.69 2 84
423 Scione Thucydides, 4.131-3, 5.2, 5.32 24 50 87
419 Epidaurus Thucydides, 5.56, 5.75, 5.80 12 92
418 Macedonia Thucydides, 5.83 93
416 Melos Thucydides, 5.114-6 6 38 95
414 Thapasus Thucydides, 6.97, 6.103 24 139 100
414 Thapasus Thucydides, 6.3 24 139 100
414 Naupactos Thucydides, 7.19, cf.7.17 42 20 104
414 Himeraeum Thucydides, 7.9 108
412 Spiraeum Thucydides, 8.10-1,8.15 2 37 114
412 Lade Thucydides, 8.19 3 19 116
412 Chios Thucydides, 8.24 2 25 119
412 Miletus Thucydides, 8.25 2 48 121
412 Chios,Delphinium Thucydides, 8.38 60
32 118
412 Chios Thucydides, 8.56 60 32 118
409 Chalcedon,Byzantium Diodoms, 13.64
60 50 118
408 Calchedon Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.2, 1.3.5-7; Diodoms, 13.66 60
118
408 Byzantium Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.14-22; Diodoms, 13.66-7 60
118
407 Thasos Diodoms, 13.72 60 15 118
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407 Phocaea Xenojghon, 1.5.11 60 30 118
407 Andros,Gaureum Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.22; Diodorus, 13.69 21 100 138
407 Andros Diodorus, 13.69 21 20 138
389 Aegina Xenophon, 5.1.2 2 153
388 Abydos Xenophon, 5.1.7 24 32 152
366 Samos Isokrates, 15.111-2 35 30 186
357 Chios Didodrus, 16.7, 16.21 36 60 200
334 Miletus Arrian, 1.19 6 216
323 Lamia Diodorus, 18.13, 18.15 10 240 218
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Date Primary references Ships Athenianhophtes
Allied
hoplites
Light
troops
Cavalry Location Totals and notes on troops Troops per ship
Fleet
number
458
Diodoms, 11.80 (cf. Thucydides, 
1.108)
50 0 1000 0 0 Mt. Geraneia
14,000 total troops, of which only 1,000 Argives are 
specifically referred to (Thucydides, 1.108). Diodoms 
mentons a Thessalian contingent (11.80), but gives nothing 
but a total figure.
22
456
Thucydides, 1.108; Scholiston 
Aeschines, 2.75=Fomara, 84;
Diodoms, 11.84; Plutarch, 
Perikles, 19.2; Pausanias, 1.27; 
Polyaenusi 3.3
50 4000 0 0 0 Naupactos
According to Diodoms, Tolmides managed through a mse 
to attract a further 3000 troops, from the 1000 voted. This 
would seem an unfeasably large number to carry on 50 
ships.
80 23
455
Thucydides, 1.111; Diodoms, 
11.85; Plutarch, Periklesi 19.
50 1000 0 0 0
Peloponnesian
Coast Embarked at Pegae, according to Thucydides. 20 24
446
Thucydides, 1.114,Plutarch, 
Pericles, 22-3; Diodoms, 12.7; 
Fomara 101 and 103; IG 1(3).39 
and 41.
5000 0 0 0 Euboea 31
432 Thucydides, 1.61 40 2000 0 0 600 Potidaea The cavalry was Macedonian. An undisclosed number of 
allied troops also accompanied the ships.
100 46
432 Thucydides, 1.64, 2.58 1600 0 0 0 Potidaea 47
432
Thucydides, 1.57-65; 2.70; 
Diodoms, 12.34; Plutarch, 
Pericles^.
30 1000 0 0 0 Potidaea 33 45
431
Thucydides, 2.17; 2.23; 2.25; 
2.30^2.31. 100
1000 0 400 0 Peloponnesian
Coast The light troops were archers. 14 49
430 Thucydides, 2.56; 2.58. 150 4000 0 0 300
Peloponnesian
Coast,
Chalkidike
26 54
430
Thucydides, 2.69; 2.80-1; 2.83- 
92; 2.102-3.
40 400 400 0 0 Naupactos
Unusually, the Athenian hoplites are explicitly described as 
"from the fleet"; marines no doubt. The 400 Messenians 
are presumably hoplites, but this is not definate. The troops 
are mentioned in connection with the winter operations 
around Astacus in 429 BC only.
20 55
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428 Thucydides^. 18 1000 0 0 0 Mytilene These troops rowed themselves to Mytilene 61
428
Thucydides, 3.7; 3.69; 3.75; 
3.77l
0 500 0 0 Corcyrea Messenian hophtes 66
425 Thucydides, 4.42-45 80 2000 0 0 200 Corinth
Cavalry taken on horse-transports. Allied troops from 
MiletuSj Andros and Caiystus take part. 82
425 Thucydides, 4.27-39 80 0 0 400 0 Pylos
The 400 are archers; in addition, Cleon additionally 
brought Lemians  ^Imbrians and_peltasts. 77
424 Thucydides, 4.67-74. 600 0 0 0 Megara 84
424 Thucydides, 4.76-7; 4.89; 4.101 40 400 0 0 0 Boeotia Also some Acamanians and Agraeans troops in this force. 85
424
Thucydides, 4.53-4; 4.56-7. Cf. 
2.27 for Aeginetan presence in 
Thyrea. See also Herodotus, 
1.82.
60 2000 0 0 0 Cythera
A small number of cavalry, and allied contingents from 
miletus and other places. The Miletans number at least 
2000.
83
423
Thucydides, 4.122-3; 4.129- 
33 5^.22 5.32 50 1000 0 600 0 Scione
The light troops are archers, and there are also 1000 
Thracian mercenaries 52 87
422
Thucydides, 5.2-3; 5.6-7; 5.10- 
11. 30 1200 0 0 300 Scione
Took a "still larger" force of allies, and added to this by 
taking troops from the seige of Scione 90
416 Thucydides, 5.84^5.114-6. 38 1200 1500 300 20 Melos The cavalry are mounted archers 81 95
416 Thucydides, 6.7 30 600 0 0 0 Omeae 20 98
415
Thucydides, 6.8; 6.25; 6.30-2; 
6.42-4; 6.46; 6.50-2; 6.62-71; 
6.74-5; 6.94-103; 7.3-8; 7.20-5; 
7.37-45; 7.50-6; 7.69-72
134 2200 2900 1300 30 Sicily
500 of the allied hoplites are from Argos and 250 from 
Mantinea. The hoplites explicitly include the marines. Of 
the light troops, 400 are archers, 80 are Cretan archers, 700 
Rhodian slingers and 120 Megarian exiles as peltasts.
48 100
414
Thucydides, 7.17, 7.19, 7.31, 
8.13; Didorus^  13.48
20 0 600 0 0 Naupactos These are part of the Messenian garrison at Naupactos 30 104
414 Thucydides, 6.94 0 0 0 280 Sicily
These men were sent to Sicily as cavalry (30 as horse- 
archers),_but without horses. 103
413
Thucydides, 7.20; 7.26; 7.31; 
7.33; 7.35; 7.42
73 1200 3800 0 0 Sicily A great many light troops as well were on board. 106
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413 Thucjdides, 7.29-31 0 0 1300 0 Thrace These are Thracian mercenaries. 111
412 Thucydides, 8.25; 8.27; 8.30 48 1000 2500 0 0 Samos
1500 of the allied hoplies came from Argos, and 500 of 
these were light troops who were given hoplite weapons. 73 121
409
Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.6-13 
cf. 1.1.34; Diodorus, 13.64
50 1000 0 0 100 Ionia Ship's crew are additionally armed as peltasts. 22 136
407
Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.21-3; 
1.5.11-14; 1.5.18-22; 1.6.15-23; 
1.6.38; Diodorus, 13.69; 13.71; 
13.76-79.
100 1500 0 0 150 Andros 16 138
389 Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.34, 
5.1.7; 5.1.35
8 0 0 1200 0 Chersonese Iphikrates' veteran peltasts 150 152
388
Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.10, cf. 
Isocrates 4.140?, Deomosthenes, 
20.76,78^82*83
10 0 0 800 0 Cyprus 8 157
368 Diodorus, 15.71, Demosthenes, 
23.120 30 1000 0 0 0 Euboea
33 181
360 Diodorus, 16.2 3000 0 0 0 Macedonia 197
349 PhilochoruSj FGrH 328, F49 30 0 0 2000 0 Olynthus 2000 peltasts 67 205
349 Harding, 80 18 0 0 4000 150 Olynthus 4000 peltasts 307 207
348 Harding 80 2000 0 0 300 Olynthus 208
323
Diodorus, 17.111 cf. 18.8,15; 
Plutarch, Demosthenes, 27, 
Phocion, 23-6; Hypereides, 
Funeral Oration. 10-20
240 5000 2000 0 500 Lamia The 2000 are mercenaries. 31 218
Ravaging Enemy Territory
Date Location Prittmry Refetettces Fleethuhtber
480 Kaiystos Herodotus, 8.121 2
466 Phaselis Plutach, Kimon, 12; Fomara 68. 12
459 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 18
458 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 18
457 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 18
456 Gytheum Thucydides, 1.108; Fomara, 84, Diodoms, 11.84 23
456 Memphis Thucydides, 1.109 18
455 Peloponnese Diodoms, 11.85 24
432 Pallene Thucydides, 1.64 47
431 Potidaea Thucydides, 1.64; 2.58 47
431 Peleponnese Thucydides  ^2.25 49
431 Pheia Thucydides, 2.25 49
431 Peleponnese Thucydides, 2.25 49
431 Euboea Thucydides, 2.26 50
431 Megara Thucydides, 2.32 49
430 Epidaurus Thucydides, 2.56 54
430 Troezen Thucydides  ^2.56 54
430 Haliae Thucydides, 2.56 54
430 Hermione Thucydides, 2.56 54
430 Prasie Thucydides, 2.56 54
429 Spartalos Thucydides, 2.70 229
429 Cynodia Thucydides, 2.85 56
428 Peloponnese Thucydides, 3.16 63
428 Peloponnesian coast Thucydides, 3.7, cf. 3.16 66
428 Oiniadai Thucydides, 3.7 66
426 Leucas Thucydides, 3.94 78
426 Caicinus Thucydides, 3.103 74
426 Peloponnesian Coast Thucydides, 3.105 225
425 Crommyon Thucydides, 4.45 82
424 Asine Thucydides, 4.54 83
424 Helus Thucydides, 4.54 83
424 Cotyrta ad Aphrodisia Thucydides, 4.56 83
424 Epidaurus Limera Thucydides, 4.56 83
423 Scione Thucydides, 4.130 87
416 Argos Thucydides, 5.84 94
415 Syracuse Thucydides, 6.52 100
414 Megara Thucydides, 6.94 100
414 River Terias Thucydides, 6.94 100
414 Inessa Thucydides, 6.94 100
414 Hybala Thucydides, 6.94 100
414 Epidaurus Limera Thucydides, 6.105 109
413 Syracuse Thucydides, 7.25 100
413 River Anapus Thucydides, 7.42 100
413 Epidaurus Limera Thucydides, 7.26 106
413 Laconian coast Thucydides, 7.26 106
413 Tanagra Thucydides, 7.29 111
412 Miletus Thucydides, 8.24 116
412 Cardamyle Thucydides, 8.24 119
412 Bolisso Thucydides, 8.24 119
412 Chios Thucydides, 8.24 119
412 Cnidus Thucydides, 8.35 118
411 Various cities Didodoms, 13.47 134
409 Pygela Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.3 136
409 Lydia Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.4-5 136
409 Persian territory Diodoms, 13.64; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.17 118
408 Calchedon Xenophon, 1.3.2 118
407 Cos Diodoms, 13.69 138
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407 Rhodes Diodoms, 13.69 138
407 Cyme Diodoms, 13.73 138
407 Various cities Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.20 138
406 Enemy territory Diodoms, 13.100 140
405 Persian territory Xenophon, Helleica, 2.1.16 140
390 Mytilene Xenophon, 4.8.30 150
390 Aspendus Diodoms, 14.99 150
389 Chersonese Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.35 152
377 Hestiaea Diodoms, 15.30 166
373 Peloponnesian territoy Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38 177
372 Peloponnesian Coast Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38 177
371 Peloponnesian Coast Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38 177
349 Boetiaia Harding 80 207
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476 Skyros Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 8; Diodorus, 11.60. 8
476 Eion Colony Plutarch, Kimon, 7-3; Scholia to Aeschines, 
2.32{=Fomara 62).
7
465 Ennoi Hodoi colony Thucydides, 1.100, cf. 4.102; Scholia to Aeschines, 
2.32(yFomara 62Jj Diodorus  ^ lUOj cf. 12.68. 14
464 Chersonese colonies? Plutarch, Kimon, 13 142
456 Periplous of Tolmides
Thucydides, 1.108; Scholist on Aeschines, 2.75=Fomara, 
84; Diodorus, 11.84; Plutarch, Perikles, 19.2; Pausanias, 
1.27j Polyaenus, 3.3
50 23
450 Clerachy on Andros Plutarch, Pericles, 11 230
449 Clerachy to Imbros Thucydides, 7.57 227
449 Clerachy to Lemnos 226
448 Clerachies on Euboea Diodorus, 11.88 28
448 Clerachies on Naxos Diodorus, 11.88 28
448 Colonization of Chersonese Diodorus, 11.88 (cf. Plutarch, Perikles, 19) 29
446 Colonization of Hestaea
Thucydides, 1.114; Plutarch, Pericles, 23; Diodorus 12.22 
cf. 7; IG 1(3).41; Scholia on Aristophanes, Clouds, 213. 32
445 Colonization of Brea Fomara 100 26
443 Foundation of Thurrii Diodorus, 12.9-11; Fomara 108 10 33
437 Colonization of Amphipolis Diodorus, 12.32; Fomara, 62 42
435 Colonization of Sinope Plutarch, Pericles, 20 41
431 Colonization of Aegina Thucydides, 2.27
53
429 Colonization of Potidaea
Thucydides, 2.70; Diodorus 12.46; Fomara 129 48
426 Notium Thucydides, 3.34 62
426 Colonization of Lesbos Thucydides, 3.50; IG (3) 67 70
415 Melos colonization Thucydides, 5.116 143
361 Clerachy on Samos
Diodorus, 18.18;Diodoras, 15.93, Aeneus Tacticus, 11.13
14
191
351 Colonization of the Chersonese
Diodorus, 16.34 204
325 Colony on the Adriatic Rhodes, Osborne 100
More 
than 9 233
Garrisons and Regional Patrols
( ■ I Location Primary References Ships Months in commission
Fleet
number
480 Artemisium Herodotus, 7.177, 7.194, 8.6-11, 8.15-19 224 4 2
480 Skiathos Herodotus, 7.179-182 224 4 2
480 Chalkis Herodotus, 7.183 224 4 2
480 Salamis Diodoms, 11.18; Herodotus, 8.40; 8.56-64; 8.74- 
97 224 4 2
479 Sestos Herodotus, 9.115-121; Diodoms, 11.37.5; 
Thucydides, 1.89. 110
9? + 
permanent 
establishment 
of ships at 
Sestos?
4
456 Naupactos Diodoms, 11.84, Thucydides, 1.103 50 9 23
450 Hellespont ML 58 A, 1. 7 Permanent 234
447 Chersonese Plutarch, Pericles, 19; Diodoms, 11.88 Permanent 29
440 Samos Thucydides, 1.115; Diodoms, 12.27 40 3 35
440 Samos Thucydides, 1.117 60 18 36
440 Caria, Chios and Lesbos Thucydides, 1.116 60 18 36
436 Black Sea Plutarch, Pericles, 20. 3 (12 for 
Lamachus?) 40
436 Sinope Plutarch, Pericles, 20 3 (12 for 
Lamachus?) 40
432 Thrace Thucydides, 1.59 30 30 45
431 Atalanta Thucydides, 2.32 Permanent 51
431 Euboea Thucydides, 2.26 30 Permanent? 50
430 Budorum Thucydides, 2.93-4 3 Permanent 58
430 Naupactos Thucydides, 2.69, 2.80, 2.103 20 18 55
429 Rhium Thucydides, 2.90 ff 20 18 55
429 Patrae Thucydides, 2.83 ff 20 18 55
428 Naupactos Thucydides, 3.7, 3. 69, 3.102 30 18 66
427 Rhegium Thucydides, 3.88 20 27 74
427 Mytilene Thucydides, 3.35 40 15 60
427 Antissa Thucydides, 3.28 40 15 60
427 Salamis Thucydides, 3.51 Permanent 71
427 Minoa Thucydides, 3.51, 4.67, Permanent 72
427 Naupactos Thucydides, 3.77 2 1 65
427 Clams Thucydides, 3.33 2 1 65
426 Naupactos Thucydides, 3.105, 3.114 20 9 225
426 Hellespont ML 65 Permanent 235
425 Pylos Thucydides, 4.2-3, 4.5,4.9 40 18 75
424 Eion Thucydides, 4.106-7 7 Permanent 86
424 Amphipolis Thucydides, 4.104 7 Permanent 86
424 Cythera Thucydides, 4.54 60 3 83
424 Thracian Coast Thucydides, 1.104 7 Permanent 86
422 Torone Thucydides, 5.2-3 30 90
418 Epidaurus Thucydides, 5.75, 5.80
12
(Permanent?) 92
415 Syracuse Thucydides, 6.65-6 134 24 100
414 Thapasus Thucydides, 6.97, 6.103 133 24 100
414 Peloponnese Thucydides, 7.17 20 42 104
413 Laconian coast Thucydides, 7.26 73 3 106
413 Megara Thucydides, 7.25 148 24 100
413 Naupactos
Thucydides, 7.31, cf. 7.19 and 7.17, Diodoms, 
13.48
20 42 104
413 Laconian Coast Thucydides, 7.26 30 2 107
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412 Spiraeum Thucydides, 8.11, 8.15 37 2 114
412 Chalce, Cos Thucydides, 8.44 74 60 118
412 Melos Thucydides, 8.39 10 Permanent 128
412 Peloponnese Thucydides, 8.15 37 2 114
412 Laucadia Thucydides, 8.13 27 42 104
412 Samos Thucydides, 8.43-4,8.51;8.54; 8.56 74 60 118
412 Syme, Chakce, Rhodes, Lycia Thucydides, 8.41 74 60 118
412 Chios Thucydides, 8.56 35 60 118
412 Chios,Delphinium Thucydides, 8.38 35 60 118
412 Lesbos Thucydides, 8.34 35 60 118
412 Chalce Thucydides, 8.55 74 60 118
411 Piraeus Thucydides, 8.97 20 133
411 Euboea Thucydides, 8.74 Permanent 132
411 Euboea Thucydides, 8.74 1 1 127
411 Cos Thucydides, 8.108 82 60 118
411 Byzantium Thucydides, 8.80 82 60 118
411 Chios Thucydides, 8.63 32 60 118
411 Sestos Thucydides, 8.62, 8.80, 8.102 32 60 118
411 Thrace Thucydides, 8.64 Permanent 129
410 Chrysopolis
Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22, Diodorus, 13.64; cf. 
ML 58, Hellenica, 4.8.27 30
60 118
410 Hellespont 161 60 118
410 Hellespont Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.36 9 Permanent 135
409 Lampsacus Xenophon, 1.2.15 238 60 118
394 Oeniadae Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.6.14 Permanent 160
388 Aegina Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.5 13 2 156
386 Thrace Harding, 29 168
377 Euboea Diodorus, 15.30 24 166
377 Metropolis Diodorus, 15.30 24 166
375 Zacytnthos Xenophon, 6.2.3, Diodorus, 15.45 60 4 175
373 Attic coast Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.14 10 Permanent 179
361 Sestos Demosthenes, 50.52-3, Hyper. 4.1 24 189
340 Hellespont Demosthenes, 18.88, Frontinius, 1.4.13 80 212
291
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Date Location Primaty References FleetStee Farther Notes
Fleet
dumber
480 Carystus and Paros Herodotus  ^8.108-11 Andros was attacked, prompting Carystus and Paros to pay money to the fleet 2
480 Isthmus Herodotus, 8.123 The awarding of prizes to the Greek commanders. 2
479 Aegina Herodotus, 8.132, Diodorus, 11.34 110
The Ionians appeal to the mainland Greeks to aid them in becoming free of Persian mle. 
According to Diodomsz the meeting tookjglace on Delos 4
479 Samos Herodotus, 9.106; Diodorus, 11.37
The idea of removing the Greeks from Ionia and re-settling them elsewhere is discussed. The 
Athenians gain support amongst the islanders for opposing this idea, forming a confederacy 
with the Samians^ChianSj Lesbians and other islanders
4
478 Byzantium
Thucydides, 1.94; Diodorus, 11.44.3; 
Plutarch, Aristidesi 23. 80
Pausanius is removed from command after the capture of Byzantium, his replacement Dokis 
is not accepted by the allies, and the Athenians take over. 5
478 Byzantium, Delos?
Thucydides, 1.95-6; Diodorus, 11.46.5; 
[Aristotle], Consitution of Athens, 23.5; 
Plutarch, Aristides., 251
60
We don't know where the agreements and oaths between the league members were sworn, or 
where the iron ingots were cast into the sea; Byzantium and Delos seem to be the most likely 
options, if these things occurred collectively [rather than city by city)
5
467 Caria and Lycia Diodorus, 11.60; Plutarch, Kimon, 12. Diodoms hints at prolonged campaigning in the area prior to the 'showdown' at Eurymedon, 
invloving force and diplomacy with the Persians and Ionian Greeks 11
466 Phaselis Plutach, Kimon, 12; Fomara 68. 200
Kimon attacks this city after it refuses to allow his fleet entry. After appeals from the Karian 
allies, Kimon resolves the dispute diplomatically; the Phaselians agree to pay 10 talents and 
join the expedtion.
12
464 Chelidonian islands Plutarch, Kimon, 13 A 'flag-showing' exercise into Persian waters in the aftermath of Eurymedon; no opposition 
encountered.
16
463 Chelidonian islands Plutarch, Kimon, 13. A 'flag-showing' exercise into Persian waters in the aftermath of Eurymedon; no opposition 
encountered.
17
456 Keghallania Diodoms, 11.84 50 Kephallania is 'won over', implying strong-arm diplomacy rather than fighting. ______ __23___
24455 Oeniadae Thucydides, 1.111; Diodoms, 11.85. 50
The attack on the town is unsuccessM, but according to Diodoms, all of the rest of the region
450 Egypt Thucydides, 1.112; Plutarch, Kimon, 60 This force was sent to aid the revolt of Amyrtaeus while the rest of the fleet went to Citium. 25
449 Egypt Thucydides, 1.112; Plutarch, Kimon, 60 This detachment rejoins the rest of the fleet to return home. 25
449 Cypriot Salamis Diodoms, 12.4 140
Diodoms records a seige of Salamis which forces the Persian king to make terms with 25
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449 Asia Minor, Islands Plutarch, Perikles, 17 5
A failed attempt to gather the Hellenes to discuss political, financial and religious matters, 
arguably mostly connected to. the tribute following, the Peace of Kallias 30
449 Hellespont, Thrace Plutarch, Perikles, 17 5
A failed attempt to gather the Hellenes to discuss political, financial and religious matters, 
arguably mostly connected to. the tribute following the Peace of Kallias 30
449 Euboea, Thessaly Plutarch, Perikles, 17 5
A failed attempt to gather the Hellenes to discuss political, financial and religious matters, 
arguably mostly connected to. the tribute following the Peace of Kallias 30
440 Samos Thucydides, 1.115; Diodorus, 12.27 40
Regime change; Athens imposed democracy and took hostages, and left a garrison behind. 
Diodorus claims that 80 talents were taken. 35
439 Samos Thucydides, 1.117 155 The Samians capitulate after 9 months, and the Byzantines give up at the same time. 36
437 Argos Thucydides, 2.68 Taken by storm in conjunction with the Akamanians, with whom an allience was made. 67
436 Black Sea Plutarch, Pericles, 20. The diplomacy here was principally gunboat; a show of strength in the region. 40
436 Sinope Plutarch, Pericles, 20 13 Lamachus' squadron may have remianed behind until the arrival fo the colonists, probably in the next year. 40
433 Corcyrea Thucydides  ^1.45 10 Sent to help the Corcyreans, but without breaking the treaty; a tough assignment! 43
433 Sybota Thucydides, 1.52, 55. 30 After the Corinthians refuse battle and some exchanges of words, both the Corinthians and 
the Athenians sail home. 43
432 Thrace Thucydides, 1.59 30 Having found Potidaea in revolt and too strong, the commanders ally with Philip and make war on Perdiccas of Macedon  ^their original target.
45
432 Pydna Thucydides  ^1.61 70 Negotiates a solution with Perdiccas before moviig on; seige fails to capture Pydna. 45
431 Cephallenia Thucydides, 2.30 150 Took the island's four cities (Palea, Crania, Samaea and Pronaea) by diplomacy. 49
430 Potidaea Thucydides, 2.70 70 Lenient terms given to the people of Potidaea to end the seige. 45
430 Crete Thucydides, 2.85 20 Sent to Crete after being pursuded to try to win over the city of Cynodia by a proxenos, Nicias 56
429 Astacus Thucydides, 2.102 40 Land forces expelled unfriendly people from Stratus, Coronta and otherplaces. 55
429 Spartalos Thucydides, 2.70 Thucydides reports destruction of the crops, and also hopes of effecting a revolt from within 229
429 Potidaea Thucydides, 2.70 The Athenians retreat to Potidaea, and from there ask for a truce in order to collect the dead. 229
428 Mytilene Thucydides, 3.3-4 40
Some desperate diplomacy ensues after the arrival of the Athenian fleet, staving off prolonged 60
294
Diplomatic and Political missions
Date; Location. Primaty References FleetSize Further Notes
Fleet
dumber
427 Mytilene Thucydides, 3.27-8 40
After an ill-fated attempt in arming their citizenry, the Mytilenians surrender to Athens, and 
terms are negotiated 60
427 Notium Thucydides, 3.34 After using a ruse, Paches takes the city by storm; it was later colonized. 60
427 Corcyrea Thucydides, 3.75 12 SIujds from Naupactos 66
427 Corcyrea Thucydides, 3.70 1
This 1 ship diplomatic mission renews the allience with Coryrea, but the island wished to 
maintain good relations with the Peloponnese too (a Corinthian delegation was there too) 223
426 Messina Thucydides, 3.90 30 Settlement and hostages from the defeated Messineans, on Sicily. 74
426 Sollium Thucydides, 3.95 30 Negotiates with his allies here. 78
426 Acamania Thucydides, 3.102
According to Fomara, Demosthenes' generalship has expired at this time, and he has no 
official command. Demosthenes, despite snubbing them over the seige of Leucras, pursuades 
the Acamanians to give him some troops to prevent an attack on Naupactos.
66
426 Peloponnesian Coast Thucydides, 3.105 20 In Winter, the Acamanins request the help of this fleet, and Demosthenes, in an attack on 
Aetolia. 225
426 Argos Thucydides, 1.107 20
The Athenians are trying to relieve the seige of Argos. 400 Messinian hoplites and 60 
Athenian archers are used. The land battle is a victory for Athens and her allies, followed by 
some 'secret' negotiations
225
425 Pylos Thucydides, 4.16, cf. 4.23 53 Armistice between the Athenians and Spartans at Pylos. 75
425 Athens Thucydides, 4.16 1
By the terms of the aristice, the Spartans were to be taken to Athens and back in a trireme for 
negotiations.
75
425 Corcyrea Thucydides, 4.46 40 Watchs the ending of the Corcyrean civil war before movingon to Sicily 75
425 Anactorium Thucydides, 4.49 The city was taken by treachery, and the allied Acamanians later colonized it. 66
425 Rhegium Thucydides, 4.65 20
Fleet 75 and its commanders must have arrived at some point around the Sicilian peace 
negotiations. This round of diplomacy amongst Sicilian states and the Athenians leads to the 74
425 Eion Thucydides, 4.7
Eion is captured by treachery by the Athenians, but re-captured by force shortly after by the 81
425 Islands off the Thucydides, 4.44 80 Nicias asks for two bodies left behind of the Athenian dead, thereby conceding victory 82
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425 Anactorium Thucydidesi 4.49 The city was taken by treachery, and the allied Acamanians later colonized it. 225
424 Ephesus Thucydides, 4.50 l
Learning of Ataxerxes' death (and possibly of the succession troubles talked of by Diodoms 
(12.71) and Ktesius (45J, this mission returns home. 80
424 Cythera Thucydides, 4.54 60
The settlement was quite favourable to Cythera, as apparently Nicias had been undergoing 
negotiations beforehand. The island was garrisoned. 83
424 Naupactos Thucydides, 4.76 40
Demosthenes raises troops in the region, and generally assess the complicated alliences and 
factions in the area. 85
423 Scione Thucydides, 4.122 1
A trireme (presumably Athenian, as the Peleponnesians agreed not to travel by sea in 
warships) arrives at Scione and tells Brasidas of the armistice; just one of no dobt many such 
diplomatic missions^many of which undoubtably involved ships.
88
423 Scione Thucydides  ^4.131-2 50 An allience with Perdiccas of Macedonia. 87
422 Thrace Thucydides, 5.6 Diplomatic mission sent to PollesL king of the Odomantians 90
422 Macedonia Thucydides, 5.6 Diplomatic mission sent to Perdiccas of Macedon 90
422 Italy Thucydides, 5.5 2 Negotiated with Italian cities on his way to Sicily 91
422 Camarina Thucydides, 5.4 2 Successful diplomacy 91
422 Agrigentum Thucydides, 5.4 2 Successful diplomacy 91
422 Gela Thucydides, 5.4 2 Unsuccessful diplomacy 91
422 Bricciniae Thucydides, 5.4 2 Encouraged the garrison 91
422 Catana Thucydides, 5.4 2 91
422 Italy Thucydides, 5.5 2 Negotiated with Italian cities on his way from Sicily 91
422 Locris Thucydides, 5.5 2
Phaex's agreement with Locris is recorded in the context of meeting a band of Locrian settlers 
en route to Athens. _____
91
418 Egesta Fomara 81+C99
Allience recorded with Egesta on Sicily, which surely must involve at least one trireme sent 34
416 38 95
416 Egesta Thucydides, 6.6
Sent to ascertain whether Egestan promises of lavish resources for a Sicilian campaign were 97
415 100
415 Egesta Thucydides, 6.44 3
Sent to find out if the money promised by the Egestans was really "there; returns to Rhegium 
with the news that is wasn't^prompting a strategic debate. ____________________
100
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415 Messina Thucydides, 6.50 1 Alcibiades makes a brief trip to Messina, but fails to win the city over and returns to Rhegium 100
415 Syracuse Thucydides, 6.50 60
Ten ships go on ahead to proclaim the restoration of Leontini, and to scout the city and 
harbours. The rest remain back, ready for battle. 100
415 Catana Thucydides, 6.51 60
While the generals negotiated with Catana, soldiers break in and the place comes over to 
Athens. 100
415 Camarina Thucydides, 6.52 134 Despite the intellegance they received, Camarina was not ready to join Athens; they would not receive more than one Athenian ship. 100
415 Catana Thucydides, 6.61 1 Salaminia. Ordered to bring back, but not arrest, Alcibiades. He and other accused people 
join this fleet in Alcibiades' ship. 102
415 Egesta Thucydides16.62 133 Managed to get 30 talents out of the Egestans. 100
415 Sicelian Allies Thucydides, 6.62 133 Try to raise an army amongt the Sicels. 100
415 Messina Thucydides, 6.74 Once again, 'diplomatic' means of getting Messina on-side fail. 100
415 Camarina Thucydides, 6.75 1 The debate at Camerina between the Athenians and Syracusans is given in Thu^dides 100
415 Carthage Thucydides, 6.88 1 Goodwill mission 100
415 Sicels Thucydides, 6.88 Sicels were encouraged to send horses, and to join the allience of they hadn’t done so already. 100
415 Egesta Thucydides, 6.88 Reguested to send horses 100
413 Argos Thucydides, 7.20 30 Went to Argos to_pick up troops provided under the treaty. Joined fleet 106 107
413 Thurii Thucydides, 7.33 73
Stop at Thurii to review the forces, and try and conclude an allience with the city, which was 
undergoing stasi at the time; they eventually add yet more troops to the relief force.
106
412+
A93 Chios Thucydides, 8.9
Confronats the Chians with evidence of their betrayal, but they claim no knowledge and agree 113
412 Teos Thucydides, 8.16 9
Warns Teos against hostility to Athens, but flees on seeing a large Peloponnesian fleet 116
412 119
412 Samos Thucydides, 8.21 3
The revolution at Samos is supported by these three ships; it is unclear how thew Samians 119
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412 Clazomenae Thucydides, 8.23 25
Carried the Clazomenaens back to their own city, and win it over to Athens; no conflict is 
implied. 119
412 Athens Thgucydides, 8.49, 8.53 1
Proposal concerning winning the king on to the side of Athens at the cost of removing the 
democracy; opposed by Phiynichus1 leaving him in an invidious_position. 118
412 Persia Thucydides, 8.54; 8.56 5
Sent to arrange matters with Tissaphemes and Alicbiades, with a view to bringing the 
Persians over to the Athenian side. 125
411 Athens Thucydides, 8.64
On the way to Athens, these ships were to put in at various cities along the way and make 
oligarchies there. 125
411 Other cities Thucydides, 8.64 Sent to initiate changes to oligarchies in other (unspecified) imperial cities. 125
411 Thasos Thucydides, 8.64 Diitrephes forced an end to democracy at Thasos 129
411 Samos Thucydides  ^8.63 5 Negotiates with the forces at Samos, with a view to making Samos oligarchic once more. 125
411 Samos Thucydides, 8.73 Leon and Diomedon assign an indefinate number of ships , including the Paralos, to watch 
out for democratic interests in Samos. 118
411 Persia Thucydides, 8.82 1 Alcibiades sails on a diplomatic mission to Tissaphemes having been elected general at 
Samos. 118
411 Samos Thucydides, 8.85 1 Returned to Samos at the same time as the diplomats from the 400 at Athens (Fleet 126) 
arrive for negotiations, and shortly before the Paralos crew (fleet 127)
118
411 Argos Thucydides, 8.86 1 On a diplomatic mission to Sparta,the Paralos crew handed over their charges to the Argives 
and set out for Smaos rather than Athens.
127
411 Samos Thucydides, 8.86 1 The Paralians brought Argive diplomats and themselves to Samos in "their own trireme" 127
411 Samos Thucydides, 8.86 Unsuccessful negotiations made with the fleet at Samos 126
411 Aspendus Thucydides, 8.88 13 More diplomacy with Tissaphemes 118
411 Cos Thucydides, 8.108 21 Alcibiades appointed agovemer and fortifies thejplace. ____ 118
411 Sardis Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.9 1 Alcibiades tried to negotiate with Tissaphemes, but was arrested. He escaped after a month. 118
411 Corcyrea Diodoms, 13.48
On request from the Corcyrean demorats, Konon brought troops over to prevent the city being 104
411 Various cities Didodoms, 13.47 30
A broad range of missions here; collecting money from inhabitants of allied cities who were 134
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411 Paros Diodorus  ^13.47 30 Democracy restored to Paros and exacts a lot of money for the_privaledge. 134
409 Colophon Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.4 The town was won overpeacefully 136
408 Bithynian Thracians Xenophon, 1.3.3-4
Xenophon records this mission of Alcibaides, winnnig over the Thracians with whom the 
Calchedians had depostited their valuables. 118
408 Calchedon Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.8-11
The seige of Calcedon is concluded by diplomatic means, and negotiations with the Persians 
start; the satrap Phamabazus required Alcibiades' oath to seal the deal. 118
408 Selymbria Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.10 Diodorus claims that Selymbia was betrayed to Alcibaides. 118
408 Calchedon Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.11-12 Alcibiades exchanged oaths with Phamabazus 118
408 Cyzicus Xenophon, Hellenica  ^1.3.13 Negotiations with the Persians 118
408 Byzantium
Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.3.14-22; 
Diodorust 13.66-7
A long seige is implied by Diodoms before Byzantium is finally betrayed to the Athenians; 
his account is more detailed than that of Xenophon. 118
408 Hellespont cities Diodorus, 13.68
According to Diodoms, after Byzantium fell the Athenians took every city in the Hellespont, 
except the Spartan base Abydos. We can imagine a combination of diplomacy and combat, 
but no city was likely to resist too much after Byzantium's fall.
118
407 Hellespont cities Diodorus, 13.68
The Hellespont campaign described by Diodoms as commencing after the capture of 
Byzantium would probably have continued into 407, at which time the region was secure 
enough for the entire fleet (excluding the 30 ships at the toll-house, presumably) to return to 
Athens
118
407 Abdera Diodorus, 13.72 15 Diodoms implies a diplomatic return of this city to the Athenian side 118
407 Cyme Diodorus, 13.73 73
After presenting false charges, Alcibiades hs an excuse to plunder Cyme. The Cymians put 
up a fighq and drive the Athenians away.
138
404 Samos Lysias, 12.71: Diodorus, 14.3
According to both Lysias an Diodoms, Lysander is sent for from Samos and imposes the 
Thirty. Xenophon (Hellenica, 1.3.13) mentions only a mission sent by the Thirty to get a 144
397 Persia 145
397 Cyprus Oxyrhynchus Historian, 7.1
The purpose of these missions was to bring supplies and hyperesia to Konon and his lfeet, 
which wasjprobablv stationed in Cyprus. ______________
147
396 Cyprus (?) Oxyrhynchus Historian, 6.1 ff 1
it is assumed that Konon is in Cyprus at this point. According to the Oxyrhynchus Historian, 
the Athenians sent other missions to Konon with supplies and crew for ships, but disavowed 146
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393 Persia FGrH 328 F 149 1
The details of this diplomatic mission are obscure, but Epikrates' stance as a friend of the 
King2 and as a 'professional' diploma  ^is well attested. 148
390 Near Telos? Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.24 10
This fleet was intended to aid the tyrant of Cyprus Euagoras against the Persians despite (as 
Xenophon points out) good relations between Athens and Persia at the time. 149
390 Hellespont
Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.25; Diodorus, 
14.94
40 Thrasyboulos resolved the dispute between two Thracian kings, Amedoctus and Seuthes, and 
allied them both to Athens 150
390 Thasos Demosthenes, 20.59 ff. 40
Thrasyboulos was admitted to Thasos by a faction there led by Ekphantos. Neither Xenophon 
nor Diodorus record this action. The Loeb translation of this speech dates the taking of 
Thasos to 408-7 BC (under fleet 118), where our sources only record money-collection.
150
390 Byzantium Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.25; Diodorus, 14.941Lysias128.5 40
Diodorus simply says he collected money; Xenophon has Thrasyboulos fanning out taxation 
contracts for the shipping and installing a democracy here. 150
390 Hellespontine and Ionian cities Xenophon, 4.8.26-7; Diodorus, 14.94 40
Xenophon talks in general terms of securing good realtions with Greek cities in the region; 
Diodorus talks of collecting money from the allies and visiting Ionia. 150
390 Chalchedon Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.28 40 Xenophon records that the Chalcedonians were made friends of Athens. 150
390 Mytilene Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.30 17 The Athenians allied with some cities, and make raids to get booty around Lesbos, gathering 
resources to attack Rhodes.
150
388 Cyprus Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.7 10 Fleet sent to help Euagoras on Cypms. 157
387 Persia Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.30, 32 The ambassadors heard the terms dictated by the king, and returned to their cities. 161
384 Chios IG112 34/35 (Rhodes Osbourne, 20) 1 Alliance treaty 167
383 Chalkis IG112 36 1 Alliance treaty 169
378 Byzantium Didodoms, 15.28, IG 112 41 1 Alliance treaty 165
378 Rhodes Diodorus, 15.28 1 Alliance treaty ___ 171
378 Mytilene 1 170
378 1 172
377 166
377 166
377 166
377
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377 Maroneia IG 112 43 This city allied itself with Athens at this point 166
377 Methymna Harding 3 7 1 The decree called for another expedition to ratify the treaty and make oaths 173
377 Dion IG 112 43 This small island joins after the garrison at Histiaia is defeated by the Thebans 166
375 Olynthus
According to Buckler, the allience was renewed at this time.On the events of 375, see Buckler 
p.250-^ based on the Chabrias Monument 166
375 Abdera
Aenius Tacticus, 15.8-10; Diodorus, 
15.36
Chabrias rescues, and allies with, the Abderians from the attack of the famine-hit 
Triballians.On the events of 375, see Buckler p.250-1, based on the Chabrias Monument. 
Diodorus erroneously reports Chabrias' death at this_point.
166
375 Hellespont Chabrias Monument
Other cities (Dikaia, Ainos and Samothrace) join the league at this point, but it is unsure 
wehter Chbrias' fleet visits them. On the events of 375, see Buckler p.250-1, based on the 
Chabrias Monument
166
375 Kerkyra Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.4.62 60 Xenophon reports that the island was taken over and a generous peace settlement made; if 
there was fighting,_it appears to have been an easy victory for Athens. 175
375 Acamania and 
Kephalonia Tod II, 126; Diodorus, 15.36 60
An inscription recording the fact that Kerkyra, Kephallonia and Arcamania joined the 
Confederacy at this time should surely be attributed to diplomatic activity undertaken by 
Timotheus.
175
375 Molossia Diodorus, 15.36 60 Diodorus reports Timotheus as winning over the Molossian king Alectus and other cities in 
the region prior to the battle with the Spartan fleet.
175
375 Sparta Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.1; Diodorus, 
15.38 1 On the terms of this peace, see Nepos, Timotheus, 2.2 and Philochorus F 151.
176
373 Thrace Diodorus, 15.46; Harding, 43 60
Acording to Diodoms, Timotheus' activities in Thrace brought Athens many alliences and 
thirty extra ships. The ships are unlikely, but treaties agreed with the King of Macedon in 177
373 Peloponnesian
territoy Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38 90
Xenophon talks of Iphikrates' plans to attack Peloponnesian territory, to win over enemy 
cities and attack those who don't join him. No details are given as to how successful this was.
177
372 Peloponnesian Coast Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38 70
Xenophon talks of Iphikrates' plans to attack Peloponnesian territory, to win over enemy 
cities and attack those who don't join him. No details are given asto how successful this was.
177
Diplomatic and Political missions
Dale; Location Primary References FleetSizs Farther Notes
Fleet
dumber
371 Peloponnesian Coast Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.2.38 90
Xenophon talks of Iphikrates' plans to attack Peloponnesian territory, to win over enemy 
cities and attack those who don't join him. No details are given asto how successful this was. 177
371 Athens Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.3.3 90
Callistratus returns to Athens in 371 to take part in negotiations for the next King's Peace, 
promising Iphikrates he will either bring money or peace. It implies that Iphikrates' force has 
been in commission continually from spring 373 BC to summer 371
177
371 Peloponnesian coast Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.4.1 89
After peace is concluded in summer 471 BC, Iphikates is instructed to return all the territory 
gained. 177
371 Sparta Xenophon, Hellenica, 6.3.2 1 Diplomats to negotiate the King^ s Peace. 180
368 Amphipolis Demosthenes, 23.149; Aeschines, 2.28
Iphikrates spent three largely unsuccessful years intriguing in the politics of the Nothem 
Aegean and the Chalkidike  ^without getting close to restoring Amphipolis. 187
367 Persia Xenophon, 7.1.36-7 1 Leon has his fellow envoy prosecuted and executed when he returned to Athens, as well as 
telling the King Athens would do well to find other friends.. 182
367 Amphipolis Demosthenes, 23.149; Aeschines, 2.28 Iphikrates spent three largely unsuccessful years intriguing in the politics of the Nothem Aegean and the Chalkidike  ^without getting close to restoring Amphipolis. 187
366 Amphipolis Demosthenes, 23.149; Aeschines, 2.28 Iphikrates spent three largely unsuccessful years intriguing in the politics of the Nothem Aegean and the Chalkidike  ^without getting close to restoring Amphipolis. 187
365 Amphipolis Demosthenes, 23.149; Aeschines, 2.28
Iphikrates spent three largely unsuccessful years intriguing in the politics of the Nothem 
Aegean and the Chalkidike, without getting close to restoring Amphipolis. Timotheus 
replaces Iphikrates in the area after the Athenians lose patience.
187
363 Macedonia Aeschines, 2.30-1 This treaty was not well recieved in Athens, and as a result Kallistratus was put to death. 185
363 Macedonian coast Rhodes-Osboume 38
This inscipton attests to the presence of generals other than Timotheus in the egion of 
Macedonia in 363, presumably also participating in the war vs. Amphipolis and the 184
362 Chersonese Demosthenes, 23.104, 50.4 cf. 50.12
Autocles failed to impress the demos, and was replaced 8 months into his tenure. Hamel 
(North Aegean Wars, p. 144) argues that his mission was to aid a rebel without angering the 
king he was rebelling from, so it seems unlikely that he could have ever impressed t
189
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Diplomatic and Political missions
Date; Locatioa Pdmaty References FleetSize Farther Notes
Fleet
dumber
361 Athens [Demosthenes], 50.12 1
Apollodoms brings ambassadors, possibly from the Thracian rebel Miltocythes, back to 
Athens 189
361 Maronea JDemosthenes], 50.21 The fleet tows merchant vessels to Maronea, and negotiates with the city. 189
361 Thasos Demosthenes, 23.115; 50.23 Diplomacy with Cotys probably took_place on Thasos 189
360 Macedonia Diodorus, 16.2
An attempt to put Argaeus rather than Philip on the throne of Macedon; Philip comes to the 
throne on 359 197
359 Chabrias Demosthenes, 23.171
Chabrias negotiates with Thracians in the Chersonnese, but without any force cannot get 
good terms. 195
359 Chersonnese Demosthenes, 23.172 1 Following Chabrias' unsuccessful negotiations, 10 ambassadors elected; they don't go, and so 
Chares is sent instead.. 196
359 Alopeconnesus Demosthenes, 23.167 359 Tmce negotiated 202
353 Chersonese Diodorus, 16.34 The Chersonese, apart from the city of Cardia, is seded to the Athenians by the succesor of 
Cotys, Cersobletos, as both have a common enemy in the form of Philip of Macedon 203
349 Olynthus 18 Having arrived in Olynthus, Chardemos' troops behave badly, causing more harm than good. 207
348 Pella 1 209
348 Greek Cities Diodoms, 16.54 This mission fails to ignite any anti-Philip feelings amongst the Greeks. 210
344 Cyprus Diodoms, 16.42 Phokion, along with the former Cypriot king Evagoras, is sent to take command of a Persian 
force. No Athenian ships are part of the fleet
211
343 Eretria Demosthenes, 9.63
The embassy fails; the faction advoctaing allience with Philip, rather than the Athenians, 
wins out.
217
340 Hieron Frontininus, 1.4.13; Philochoms, FGrH 
328F162.
40
While Chares goes off to engage in dipomacy with the Persians, Philip takes the oppourtunity 
to take most of the 230-strong grain fleet that he was meant to be protecting. This part ofthe 
fleet too presumably leaves the Hellespont as a result of Philip's action.
212
339 Greek cities and 
islands
Aeschines, 3.145, 3.151; Demosthenes, 
18.178
These various diplomatic missions get a favourable response from the Corithians, Euboians, 
Achaians, Megarians, Leukadians, Kerkyrians, Argo lid Akatians and Akamanians.
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Diplomatic and Political missions
Date Location Primary References FleetSiae Further Notes
Fleet
dumber
331 Tyre Arrian l The entire crew of the Paralos took part in these negotiations with Alexander while he was besieging Tyre. 215
323
Alexander in Persia 
(Susa?)
Diodorus, 17.11.3 The Athenians are not listed specifically, but there presence can surely be assumed. 219
323 Various cities Diodorus, 18.11
it is not known exactly which cities the Athenians visited, but Diodoms (18.11) gives a 
conprehensive list of those _glaces that eventullyjoined the allience. 220
323 Taenarum Diodorus, 18.9 Advice are sent to Leosthenes to be secretive; he was building up an army from Alexander's 
disbanded mercenaries. 221
323 Taenarum Diodoms, 18.9 Later, when Alexander dies, Leosthenes is given more open and tangible (money and 
wapons) support from Athens 221
323 Thessaly Diodoms, 18.12 240 The Athenians win over the Thessalians, and are victorious in a land battle against Antipater 218
Protecting Merchants and Persecuting Pirates
Date Location Primary References Fleetnumber
430 Can an and Lycian 
coast Thucydides, 2.69 57
410 Hellespont Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.36 135
410 Chrysopolis
Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22, 
Diodorus, 13.64; cf. ML 58, 
Hellenica, 4.8.27
118
409 Chysopolis Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22 118
388 Lysias, 19.50 154
376 Athens Diodorus, 15.34 163
376 Paros? Naxos? Diodorus, 15.34 163
362 Chersonese Demosthenes, 23.104, 50.4 cf. 
50.12 189
361 Maronea {Demosthenes], 50.21 189
361 Hieron {Demosthenes], 50.19 189
340 Hieron Frontininus, 1.4.13; Philochorus, 
FGrH 328 F162. 212
340 Hellespont Demosthenes, 18.88 212
Date Location Primary References llliliilnumber
476 Skyros
Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, 
Kimonj 8^Diodorusi 11.60.
8
431 Atalanta Thucydides, 2.32 51
430
Carian and Lycian 
coast
Thucydides, 2.69 57
388 Aegina Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.5 156
361 Chersonese pemosthenes], 50.12 189
333 ? IG 11(2) 1623,11. 276 ff. 238
325 Adriatic sea naval station
RO 100 233
Money Collection and Religious Rites
Date Location. Primary References Fleetnumber
480 Andros Herodotus, 8.108-11 2
480 Karystos Herodotus, 8.121 2
475 Karystos Thucydides, 1.98; Herodotus, 9.105 9
430 Carian and Lycian coast Thucydides, 2.69 57
428 Caria Thucydides, 3.19 64
425 Eion (Strymon) Thucydides, 4.50 79
424 Pontus Thucydides, 4.75 79
424 Hellespont Thucydides, 4.75 79
424 River Calex Thucydides, 4.76 79
411 Cyzicus Thucydides, 8.107 118
411 Halicarnassus Thucydides, 8.108 118
411 Various cities Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.8 118
411 Various cities Didodoms, 13.47 134
411 Paros Diodoms, 13.47 134
410 Thrace Diodoms, 13.49; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.12 118
410 Thasos Didorus, 13.49; Xenophon, 1.1.11 118
410 Cyzicus Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.119-20 118
410 Chrysopolis Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22, Diodoms, 13.64; cf. ML 58^  Hellenica, 4.8.27 118
410 Hellespont 118
409 Chysopolis Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.22 118
409 Lydia Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.4-5 136
409 Persian territory Diodoms, 13.64; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.17 118
408 Bithynian Thracians Xenophon, 1.3.3-4 118
408 Chersonese, Hellespont Xenophon, 1.3.8; Diodoms, 13.66 118
407 Caria Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4.9 118
407 Cos Diodoms, 13.69 138
407 Rhodes Diodoms, 13.69 138
407 Cyme Diodoms, 13.73 138
407 Various cities Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.5.20 138
390 Byzantium
Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.25; Diodoms, 
14.94., Lysias  ^28.5
150
390 Mytilene Xenophon, 4.8.30 150
390 Klazomenai IG 112 28 (Rhodes-Osboume 18J 150
390 Aspendus Diodoms, 14.99 150
389 Chersonese Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.8.35 152
375 Athens Xenophon, 5.4.66 175
373 Kephallonia Xenophon, 6.2.38 177
Date Location. Primary References
Heet
number
476 Skyros
Thucydides, 1.98; Plutarch, Kimon, 8; 
Diodorus  ^11.60.
8
449 Asia Minor, Islands Plutarch, Perikles, 17 30
449 Hellespont, Thrace Plutarch, Perikles, 17 30
449 Euboea, Thessaly Plutarch, Perikles, 17 30
423 Delos Thucydides, 5.1 89
409 Notium Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.2.11 136
377 Delos RO 28 239
375 Alyzia Xenophon, 5.4.66 175
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Figures for Naval Activity in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC
Activity
Recorded Instances 
(from 9(13 entries) %
Recorded instances for 
5th century fleets (from 
692 entries)
%
Recorded instances for 
4th century fleets (from 
211 entries)
%
% difference, 
between 5th and 
4th centuries
Sea battle 83 9% 68 10% 15 7% -3
Land Battles 87 10% 78 11% 9 4% -7
Siege 136 15% 110 16% 26 12% -4
Blockade 86 10% 76 11% 10 5% -6
Troop transport 64 7% 53 8% 11 5% -3
Ravaging 70 8% 62 9% 8 4% -5
Colonisation 24 3% 21 3% 3 1% -2
Garrison/Patrol 106 12% 97 14% 9 4% -10
Diplomacy/Politics 189 21% 120 17% 69 33% 16
Merchants 12 1% 4 1% 8 4% 3
Pirates 7 1% 3 0.5% 4 2% 1.5
Money Collection 36 4% 29 4% 7 3% -1
Religious Activity 7 1% 6 1% 1 0.5% -0.5
Appendix 4: Naupactos Tables
Naupactos Fleets
Fleet
number Date Commander
Total
ships
Principal Primary 
References Notes
23 456 Tolmides 50
Thucydides, 1.103 and 
108; Fomara, 84; 
Diodorus, 11.84
Captured Naupactos, and settled it with 
Messenians who had survived Ithome and 
the war with Sparta.
430 Phormio 20 Thucydides, 2.69 Arrived in Winter, 430/29 BC
55 429 Phormio 20 Thucydides, 2.80-1; 2.83-92 Won two sea battles against larger fleets
428 Phormio 40 Thucydides, 2.102-3 Left Naupactos in Spring 428 BC
56 429 20 Thucydides, 2.92 Joined fleet 55 after the two battles in 429 BC
428 Asopios 30 Thucydides, 3.7, cf. 69
18 ships in this fleet were sent home 
before reaching Naupactos .Despite the 
loss of the general and many men in battle 
in 428, it seems that 12 ships returned to 
Naupactos; at any rate, they were there 
the next summer.
66 427 Nikostratus 12 Thucydides, 3.69, 3.75,3.77
The fleet joined in the intrigues around 
Corcyrea, and fought a battle there.
426 Demosthenes 9 Thucydides, 3.102
Demosthenes uses 1,000 hoplites carried 
in "his ships" to repel an attack on 
Naupactos, the vessels likely to have been 
a few left behind from this fleet, and/or 
Fleet 78
65 427 2 Thucydides, 3.77 Salaminia and Paralos. Joined fleet 66
78 426 Demosthenes 30 Thucydides, 3.94, cf. 98
After disasterous attack on Aetolia, 
Demosthenes returned to Naupactos, 
though without this fleet; see Fleet 66.
225
426 Aristotle,Hierophon 20
Thucydides, 3.105; 
3.107 3.112; 3.114 Arrived in Winter, 426/5 BC
425 Aristotle,Hierophon 20?
Thucydides, 4.13, 4.49 Sent ships to help the seige at Pylos
85 424 Demosthenes 40 Thucydides, 4.76-77
Demosthenes based this fleet briefly at 
Naupactos
414 Konon 20 Thucydides, 7.17, 7.19 Arrived in Naupactos in Winter 414/3 BC
413 Konon 18
Thucydides, 7.31, cf. 
7.19 and 7.17
Asked for help from Fleet 106
104 413 Diphilus 33 Thucydides, 7.34
Fought an undecicive battle against a 
Corinthian fleet
412 Hippocles 27 Thucydides, 8.13 Posted to intercept ships from Sicily.
411 Konon 0 Diodorus, 13.48 Carried troops to Corcyra
410 Konon 0 Diodorus, 13.48
Konon probably remained stationed at 
Naupactos during these turbulent times.
106 413
Demosthenes
and
Eurymedon
10 Thucydides, 7.31
Sent to Fleet 104 and joined before 
Diphilus took command.
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Naupactos Details
Primary References Seabattle?
Land
Battle? Diplomacy? Siege? Ravaging? i
Garrison/patrol? Blockade? Colonization? Troop-transport?
Fleet
number
Thucydides, 1.108; Fomara, 84, Diodoms, 
11.84
No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes 23
Diodoms, 11.84 No No No Yes No No No No Yes 23
Diodoms, 11.84 No No Yes No No No No No Yes 23
Thucydides  ^1.108 No No No Yes No No No No Yes 23
Fomara, 84 No No No Yes No No No No Yes 23
Fomara, 84 No No No Yes No No No No Yes 23
Diodoms, 11.84, Thucydides, 1.103 No No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 23
Thucydides, 1.108 No Yes No No No No No No Yes 23
Diodoms, 11.84 No No No Yes No No No No Yes 23
Thucydides, 2.83 ff Yes No No No No Yes No No No 55
Thucydides^. 103 No No No No No Yes No No No 55
Thucydides, 2.102 No No Yes No No No No No Yes 55
Thucydides, 2.90 ff Yes No No No No Yes No No No 55
Thucydides, 2.80 No No No No No Yes No No No 55
Thucydides, 2.69 No No No No No Yes No No No 55
Thucydides, 3.69 No No No No No Yes No No No 66
Thucydides, 3.102 No No Yes No No No No No No 66
Thucydides, 4.49 No No Yes Yes No No No No No 66
Thucydides, 3.78 ff Yes No No No No No No No No 66
Thucydides, 3.75 No No Yes No No No No No No 66
Thucydides, 3.7, cf. 69 No No No No No Yes No No No 66
Thucydides, 3.7 No Yes No No No No No No No 66
Thucydides, 3.7 No No No No Yes No No No No 66
Thucydides, 3.7 No No No No No Yes No No No 66
No No No Yes No No Yes 66
No No No No 66
No No No 78
No No No
No No
No Yes
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Naupactos Details
Primary References
Sea
battle?
Land
Battle? Diplomacy? Siege?
Ravaging? ; Garrison/patrol? Blockade? Colonisation? Troop-transport?
fleet
number
Thucydides, 3.98 No No No No No No No No Yes 78
Thucydides, 4.101 No Yes No No No No No No No 85
Thucydides, 4.76 No No Yes No No No No No No 85
Thucydides, 7.34 Yes No No No No No No No No 104
Thucydides, 7.17 No No No No No Yes No No No 104
Thucydides  ^7.19, cf.7.17 No No No No No No Yes No No 104
Thucydides, 7.31, cf. 7.19 and 7.17 No No No No No Yes No No No 104
Diodoms, 13.48 No No No No No Yes No No No 104
Diodoms, 13.48 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes 104
Diodoms, 13.48 No No No No No Yes No No No 104
Diodoms, 13.48 No No No No No Yes No No No 104
Thucydides, 8.13 Yes No No No No Yes No No No 104
Thucydides, 7.33 No No No No No No No No Yes 106
Thucydides, 7.33 No No No No No No No No Yes 106
Thucydides, 7.33 No No Yes No No No No No No 106
Thucydides, 7.26 No No No No Yes No No No No 106
Thucydides, 7.42 No No 1 No No No No No No Yes 106
Thucydides, 7.26 No No No No No No No No Yes 106
Thucydides, 7.26 No No 1 No No Yes Yes No No No 106
Thucydides, 7.31 Yes No 1 No No No No No No No 106
Thucydides, 7.31 No No No No No No No No Yes 106
Thucydides, 7.31 No No No No No No No No Yes 106
Thucydides, 3.105 No No Yes No Yes No No No No 225
Thucydides, 1.107 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes 225
No Yes No No No No No No No 225
No No No No 225
No No No 225
No No No 225
TOTALS 6 8 12 10 7 19 1 1 21 8 fleets
Bibliography
Adcock, F. and Mosley, D.J., Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, London, (1975)
Amelang, J.S., and Beer, S. (eds.), Public Power in Europe: studies in historical transformations, 
Pisa, (2006).
Amit M, Athens and the Sea: a study in Athenian sea-power, Brussels (1965)
Anderson, B.R.O’G., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism, London, (1983)
Andrewes, ‘The Arginusae trial’, Phoenix 28, pp. 112-122 (1974)
Andrewes, A., ‘The generals in the Hellespont, 410-407 BC’, The Journal o f Hellenic Studies, 
vol. 73, pp. 2-9, (1953)
Andrzejewski, S., M ilitary Organization and Society, London, (1954)
Austin, M.M., and Vidal-Naquet, P., (trans. Austin, M.M.), Economic and Social History of 
Ancient Greece: an introduction, revised edition, London, (1977)
Badian, From Plataea to Potidaea: studies in the history and historiography o f the 
Pentecontaetia, Baltimore (1993)
Bertosa, B., ‘The social status and ethnic origin o f the rowers o f Spartan triremes’, War and 
Society 23, pp. 1-20 (2005)
Bekker-Nielsen and Hannestad (eds.), War as a Cultural and Social Force; essays on warfare in 
antiquity, Copenhagen (2001)
Blackman D, ’The Athenian navy and allied contributions in the Pentekontaetia’, Greek, Roman 
and Byzantine Studies 9, pp. 334-45 (1984)
Boegehold, A.L. and Scafuro, A.C. (eds), Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology, London, (1994)
Boegehold, A.L., ‘Perikles’ Citizenship Law of 451/0 B.C.’, pp. 57-66 in Boegehold, A.L. and 
Scafuro, A.C. (eds), Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology, London, (1994)
Bridges, E., Hall, E. and Rhodes, P.J., Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: antiquity to the 
third millennium, Oxford, (2007)
Brunt, P.A., Studies in Greek History and Thought, Oxford, (1993)
Burford, A., Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society, London, (1972)
Bury, J.B., Cook, S.A. and Adcock, F.E (eds.), Cambridge Ancient History, volume 5: Athens 
478-401 B.C., first edition, Cambridge, (1927)
Carter, L.B., The Quiet Athenian, Oxford, (1986)
Cartledge, P., Millett and von Reden, S., (eds.) Kosmos: essays in order, conflict, and community 
in classical Athens, Cambridge, (1998)
Cartledge, P., ‘The machismo o f the Athenian Empire-or the reign o f the phaulusT  pp. 54-67 in 
Foxhall, L. and Salmon, J. (eds.), When Men Were Men: masculinity and identity in classical 
antiquity, London, (1998)
310
Casson L, ‘Galley slaves’, in Transactions o f  the American Philological Association 97, pp. 35-
44, (1966)
Casson L, Ancient Trade and Society, Detroit (1984)
Casson, L., The Ancient Mariners: seafarers and sea fighters o f the Mediterranean in ancient 
times, Princeton, (1991)
Casson L, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World, Baltimore (1995)
Cawkwell, G.C., ‘Athenian naval power in the fourth century’, Classical Quarterly 34, pp. 334-
45, (1984)
Ceccarelli, P., ‘Sans thalassocratie, pas de democratic? Le rapport entre thalassocratie et 
democratic a Athenes dans la discussion du Ve ei IVe siecle av. J.-C.’, Historia 42, pp. 444-470
(1993)
Cohen E.E, The Athenian Nation, Princeton (2000)
Cohen, E.E., ‘An unprofitable masculinity’, pp. 100-12 in Money, Labour and Land: Approaches 
to the economies o f  ancient Greece, Cartledge P., Cohen E.E., and Foxhall, L. (eds.), London, 
(2002)
Connor W.R., ‘The problem o f  Athenian civic identity’, pp. 34-44 in Boegehold, A.L. and 
Scafuro, A.C. (eds), Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology, London, (1994)
Cook, M.L., ‘Timokrates’ 50 talents and the cost o f ancient warfare’, Eranos 88, pp. 69-97 
(1990)
Davies, J.K., Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 B. C. Oxford, (1971)
Davies, J.K., Wealth and the Power o f  Wealth in Classical Athens, New York, (1981)
Develin, R., Athenian Officials, 684-321 BC, Cambridge, (1989)
Eddy, ‘Athens’ Peacetime navy in the age o f Pericles’ Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies 9, pp. 
141-56(1968)
Ellis, J.R., Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, London, (1976)
Falkner, C., ‘Astyochos, Sparta’s incompetent navarch?’, Phoenix 53, pp. 206-221, (1999)
Figuiera, T.J., Athens and Aigina in the Age o f  Imperial Colonization, Baltimore, (1991)
Fisher, N.R.E., ‘Gymnasia and democratic values o f leisure’, pp. 84-104 in Cartledge, P., Millett 
and von Reden, S., (eds.) Kosmos: essays in order, conflict, and community in classical Athens, 
Cambridge, (1998)
Fisher, N.R.E. and van Wees, H. (eds.), Archaic Greece: new approaches and new evidence, 
London, (1998)
Flensted-Jensen P. et al. (eds.) Polis and Politics. Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to 
Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday, Copenhagen, (2000)
Forsdyke, S., Exile, Ostracism and Democracy, Princeton, (2005)
Fomara, C.W., The Athenian Board o f  Generals From 501-404, Wiesbaden, (1971)
311
Fomara, C.W., (ed.) Translated Documents o f Greece and Rome. Vol. 1: Archaic times to the end 
o f  the Peloponnesian War, 2nd edition, Cambridge, (1983)
Foxhall, L. and Salmon, J. (eds.), When Men Were Men: masculinity and identity in classical 
antiquity, London, (1998)
Gabrielsen, V., Financing the Athenian Fleet: public taxation and social relations, Baltimore
(1994)
Gabrielsen, V., ‘Naval warfare: its economic and social impact on ancient Greek cities, pp. 72-98 
in Bekker-Nielsen and Hannestad (eds.), War as a Cultural and Social Force; essays on warfare 
in antiquity, Copenhagen (2001)
Gardener, P., ‘Boat-races among the Greeks’, Journal o f  Hellenic Studies 2, pp. 90-7, (1890)
Gardener, P., ‘Boat-races at Athens’, Journal o f  Hellenic Studies 2, pp. 315-7, (1890)
Garlan, Y. (trans. Lloyd, J), War in the Ancient World, a social history, London, (1976)
Garland, R., The Piraeus from  the fifth to the first century B.C., London, (1987)
Gamsey, P. (ed.), Non-slave Labour in the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge, (1980)
Gomme, A.W., H istorical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. 1, Oxford, (1945)
Gomme, A.W., Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. 2, Oxford, (1956)
Gomme, A.W., Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. 3, Oxford, (1956)
Gomme, A.W., Andrewes, A., Dover, K.J., Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. 4, 
Oxford, (1970)
Gomme, A.W., Andrewes, A., Dover, K.J., Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. 5, 
Oxford, (1981)
Graham, A.J., Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece, Chicago, (1983)
Graham A.J, ‘Thucydides 7.13.2 and the crews o f Athenian triremes’, in Transactions of the 
American Philological Association 122, pp. 357-70, (1992)
Graham, A.J., ‘thucydides 7.13.2 and the crews o f Athenian triremes: an addendum’, 
Transactions o f the American Philological Association 128, pp. 89-114, (1998)
Hansen, M.H. (trans. Crook, J.A.), The Athenian Democracy in the Age o f Demosthenes: 
structures, principles and ideology, Oxford, (1991)
Hanson, V.D., ‘Hoplites into democrats: the changing ideology o f Athenian infantry’, pp. 289- 
312 in Ober, J. and Hedrick, C. (eds.), Demokratia: a conversation on democracies, ancient and 
modern, Princeton, (1996)
Hanson, V.D., Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece, revised edition, London, (1998)
Hanson, V.D., The Western Way o f  War: infantry battle in classical Greece, 2nd edition, Berkeley 
(2000)
Hanson, V.D., ‘Hoplite battle as ancient Greek warfare. When, where and why?’, pp. 201-232 
van Wees, H. (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient Greece, London, (2000)
312
Harding, P. (ed.), Translated Documents o f  Greece and Rome. Vol. 2: From the end of the 
Peloponnesian War to the battle oflpsus, Cambridge, (1985)
Harrison, C., ‘Triremes at rest: on the beach or in the water?’, Journal o f Hellenic Studies 119, 
pp. 168-171 (1999)
Heskel, J., The North Aegean Wars, 371-360 B.C., Stuttgart (1997)
Hignett, C., A History o f  the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. Oxford, 
(1952)
Hollady, A.J., ‘Further thoughts on trireme tactics’, Greece and Rome, second series vol. 35, pp. 
149-51,(1988)
Homblower, S., Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 1: Books I-III Oxford, (1991)
Homblower, S., Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 2: Books IV-V.24, Oxford, (1996)
Homblower, S., ‘Sticks, Stones and Spartans. The sociology o f Spartan violence’, pp. 57-82 in 
van Wees, H., (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient Greece, London, (2000)
Homblower, S., 'The Old Oligarch (Pseudo-Xenophon's Athenaion Politeia) and Thucydides: a 
fourth-century date for the Old Oligarch?', pp. 263-84 in Flensted-Jensen, P. et al. (eds.) Polis 
and Politics. Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his 
Sixtieth Birthday, Copenhagen, (2000)
Homblower, S., The Greek World 479-323 BC, third edition, London, (2003)
Hunt, P., Slaves, Warfare and Ideology in the Greek Historians, Cambridge (1998)
Jones, A.M.H., Athenian Democracy, Baltimore, (1957)
Jordan B., The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period: a study o f Athenian naval administration 
and military organisation in the fifth andfourth centuries BC, California, (1975)
Kagan, The Fall o f  the Athenian Empire, Cornell, (1987)
Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History 1-5.24, California, 
(1993)
Kearns, E., The Heroes o f  Attica, London, (1989)
Keen, A.G., ‘Grain for Athens: the importance o f the Hellespontine route in Athenian foreign 
policy before the Peloponnesian war’, pp. 63-73 in Oliver, G.J., Brock, R., Cornell, T.J. and 
Hodkinson, S., (eds.), The Sea in Antiquity, Oxford, (2000)
Krenz, P., ‘Deception in archaic and classical warfare’, pp. 167-200 in van Wees, H. (ed.), War 
and Violence in Ancient Greece, London, (2000)
Lada-Richards, I., Initiating Dionysus: ritual and theatre in Aristophanes ’ Frogs, Oxford, (1999)
Lambert, S.D., ‘The Attic Genos Salaminioi and the Island o f Salamis’, Zeitschrift fur 
Papyrologie und Epigraphik 119, pp. 85-106 (1997)
Lambert, S.D., ‘Athenian state laws and decrees, 252/1-322/1: III decrees honouring foreigners
B. other awards’, Zeitschrift fur Papyrologie und Epigraphik 159, pp. 101-154 (2007)
Lazenby, J.F., ‘Naval warfare in the Ancient World: myths and realities’, International History 
Review 9, pp. 438-455 (1987)
313
Lazenby, J.F., ‘The diekplous’, Greece and Rome, second series vol. 34, pp. 169-77, (1987)
Lewis, D., (ed), Cambridge Ancient History, volume 5: The fifth century B.C. second edition, 
Cambridge (1992)
Loomis, Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation in Classical Athens, Ann Arbor, (1998)
MacDowell, D.M., Aristophanes and Athens: An introduction to the plays, Oxford, (1995)
Manville, P.B., ‘Towards a new paradigm o f Athenian citizenship’, pp. 31-33 in Boegehold, A.L. 
and Scafuro, A.C. (eds.), Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology, London, (1994)
Marincola, J., ‘The Persian wars in fourth-century oratory and historiography’, pp. 105-125 in 
Bridges, E., Hall, E. and Rhodes, P.J., Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: antiquity to the 
third millennium, Oxford, (2007)
Markle M.M, ‘Jury pay and assembly pay at Athens’, pp. 95-131 in Athenian Democracy, 
Rhodes P.J. (ed.), Edinburgh University Press (2004). Originally published in Crux, Essays 
Presented to G.E.M  de Ste Croix on his 75th Birthday: History o f Political Thought Vol. No. VI
(1985)
Maurer, K., ‘Thucydides 7.63.3 on the sailors ‘considered’ Athenian’, pp. 271-283 in Gorman, 
V.B. and Robinson, E.W., (eds.), Oikistes : studies in constitutions, colonies, and military power 
in the ancient world, offered in honor o f  A.J. Graham, Boston, (2002)
McCoy, W.J., ‘Thrasyllus’, The American Journal o f  Philology, vol. 98, pp. 264-289 (1977)
Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D. (eds.), A selection o f  Greek historical inscriptions to the end o f the fifth 
century B.C., Oxford, (1969)
Meiggs, R., The Athenian Empire, Oxford University Press (1972)
Merrit B.D, Wade-Gery H.T, McGregor M.F, The Athenian Tribute Lists, vol. 3, Princeton, 
(1950)
Momigliano, A., ‘Sea power in Greek thought’, The Classical Review 58, pp. 1-7, (1944)
Morris, I. and Raaflaub, K. (eds), Democracy 2500? Questions and challenges, Dubuque, (1998)
Morrison, J.S., ‘Hyperesia in naval contexts in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.’, Journal o f  
Hellenic Studies 107, pp. 88-97, (1987)
Morrison J.S, Coates J.F, and Rankov N.B, The Athenian Trireme: the history and reconstruction 
of an ancient Greek warship, 2nd edition, Cambridge, (2000)
Morrison J.S and Williams, R., Greek Oared Ships 900-322 BC, Cambridge, (1968)
Mosely, D.J., Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, Wiesbaden, (1975)
Mosse, C., (trans. Lloyd, J.), The Ancient World at Work, London, (1969)
Nussbaum, G.B., The Ten Thousand: a study in social organization and action in Xenophon’s 
Anabasis, Leiden, (1967)
Ober, J., Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: rhetoric, ideology and the power o f the people, 
Princeton, (1989)
314
Ober, J., The Athenian Revolution: essays on ancient Greek democracy and political theory, 
Princeton, (1996)
Ober, J., Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: intellectual critics o f popular rule, Princeton, 
(1998)
Ober, J., ‘Revolution matters; democracy as demotic action (a response to Kurt A. Raaflaub)’, pp. 
67-85 in Morris, I. and Raaflaub, K. (eds), Democracy 2500? Questions and challenges, 
Dubuque, (1998)
Ober, J. and Hedrick, C. (eds.), Demokratia: a conversation on democracies, ancient and 
modern, Princeton, (1996)
Oliver, G.J., Brock, R., Cornell, T.J. and Hodkinson, S., (eds.), The Sea in Antiquity, Oxford, 
(2000)
Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World: an essay in Mediterranean history, Liverpool, (1978)
Osborne, R., Demos: The discovery o f  classical Attika, Cambridge, (1985)
Osborne R (ed.), LACTOR 1: The Athenian Empire, 4th edition, London (2000)
Patterson, C., Pericles ’ citizenship law o f 451-50 B.C., New York, (1981)
Potts, S.R., ‘Power Made Public: Athenian displays o f power and Aegean diplomacy in the fifth 
and fourth centuries B.C .’, pp. 143-60 in Amelang, J.S., and Beer, S. (eds.), Public Power in 
Europe: studies in historical transformations, Pisa, (2006)
Powell A. (ed.), The Greek World, London (1995)
Pritchett, W.K., Greek State at War, vol. 1, London (1974)
Pritchett, W.K., Greek State at War, vol. 5, Princeton (1995)
Pritchett, W.K, Thucydides ’ Pentekontaetia and Other Essays, Amsterdam, (1995)
Quinn, T.J., Athens and Samos Lesbos and Chios, 478-404 BC, Manchester, (1981)
Raaflaub, K.A., ‘Equalities and inequalities in Athenian democracy’, pp. 139-174 in Ober, J. and 
Hedrick, C. (eds.), Demokratia: a conversation on democracies, ancient and modern, Princeton, 
(1996)
Raaflaub, K.A., ‘Power in the hands o f the people: foundations o f Athenian democracy’ pp. 31-
66 in Morris, I. and Raaflaub, K. (eds), Democracy 2500? Questions and challenges, Dubuque,
(1998)
Raaflaub, K.A., ‘The thetes in democracy (a response to Josiah Ober)’ pp. 87-103 in Morris, I. 
and Raaflaub, K. (eds), Democracy 2500? Questions and challenges, Dubuque, (1998)
Rawlings, L.P., ‘Alternative agonies: hoplite martial and combat experiences beyond the 
phalanx’, pp. 233-59 in van Wees, H. (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient Greece, London, (2000)
Rawlings, L.P., The Ancient Greeks at War, Manchester, (2007)
Rhodes, P.J., Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, Oxford, (1981)
Rhodes, P.J., The Athenian Boule, revised edition, Oxford, (1985)
Rhodes, P.J, Ancient Democracy and Modern Ideology, London, (2003)
315
Rhodes, P.J. (ed.), Athenian Democracy, Edinburgh, (2004)
Rhodes, P.J., and Osborne, R. (eds.), Greek Historical Inscriptions: 404-323 BC, Oxford, (2003)
Robinson, E. W. (ed.), Ancient Greek Democracy: readings and sources, London, (2004)
Rosivach V.J, ‘Manning the Athenian fleet, 433-426 BC’, American Journal o f Ancient History 
10.1, pp. 41-66(1985)
Roy, J., ‘The Threat from the Piraeus’, pp. 191-202 in Cartledge, P., Millett and von Reden, S., 
(eds.) Kosmos: essays in order, conflict, and community in classical Athens, Cambridge, (1998)
Sabben-Clare, J.P. and Warman, M.S. (eds.), LACTOR 12: The culture o f Athens, London, (1991)
Salmon, J.B., Wealthy Corinth: a history o f  the city to 338 BC, Oxford, (1984)
Sargent, R., ‘The use o f  slaves by Athenians in warfare II; In warfare by sea’, Classical Philology 
22, pp. 264-79(1927)
Shipley, G.,A History o f  Samos: 800-188 BC, Oxford, (1987)
Sinclair, R.K., Democracy and Participation in Athens, Cambridge, (1988)
Stadter, P.A., A commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles, Chapel Hill, (1989)
Starr, C.G., The Influence o f  Sea Power on Ancient History, Oxford, (1989)
Stavely, E.S., Greek and Roman voting and elections, London, (1972)
Ste. Croix, G.E.M. de, Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays, Oxford, (2004)
Strauss, B.S., Athens After the Peloponnesian War; Class, faction and policy 403-386 BC, 
London, (1986)
Strauss, B.S., ‘The Athenian trireme: school o f democracy’, pp. 313-25 in Ober, J. and Hedrick,
C. (eds.), Demokratia: a conversation on democracies, ancient and modern, Princeton, (1996)
Strauss, B.S., ‘Democracy, Kimon, and the evolution o f Athenian naval tactics in the fifth 
century BC’, pp. 315-326 in Flensted-Jensen P. et al. (eds.) Polis and Politics. Studies in Ancient 
Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday, Copenhagen, 
(2000)
Strauss, B.S., Salamis: the greatest battle o f  the ancient world, 480 BC, London, (2004)
Strauss, B.S., ‘The Dead o f Arginusae and the Debate About the Athenian Navy’, pp. 40-67 in 
Nautiki Epithewrisi (2004). Taken from www.barrvstrauss.com/articles.html
Strauss, B.S., ‘The Agony o f War Under Oars’ pp. 39-42 in Naval History (2005). Taken from 
www.barrvstrauss.com/articles.html
Taylor, M.C., Salamis and the Salaminioi: the history o f  an unofficial Athenian demos, 
Amsterdam, (1997)
Tod, M.N., A Selection o f Greek Historical Inscriptions, volume 1, Oxford, (1933)
Tracy, S.V., Athenian Democracy in Transition: Attic letter-cutters o f 340 to 290 B.C., Berkeley,
(1995)
316
Trundle, M., Greek Mercenaries: from  the late archaic period to Alexander, Oxford, (2004)
Unz, ‘Chronology o f the Pentekontaetia’, pp. 68-85 in Classical Quarterly 36, (1986)
Van Wees H., ‘Politics and the Battlefield: ideology in Greek warfare’, pp. 153-78 in Powell 
A.(ed.), The Greek World, London (1995)
Van Wees, ‘Greeks bearing arms: the state, the leisure class, and displays of weapons in archaic 
Greece’, pp. 333-378 in Fisher, N.R.E. and van Wees, H. (eds.), Archaic Greece: new 
approaches and new evidence, London, (1998)
Van Wees, H. (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient Greece, London, (2000)
Van Wees H. ‘The myth o f  the middle class army: military and social status in ancient Athens’, 
pp. 45-71 in Bekker-Nielsen and Hannestad (eds.), War as a Cultural and Social Force; essays 
on warfare in antiquity, Copenhagen (2001)
Van Wees, H., Greek Warfare: Myths and realities, London, (2004)
Wallace, R.W., ‘Solonian democracy’, pp. 11-29 in Morris, I. and Raaflaub, K. (eds), Democracy 
2500? Questions and challenges, Dubuque, (1998)
Wallinga, H.T., Ships and Sea-power Before the Great Persian War: the ancestry o f the ancient 
trireme, Leiden, (1993)
Wallinga, H.T., Xerxes ’ Greek Adventure: the naval perspective, Leiden, (2005)
Westermann, ‘Notes upon the Ephodia o f Greek ambassadors’, Classical Philology 5, (1910) 
Whibley, L., Greek Oligarchies: their character and organization, London, (1896)
Whitehead, D., Ideology o f  the Athenian Metic, Cambridge (1977)
Whitehead, D., The Demes o f  Attica: 508/7-ca. 250 B . C ; a political and social study, Princeton,
(1986)
Whitehead, I., ‘The periplous’, Greece and Rome, second series vol. 34, pp. 178-85, (1987)
